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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation examines how bipolar disorder, a common and disabling psychiatric condition, 
is made relevant as a participants‟ concern in a site of massively consequential psychological 
business – the psychotherapy session. As its central thesis is the claim that the practices by 
which bipolar disorder gets done as bipolar disorder are invariably absent in most formal 
accounts of the disorder. In this regard, the dissertation provides an empirically grounded 
description of a range of discursive practices associated with the doing of bipolar disorder in 
psychotherapy. This is undertaken from a discursive psychological orientation that draws 
extensively from ethnomethodology, conversation analysis, and Wittgensteinian philosophy.  
Following a review of bipolar disorder as a diagnostic psychiatric category, 
consideration is given to alternate conceptualisations which suggest the category is constructed 
in-and-through complex socio-historical practices which are often occluded and considered 
irrelevant to the category‟s situated deployment. This notion is used to provide a more sustained 
examination of how one might „get at‟ such practices in situ by way of conducting 
ethnomethodological and conversation analytically informed investigations. In consideration of 
how one might approach psychological categorisation practices in talk-in-interaction, a 
discursive psychological orientation is developed which stresses the social, public nature of 
psychological categories in use. 
The empirical materials examined in the dissertation are drawn from a corpus of audio 
recordings of seven „naturally occurring‟ psychotherapy sessions involving a clinical 
psychologist and five clients for whom the category „bipolar disorder‟ has demonstrable 
relevance. Practices examined include those relating to the production and recognition of what 
might count as a bipolar disorder „symptom‟, the manner in which „moods‟ operate as account 
production devices, and the methods by which psychological terms (such as „thought‟ and „feel‟) 
operate in-and-as situated practices involved in psychotherapeutic business. 
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EXERGUE 
 
I have a bunch of stuff and I want to see whether an order for it exists. Not that I want to 
try to order it, but I want to see whether there‟s some order to it. 
 
Harvey Sacks (1992) Lectures on Conversation, vol. 1, p. 646 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Subsequent to the identification of „manic-depressive insanity‟ by Emil 
Kraepelin in the early twentieth century (Kraepelin, 1921), contemporary mainstream 
scientific conceptualisations of what is now called „bipolar disorder‟ (e.g., Goodwin & 
Jamison, 1990) are that it is a serious brain disorder that produces intraindividual 
cognitive and emotional dysfunction with subsequent difficulties in social integration 
(e.g., American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2000; World Health Organization 
[WHO], 1992), that it is related to genetic factors that possibly give rise to gross 
neuropathology and systemic dysfunction in the regulation of brain neurochemistry 
(e.g., Belmaker, 2004; Blair et al., 2006; Kaufman, 2003), and that while it is incurable 
with current medical technologies, first line symptom amelioration is primarily 
composed of administering psychopharmacological agents to diagnosed individuals 
(e.g., APA, 2002; National Institute of Mental Health, 2002; Royal Australian and New 
Zealand College of Psychiatry Clinical Practice Guidelines Team for Bipolar Disorder 
[RANZCP-CPGT], 2004; Yatham et al., 2005). Soon, the genetic basis for the disorder 
will be revealed (e.g., Blair et al., 2006), and new and novel drugs will enable 
individuals afflicted with the disorder to lead relatively normal lives (e.g., Leonard, 
2001; Malhi & Yatham, 2004). 
Within this formulation, the identification and treatment of bipolar disorder 
could be seen as one of the success stories of biological psychiatry, and while criticism 
has been directed towards contemporary accounts of mental illness in general (e.g., 
Horwitz, 2002), specific illnesses such as schizophrenia (e.g., Boyle, 2002), and 
systems of mental health care delivery (e.g., Laurance, 2003; Newnes, Holmes, & 
Dunn, 1999), there appears to be a lack of critical commentary within the scientific 
literature specifically focused on mainstream conceptualisations of bipolar disorder      
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(e.g., Healy, 2006b). In fact, it would appear that there is little controversy to be found 
at all, notwithstanding consideration of more practical concerns, such as the best way to 
achieve efficient healthcare delivery services that ensure appropriate diagnosis, the 
prescribing of the most efficacious medications, assisting patients to adhere to 
medication regimes and treatment, and ensuring adequate assessments of patient 
satisfaction (e.g., Dell'Osso et al., 2002; Frye, Gitlin, & Altshuler, 2004; Greil & 
Kleindienst, 2003; Johnson, Lundström, Åberg-Wistedt, & Mathé, 2003; Lingham & 
Scott, 2002; Sajatovic, Davies, & Hrouda, 2004). 
Such complacency may well be unwarranted. The increase in the number of 
evidentiary claims of risk associated with generally available psychopharmacological 
therapies (e.g., Antonuccio, Burns, & Danton, 2002; Breggin, 2004; Fava, 2003; 
Ghaemi, Hsu, Soldani, & Goodwin, 2003; Goldberg & Truman, 2003; Kirsch, Moore, 
Scoboria, & Nicholls, 2002; Kirsch, Scoboria, & Moore, 2002); criticism directed at the 
methodologies of widely reported genetic inheritance accounts of psychopathology 
(e.g., Joseph, 2003; Leo & Joseph, 2002); the lack of identification of any unambiguous 
genetic susceptibility loci (e.g., DePaulo Jr, 2004; Dick et al., 2003; Friddle et al., 2000; 
Segurado et al., 2003; Stoltenberg & Burmeister, 2000); continuing issues regarding the 
problematic nature of diagnostic reliability and validity (e.g., Duffy, Gillig, Tureen, & 
Ybarra, 2002; Kirk & Kutchins, 1992); growing recognition of the heterogeneity of the 
bipolar disorder concept and the clinical, social, and economic problems associated with 
imprecise diagnostic categories (e.g., Alda, 2004; Angst & Gamma, 2002; Dunner, 
2003; Harpaz-Rotem & Rosenheck, 2004; Himmelhoch, 2003; Parker, 2003; 
Schweitzer, Maguire, & Ng, 2005; Smith, Muir, & Blackwood, 2004); and the highly 
contested nature of claims regarding findings of any neurophysiological or 
neurobiological differences in individuals with bipolar disorder (e.g., Bearden, 
Hoffman, & Cannon, 2001; Berns & Nemeroff, 2003; Hoge, Friedman, & Shulz, 1999;      
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Ross & Pam, 1995; Strakowski, DelBello, Adler, Cecil, & Sax, 2000; Vawter, Freed, & 
Kleinman, 2000), would appear to provide a warrant for undertaking more critical 
examinations of current conceptualisations concerning bipolar disorder. 
In the introduction to a paper published in the Berkeley Journal of Sociology in 
1963, Harvey Sacks, in commenting on methodological problems related to the practice 
of providing sociological descriptions, made an unusual and somewhat provocative 
remark:  
 
Here my concern is to make current sociology strange. The stance it adopts towards its 
subject matter seems so peculiar to me and so natural to most of its practitioners that an 
attempt to reconstitute the relation between sociological apparatus and sociological 
subject matter seems necessary. (Sacks, 1963, p. 1) 
 
Paraphrasing Sacks, here it is my concern to make current psychology and 
psychiatry strange, specifically in regard to the formulation, investigation, and 
dissemination of knowledge concerning „bipolar disorder‟.
1 In regard to why they might 
need to be „made strange‟, consider that bipolar disorder is characterised as a relatively 
common and disabling psychiatric disorder that is described principally as a disorder of 
mood (e.g., APA, 2000). Now, such a characterisation belies a rather curious state of 
affairs when one consults the vast clinical literature on so-called „mood‟ disorders, 
namely, that what exactly a „mood‟ is remains relatively unexplicated, or at the very 
least highly contested and subject to considerable descriptive variation. Nevertheless, 
this appears not to pose a problem for those contributing to an ever increasing literature 
on the topic, in which „moods‟ are routinely measured, quantified, assayed, modified, 
compared, and determined to be disordered or functioning appropriately. Moreover, this 
                                                 
1 While there may well be a considerable literature on „making things strange‟ with regard to psychiatric 
disorders and problematic psychological functioning, the particular „strangeness‟ that I wish to borrow 
from Sacks is directed more towards methodological concerns as opposed to critical evaluations of 
particular claims concerning bipolar disorder. In other words, „making things strange‟ stands in some 
contradistinction to showing how „things are wrong‟.      
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appears to be of little concern to „lay‟ persons as they go about their everyday affairs, 
and to whom having and recognising others‟ „moods‟ (be they related to persons, 
animals, or indeed inanimate objects) apparently presents no special problems requiring 
some form of social scientific remedy. 
 In other words, from the perspective of the professional practitioner, it would 
appear that there might well be a gulf between scientific, technical descriptions of 
„moods‟, and those that might be employed by „lay‟ persons as they engage in a variety 
of non-technical concerns. As Sacks makes clear, this is not of concern for the „lay‟ 
person, as employing a „common-sense‟ description needs to be just „good enough‟ 
(1963, p. 9). However, the same cannot be said for the professional scientist, and as 
Sacks suggests “to employ an undescribed category is to write descriptions such as 
appear in children‟s books” (1963, p. 8). This raises the invidious question, of how is it 
that people can be routinely diagnosed as having a disorder of „mood‟, when „mood‟ 
appears to be a vernacular, highly ramified, and conceptually fuzzy term?  
In this regard, rather than advocating a focus on the correct or incorrect use of a 
particular term in order to mount a critique dismissive of accounts of bipolar disorder as 
being inherently conceptually flawed and misguided in the first instance, I suggest that 
bipolar disorder, rather than being investigated as something that comprises an 
essentially individual, psychobiological problem, can also be productively examined as 
comprised as-and-from multiform practices that are discursively constructed. Now, 
while it has become something of a commonplace now in the social sciences to refer to 
things as being socially constructed (e.g., Gergen, 1985; Raskin, 2002), the particular 
form of construction on offer here is not to be regarded as merely comprising yet 
another variant of the corpus of literature on „the social construction of X‟. Rather, the 
concern here is how one might provide analytic descriptions of, and not explanations      
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for, the multiform discursive practices by which one can (for example) recognise 
bipolar disorder as bipolar disorder. 
Utilising such a formulation, investigations that take bipolar disorder as their 
substantiative topic might undertake examinations of such things as: the practices by 
which persons diagnosed with bipolar disorder might come to exhibit pathological 
social identities (cf. Rapley, 2004, on „intellectual disability‟); the practices by which 
ascriptions of psychiatric labels entails negotiated and contested membership categories 
(cf. Wise, 2004, on the categories „sane‟ and „not sane‟); the practices by which 
particular descriptions of conduct may come to denote „symptoms‟ of bipolar disorder 
(cf. Palmer, 2000, on „delusions‟); in short, the practices by which persons do „being 
bipolar‟. Such practices, involving mental health professionals and consumers of mental 
health services in the current inquiry, may be undertaken (and examined) regardless of 
the validity of scientific knowledge claims of biological psychiatry, clinical psychology, 
or indeed any particular discipline that has some stake with regard to providing 
explanations, theoretical conceptualisations, or treatments of „bipolar disorder‟.  
By way of providing an initial brief summary of the particular approach to topics 
of psychological interest, the following dissertation has been undertaken from a 
particular methodological and theoretical perspective that can be characterised as 
representing a form of empirically oriented discourse analysis, specifically a discursive 
psychological approach has been adopted (e.g., Edwards, 2005; Edwards & Potter, 
1992, 2001, 2005; Hepburn & Potter, 2003; Potter, 2003a, 2005b; Rapley, 2004). Such 
an approach might enable an examination of how individuals construct particular 
realities, minds, cultures, and identities using language in the performance of practical 
activities (Edwards & Potter, 2001). The primacy of discourse as a medium for action is 
stressed, with talk and texts approached as components of social practices (e.g., Potter, 
2003a, 2003c, 2004b). This approach can be characterised as incorporating a philosophy      
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of ordinary language perspective (e.g., Coulter, 1979; Ryle, 1949; Winch, 1958; 
Wittgenstein, 1967a), and in the present form is undertaken with a strongly 
„Wittgensteinian‟ orientation.  
In addition, the methodological and conceptual „attitude‟ of the particular form 
of discursive psychology developed here, draws extensively on ethnomethodology 
(Garfinkel, 1967), conversation analysis (Sacks, 1992a; Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 
1974), and is broadly informed by studies in the sociology of scientific knowledge (e.g., 
Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Knorr Cetina, 1999; Lynch, 1993). While the present 
dissertation is influenced by the work of „discourse‟ scholars such as Michel Foucault 
(e.g., Foucault, 1967), it is more specifically informed by (or perhaps, more correctly 
described as troubled by) the critical historical work of Nikolas Rose (e.g., Rose, 1985, 
1996a, 1999) concerning the practices of the so-called „psy disciplines‟, and the critical 
ethnomethodological and effective semiotics work of Alec McHoul (e.g., McHoul, 
1982, 1996). 
In sum, one might best characterise the dissertation‟s principle analytic stance as 
one of a strongly Wittgensteinian, ethnomethodological, discursive psychology, and its 
central thesis as the claim that the practices by which bipolar disorder gets done as 
bipolar disorder are invariably absent in most formal accounts of the disorder. In this 
regard, the dissertation is undertaken in order to provide an empirically grounded 
description of a range of discursive practices associated with the doing of bipolar 
disorder in psychotherapy. The dissertation comprises seven substantive chapters, the 
first three chapters attending to conceptual and methodological concerns, with the 
following four chapters comprising an empirically grounded analysis of „naturally 
occurring‟ data obtained from recordings of psychotherapy sessions involving a clinical 
psychologist and clients to whom the category „bipolar disorder‟ has demonstrable 
relevance.        
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In Chapter 1 will provide a brief overview of „bipolar disorder‟, with an eye 
towards establishing if „official‟ descriptions might provide some utility in conducting 
examinations of the practices by which bipolar disorder might feature, not just as a 
medical disease entity, but in a range of ordinary and everyday practices. I will also 
undertake an examination of two disparate sociological positions towards matters 
pertinent to the practices of psychology and questions pertaining to mental illness, the 
aforementioned critical Foucaultian historical scholarship of Nikolas Rose (e.g., Rose, 
1996a, 1999) and the strongly ethnomethodologically informed Wittgensteinian 
scholarship of Jeff Coulter (e.g., Coulter, 1973, 1979).  
In then moving to a consideration of such practices, in Chapter 2 I will 
undertake a review of ethnomethodologically informed approaches to doing social 
science, including conversation analysis and membership categorisation analysis, by 
which one might secure a methodological grounding for undertaking examinations of 
the practices by which (for example) „bipolar disorder‟ is produced, recognised, and 
otherwise assembled as an „objective‟ and „real‟ social fact. My focus here will be on 
consideration of discursive, psychological practices, and I will further develop this in 
Chapter 3 with a review of the ethnomethodologically informed discursive psychology 
of Edwards and Potter (Edwards & Potter, 1992). In this chapter I will also consider in 
more detail the difficulties in establishing when logical-grammatical investigations, 
such as those informed by Wittgenstein (1967a), Ryle (1949), and more recently 
Coulter (1983b), and empirical investigations of various psychological practices can be 
profitably undertaken.  
In moving towards an empirical analysis of materials, in Chapter 4 I will 
introduce the „setting‟ that was examined, one that could be described as a site of doing 
psychological business, which for those identified as having bipolar disorder may be 
massively consequential - the „psychotherapy session‟. I will also provide some initial      
  8 
analysis of the empirical materials, comprising a corpus of audio recordings of seven, 
two-party psychotherapy sessions recorded by a clinical psychologist and involving five 
client participants.  
In undertaking a more detailed examination of these materials, in Chapter 5 I 
will examine how bipolar disorder „symptoms‟ get produced in talk-in-interaction, and 
provide analysis of the practices by which symptoms are made to be obvious by-and-for 
participants in talk-in-interaction. In Chapter 6, I will explore the distinction between a 
„symptom‟ of a mood disorder and a „mood‟ itself, and present some analysis in which 
„moods‟ might be approached, not as intraindividual affective „states‟, but as reflexive 
„account production devices‟. In the final analytic chapter, I will examine the manner in 
which mental predicates and psychological terms such as „thoughts‟ and „feelings‟ are 
used in psychotherapeutic interactions, given that bipolar disorder, ostensibly a disorder 
of „mood‟, presumably involves problematic „thoughts‟ and „feelings‟.  
To return to the question of the „strangeness‟ of contemporary social scientific 
accounts of bipolar disorder, such a question might be better recast in light of the 
aforementioned discussion as: how might one undertake the provision of descriptions of 
some of the multiform practices that are associated with how bipolar disorder is 
produced, recognised, and otherwise done as bipolar disorder in settings that are 
massively consequential? This dissertation makes a tentative first step towards 
providing such descriptions.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Bipolar Disorder 
 
And it can work for us too, in an age that has no use for anxiety, in which we lie 
etherised like Prufrock, sedated, becalmed, and tranquil, neither high nor low. No 
suffering, no soul, no art. Yes, if Vincent [van Gogh] had been on valproate he might 
still have painted. If he were alive today and on valproate Vincent would be driving 
around in a white transit van, painting houses battleship grey. (Thomas & Bracken, 
2001, p. 1434) 
 
How should one undertake the provision of a contemporary description of 
bipolar disorder? The question of how this particular form of madness has been 
described, categorised, or constructed since antiquity is one that has fascinated and 
bedevilled scholars, perhaps in part due to the idea that any formulation of aberrant or 
abnormal behaviour is exquisitely entangled within particular historical and social 
contexts. Now, while there are numerous accounts of the history of madness (e.g., 
Bynum, Porter, & Shepherd, 1985; Foucault, 1967; Jackson, 1986; Peterson, 1982) it is 
not particularly useful to recount those here. However, it might be prudent to briefly 
provide an historical account, or one that sounds vaguely historical, of how „bipolar 
disorder‟ has come to be intelligible as (for example) a kind of categorical ascription 
delineating particular kinds of conduct.  
In this sense, I will begin by suggesting that modern conceptualisations of 
bipolar disorder required the development of a psychiatric nosology, which enabled for 
the processes of psychiatric diagnosis, with such diagnosis serving as the foundation for 
any discourse on bipolar disorder. An examination of the development and deployment 
of such a nosology might reveal how bipolar disorder is constructed, how knowledge 
concerning bipolar disorder is utilised, and how certain professions might legitimise 
claims to authority over bipolar disorder.       
  10 
Within this formulation, I will consider two disparate positions with regards to 
psychological, psychiatric, and sociological conceptualisations of insanity; the critical 
Foucaultian historical scholarship of Nikolas Rose (e.g., Rose, 1985, 1996a, 1999) and 
the strongly ethnomethodologically informed Wittgensteinian scholarship of Jeff 
Coulter (e.g., Coulter, 1973, 1979, 1983b). In providing this account, I will attempt to 
hint at the utility of undertaking a respecification of questions such as „what is bipolar 
disorder‟, „how do we identify bipolar disorder‟, and „how do we diagnose bipolar 
disorder‟ into something like „what are the practices by which bipolar disorder gets 
[witnessed], [recognised], [displayed], [recorded], or otherwise [done] as „bipolar 
disorder‟? Or, to put it another way, how does bipolar disorder get made relevant as a 
members‟ concern? 
Historical Conceptualisations 
From the perspective of a western intellectual tradition it is the ancient Greek 
historical record that serves as a foundation for most contemporary conceptualisations 
of madness, and the contemporary „bipolar disorder‟ (Porter, 1989). However, 
undertakings to uncover the origins of particular forms of madness are seemingly 
limited to reviewing forms of recurrent historical accounts (Canguilhem, 1968) that 
render their subject matter as ahistorical and asocial. For example, with regard to the 
presumed origins of bipolar disorder, Georgotas (1988) describes how the word mania 
is to be found at the opening of Homer‟s epic The Iliad  (the word appears in the Greek 
as wrath), and further provides evidence of the existence of bipolar disorder in ancient 
Greek times by casting Homer‟s accounts in the language of modern medicine. For 
example “… Ajax‟s rapid switch from an overexcited, probably manic state, to a state of 
uncontrolled despair, which ended in suicide, perhaps the first recorded case of rapid 
cycling manic-depressive behavioral state in history” (Georgotas, 1988, p. 3). What is 
not accounted for however, is that for the heroes of Homer, from the perspective of the      
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modern practitioner, suffering could only be manifest through exogenous afflictions; 
endogenous disturbances are not found among the historical record, and were either 
unrecognised or simply did not exist (Peeters, 1996). It was not until after the 
seventeenth century that conceptualisations of self permitted understandings of mental 
afflictions as being the product of principally intra-individual forces.  
This type of account is ubiquitous in the scientific literature. For example, a 
widely used undergraduate textbook in abnormal psychology provides an account of 
Hippocratic humoral theory as “… the first example of associating psychological 
disorders with chemical imbalance, an approach that is widespread today” (Barlow & 
Durand, 2001, p. 11). One is left to wonder, from this account, whether the authors are 
unintentionally making the point that Hippocratic humoral theory and contemporary 
chemical imbalance attributions are equivalent, that is to say, both are highly contested 
claims. In Goodwin and Jamison‟s Manic-Depressive Illness (1990) – essentially 
regarded as „the bible‟ for researchers and clinicians working in the area of bipolar 
disorder – there appear numerous examples of this type of interpretation. For example, 
they write that “medical writers of ancient Greece conceived of mental disorders in 
terms that sound remarkably modern. They believed that melancholia was a 
psychological manifestation of an underlying biological disturbance, specifically, a 
perturbation in brain function” (1990, p. 56). From this extract, the authors are doing 
more than suggesting the ancient Greek writings bear some similarity to modern 
accounts of mental disorders, they provide what is essentially a modern account with 
the terms „psychological manifestation‟, „biological disturbance‟, and „brain function‟ 
representative of modern discourse on mental illness.  
It is difficult to peruse any of the recent scientific literature on bipolar disorder 
without noting that the Roman physician Aretæus of Capadocia, following from the 
Hippocratic traditions, is apparently the first bona-fide observer to identify bipolar      
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disorder, with his supposed descriptions of mania and melancholia occurring in 
individuals over time (this is widely cited to Adams, 1856). While Hippocratic 
discourse concerning bodily organs, blood and humours, excess spirit, and the like 
might be suggestive of historical connections between such concepts as melancholia 
being caused by an excess of black bile and modern conceptualisations invoking 
neurophysiological descriptions relating neurotransmitters to behaviour, such accounts 
are derived from, and rooted within, the discursive practices of contemporary scholars. 
As illustrated by Foucault, conceptualisations of madness at a given point in history are 
necessarily reflective of normality (Foucault, 1967), and thus it is problematic to ascribe 
accounts of madness to particular historical periods given our current historical and 
cultural perspectives on what counts as-and-for sanity.  
While accounts of madness, and in particular modern justifications that bipolar 
disorder is something that has been with humankind for millennia, are prone to 
assuming smooth historical continuity and misplaced acceptance of the notion of the 
inevitability of scientific progress, it would appear that prior to the nineteenth century 
the concept of a mental disease that fused the two states of mania and melancholia 
simply would have been unintelligible (Berrios, 1988, 2004; Del Porto, 2004; Healy, 
2006b). The construction of bipolar disorder required relatively stable 
conceptualisations of both mania and melancholia, and these appear to have been in a 
state of constant flux. While mania had been used to describe uncontrollable rage, 
excitement, and seemingly incomprehensible behaviour that might be characterised as a 
kind of „utter madness‟ up until the eighteen century (Berrios, 2004), melancholia 
underwent significant changes, as reflected in qualitatively differing historical accounts 
(Berrios, 2004; Peeters, 1996). For example, consider the variation of accounts 
pertaining to a kind of spiritual desolation of the medieval monk, the gulf between 
humanistic ideals and broader social conditions that manifest in the seventeenth century,      
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the divorce between words and the things they referred to during the Renaissance, and 
the alienation of the self expressed during the nineteenth century (Peeters, 1996).  
More generally, during the Renaissance madness appears to have been 
something that could become manifest at anytime, to any individual, however in the 
eighteenth century madness appears to have undergone a transformation from 
something that was essentially part of the human experience, to a condition that 
signified exile from it due to loss of reason; the mad became increasingly divorced from 
the society of the sane (Foucault, 1967).  
Contemporary Conceptualisations of Bipolar Disorder 
It was not until the nineteenth century that French and German psychiatrists 
provided accounts of what appeared to be specific disorders that bear some resemblance 
to modern conceptualisations of bipolar disorder, with descriptions of an alternating 
mania and melancholia such as those proposed by Esquirol in 1854 (Shorter, 1997), the 
insanity of double-form by Baillarger (1854), the pairing of mania and melancholia 
described as „la folie circulaire‟ („circular insanity‟; the presence of depressive and 
excited states) by Jean Pierre Falret (1854), accounts of mania and melancholia as 
properties of a single disorder by Griesinger (1867), and the concept of circular or 
cyclothymic disorders by Kahlbaum (Baethge, Salvatore, & Baldessarini, 2003). 
Importantly, Esquirol suggested that melancholia should be reserved for usage by 
moralists and poets, and this has been suggested as reflective of a desire to furnish 
psychiatry with a rigorous approach to nomenclature, methodology, observation, and 
explanation (Peeters, 1996). With the increase in the number of asylums, in other words 
with the growing „institutionalisation‟ of madness (Foucault, 1967), discourse 
concerning melancholia appears to have became subject to a process of 
„psychologisation‟, with melancholia eventually dispensed with as a term to describe 
illness in favour of the term „depression‟ during the nineteenth century (Peeters, 1996).      
  14 
In conventional usage, melancholia had acquired a moral connotation (Berrios, 1988), 
and this was clearly incompatible with a scientific and technical discourse that strove to 
be predominantly physiological, as espoused by those with a vested interest in claiming 
a stake to the management and treatment of the mad. 
The Dictionary of Psychology and Philosophy (Baldwin, 1901) represents an 
example of one of the final resting places for melancholia‟s prominence as a clinical and 
conceptual term, with extensive descriptions of mania and melancholia provided. Mania 
is described as a “mental disease involving irresistable and uncontrollable or 
uncontrolled habit, desire, or craving, with unreasonable or inadequate motives” (1901, 
n.p.). It specifies two forms of usage, with mania as symptomatic, and as a name for real 
diseases or psychoses. Melancholia is defined as being applicable to “all abnormal 
mental conditions dominated by depression” (1901, n.p.) and comprises numerous 
varieties including „simple melancholia‟, „stuporous‟, „delusional‟, „homicidal‟, and 
„suicidal‟ (1901, n.p.). In contrast to the entries for mania and melancholia, which 
provide for detailed descriptions of „symptom-complexes‟, depression is described with 
relative economy as a symptom that “occurs in weakened conditions of the nervous 
system” (1901, n.p.) that is “especially characteristic of melancholia” (1901, n.p., 
emphasis added). Dejection and depression are characterised as almost synonymous, 
with depression constituting “lowered vitality of physical and mental life” (1901, n.p.) 
and dejection constituting “despondency of mental mood” (1901, n.p.). 
The definitions of mania, melancholia, and depression appearing in the 
Dictionary of Psychology and Philosophy contained elements of the work of Kraepelin 
(1921), who advocated a symptomological approach to the classification and description 
of mental disorders as discrete entities, which has come to underpin modern nosologies. 
Kraepelin was the first to formulate depression as a discrete disease entity and to 
distinguish manic-depressive insanity as separate from other psychotic disorders (e.g.,      
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Georgotas & Cancro, 1988). Kraepelin proposed that manic-depressive insanity 
included a manifestation of the disease that displayed recurrent and severe depressive 
episodes, and a rarer form that alternated between depression and mania.  
Kraepelin set out to devise a system of psychiatric diagnosis that would form an 
organizing framework for research. This system was predicated upon the assumption 
that patients suffering from the same disorder should have the same symptoms. This, in 
turn, indicated common brain abnormalities that were caused by common aetiological 
processes. Thus, if patients with similar symptoms were grouped, once could construct a 
system of classification and diagnosis that could serve as a methodology to assist in the 
discovery of the biological origins of mental illness.  
While Kraepelin‟s work could be seen as the principal component for the 
development of a modern psychiatric nosology, struggles to develop a systematic 
nomenclature were perhaps less motivated by a desire to develop scientific 
understandings of human behaviour and more by administrative and governmental 
needs (Grob, 1991; Kirk & Kutchins, 1992). It is important to consider that the mad 
themselves most likely did not seek to avow membership to any particular diagnostic 
categories, it was those who sought to enumerate, manage, and essentially control (and 
possibly treat) them that held this as a desirable activity (e.g., Foucault, 1967). A major 
initial impetus for developing a psychiatric nosology, at least in the United States, was 
born from the desire to obtain and collate statistical information on the general 
population (e.g., Grob, 1991; Houts, 2000; Kirk & Kutchins, 1992).  
The Development of an „Official‟ Classification 
Prior to the nineteenth century madness was apparently to be found in a 
relatively modest number of forms, if one considers the results of the 1840 United 
States census which recorded the population frequency of only one category, that of 
„idiocy‟. By the census of 1880 there were seven „official‟ categories of mental illness      
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distinguished: mania, melancholia, monomania, paresis, dementia, dipsomania, and 
epilepsy (Grob, 1991).  
During the Second World War military psychiatrists were confronted with 
individuals who had been exposed to severe personal stress as the result of combat 
experiences, who were otherwise mentally sound (Houts, 2000). This precipitated a 
change in clinical focus, from that of the treatment of psychopathology in severely 
disordered persons to that of normal individuals who had suffered extreme trauma. 
Practitioners switched from a primarily medical, biological orientation to a chiefly 
psychoanalytic approach. Importantly, it was with the sampling and statistical analysis 
of large populations of servicemen, and the identification of stress as a precipitating 
factor in the manifestation of mental illness, that served as the developmental 
framework for the United States Army (and later the Veterans Administration) to 
construct psychiatric nomenclature (Houts, 2000).  
Contemporaneously, the WHO published the sixth edition of the International 
Classification of Diseases (ICD) (WHO, 1949), significantly influenced by 
nomenclature as developed by the Veterans Administration, and this was the first 
edition that incorporated a section for mental disorders. Of additional importance was a 
dramatic rise in the number of psychoanalytically trained professionals fleeing Europe 
during this period, which resulted in further expansion of a kind of „psychopathology of 
everyday life‟ market, with psychiatrists becoming much more interested in applying 
mental health practices to non-institutional populations as a result of growing social 
activism and prevailing post-war ideas of social betterment (Kirk & Kutchins, 1992). 
The APA Committee on Nomenclature and Statistics developed a variant of the 
ICD-6 that represented the first incarnation of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM) (APA, 1952). Within the DSM mental illness was divided into 
three categories including organic brain syndromes, functional disorders, and mental      
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deficiency. The general tenor of the manual was one that emphasised psychodynamic 
and psychoanalytic perspectives, as a result of the significant changes that had occurred 
in clinical practice as a result of the Second World War. For example, disorders are 
presented in the DSM as comprised of various psychiatric „reactions‟ (Gruenberg, 
Goldstein, & Pincus, 2005). While the manual was oriented to obtain statistical 
information, it was also advocated as resource for professionals to utilise in making 
clinical psychiatric diagnosis. Manic-depressive reactions were listed amongst the 
psychotic disorders. 
With the publication of DSM-II (APA, 1968) there was an expansion in the 
number of broad categories of disorder from three to ten, with an increase in the total 
number of disorders from 108 to 162. The psychodynamic and psychoanalytic 
perspectives remained prominent, however the „reactive‟ conditions were dropped 
(Gruenberg et al., 2005). Manic-depressive illness in the DSM-II is categorised as a 
form of affective psychosis.  
The next revision DSM-III (APA, 1980), published ostensibly to fulfil 
international treaty obligations the United States had to ensure comparability with the 
WHO‟s ICD development, represented a monumental change in psychiatric nosology 
(see Kirk & Kutchins, 1992, for detailed review). The previously dominant 
psychodynamic approaches embodied by the earlier versions of the DSM, that placed 
significant clinical importance towards biological, psychodynamic-psychological, and 
social factors, were essentially usurped by an atheoretical, research oriented medical 
model. Criticism of the diagnostic system was intense from clinicians and researchers, 
in addition to social activist groups, pharmaceutical companies, and third party 
reimbursement organisations. Again, the number of diagnoses increased, from 182 to 
265.       
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The publication of the DSM-III represented a significant development in both 
the conceptual formulation and psychiatric nomenclature pertaining to manic-depressive 
illness, with the term manic-depression dropped in favour of a new term, bipolar 
disorder (cf. to the dispensation of the term „melancholia‟ in favour of „depression‟ in 
the early part of the century). Further, a primary distinction was made between major 
depressive disorders and bipolar disorders (Gruenberg et al., 2005). In this regard, the 
new nomenclature embodied a polarity hypothesis, that had became increasingly 
popular throughout Europe and later the United States during the 1970s (Goodwin & 
Jamison, 1990), which posited the existence of differences between bipolar (with 
mania) and unipolar (recurrent severe depression or melancholia) forms of major 
affective disorders, the distinguishing feature presentation of episodes of mania (Perris, 
1966). This hypothesis received considerable support following the rediscovery of the 
utility of lithium salts as a means for the treatment of agitated patients (Cade, 1949).  
A revision, the DSM-III-R (APA, 1987) incorporated significant changes. The 
number of disorders increased from 265 to 292. The first major expansion of the bipolar 
disorder concept was the distinction between two discrete forms of the disorder: a type I 
bipolar syndrome that was characterised by the presence of both mania and depression; 
and a type II bipolar syndrome that features recurrent major depressive episodes with 
hypomania, a milder form of mania (Dunner, Gershon, & Goodwin, 1976).  
The concept of mania was further broadened by the suggestion that mania could 
result from medical and toxicological conditions, and was not necessarily solely due to 
psychopathology (Krauthammer & Klerman, 1978). Further, it was suggested that 
additional to bipolar type I and bipolar type II disorders there were an additional five 
subtypes (Klerman, 1981). These subtypes included those characterised by drug induced 
mania (bipolar type III), a form that represented a cyclothymic personality (type IV), 
another that was represented by depressed individuals with a family history of bipolar      
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disorder (type V), a mania without depression (type VI), and secondary mania 
(Klerman, 1981). 
There was also considered to be substantial overlap between bipolar and 
unipolar forms of major affective disorder. This overlap was essentially the result of 
difficulties in clinically diagnosing hypomania, and the notion of „pseudounipolar‟ or 
bipolar like forms of depression was formulated. Therefore, the idea of a spectrum of 
affective disorders was developed in which a hierarchy of different patterns of illness is 
described, and thus the bipolar spectrum may include cyclothymia, dysthymia, and a 
variety of personality disorders including borderline personality disorder and 
narcissistic personality disorder (Akiskal, 1983). This was further developed with 
models of mental illness that, harkening back to the stress-diathesis theories that 
underpinned the original DSM, emphasised the role of stress-vulnerability in the 
development of psychopathology (e.g., a „threshold hypothesis‟) that suggested mania 
constituted a more severe form of affective disorder, in which predisposed individuals 
would require exposure to lower levels of stress to precipitate a manic decompensation 
(Tsuang, Farrone, & Fleming, 1985). 
The Contemporary DSM Account 
With the publication of DSM-IV (APA, 1994) the diagnostic categories of 
bipolar II disorder, cyclothymia, and a rapid cycling variant were included. More 
broadly, the number of disorders was again increased, to 365. The DSM-IV-TR (APA, 
2000) represented a minor revision, with no new disorders or changes to the bipolar 
disorders. In this, the most current incarnation of the „official‟ DSM nosology, the 
bipolar disorders are comprised of four criteria sets: bipolar I disorder, bipolar II 
disorder, cyclothymic disorder, and bipolar disorder not otherwise specified. These 
categories are comprised of a number of „mood episodes‟ that serve as the building 
blocks for the disorder diagnoses; these comprise „major depressive episode‟, „manic      
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episode‟, „mixed episode‟, and „hypomanic episode‟ (see Appendix A, Tables A1-A4). 
The criteria for one or more of these „mood episodes‟ must be met in order to warrant a 
specific diagnosis (i.e., bipolar I, II, cyclothymia, or bipolar disorder „not otherwise 
specified‟).  
Individuals with bipolar I disorder must have experienced at least one episode of 
mania (see Table A1), with the possibility of having experienced previous depressive 
episodes (see Table A2), and most individuals will continue to experience subsequent 
episodes that are either manic or depressive. Additionally, hypomanic (see Table A3) 
and mixed (see Table A4) episodes can occur, as well as significant mood lability 
between episodes that is considered to be not of sufficient severity to warrant the 
diagnosis of either a manic or depressive episode.  
By contrast, individuals meeting the DSM-IV-TR criteria for bipolar II disorder 
have a history of one or more major depressive episodes and (at least one) hypomanic 
episode. In addition, individuals may exhibit significant evidence of mood lability, 
hypomania, and depressive symptoms that are considered significant in terms of clinical 
presentation, but do not meet the duration criteria for bipolar II disorder. In these cases a 
diagnosis of bipolar disorder not otherwise specified is warranted. In the absence of a 
manic, mixed, or major depressive episode, cyclothymic disorder is considered if there 
have been numerous periods of consistent (greater than 2 months) depressive and 
hypomanic symptoms for at least 2 years (1 year in children). The DSM-IV-TR also 
includes specifiers describing the course of recurrent episodes. These include seasonal 
pattern, longitudinal course, and rapid cycling. Now, rather than providing a detailed 
exposition concerning all of the elements of the contemporary DSM-IV-TR account 
pertaining to bipolar disorder, I will briefly examine the diagnostic criteria relating to 
bipolar I, and draw some contrast with the requirements for a diagnosis of bipolar II.      
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The identification of bipolar I disorder is predicated on the essential observation 
that an individual has demonstrably experienced a manic episode. This manic episode is 
characterised by the presence of a “distinct period of abnormal and elevated, expansive, 
or irritable mood lasting at least a week (or any duration if hospitalization is necessary)” 
(Table A1). Further, a combination of several symptoms is required (see criteria B, 
Table A1). In consideration of these symptoms, and in a decidedly provocative tone, to 
avoid being prescribed a diagnosis of bipolar I disorder a potential candidate for 
normality needs to studiously avoid engaging in behaviours that would appear to be 
entirely unremarkable, such as working conscientiously (e.g., criteria B6), falling in 
love (e.g., criteria B7), or perhaps taking up the vocation of stage-acting (e.g., criteria 
B1). Alternatively, one might avoid coming under the gaze of a clinician who has never 
been overcome with passionate yearnings for a distant lover, consorted with thespians, 
or burnt the midnight oil to make a deadline for an important project.  
Now, while these behaviours alone may be insufficient for making a diagnosis 
of bipolar disorder, they may nevertheless become potential symptoms once the issue of 
bipolar disorder has been raised. Consider that criteria D requires that the „mood 
disturbance‟ must be “sufficiently severe to cause marked impairment in occupational 
functioning, usual social activities, or relationships with others” (Table A1). This leaves 
unanswered the question, how does one determine exactly when a mood disturbance is 
of sufficient magnitude that it causes difficulties in living? One suggestion is that mania 
is something that, like many other disorders presented in the DSM-IV-TR, appears to be 
mainly problematic for people other than the afflicted person. In other words, the 
evidence required by the diagnostic criteria of impairments in occupational functioning, 
social activities, or personal relationships might only be provided by accounts given by 
individuals other than a prospective patient.       
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Now, while one might consider that people may be diagnosed based on their 
own accounts of their effects on others, consider that Belmaker advises that “acute 
mania is a medical emergency. If a manic patient is not treated rapidly, he or she is 
liable to engage in activities that may endanger the patient‟s marriage or job and 
possibly the patient‟s life” (2004, p. 478). Belmaker elaborates by describing a situation 
wherein a person can have a rational conversation with a family physician, which may 
disguise the fact that they may be a candidate for involuntary hospitalisation, and it is 
critical to obtain information from family, friends, and co-workers that would assist in a 
determination of competency.  
In short, mania is something that requires the exercise of immediate and total 
control over an afflicted patient, and is something that is essentially identified by the 
consensus of others (e.g., APA, 2002; RANZCP-CPGT, 2004; Yatham et al., 2005). 
The diagnosis of mania is one that is ascribed on the basis of moral conduct. It is 
predicated on judgements that a person is at risk of harm to self or others due to loss of 
self-control, and invariably such a person has no insight or awareness of such risk 
(Dell'Osso et al., 2002), even when judgements of risk may require knowledge of 
exogenous social factors influencing the person that are controlled by those very 
individuals in the position to give such judgments.  
Belmaker (2004) further offers the example that a person suffering mania may 
decide to buy 500 television sets if they believe the price of televisions may increase. 
But, isn‟t this exactly what one would expect of a canny trader making attempts to 
corner a market? Unfortunately for biopsychiatry there are only such „symptoms‟, in 
this case „buying 500 television sets‟ (as curious a „medical‟ symptom as one might be 
likely to encounter), that allow for the inference of a pathological disease entity (cf. 
Boyle, 2002). How, in a positivist, scientific enterprise is one to determine that the 
buying of television sets constitutes a marker for a disease process? Obviously, such a      
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prescription is essentially predicated on a clinical judgement that is itself informed by, 
and constrained within, normative cultural practices. What if the (presumably 
hypothetical) individual Belmaker describes engineers a tidy profit on the sale of the 
televisions? Belmaker elaborates on this theme and suggests that manic behaviour is 
distinct from a person‟s usual, normal, everyday behaviour. The inference is that what 
constitutes normal behaviour is something that is predictable, historically continuous, 
and subject to voluntary intra-individual control. It is changes in behaviour that are 
characteristic of a disease process – this, then, is the essential characteristic of bipolar 
disorder, and posits a normative view of human behaviour as being static, uniform, and 
non-adaptive.  
The problematic application of diagnostic criteria towards individuals in an 
apparently asocial and ahistorical fashion is illustrated in the telling commentary by 
Floersch and colleagues (Floersch, Longhofer, & Latta, 1997) that critically reviews the 
infamous research purported to have identified bipolar disorder (and subsequently a 
genetic link with chromosome 11) amongst members of an Old Order Amish 
community (Egeland & Hostetter, 1983). The researchers involved in the Amish study, 
while declaring the attractiveness of the Amish as a research population (due in large 
part to the apparently uncomplicated diagnosis of mental disorders in the Amish 
community due to their straightforward and simple lifestyle) were nonetheless 
compelled to alter diagnostic criteria to account for cultural factors that they felt were 
problematic (Egeland, Hostetter, & Eshleman, 1983); specifically, self esteem and 
grandiosity (analogous to criteria B1 in Table 1A) and excess involvement in potentially 
„painful‟ activities (analogous to criteria B7 in Table 1A).  
This occurred despite the valid presumption that if Amish culture was as 
transparent and homogenous as the researchers had been at pains to suggest, it might be 
presumed that the presence of an individual with bipolar disorder within the community      
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could be easily ascertained. In short, the researchers were required to construct a version 
of Amish behaviour that was invariant, non-contingent, and homogeneous to allow for 
the making of a diagnosis predicated upon interpretations of abnormal behaviour based 
on such activities as driving a buggy too fast, the excessive use of public telephones, or 
engaging in a smoking binge (Floersch et al., 1997).  
In contrast to the requirement of criteria D for bipolar I, which requires the 
establishment of marked impairment in social functioning that is most likely to be 
established from (or as previously argued, predicated upon) the reports of others, the 
analogous criteria for bipolar II (criteria C), allows for the possibility that an individual 
subjectively experiences “clinically significant distress” (Table A2). This criterion can 
be satisfied, in other words, by an individual directly reporting that they are terribly 
depressed, unhappy, sick-of-it-all, miserable, or such, without a requirement that their 
behaviour has (prior to some clinical examination) to have been judged pathological by 
others. This distinction is crucial, for it establishes a diagnostic framework that assumes 
that depression can and will be reported as being distressing, while mania will not. In 
short, mania is cast as an experiential, pathological disease state that might require 
verification by consideration of third-person ascriptions and accounts in the absence of 
first-person avowals, whereas depression is cast as an experiential state that can often be 
verified by consideration of only first-person avowals.   
If one turns to a consideration of hypomania, some have suggested that it should 
not be considered as a disease as such, as hypomanic episodes, presumably representing 
the behavioural manifestations of the hypomanic disease entity itself, could be regarded 
as being generally good things to experience (Cooper, 2004). Indeed, hypomania is 
distinguished from mania in that episodes of the former are recognisable as having little 
or no impairment in social or occupational functioning (Table A3) and are often 
reported as desirable. Moreover, persons may “seldom recognize hypomania as a      
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problem” (Yatham et al., 2005, p. 8). Nonetheless, behaviour that could be characterised 
as hypomanic may become clinically relevant if it occurs in people who also experience 
depression, as it distinguishes a particular type of bipolar disorder. In this regard, 
theorising has lead to suggestions that the distinguishing feature of bipolar disorder is 
mania and not mood swings, and that the disorder should be primarily approached as a 
manic disorder with a range of co-morbid conditions such as depression (e.g., Joffe, 
Young, & MacQueen, 1999; Schweitzer et al., 2005).  
Contemporary research has focused on presumed comorbidity of a range of 
conditions such as substance abuse and anxiety disorders that are identified as being 
present amongst populations of those diagnosed with bipolar disorder (e.g., Alda, 2004), 
and suggestions of unrecognised bipolar „mixed‟ states from findings that persons 
suffering depression may also experience hypomanic symptoms (Akiskal, Benazzi, 
Perugi, & Rihmer, 2005). Additionally, some have suggested that there should be 
consideration given to a diagnostic category of „mixed hypomania‟ (Suppes et al., 2005) 
where persons display significant depressive symptoms while meeting criteria for a 
hypomanic episode. Such research is indicative of a growing interest in the further 
development of a bipolar spectrum concept that subsumes other disorders, such as 
borderline personality disorder (e.g., Angst & Gamma, 2002; Himmelhoch, 2003; Smith 
et al., 2004), and provides a means by which the claimed potential for early-onset of 
bipolar disorders in children and adolescents can be supported (e.g., Papolos & Papolos, 
1999). 
The development of a bipolar spectrum disorder, which places mania at one 
extreme and highly recurrent unipolar depression at the other, is a stark example of how 
fragmented modern psychiatric nosology has become. The dramatic increase in the 
number of theoretical and diagnostic conceptualisations of bipolar disorder has led 
many commentators to call for some degree of restraint, fearing a dilution and      
  26 
trivialisation of not only the concept of bipolar disorder, but perhaps the entire 
undertaking that posits mental illnesses as biological diseases.
1 For example, in an 
editorial appearing in the flagship scientific journal for bipolar disorder, Bipolar 
Disorders, Baldessarini makes this point explicitly when he writes “reasons for urging 
restraint include the strong impression that classic bipolar disorders – and abundance of 
phenocopies, notwithstanding – are about as close to a „disease‟ as we have in modern 
psychiatry” (Baldessarini, 2000, p. 5).  
Now, while the previous discussion has been focused on what at first glance 
appear to be obvious shortcomings with DSM descriptions of bipolar disorder, and how 
contemporary conceptual and empirical projects seek to attend to the problematic nature 
of such classificatory systems, I would suggest that consideration of such issues alone 
provides little purchase on how it is that, despite such shortcomings, clinicians and 
patients  routinely engage in a variety of consequential practices that accommodate the 
diagnosis and treatment of something.  
Moreover, the DSM is utilised not simply as a system of classification for 
determining the presence or absence of bipolar disorder psychopathology within 
individuals, but serves as a guideline for such things as the research and development of 
new psychoactive pharmaceuticals and psychotherapeutic interventions, provides a 
classificatory system for determinations concerning access to insurance and government 
benefits, and provides demarcation for determinations of legal responsibility. 
Importantly, the concepts and descriptions of bipolar disorder contained within the 
nosology are accommodated within broader social domains and serve as a primary 
reference for depictions of the mad in contemporary film, popular literary fiction, art, 
and critically language (Kirk & Kutchins, 1992). In this regard, one might consider that 
                                                 
1 For example, Healy suggests that “Kraepelin‟s likely response to recent proposals that we recognize and 
distinguish between bipolar 1, 2, 2.5, 3, 3.5, 4, 5, and 6 and bipolar spectrum disorders would probably 
not be printable” (Healy, 2006a, p. e320).        
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the DSM is the pre-eminent, official document pertaining to how one can undertake 
categorisations of conduct that might be understood as officially reflective and denotive 
of bipolar disorder. By this, I mean that one should consider the difference between the 
document as an official description of what counts as bipolar disorder for a multitude of 
practical, administrative, and institutional activities, and as a document that accurately 
describes what individual persons do as they go about their everyday affairs.  
Rose and Practices of the Self 
If one considers a Foucaultian perspective, it is of importance to consider the 
way in which psychological language and ideas may have come to provide a relevant 
context for discourse pertaining to bipolar disorder, and how deployment and utilisation 
of such psychologically oriented discursive resources may systematically constitute 
individual experience (Foucault, 1967). As Nikolas Rose (e.g., Rose, 1996a, 1999) 
suggests, the recurrent theme in post-modernist scholarship from the human sciences is 
that the idealised „human being‟, comprised of a „self‟ that is somehow inscribed with 
unique and individual experiences that represents an individual entity enclosed within 
the boundaries of a body, is not the principle generative locus of human history and 
human culture (e.g., Danziger, 1990; Gergen, 1985; Hansen, McHoul, & Rapley, 2003; 
McHoul & Rapley, 2001; Rabinow & Rose, 2003).  
As Rose suggests, modern western societies are unusual in such a 
conceptualisation of the self as being self-evidently the locus of temporally and 
contextually invariant „beliefs‟, „desires‟, and so forth, and draws particular attention to 
the unusual manner in which the development of legal and political apparatuses has 
occurred that operate to regulate conduct upon such a conception of the self (Rose, 
1996b). From this perspective, Rose offers a compelling Foucaultian influenced account 
of how psychology, psychiatry, psychotherapy, and the other „psy disciplines‟, play a 
key role in the construction of contemporary western individuals‟ sense of self,      
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changing the ways in which human beings understand and act upon themselves, and 
how they are acted upon by those in positions of power (Rose, 1996a, 1999). 
The psy disciplines have been essential to the practice of institutional control, by 
specifying the manner in which individuals are seen to be normative or maladaptive, 
productive or inefficient, fulfilled or unrealised, combat ready or shell shocked, sane or 
mad. They have sought to classify people, to measure and determine their innate 
capacities, to attenuate deficiencies and amplify abilities. They have become essential 
providers for the technologies and techniques for the disciplining of human difference 
(Rose, 1996a). Critically, institutional and organisational control has served to shape the 
nature of the control of self, with the incorporation of technologies employed to manage 
and control groups becoming instantiated within the individual.  
For example, consider the „intelligence test‟, developed as a specific 
methodology for the classification and segregation of those deemed to be representative 
of degeneration and subsequently categorised as unfit for procreation (e.g., Gould, 
1981; Rapley, 2004; Rose, 1999). It has not only become a ubiquitous professional 
instrument and concept for the screening of individuals to ensure the appropriate 
allocation of institutional and social resources, but has become incorporated into the 
experience of the layperson as „IQ‟, as a form of understanding and communicating 
about human potential, experience, of being-in-the-world. One might consider that with 
time, the plethora of measures of what could be glossed as a kind of „affective 
intelligence‟ that currently are utilised for the screening of possible mood disorders, 
such as the Hamilton Depression Scale (Hamilton, 1967), Beck Depression Inventory 
(Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961), Beck Anxiety Inventory (Beck, 
Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988), Beck Hopelessness Scale (Beck, Lester, & Trexler, 
1974), and the Mood Disorder Questionnaire (Hirschfeld et al., 2000), may become as 
ubiquitous as „IQ‟ in persons‟ ordinary, everyday experiences.      
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Rose argues that psychology cannot, or should not, be regarded as a given, 
discrete, and bounded domain that could be considered separate from society (Rose, 
1985, 1996a). Further, Rose suggests that the objects of psychological interest cannot be 
regarded as existing a priori awaiting empirical discovery. Rather, the term 
„psychology‟ can and should be approached as a method of indexing a diverse 
collection of practices (Rose, 1996b).
2 Significantly, the relations between such 
psychological practices and those involving other discourses has produced a psychology 
that has made certain things “thinkable in new ways, and made certain new things 
thinkable and practicable” (Rose, 1996b, p. 105). As Danziger has suggested, 
psychological theories operate, indeed are predicated upon, some a priori 
conceptualisations of that which they theorise (Danziger, 1997). In this way, the psy 
disciplines have come to manufacture the objects of their interest in the process of 
knowing them (Rose, 1996a, pp. 107-108).  
For example, it is by way of the development and application of research 
technologies in public opinion research, with the creation of the „representative sample‟, 
that the social sciences have enabled the construction of the „opinioned person‟ who 
dwells within an „opinionated society‟ (Osborne & Rose, 1999). In regards to bipolar 
disorder, consider one possible mechanism by which we might observe the creation of 
„paediatric bipolar disorder‟ (e.g., Harpaz-Rotem & Rosenheck, 2004; Papolos & 
Papolos, 1999; Weckerly, 2002). Clinical trials are undertaken in which sedative 
pharmacological agents are administered to children characterised as being „overactive‟, 
and „at risk‟ of having a „mood disorder‟, with such agents invariably leading to clinical 
rating scale changes that are used to validate a diagnosis of bipolar disorder and lead to 
further interventions and treatments (Healy, 2006b). 
                                                 
2 I use the term practices here to gloss Rose‟s explication of psychology as “indexing an assortment of 
ways of thinking and acting, practices, techniques, forms of calculation, routines and procedures, and 
skilled personnel” (1996b, p. 104). I further note that in the preface to the second edition of Governing the 
Soul, Rose writes that “psy, here, is not simply a matter of ideas, cultural beliefs or even a specific kind of 
practice” (1999, vii). Hence, my use of the plural form.       
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Moreover, the formulation of separate components of the „bipolar self‟ into such 
domains as the emotional-cognitive (e.g., Martinez-Aran et al., 2004; Savitz, Solms, & 
Ramesar, 2005), physiological (e.g., Berns & Nemeroff, 2003), and genetic (e.g., Blair 
et al., 2006; Faraone, Glatt, Su, & Tsuang, 2004) provides a useful demarcation of 
functions that allows for the development of competition between differing professional 
interests. This „carving up‟ of the individual psyche is then more the result of a 
commoditisation of the person than an efficient and value free division of scientific 
labour. The codification of affective states provided for a scientific approach to 
understanding the human experience, and enabled for the dispensation of troublesome 
philosophical and metaphysical accounts (cf. Baldwin, 1901). Further, with the overlap 
of psychology, biological psychiatry, and genetics, it could be argued that we are seeing 
the forging of a new kind of human, one that can be understood as potentially 
genetically, biologically, and socially „at risk‟ (Novas & Rose, 2000). For the „bipolar‟ 
human, then, such risk becomes manifest and visible in the dramatic increase in the 
diagnosis of bipolar disorder in children (Harpaz-Rotem & Rosenheck, 2004), 
investigations into the genetic vulnerability of mania (Faraone et al., 2004), indeed the 
establishment of metrics associated with suicide (Marangell et al., 2006; Valtonen et al., 
2006). 
In this sense, and as historians of psychology have demonstrated, notably 
Danziger in his investigations of the procedures and practices of what constitutes 
„psychological research‟, the „subject‟ of psychology and the discipline itself are 
essentially „socially constructed‟ (Danziger, 1990). Danziger‟s examinations of the 
relation between pure and applied psychology are demonstrative of how what could be 
considered non-scientific factors are critical in determining what comes to be regarded 
as credible psychological knowledge (Rose, 1996b). And, as Shapin (1995) details, 
contemporary social studies of science have strongly engaged the critical faculties of      
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historians and philosophers, with the distinction between what could be regarded as 
historical or philosophical and what had been traditionally regarded as sociological 
practices becoming difficult to discern (e.g., Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Knorr Cetina, 
1999; Lynch, 1985, 1993; Pollner, 1987). 
Returning to the manner in which these „regimes of truth‟ with regard to 
psychology have come to be constructed, Rose points firstly to the contestation between 
different „social and conceptual authorities‟ (1996b, pp. 110-111). For example, 
consider the contestation over what counts as a mental illness in the development of an 
official document such as the DSM (Kirk & Kutchins, 1992). Secondly, Rose suggests it 
has involved constructing „modes of perception‟ by which actions and objects might be 
recast according to particular images or patterns (Rose, 1996b). For a literal approach to 
such a suggestion, consider how the depiction of brain images from „PET‟ scans may 
come to constitute new relations between those suffering „depression‟ and their brains 
(e.g., Dumit, 2003). Thirdly, Rose argues it has been characterised by adoption of a kind 
of specialised language (Rose, 1996b). For example, consider the manner in which 
„melancholia‟ was dispensed with in favour of the term „depression‟ (Peeters, 1996), 
and how „manic-depression‟ was replaced with „bipolar disorder‟ as an „official‟ 
designation with the publication of the DSM-III (APA, 1980). Finally, Rose points to 
the development of a „psychologised network‟ in which the psychological problems of 
individuals and groups are linked (Rose, 1996b, 1999). One need look no further than 
the development of the DSM for example of such a consequential linkage, with the 
connection between the individual and the group serving as the basis for statistical 
determinations of „abnormality‟ within and between individuals (Kirk & Kutchins, 
1992). 
Rose refers to the „disciplinisation‟ of psychology that occurred from the mid-
nineteenth century that allowed a positive knowledge of „man‟ to become possible with      
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the development and use of statistics and the scientific experiment (Rose, 1996b, pp. 
111-113). Such technical „tools‟ and „methods‟, that Rose terms the „truth techniques‟ 
(Rose, 1985), that psychology adopted in order to demonstrate, justify, and amplify its 
theoretical propositions, have come to constitute the limits of psychological thought 
itself. Rose connects this disciplinisation of psychology to a „psychologisation‟ of a 
range of practices in which psychology serves to inform, even dominate, other ways of 
constituting truths about persons (Rose, 1996b). Rose argues that the regulatory and 
administrative requirements of social authorities and practitioners played a key role in 
establishing what types of problems psychological truths could be legitimately claimed 
to solve, or indeed to suggest (Rose, 1985, 1999). Such production of psychological 
truth is linked to the process by which a range of “domains, sites, problems, practices, 
and activities have „become psychological‟” (Rose, 1996b, p. 114). With regard to the 
particularities of what is involved in the construction of what counts as „the 
psychological‟, Rose suggests processes in which certain forms of thinking and acting 
come to appear to be solutions to problems confronting people (Rose, 1996b). Such an 
account places contemporary scientific reality as an achieved outcome of the methods 
used in its undertaking (Rose, 1996b, 1999). 
Rose points to the problematisation of such „psychological‟ practices, in that that 
they are made “simultaneously troubling and yet intelligible” (1996b, p. 114), such that 
the relation between what counts as a useful psychological theory and a practice that 
may be associated with such a theory becomes transparent (Rose, 1996b). Consider the 
suggestion that the contemporary concept of bipolar disorder required a 
clinicoanatomical perspective of disease, the observation of longitudinal course, 
uniform semiology concerning affectivity, the construct of personality, and the idea of 
differential diagnosis (Berrios, 1988). For example, the clinicoanatomical perspective of 
problematic conduct enabled the fragmentation of discourse concerning madness into      
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discrete categories, thus allowing for the objectification of entities that are now called 
bipolar disorder, mania, and depression (Berrios, 1988, 1999, 2004). To permit the 
serendipitous observation of the apparent longitudinal courses of bipolar disorders, 
individuals were required to be segregated and incarcerated. Only then could they be 
observed by those who had sufficient resources that might enable a close proximity to 
persons they wished to measure and categorise, or indeed treat (e.g., Cade, 1949; 
Kraepelin, 1921).  
In this sense, the concept of a longitudinal as opposed to cross-sectional view of 
bipolar disorder could be seen as more a product of management practices than 
scientific enquiry. In other words, rather than these being prerequisite conditions or 
developments that are reflective of an inevitable accumulation of scientific knowledge, 
these could be seen as demonstrative of the deployment of various forms of truth-
techniques formulated during the rise of the modern psy disciplines (Rose, 1996a). 
Moreover, they appear to have become more or less justifications given for the theories 
and practices that underpin contemporary psy discipline projects.  
Foucault‟s notion of „surfaces of emergence‟ (Foucault, 1972) serves to inform 
Rose in consideration of the apparatuses within which psychological troubles came to 
be rationalised as such things as diseases, dementia, and neurosis. These apparatuses, 
for example the family, the workplace, the religious community, are normative and 
serve as a locus for the classification of phenomena that appear within them. This is 
further demonstrative of the notion that, rather than viewing the development of the psy 
disciplines as a logical and coterminous unfolding of scientific progress as applied to 
the human condition, with practitioners doing no more than refining and developing the 
application of scientific methods to effect understandings, treatments, and possible 
cures for unwanted conduct involving such things as homosexuality, masturbation, 
anxiety, idiocy, racial impurities, or bed-wetting, it is more appropriate to view such      
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development as being linked historically to how people have regulated, and have been 
regulated (Rose, 1999). Historically, the psy disciplines organised and developed 
around problems inherent to the hospital (e.g., Rush, 1812), the asylum (e.g., Hall, 
1895), the clinic (e.g., Witmer, 1907), the school (e.g., Binet & Simon, 1916), the boot 
camp (e.g., Yerkes, 1921), the factory (e.g., Mayo, 1933) – in short, the institution. 
Such institutional problems permits authorities to simplify conducts they may be 
concerned with (e.g., the assignment of work, the management of the sick, the 
punishment of the criminal), and the technologies of psychology accords these 
otherwise mundane activities a coherence and a rationale, and in doing so the very 
notion of authority is transformed (Foucault, 1967; Rose, 1996b). Consider that in the 
management of individuals‟ with bipolar disorder, considerable attention is directed 
towards obtaining assessments from friends, family, and work colleagues concerning an 
afflicted individual‟s function, and that such individuals are often encouraged to keep a 
„mood diary‟ by which prospective assessments can be made by clinicians (e.g., Yatham 
et al., 2005). In short, pre-existing forms of authority are transformed; they have 
become „infused‟ with psychology, and have become ethical to the extent that 
individuals‟ engage in an exercise of authority over themselves in a kind of therapeutic 
manner (Rose, 1996a, 1999).  
Rose suggests that these „practices of the self‟ can be understood and 
investigated by reference to three interrelated axes (Rose, 1996b, 1999). The first, that 
of „moral codes‟, relates to the manner in which the contemporary subject is attached to 
a „project of identity‟ in which life is evaluated and made meaningful as the product of 
„personal choice‟ (Rose, 1996b, pp. 119-120). Psychological values have become 
normative for all manner of everyday activities, and in relation to problematic affect 
persons might be enjoined to empower themselves by „seeking help‟ from a therapist or      
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perhaps a physician who can prescribe a psychopharmacological remedy (e.g., Gardner, 
2003; Rowe, Tilbury, Rapley, & O'Ferrall, 2003).  
The second, that of „ethical scenarios‟, relates to how psychological discourse is 
ubiquitous in settings where the conduct of individuals may be of concern for others, 
such as in the school, the workplace, and indeed the psychiatric hospital (Rose, 1996b, p. 
120). Psychology has altered how individuals come to make their lives meaningful to 
themselves, with a vast array of practices and locales created to permit „therapeutic 
engagement‟, with techniques developed and applied to the way in which each 
individual manages their own conduct (Rose, 1996b).  
Consider that with the exponential growth in the available literature on bipolar 
disorder that has occurred with the development and rapid uptake of internet based 
information sources, individuals are able to rapidly obtain information on what would 
have been, no more than a few years ago, only available in scientific journals. In one 
regard, the advent of consumer movements has seen the ownership of discourse 
concerning mental illness move from the specialised confines of scientific journals and 
the practices of professionals, to the photocopied leaflet of the support group and the 
web pages and online message boards of non-profit community groups. However, such 
ownership does not necessarily mean there has been a reconceptualisation or reworking 
of traditionalist tropes on mental illness, rather, there appears to have been a wholesale 
adoption of specialist discourse that is used in a fashion that perpetuates traditional 
formulations. In short, the „consumer‟ of mental health services has become a 
knowledgeable layperson, able to deploy psychological and psychiatric jargon 
efficiently in order to interact with professionals in a more equitable „partnership‟. Thus, 
rather than the management of bipolar disorder being the sole province of the 
professional practitioner or institution, it becomes a joint responsibility between 
„stakeholders‟.      
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The third aspect, drawing more directly from Foucault, concerns „techniques of 
the self‟. Such „techniques‟ comprise procedures elaborated by „experts‟ that can enable 
individuals to act upon themselves to realise a kind of autonomous selfhood (Rose, 
1996b, pp. 120-121). Moreover, such techniques seek to instantiate within individuals a 
“constant and intense self-scrutiny, an evaluation of our personal experiences, emotions, 
and feelings in relation to psychological images of fulfilment and autonomy” (Rose, 
1996b, p. 121). Consider the recommendations by clinicians that individuals with 
bipolar disorder keep a „mood diary‟ (Yatham et al., 2006), undertake 
„psychoeducation‟ in order to manage medication compliance (Colom, Vieta, Tacchi, 
Sanchez-Moreno, & Scott, 2005), or to seek out family planning advice prior to making 
any „reproductive decisions‟ (Viguera, Cohen, Bouffard, Whitfield, & Baldessarini, 
2002). 
The aforementioned serve to illustrate the central theme of Rose‟s position with 
regard to a consideration of the psy disciplines, namely that of an understanding of the 
psy disciplines as being important, not for what they necessarily are, but for what they 
do and what they permit. They function as „forms of thought‟ that permit certain ways 
of thinking about people and the self, and importantly, allow for some of these forms of 
thought to be seen as authoritative due to their scientific and professional origins 
(Foucault, 1970; Rose, 1999). For example, consider the account given by Neil Cole of 
his initial diagnosis of bipolar disorder, detailed in the opening paragraph of an article 
titled „A bipolar journey‟ published in the Australian and New Zealand Journal of 
Psychiatry:  
 
I was diagnosed with bipolar disorder in February 1993. At that time I was the shadow 
Attorney-General in the State Parliament of Victoria. My new psychiatrist, the second 
in 12 months, after 40 minutes into what I thought would be another round of soul-
searching psychotherapy, said: „I think you might be manic-depressive‟. To which I 
replied: „What‟s that?‟ He briefly explained it to me, said he wasn‟t sure I had it and      
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suggested I read a book called The ecstasy and the agony by Dr David Grounds. I read 
the book and returned the next week. He asked me what my reflections were on the 
book. I responded that I could identify with all of the characters, but it was a terrible 
plot. We both then agreed there was little doubt about the diagnosis. (Cole, 2004, p. 671, 
emphasis in original) 
 
In such an account, one might get a sense of the manner in which the psy 
disciplines are endowed with a mantle of credibility, such that a „shadow Attorney-
General‟ can come to accept as a possibility a tentative diagnosis of bipolar disorder 
after a 40 minute conversation. A diagnosis which is indeed ratified following not much 
more than a book reading. As Rose (1996b) suggests, such credibility also makes 
human beings amenable to having certain things done to them by others, in terms of 
calculated interventions (e.g., in Cole‟s case medication trials and hospitalisations), and 
other more psychological and dispositional practices (e.g., “My psychiatrist was happy I 
lost pre-selection. She thought the stress was too great for me. It was for me by then.” 
Cole, 2004, p. 672). 
But how might one gain a sense of how such practices, that are essentially only 
hinted at and alluded to in the current formulation, actually work? Indeed, what might 
count as a satisfactory description of such a practice? While Rose provides a compelling 
critical history (or as he describes his project, a “historical ontology of ourselves”, 1999, 
p. xiii) by which one can consider how the practices of the psy disciplines are 
inextricably tied up in their historical-sociocultural development and construction, such 
an approach is essentially silent when it comes to providing descriptions of actual, 
empirically observed, on-the-ground practices.  
Coulter and Practices of Insanity Ascription 
Working from a Wittgensteinian informed ethnomethodological position, Jeff 
Coulter has made the case that people may come to be ascribed as having a mental 
illness, not by virtue of the application of theoretically rigorous and scientifically robust      
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methods of diagnosis of specific mental disturbances, but essentially by way of 
judgments and discriminations which could be made, and indeed for their sensibility 
must be able to be made, by any member of a given culture (Coulter, 1973). Coulter 
suggests that, in relation to the specialised knowledge of those in the mental health 
professions, “the central point here is that even a psychiatrist must provide a case for his 
version that is congruent with commonsense knowledge” (1973, p. 85). More recently, 
but in a similar fashion, Rapley has argued a similar case with regard to the manner in 
which people come to be seen as having an „intellectual disability‟ (Rapley, 2004). In 
other words, would it make sense that a person could be diagnosed as having a mental 
illness if such a mental illness was not recognisable by others? 
As Coulter has suggested, „symptoms‟ are constructed as such from the 
application of a disease model to talk and conduct, with such talk and conduct taken as 
either evidence of some nominal disease process that gives rise to them, or treated as the 
disease itself. For example, within the scientific literature on bipolar disorder it is not 
unusual to find such statements as “a diagnosis of bipolar disorder can only be made 
with certainty if and when the manic syndrome declares itself” (Schweitzer et al., 2005, 
p.419, emphasis added). The notion that such a syndrome can in some way „declare 
itself‟ notably belies the practices by which such syndromes are constructed, principally 
by clinicians who ascribe the syndrome to individuals on the basis of conduct, with such 
conduct often evaluated solely on the basis of the avowals made by clients to clinicians; 
evaluations of conduct are the sole means by which a psychiatric diagnosis can be 
made.  
How does a manic syndrome come to „declare itself‟ to exist, if not by accounts 
given by clinicians that render conduct of persons it is postulated to afflict as 
declarations of the syndrome‟s presence? Further, such statements suggest that whatever 
factors may be relevant to the construction of specific diagnostic descriptions of      
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particular disorders, nonetheless something like a „manic syndrome‟ would be seen as 
such by any competent observer. Consider that the practices and procedures by which 
clinicians go about determining the existence or not of such a „manic syndrome‟ 
remains unexplicated in such accounts, for it would appear that the syndromes 
themselves appear to be readily visible, immediately apparent, and warrantable as 
confirmations of the diagnosis.  
In short, the practical application of psychiatric diagnosis to particular 
individuals is a thoroughly pragmatic affair (Coulter, 1973), whether that is achieved by 
the application of diagnostic criteria outlined in a psychiatric nosology, by the use of 
„clinical experience‟, or for that matter by determinations made when considering 
epidemiological data. The actual epistemological status of a „diagnosis‟ is something 
which is generally not considered in the day to day activities of those working within 
mental health domains. Rather, such status is a priori to the pragmatics of allocating 
treatment resources, determining insurance and disability payments, and otherwise 
managing the business associated with providing services to people who claim, or are 
identified by others, as requiring some form of assistance.  
While the reification of a disease model of bipolar disorder is something that 
may be required for nominal theoretical purposes, and is arguably instantiated in the 
current psychiatric nosologies (i.e., DSM and ICD), it would be amiss to presume that 
clinicians go about dealing with their clients as if they were considering a unique 
presentation of some strange phenomena on every occurrence, that warranted a detailed 
and exhaustive epistemological examination of the entire concept of „bipolar affective 
disorder‟ in a ten to fifteen minute consultation. Not to mention the metaphysical 
troubles that such clients might encounter on being presented with such examinations 
upon every visit to a clinician. This is not to suggest, however, that they and their clients 
do not engage in some form of practical epistemology, as opposed to some kind of      
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metaphysical, armchair philosophical considerations, as that is a pragmatic concern that 
is of an entirely different character (e.g., Whalen & Zimmerman, 1992). 
In this sense, Coulter suggests that being able to be diagnosed as being insane 
requires that there exist a priori a population of the insane, in other words a population 
of individuals diagnosed as insane, which has been constructed by a process of clinical 
diagnoses and judgments. And such diagnoses and judgments, although they may rely 
upon some form of psychopathological theory, rest upon commonsense judgments and 
ascriptions of insanity. And, critically, Coulter suggests that accounts of 
psychopathology, biogenetic or social in orientation, are often predicated on category 
errors.  
This leads to one of Coulter‟s major insights, which is to be found in his 
identification of what he describes as an “irremediable constraint” (1973, p. 6, emphasis 
in original) on all research involving the classification of mental illnesses, namely that 
the context-specificity of assessments made by practicing clinicians precludes the 
development of any adequate aetiological or epidemiological research that could 
provide generality pertaining to diagnostic procedures, practices, and nosologies. For 
example, epidemiological studies on bipolar disorder are predicated on the assumption 
that there exists a „base rate‟ or a „true level‟ of bipolar disorder (as comprised of 
bipolar „mood‟ episodes, genetic vulnerabilities, and so forth) in a particular population 
(e.g., Cassidy & Carroll, 2001; Cavanagh, 2004; Smoller & Finn, 2003; Tsuchiya, 
Byrne, & Mortensen, 2003). However, following from Coulter, given that bipolar 
disorder can only be ascribed to an individual on the basis of clinical judgement, the 
disorder can only become visible epidemiologically by way of practical interactions and 
judgmental processes. Unfortunately, this insight from Coulter has not been taken up 
with any noticeable degree of import within current relevant literatures.      
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Given the claim that bipolar disorder is essentially a judgement of moral conduct 
that is ascribed as if it were a disease process, it is difficult to review the voluminous 
literature dealing with the presumed underlying physical causes with anything less than 
a jaundiced view. For, if the great bulk of the literature has failed to attend to the 
manner in which peoples‟ ascriptions and avowals relating to such conduct (in the 
context of psychiatric and psychological dysfunction) is an essential underpinning for 
any attempt to conduct more detailed studies, then in the technical language of the psy 
practitioner, there may be significant issues concerning the construct validity of a great 
many proposed casual mechanisms. In other words, if people talk about „feeling sad‟ for 
example, formal descriptions of such talk not attentive to the manner in which such talk 
may feature in-and-as the complex performance of situated and contextually relevant 
social actions, may well provide for a unwarranted inference that such talk is necessarily 
reflective or indicative of some underlying pathology.   
Now, while appeals that findings of statistical regularity of the presence of 
particular categories in a population is evidence of both the validity of the concept the 
categories define, and the reliability of said categories, all such appeals founder on the 
premise that all that is being identified are regularities of a logical-grammatical form. 
That is to say, all that is being elucidated is that words like „high‟ might be related in 
some sense to words like „excited‟, and perhaps that seemingly counter-intuitively 
words like „elevated‟ can be related to „depressed‟. This, of course, is exactly the 
problem with most forms of social science research that post-Wittgensteinian forms of 
discursive scholarship have sought to foreground.  
Indeed, this particular form of critique is given support by work that has exposed 
serious issues regarding the problematic nature of diagnostic reliability and validity in 
psychiatric nosologies (Duffy et al., 2002; Kirk & Kutchins, 1992), the manner in which 
theoretical and methodological issues concerning the validity and reliability of      
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psychiatric nosology are contested (Berrios, 1999; Bertelsen, 1999; Crowe, 2000; Duffy 
et al., 2002; Grob, 1991; Houts, 2000; Jablensky, 1999; Kirk & Kutchins, 1992), and the 
recognition of the heterogeneity of bipolar disorder and problems associated with 
imprecise diagnostic categories (Alda, 2004; Angst & Gamma, 2002; Dunner, 2003; 
Harpaz-Rotem & Rosenheck, 2004; Himmelhoch, 2003; Parker, 2003; Smith et al., 
2004). 
As Coulter argues, psychiatric diagnoses founder on the problem that 
interpersonal standards of conduct cannot be codified in the same manner as 
physiological systems. An important and often unremarked upon issue is that theories of 
bipolar disorder, and more specifically the predominant ones that are focused on issues 
pertaining to biogenetic accounts, draw in large measure for their support evidence from 
practicing health workers who utilise the same theories as resources for the practicalities 
involved with working with clients (Coulter, 1973, p. 22). This problem, of theory-as-
resource, is a problem insofar as it leads both theorists and practitioners into conceptual 
and methodological pitfalls when work is undertaken towards the further development 
and extension of a positivist approach to mental health matters (cf. Rose‟s account 
where the linkages between a psychological theory and a related practice are, and are 
possibly required to be made, transparent; Rose, 1996a, 1996b). 
However, one might approach the apparent discrepancies and divergent 
theorising concerning bipolar disorder as less a „problem‟ that needs resolution if one is 
to provide accounts of bipolar disorder that might achieve a „final word‟ on the topic, 
but rather as illustrative of the manner in which persons who have some stake in the 
issue of bipolar disorder go about the business of making sense of their practical 
actions. In other words, while the scientific literature provides not one, but many 
competing accounts of the epistemological and ontological status of „bipolar disorder‟ 
with regard to such issues as the theoretical foundations for clinical diagnosis,      
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treatment, and so forth, it may well be that the actual practices of dealing with the 
category as a social categorisation are less problematic.  
For example, the ascription of the category to an individual generally takes place 
outside the highly operationalised confines of the technical, scientific literature, and yet 
people routinely diagnose the disorder, get diagnosed with the disorder, prescribe and 
undertake treatments for the disorder, and appear to have some understanding of what 
the disorder is. In this regard, professionals and consumers of mental health services 
appear to orient to the category of „bipolar disorder‟ not as either practicing or lay 
scientists, but as persons going about their everyday affairs who adequately deal with 
the practical and pragmatic matters associated with „having a psychiatric condition‟. 
Consider that in the absence of any gross pathological, or more specific 
neuropathological procedures by which the presence of the bipolar disease entity can be 
confirmed, criteria which are used to determine the validation of any particular „case‟ of 
bipolar disorder are essentially limited to the “internal cohesion of the clinical picture” 
and “course and outcome” (Cavanagh, 2004, p. 204). Consider the criteria of the 
„internal cohesion‟ of the „clinical picture‟, which Cavanagh leaves unexplicated. I 
would suggest that such „internal cohesion‟ could be regarded as a gloss for a 
„convincing narrative‟, a rhetorically constructed and positioned account concerning a 
particular person incorporating a range of vernacular descriptions that can be rendered 
in ostensibly „clinical‟ terminology. In other words, a diagnosis of bipolar disorder in a 
given instance is to be validated, and can only be validated, by reference to the very 
accounts that serve in its production. Moreover, with regard to the second criteria, that 
of „course and outcome‟, any account can only be examined post hoc, that is to say, by 
reference to the utility it may have in assessing any potential „course and outcome‟ once 
a diagnosis has already been made.       
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With regard to such accounts, what remains unexplicated are the practices that 
enable the production of plausible accounts, those that essentially define the disorder, 
and how such practices in turn may become the very practices by which any account of 
„course and outcome‟ can be evaluated. In short, unless and until psychiatry has at its 
disposal some form of verification of the disorder than can be rhetorically positioned as 
remaining outside the domain of what could be characterised as „account production‟, it 
would appear to remain vulnerable to critical contestation of its ostensibly scientific 
credentials on both ontological and epistemological grounds.  
However, investigations concerning the production of accounts of the disorder, 
accounts pertaining to the disorder‟s validation, and how accounts of these accounts are 
produced, may be of some utility to both critics and practitioners working in psychiatric 
domains. This should not be considered a trivial or pointless undertaking. After all, 
consider the claim that bipolar disorder had at one time been effectively a kind of „gold 
standard‟ with regard to conceptualisations of psychiatric disorders as diseases, but is 
now in danger of losing its utility as such a standard (Baldessarini, 2000). Moreover, 
consider the suggestion that bipolar disorder “has become more heterogeneous and there 
is increasing evidence that different subtypes of the disorder need different 
pharmocotherapeutical approaches” (Greil & Kleindienst, 2003, p. 45). In short, there 
would appear to be a warrant for undertaking investigations of account production 
practices concerning bipolar disorder, given that contemporary clinical categorisations 
appear not only to be unsatisfactory but also consequentially linked to such things the 
medication and hospitalisation of a growing number of vulnerable and „uninformed‟ 
consumers who until recently would have remained outside the gaze of clinicians, 
researchers, and insurance providers: namely children (Harpaz-Rotem & Rosenheck, 
2004).       
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What Coulter suggests is that for researchers investigating „insanity‟, the move 
should be away from providing accounts that seek to explain insanity, and towards 
providing descriptions of how insanity is ascribed – in other words towards a 
“culturally indigenous ethnopsychiatry” (1973, p. 114). In this regard, Coulter is 
operating from a descriptive epistemological position that highlights the manner in 
which observations are transformed analytically as being representative of rules that in 
some sense „reside‟ within such things as „brains‟, „cultures‟, and „minds‟ (McHoul, 
1988a). Coulter suggests that in order to bypass such problems those working in the 
social sciences need to consider seriously the idea that explanatory frameworks 
requiring an appeal to „rules‟ should be discarded (1973).
3 For example, when 
considering the issue of mental illness, the practices associated with the ascribing of 
diagnostic classifications should be considered as significant as any other aspect, such 
as treatment and etiological issues. The critical focus is directed toward the processes 
and practices which lead up to and bring about such things as the making of a clinical 
diagnosis, the prescribing of a particular treatment, or the examination of any casual 
factors. 
As Coulter suggests, psychiatric practices are bound up with the concerns of 
everyday life, and the presupposed objectivity of psychiatric diagnoses and judgements 
is perhaps less a matter of the application of universal principles and more a matter of 
pragmatic concern with individual situations and circumstances (1973, p. 150). 
Moreover, mental health procedures that are divorced from cultural conventions and 
standards could be seen as essentially irrelevant to the practical delivery of health care, 
as the displacement of the pragmatic features that constitute the bulk of the work that 
concerns health care workers in favour of context free procedural prescriptions can only 
furnish artificial and arbitrary modes of action (1973, p. 150). As Coulter suggests “we 
                                                 
3 This issue will be given further consideration in Chapter 3.      
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are frequently engaged in the methodical specification of people‟s minds. We can 
accomplish this work for practical purposes because we are equipped with conventional 
inferential procedures” (1973, p. 155, emphasis added). 
Rose, Coulter, and Practices 
I regard the accounts provided by Rose and Coulter as (exceptionally) useful 
sociological glosses concerning the various practices of psychology and psychiatry, and 
as affording a basis from which I might develop an orientation to how such practices 
might be described, in contrast to accounts of such disciplines and their practices as 
being essentially analogues of the natural sciences. In other words, while Rose does not 
provide empirical descriptions of particular practices, he does provide for something 
that counts, for my purposes, as a kind of jarring, unsettling description. A description 
that proffers a means by which one can consider a possible relationship between the 
local, situated practices of the psy disciplines (for example the testing of individuals 
cognitive capacities, the measurement of „opinions‟, the delivery of therapeutic 
interventions and so forth) and the manner in which such a „complex‟ (Rose, 1985) 
itself renders such local practices as intelligible and understandable by reference to its 
own macro descriptive and explanatory accounts. And, while Coulter presents a 
conceptual critique by which one can examine the underpinnings of contemporary 
theories and practices relating to (for example) the identification of bipolar disorder, 
which suggests they are built on-and-as a slew of ordinary and mundane kinds of 
ascriptive practices, as opposed to any „technical‟ and „specialised‟ procedures that 
psychology and psychiatry may posit such determination require, he does not touch 
upon the historical formation of such concepts or practices.  
Now, if one has a specialised interest in categorisation, consider how Rose and 
Coulter might be read in a manner that suggests the utility in examining the manner in 
which categorisation practices, operative in-and-as a diverse range of sites, situations,      
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contexts, discourses, technologies, and so forth can produce something like „bipolar 
disorder‟ as a utterly unremarkable and straightforward description of a person. For 
example, it is in the reformulation of persons‟ moral conduct, in-and-as publicly 
available practices, by way of categorisations that relate to ostensibly individualised, 
private, psychological states, by which one might gain some sense of the manner in 
which the „practices of the self‟ of Rose and the „conventional inferential procedures‟ of 
Coulter might intersect. However, what is missing from both accounts is any detailed, 
empirical examination of actual practices. Rather, both concentrate on providing 
conceptual analyses (albeit in different domains). 
To illustrate this point, consider that given the rather unscientific and vague 
nature of the principal instrument for guiding psychiatric diagnosis of bipolar disorder 
(i.e., DSM), numerous commentators have suggested that clinicians employ an 
essentially pragmatic use of psychiatric nosology systems (e.g., Frances & Egger, 1999; 
Gillett, 1999). For example, a critical user of the DSM-IV-TR might be portrayed as 
utilising the nosology in an attempt to pool and compare observations to enable the 
production of a provisional conception of what constitutes bipolar disorder. But if that is 
the case, how do researchers, hospital administrators, insurance companies, and 
government departments come to make sense of bipolar disorder with application to any 
individual? Does this render the entire project of mental health research, treatment, and 
management of bipolar disorder that rests upon the use of psychiatric nosology as 
provisional?  
One might suggest that post-hoc appeals to the pragmatic nature of nosology are 
merely apologist, with professions that cannot convincingly identify and describe the 
illnesses they claim to treat as deserving of sustained critical inquiry (Kirk & Kutchins, 
1992). The notion that psychiatric nosology is merely a way to assist individuals‟ 
attempts to communicate observations about perceived bipolar-like phenomena,      
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suggests that it does not matter how we may talk about the phenomena of bipolar 
disorder as long as it is acknowledged to really exist. This type of justification suggests 
that, ceteris paribus, the Malleus Maleficarum was merely a pragmatic method of 
determining if a particular individual was a witch – while the document may well 
contain errors in logic and of fact, the a priori existence of witches was not to be 
disputed. Perhaps, with a nod to Thomas Szasz (1971), development of a Malleus 
Maleficarum II may have provided for more reliable methods of witch hunting?  
In this sense, the identification, diagnosis, and treatment of bipolar disorder in a 
given individual are not to be seen as isolated, clinical activities that merely involve the 
application of diagnostic rules and procedures to observed and reported behaviour. For 
example, one might suggest that the ascription of a clinical diagnosis of bipolar disorder 
could be seen as involving a number of related actions, to which we might assign 
categories such as „judgemental‟, „performative‟, „professional‟, and „administrative‟. A 
diagnosis is judgemental in that it categorises the behaviour of an individual in a broad 
social context as being either normal or abnormal. It is performative in that, in addition 
to guiding the choice of therapeutic interventions, it takes place within medical and 
legal constraints that may have implications for individuals‟ rights and obligations, for 
example in matters concerning criminal liability, access to employment, or custody of 
children. It is professional in that it constitutes a display of scientific and professional 
competence and authority concerning a matter of problematic human functioning. And 
it is administrative in that it provides essential data for bureaucratic functions related to 
such things as mental health service delivery, and importantly, aids in further accretion 
of scientific knowledge to the corpus of material concerning the bipolar disorders 
themselves. Thus, to relegate the importance of psychiatric nosology to that of being 
merely a way in which disinterested and objective clinicians can communicate their 
observations to others is misplaced.       
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However, this serves to occlude an important concern, that in such 
considerations one may fail to appreciate that formal accounts detailing any psychiatric 
nosology, any diagnostic criteria, any treatment recommendation, any review of 
treatment efficacy, any epidemiological survey, any clinical treatment guideline for 
bipolar disorder can only ever be approached as loose, informal, and provisional in 
actual clinical psychiatric and psychological practice. That is to say, more thorough 
investigations of the practices by which such formal accounts of „bipolar disorder‟ are 
claimed to inform may be required.  
Conclusion 
Drawing from these general themes, and more specifically from work that has 
undertaken examination of practices associated with the doing of „intellectual disability‟ 
(Rapley, 2004; Rapley, Kiernan, & Antaki, 1998), „attention deficit/hyperactivity 
disorder‟ (McHoul & Rapley, 2005a), and psychiatric conceptualisations of „delusions‟ 
(McCabe, Heath, Burns, & Priebe, 2002; McCabe, Leudar, & Antaki, 2004; Palmer, 
2000), if one is to understand the way in which „manic depressive‟ or „bipolar‟ 
individuals are somehow different from those who are not describable as such, it is 
critical that an examination of what such people actually do be seriously considered. 
Such an undertaking stands in contrast to those generating inferences based on 
psychological measures of „quality of life‟ (e.g., Chand, Mattoo, & Sharan, 2004), 
determinations as to whether people have „insight‟ (e.g., Dell'Osso et al., 2002), or the 
statistical aggregation of a bewildering range of variables, factors, and demographic 
„risk‟ indicators furnished by the psy disciplines that occludes peoples‟ lived 
experiences (e.g., Sierra, Livianos, & Rojo, 2005; Tsuchiya et al., 2003; Valtonen et al., 
2006). In addition, examinations that attend to the practices by which such people come 
to be describable as „bipolar‟ are of equal, if not greater, importance given that almost 
all theoretical, research based, and clinical endeavours treat the „bipolar individual‟ as      
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an entity seemingly disconnected from the actual practices that underpin any such 
identification. 
For example, in their examination of a diagnostic session involving a young boy, 
his parents, and a paediatrician, McHoul and Rapley (2005) provide an analysis of how 
routine and mundane the act of diagnosis and medication for „attention-
deficit/hyperactivity disorder‟ (ADHD) is, even when such a diagnosis is met with 
resistance. They employ a „hybrid‟ methodological approach, involving a critical 
discourse analytic positioning of their investigation with respect to local political and 
social concerns around the high rate of diagnosis and treatment for ADHD in Western 
Australia, an ethnomethodological and conversation analytic examination of the manner 
in which various „social facts‟ concerning a child‟s behaviour are constructed as such 
in-and-through talk-in-interaction, and a discursive psychological analysis of how 
professional accounts concerning contested psychological categorisations come into 
conflict with ordinary, everyday, commonsensical usages of such terms.  
In this manner, rather than providing yet another decontextualised rendering of 
ADHD as a thing in the world that can be revealed by inferential statistical techniques, 
manipulation of variables in experimental settings, or by examination of medication 
prescription rates, they suggest that the literature and research in this area has essentially 
failed to examine how the ascription of ADHD can come to be produced as an “actual, 
recordable, retrievable and therefore analysable, real event in the world” (McHoul & 
Rapley, 2005a, p. 446, emphasis in original). They offer their detailed analysis of a 
single transcript to illustrate: 
 
… that a single case, analysed in some degree of detail, may shed light on how, on a 
day-to-day basis (and as any „macro‟-analysis‟s always and necessarily missing topic), 
such gross pharmacological and statistical outcomes could possibly be locally 
generated. (McHoul & Rapley, 2005a, p. 446, emphasis in original) 
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Relevant to the current investigation, the act of diagnosis and related endeavours 
serves as a critical foundation on which to assess the claims that bipolar disorder is 
something that, rather than existing in the world awaiting discovery, is something that is 
constructed, produced, or otherwise made relevant in-and-as human praxis. Bipolar 
disorder, rather than being identified solely as a clinical, pathological, disease entity that 
might be „discovered‟ by the objective gaze of the researcher or clinician, can also be 
regarded as involving conduct and descriptions of conduct, involving numerous, 
multiform practices, that are made locally relevant and “visible-rational-and-reportable-
for-all-practical-purposes, i.e., „accountable‟” (Garfinkel, 1967, vii). What such 
practices might be, how they might be investigated empirically, and the manner in 
which descriptions might be provided of them, is the topic of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Describing Description in the Social Sciences 
 
In any case, till we have described the category, suicide, i.e., produced a description of 
the procedure employed for assembling cases of the class, the category is not even 
potentially part of the sociological apparatus. (Sacks, 1963, p. 8)  
 
It would appear that a paradigmatic aim of the social sciences has been to 
provide explanations of differential rates within and between measurements of a range 
of behavioural categories, be they „suicide‟, „crime‟, „intelligence‟, „attitudes‟, „mental 
illness‟, „emotions‟, and so forth. And while such categorisations may be characterised 
as being, or referring to, „hypothetical constructs‟, „operational definitions‟, „biological 
entities‟, or even „social constructions‟, nonetheless the data collected, aggregated, and 
disseminated using such categories are taken to exist in the social and psychological 
world independently of any particular categorisations (Atkinson, 1981). In other words, 
while an explanation of a differential rate of „suicide‟ associated with a „mental illness‟ 
such as „bipolar disorder‟ (e.g., Oquendo & Mann, 2006) may be open to contestation, 
the data pointing to rates of suicide for those deemed to have bipolar disorder, for 
example, are to be taken as they appear – facts of the social world.  
In considering how the assessment of „delinquents‟ was undertaken by official 
agencies, Cicourel (1968) provided for an account of how such things as „class 
background‟ and „family circumstances‟ were considered by agency officials as they 
undertook the making of consequential determinations concerning the application of 
legal action in relation to particular children identified as „delinquents‟.
1 What Cicourel 
found was that children from ostensibly low income or „broken‟ families were 
considerably more likely to be processed through official channels than those children 
who came from less disrupted families – and whom might have „respectable‟ parents 
                                                 
1 Summary presented here drawn from an excellent synopsis provided by Atkinson (1981).      
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that officials could „have a word‟ with. In short, in the making of determinations 
concerning the placement of children, officials were essentially making „common-
sense‟ judgements about the „typical delinquent‟, and as such large numbers of 
„working-class‟ children, from „broken homes‟, came to constitute the official statistics 
on delinquency. These statistics then served to furnish the conclusions for researchers, 
drawing upon them, that variables like „broken homes‟ and „working-class‟ 
backgrounds are implicated as correlates or causes of delinquency. 
In regard to such „common-sense‟ judgements concerning the facts of the social 
world, Sacks describes how there is a group of professionals who are in the business of 
not regarding the actions or appearances of people in a taken-for-granted manner, 
namely the police (Sacks, 1972b). Sacks suggests that police are charged with the task 
of having to look at the normal appearances that people may present, with persons of 
interest to the police (i.e., criminals) having some concern with ensuring that those 
normal appearances are in fact how they present themselves in order to not arouse 
police suspicion, in a manner that allows them to identify and locate criminals and 
criminal activity. Sacks suggested that police use an „incongruity procedure‟ that 
enables them to simultaneously view persons and events in a manner that allows for 
appearances to be seen as potentially questionable, but that permits for general 
appearances to be not doubted. Indeed, the same can be said for the objects of police 
interest, namely criminals, with Sacks making the point that “as the police are oriented 
to using appearances as evidence of criminality, so criminals are oriented to using 
appearances as fronts, i.e. as hindrances to recognition” (Sacks, 1972b, p. 284). 
Sacks points to an important caveat with regard to the utilisation of a kind of 
specialised knowledge that the police may bring to bear on apprehending criminals, 
determining the truth of statements, and other activities that fall within the 
policeperson‟s usual domain, that police are required to provide descriptions and      
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accounts of what has lead them to perform particular activities (e.g., the arrest of a 
particular suspect) such that anyone might reasonably be able to understand the grounds 
by which such activities are justifiable (Sacks, 1972b).
2 
Consider, then, that social scientific theories and explanations of such things as 
„delinquency‟ or „criminal activity‟ that do not take into account the theories and 
procedures employed by those who are in the business of making such pragmatic 
determinations (e.g., court officials, police officers), and that take as their data the 
products of such „lay‟, „impoverished‟, or „unsophisticated‟ knowledge and practices 
(e.g., „rates of delinquency‟, „criminal charges‟), might only comprise essentially 
confounded variants of the very things they seek to surmount, namely, „folk theories‟ 
predicated on „common-sense‟ knowledge. 
Notwithstanding such a claim, given the apparent order one observes in the 
social world, refinements in social scientific theories, methods, and procedures 
presumably might allow social scientists from a wide range of disciplinary affiliations 
to overcome such problems, and undertake more accurate investigations. However, 
what the aforementioned touch upon is that in undertaking social scientific 
investigations that posit social life as essentially orderly and regular, a presumption of 
the independence of facts appears to be a prerequisite commitment for any such 
endeavours. Indeed, it would seem that to observe social life as orderly one must have 
available some independent facts that in some sense can be extracted from the social 
world, and that to have such independent facts one must posit the existence of a social 
world that allows for the extraction of such facts. In other words, it would seem that 
both are required, or somehow interconnected, in order that a social science can be both 
thinkable and doable in practice.  
                                                 
2 Note the resonance with Coulter‟s account concerning ascriptions of mental illness in Chapter 1.      
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Ethnomethodology 
In examining the production of such a social order, Harold Garfinkel conducted 
a number of investigations during the 1950‟s and 1960‟s, collected and published as 
Studies in Ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967), that posited that human actions and 
institutions require that members are able to make shared sense of their situations, and 
moreover that members act on such shared sense making. In a collaborative social 
science study of juries in the 1950s (as reported in Garfinkel, 1974) researchers were 
interested in studying the tape recordings made of jurors‟ deliberations, in an attempt to 
provide an analysis of reasoning in a naturally observed non-experimental setting. In 
one instance they obtained recordings of deliberations from a particular court case (a 
later legal ruling prohibited the use of the recordings by the researchers), however, what 
became a critical issue in considering how to go about analysing jurors deliberations 
was how one might avoid reducing the natural reasoning of the jurors into pre-existing 
social science categories.  
Garfinkel noted that as jurors engaged in discourse concerning the facts of the 
case and what evidence could be considered reasonable, consistent, and logically 
coherent, jurors might make disclaimers such as “I‟m not a lawyer, but …” then proceed 
to debate, negotiate, and otherwise engage in discourse that accommodated concepts 
such as fairness and justice (Garfinkel, 1974). What Garfinkel attempted to do, was to 
investigate such „lay usage‟ without conceptualising such usage as being something of a 
degraded form of professional knowledge. Rather, what was considered was the 
possibility that everyday or lay language and practices are largely unconnected with 
professional ones, which themselves are grounded in ordinary language history and 
community experience. Indeed, the so-called professional language might be regarded 
more likely a source of possible distortion than the lay usage.      
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Thus, Garfinkel coined the term „ethnomethodology‟ to recognise that the 
solution to the social scientists‟ dilemma was to understand that in their attempts to 
develop a methodology to approach the question of investigating and understanding 
jurors‟ natural reasoning, that what they were doing should not be considered any less a 
part of the social world, and that their methodology was not solely within the province 
of social science (Garfinkel, 1974). Ethnomethodology, then, could be used as a means 
by which attention could be drawn to the problematic manner in which endogenous 
investigations of methodology are connected with, and serve to reflexively organise, 
social practices (Lynch, 2002a). In short, the distinction between knowledge (of the 
scientist) and the beliefs or practices of those studied becomes one that is open to 
further investigation. In short, ethnomethodology seeks to uncover the self-organising 
principles of social activities by way of an examination of the work members perform to 
organise such activities (Benson & Hughes, 1983; Garfinkel, 2007; Heritage, 1984b).  
In examining the production of social order, by way of investigations of 
members‟ practical activities, it is important to note that as members go about their 
everyday activities, they do not and cannot routinely attend to the reflexive nature of 
either their actions or accounts, for to do so would render the doing of such as 
problematic (Garfinkel, 1967). For example, someone engaged in a conversation with 
friends at a café may give an account of their activities as „having lunch‟; however, they 
would not consider themselves to be a „lunch theorist‟. Indeed, to attend to providing an 
account of each and every element of „having lunch‟ (e.g., „drinking coffee‟, „engaging 
in conversation‟, „glancing at others‟) while engaged in the actual, practical activities 
that constitute the doing of  „having lunch‟ may well render the doing of such an activity 
problematic.  
To address this issue, which could be glossed as „the problem of the invisibility 
of common sense‟ (ten Have, 2002), Garfinkel considered that if one could engineer      
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disruptions and breaks in the social order, these might reveal the operations of such 
taken-for-granted, common-sense practices. Garfinkel conducted a number of so-called 
„breaching experiments‟, wherein students were instructed to act in ways that could be 
construed as challenging conventional social understandings and practices. Or as 
Garfinkel more delightfully characterised things “procedurally it is my preference to 
start with familiar scenes and ask what can be done to make trouble” (Garfinkel, 1967, 
p. 37). Such tasks included requesting that students pretend to be boarders in their own 
homes, to ask people in everyday conversation to clarify all of their remarks, and to 
approach customers in shops and act as-if the customer was a sales assistant. 
In providing such examples, Garfinkel suggested that the properties of general, 
everyday understandings, rather than being viewed as “precoded entries on a memory 
drum” should be examined as resulting from persons‟ furnishing a “background of seen 
but unnoticed features of common discourse whereby actual utterances are recognised 
as events of common, reasonable, understandable, plain talk” (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 41). 
These unnoticed properties of everyday discourse are considered to be the preconditions 
that allow people to make claims to understand others and themselves, and Garfinkel 
suggested that when people attempt to depart from such usages there will be attempts 
made to restore things to some proper state. Two examples provided by Garfinkel 
include: 
 
CASE 6 
The victim waved his hand cheerily. 
(S)  How are you? 
(E)  How am I in regard to what? My health, my finances, my school work,  
        my peace of mind, my …? 
(S)  (Red in the face and suddenly out of control.) Look! I was just trying to  
        be polite. Frankly, I don‟t give a damn how you are. 
   (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 44) 
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CASE 1 
The subject was telling the experimenter, a member of the subject‟s car pool, about 
having had a flat tire while going to work the previous day. 
(S)   I had a flat tire. 
(E)   What do you mean, you had a flat tire? 
She appeared momentarily stunned. Then she answered in a hostile way: “What do you 
mean, „What do you mean?‟ A flat tire is a flat tire. That is what I meant. Nothing 
special. What a crazy question!”  
   (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 42) 
 
These examples are demonstrative of the somewhat obtuse point that Garfinkel 
was making, that for people going about their everyday affairs, they generally do not 
permit others to understand “what they are really talking about” in a manner that 
follows from “strict rational discourse as these are idealized in the rules that define an 
adequate logical proof” (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 41). In other words, the social practices that 
people engage in cannot be easily cast in social scientific terms, models, or taxonomies. 
They cannot be dismantled, reduced, or replaced – in short they are „irremediable‟ 
(Garfinkel, 1967).  
Garfinkel suggests that efforts to overcome the ubiquitousness of „common-
sense‟ practices in providing social scientific accounts, by dismissing them as „folk‟ 
practices‟ that stand in need of more formal, scientific, and presumably correct 
renderings, is analogous to tearing down the walls of a building in order to see what 
holds the roof up. Or, as Sacks remarked, that the application of social science 
definitions to phenomena is akin to “erecting a headstone over a grave” (as cited in 
Laurier & Philo, 2004, p. 433). In regard to these social practices, and the investigation 
of „common-sense‟ knowledge, Garfinkel provided a number of formulations that could 
be seen as foundational to the adoption of an „ethnomethodological attitude‟, the most 
salient including indexicality, reflexivity, accountability, and the „documentary method 
of interpretation‟.      
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Within linguistics and philosophy, indexical expressions are those expressions 
that are understood by virtue of the contexts and occasions in which they are used, such 
as „I‟, „this‟, „that‟, „here‟, „now‟, and so forth. What Garfinkel proposed was that the 
entire language was profoundly indexical on all occasions, and for all actions, as it is 
used by members, and that the meaning of everyday talk is dependent upon the context 
in which talk occurs (Benson & Hughes, 1983; ten Have, 2002). Importantly, context 
itself is indexical, and this has serious consequences for any undertaking that attempts to 
replace indexical expressions with expressions that are putatively context independent, 
for this can only produce further indexical expressions. Such undertakings, whether 
they be social scientific endeavours to explicitly produce „context-free‟ technical 
languages, or practices by which people go about their everyday affairs, are all bound 
by the indexical nature of language.  
In short, whatever clarity, precision, or agreement is displayed in language, it 
can only be occasioned as such (Hilbert, 1992) Indeed, Garfinkel positioned the notion 
of indexicality as a canonical principle of ethnomethodology, with the use of “the term 
„ethnomethodology‟ to refer to the investigation of the rational properties of indexical 
expressions and other practical actions as contingent ongoing accomplishments of 
organized artful practices of everyday life” (1967, p. 11).   
With language in its entirety indexical, members attempt to make sense and 
meaning of talk by reserving judgement prospectively and applying sense 
retrospectively (Garfinkel, 1967). By way of example, in Sudnow‟s (1965) study of the 
social organisation of a public defender‟s office, clients were given the opportunity to 
plead guilty in a plea bargain, or could not plead and take their chances in court. What 
Sudnow demonstrated, was that the meaning of being a criminal is not contained within 
a particular „criminal act‟, but can be seen to be emergent from the context in which 
such a „criminal act‟ can be interpreted, with attorneys having understandings of certain      
  60 
clients as being atypical and deserving of special handling, with other clients being 
understood as being charged with typical „normal crimes‟ which could be processed 
with standard procedures and plea bargaining.  
Ethnomethodology posits that the facts about society are features accomplished 
by members using practical reasoning and common-sense knowledge as they go about 
their everyday activities, and accounts given about society become constituent 
components of the very things they describe, in other words they are reflexive (Benson 
& Hughes, 1983). Garfinkel considered that members invoke accepted facts or patterns 
(e.g., rules) to provide accounts of their actions, with this constitutive of a reaffirmation 
of the existence of the very same facts or patterns. That the same facts and patterns can 
be utilised in different contexts, at different times, to offer alternate or contradictory 
accounts points to the meaning of any particular fact or pattern as being embedded in 
the particulars of a specific situation, and moreover, subject to a consensual process of 
meaning construction (Marcon & Gopal, 2003). The study by Wieder (1974) that 
examined the „convict code‟ of paroled ex-convicts living in a halfway house provides a 
detailed commentary on issues of reflexivity.  
This leads to another canonical statement offered by Garfinkel concerning 
ethnomethodology, namely that “the activities whereby members produce and manage 
settings of organized everyday affairs are identical with members‟ procedures for 
making those settings „account-able‟” (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 1). This notion of 
„accountability‟ refers to intelligibility (rather than liability or responsibility) in that 
members can design their actions such that the „sense‟ of such actions is immediately 
apparent to others, or at least readily explicable to others, and as such the 
understandability and expressability of any given activity are essential components of 
that activity (ten Have, 2002). Social phenomena of all types, varieties, and 
manifestations are thus to be described by ethnomethodology in terms of their essential      
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accountability. For example, if one considers „suicide‟, whether as an action (i.e., as in 
„a suicide‟), or as a categorisation of conduct (i.e., as „suicidal‟), such determinations 
are required to be accountable, that is they must be observable, reportable, and 
describable as „a suicide‟ or as „suicidality‟. The upshot of this for those involved in 
social science research is that the way in which members go about making their 
activities intelligible can be explicated from the accounts that members themselves 
provide (Garfinkel, 1967).  
Another of the canonical terms associated with Garfinkel is the „documentary 
method of interpretation‟. While Garfinkel derived the term from earlier work by 
Mannheim (Heritage, 1984b)
3 in Garfinkel‟s rendering it refers to a process in which 
members see other members‟ actions as expressions of „patterns‟, and these „patterns‟ 
enable the members to see what the actions are (Benson & Hughes, 1983). Later 
appearances and actions may result in a reinterpretation, or reconstruction, of what the 
previously seen appearances „really were‟, and importantly:  
 
Not only is the underlying pattern derived from its individual documentary evidences, 
but the individual documentary evidences, in their turn, are interpreted on the basis of 
„what is known‟ about the underlying pattern. Each is used to elaborate the other. 
(Garfinkel, 1967, p. 78) 
 
In other words, the documentary method of interpretation serves to emphasise 
the socially shared nature of sense making, and the procedural and methodic 
organisation of „common-sense‟ knowledge (Watson, 1997). This process of 
documentary interpretation is presented as providing for a way in which sociological 
accounts, be those of professional social scientists or lay members, can describe the 
features of members‟ practical reasoning (Benson & Hughes, 1983; Heritage, 1984b). 
And as Watson suggests, this can be seen to stand in some contrast to understandings of 
                                                 
3 Heritage (1984b, p. 84) also notes that this idea was not unfamiliar to phenomenologists since Husserl.      
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sense making that posit the primacy of individualistic, private, internal operations 
(Watson, 1997).  
Ordinary Language and Zero-Degree Accounts 
While Garfinkel‟s earlier work (Garfinkel, 1967) makes reference to the work of 
the social phenomenology of Alfred Schutz, and in recent expositions is presented as a 
kind of rival to a Husserlian programme (Garfinkel & Liberman, 2007) and can be 
understood as a continuation of a phenomenological tradition, it can also be approached 
as being compatible with the „ordinary language philosophy‟ tradition as represented by 
the work of those such as Wittgenstein (1967a), Austin (1962) and Ryle (1949). Indeed, 
Garfinkel and Sacks acknowledged the influence of Wittgenstein, going so far as to 
suggest that with regard to their conception of indexical expressions that the later 
Wittgenstein examined “philosopher‟s talk as indexical phenomena” and suggested that 
one can read Wittgenstein as comprising “a sustained, extensive, and penetrating corpus 
of observations of indexical phenomena” (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970, p. 348).
4 
But what of the obvious critique, that ethnomethodological studies of members‟ 
activities are themselves subject to the same analyst-member problems that 
ethnomethodology claims plague all forms of social science research? Coulter argues 
that the issue to consider is the issue of theorising (Coulter, 1999). Following from 
Wittgenstein, who argued against theory construction as a means by which 
philosophical problems could be dissolved, and Garfinkel who essentially argued the 
same with regard to theory in sociology, Coulter advocates the importance of analysis, 
with the ethnomethodological insight being: 
 
Our ordinary language and practical, commonsense reasoning, never having been 
subject to serious empirical-analytic inquiry, comprises methods and resources so dense 
and so rich for producing social orders of all stripes that „theorising‟ was redundant. It 
                                                 
4 Attention has been drawn to this observation by several commentators, notably Heritage (1984b, p. 
122).      
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could only and ever idealise, abstract from, restrict the appeal to, select from, distort 
and, thereby, stipulatively circumvent, the real issues that actually, in their rich integrity, 
arise within our ordinary affairs, including the issues pertaining to the putatively 
„mental‟ attributes and features of persons. (Coulter, 1999, p. 177, emphasis in original) 
 
Winch, in discussing the problematic relationship between social science and its 
domain of inquiry, makes a point that has some resonance with Coulter‟s position on 
ethnomethodology: 
 
If we are going to compare the social student to an engineer, we shall do better to 
compare him to an apprentice engineer who is studying what engineering – that is, the 
activity of engineering – is all about. His understanding of social phenomena is more 
like the engineer‟s understanding of his colleagues‟ activities than it is like the 
engineer‟s understanding of the mechanical systems which he studies. (Winch, 1958, p. 
88) 
 
In this regard, Coulter makes a distinction between the kinds of descriptions that 
are available to an analyst. Descriptions which could be considered as true, or 
meaningful, for an observer are „transparent‟. Those descriptions that could be true for a 
member are „opaque‟. To illustrate, Coulter provides an example of a child or an animal 
„watching‟ television, and suggests that it is entirely reasonable that someone may say 
that the child or animal was “watching the President” (Coulter, 1983b, pp. 108-109).  
Now, while this may be true, or meaningful, for the observer (for whom the concepts of 
„watching‟ and „President‟ are available) it could not said to be true or meaningful for 
the child or animal, as such concepts are unavailable.
5 In this regard, Coulter 
characterises much of the social sciences as conflating „opaque‟ descriptions for 
„transparent‟ ones, with the disciplines becoming tangled with the inevitable 
proliferation of category mistakes (Ryle, 1949).  
                                                 
5 My gloss here is essentially identical to the one provided by McHoul (1988b).      
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Now, a legitimate solution to this problem is to directly ask a member to provide 
a description, albeit this could be problematic if one were asking a young child or an 
animal. Winch, in an examination of what constitutes meaningful behaviour, offers a 
paradigm case of someone performing an “action for a reason” (1958, p. 46). He asks 
what kind of explanation is it, that a person who voted a particular way in an election 
could be said to have done so because of X. The paradigm case would be if that person, 
prior to the election, had discussed various issues and come to the conclusion that X. 
Winch then argues that in the case of an observer offering an explanation for why the 
person voted for a particular political party in an election, it should be noted that the 
observer‟s explanation must be understood not just by the observer (and others given 
the observer‟s explanation), but must also be understood by the person who voted. In 
short, an analyst who makes a claim that someone has acted for a reason, must ensure 
that reason is intelligible for the person, otherwise the analyst may attribute a reason 
that is essentially senseless to the person the reason is attributed to. Winch then 
develops this idea to ask the question “by what criteria do we distinguish acts which 
have a sense from those which do not?” (1958, p. 49).  
Now, if we take the question of how, for example, one might go about 
constructing a methodology for providing an account of Coulter‟s „watching television‟ 
example, we can explicate in a general sense some of the issues of contention in 
contemporary social sciences. An analyst might restrict themselves to providing an 
account of what they, themselves, observe empirically. Such an account might describe 
things such as where the child is spatially positioned in the room, in relation to the 
television, and in relation to the analyst. The analyst might describe what they observe 
is being projected or otherwise presented on the television screen. They may also 
provide for a detailed quantitative account of any movements or utterances the child 
may make. Such an account, then, would be essentially behaviourist, in that the concern      
  65 
would be on observed motor behaviour. Another analyst might provide for a detailed 
description of how the child might be responding to, or otherwise interacting with, 
images on the television screen. For example, they might note the child shows higher 
degrees of „interactivity‟ when particular images are displayed. Such an account, then, 
would be essentially a cognitivist one.  
What these, and indeed any account, are predicated on are the descriptive 
practices of the one providing the description. A parent of the child might provide an 
account that describes the child as „not doing homework‟. A friend of the child might 
provide an account of the child as „playing a game‟. A child psychologist could provide 
an account that the child is „learning‟ or „processing information‟. The child themselves 
may give an account of „watching television‟. In other words, the sense of any act can 
only be approached by a consideration of the sense of its description, such that the sense 
of a particular account is bound up with the account‟s reflexive, indexical, and 
normatively accountable production.    
Now, one often cited problem with this ethnomethodological approach to the 
provisions of descriptions is that it is, in principle and practice, impossible to discard or 
somehow transcend the logical-grammatical foundations of language use on the part of 
the analyst. Simply stated, there cannot be any provision for an account about the „child 
television‟ scenario that is not bounded by, and with, the analyst‟s own discourse. While 
analysts in the ethnomethodological tradition may stress the notion that they do not 
want to make „cultural dopes‟ of members (Garfinkel, 1967) by way of providing 
descriptions of the practices members engage in as „ironies‟ (Garfinkel, 1967, viii), the 
issue is that for any particular practice, descriptions can be deemed „adequate‟ by 
reference only to the common-sense knowledge on which those practices might be 
based.       
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As McHoul (1988a) has suggested, while the adoption of a logical-grammatical 
description in preference to a practical one allows for the provision of a description of a 
putatively „zero-degree‟ account (Barthes, 1967), such a position represents a 
manifestation of the same radical separation between members and analysts that 
ethnomethodology sought to displace. Even within ethnomethodology, it is recognised 
that to undertake ethnomethodological work in a pure form that would represent “an 
affirmation of the organized and intelligible character of a social world untouched by 
academic hands” (Lynch, 1993, p. 152) would be comparable to a kind of ground-zero 
whereby the entire practical enterprise of ethnomethodology is rendered utterly 
inconsequential.  
However, McHoul (1988a) makes the point that an alternate form of critique can 
be built on exactly this insight, that the imbrication in common sense, the taken-for-
grantedness, the mundane nature, that can make a particular practice possible, is central 
to Michel Foucault‟s concern with the relations between social scientific disciplines and 
members‟ everyday experience. McHoul develops the idea that approaches such as the 
Wittgenstein inspired, logical-grammatical ethnomethodology of Coulter (e.g., Coulter, 
1979) could provide a crucial complement to Foucaultian theory which would allow it 
to operate at the pragmatic level of everyday discourse; a matter which has been 
touched upon in relation to the work of Nikolas Rose in Chapter 1, and to which I will 
return to at the end of this chapter. 
Conversation Analysis 
Conversation analysis has developed into a major discipline that examines the 
notion that language should be primarily regarded as a form of social action. It 
represents an extension of ethnomethodological principles first developed by Garfinkel 
(1967) towards the empirical study of the details of conversational activities undertaken 
initially by Sacks (Sudnow, 1972), much of which became formalised with his interest      
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in analysing tape recorded telephone conversations made by people to a suicide 
prevention centre (Sacks, 1967, 1972a).
6 
As recounted by Schegloff (1992a), what interested Sacks, and has subsequently 
developed into a major area of sustained critical inquiry (e.g., Atkinson & Heritage, 
1984; Boden & Zimmerman, 1991; Drew & Heritage, 1992b, 2006; Goodwin & 
Heritage, 1990; Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998; Lerner, 2004; Psathas, 1995; Sacks, 1992a; 
Silverman, 1998; ten Have, 1999) was concern with a practical problem that involved 
getting callers to an emergency psychiatric hospital to give their names. Sacks asked, at 
what point in the call could you tell that someone would not give their name? (Sacks, 
1992a). Sacks found that, if a person answering a call used something similar to “This is 
Mr Smith may I help you” as an opening, then any answer other than something like 
“Yes, this is Mr Brown” seemed to make the process of getting the caller‟s name 
problematic (Sacks, 1992a, p. 3).      
Now, an initial approach to the question of why a caller to a suicide hotline 
might not give their name might tackle issues such as those pertaining to uncovering a 
particular caller‟s intention, by an exposition of various factors concerning a caller‟s 
psychological functioning, social contextual factors, or discreet linguistic variables. In 
contrast, conversation analysis considers such things as intentionality not as 
metaphysical problems to be dealt with, but as practical matters for participants 
(Edwards, 1997). This is representative of a feature which distinguishes conversation 
analysis from other approaches to the study of language and social interaction, in that it 
is primarily concerned with the interactional accomplishment of social activities, by 
way of an examination of particular actions that occur in particular contexts (Sacks, 
1992a).  
                                                 
6 There is some dispute as to the actual „beginnings‟ of what could be formally described as „conversation 
analysis‟. The account given here is drawn from the canonical published sources. For an alternative (and 
somewhat „charged‟) account provided by one of the early practitioners, see Sudnow (2000).       
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This activity focus embodies the ethnomethodological concern with the manner 
in which mutually intelligible social interactions are methodically produced by 
members for members (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973). Thus the principle aim of 
conversation analytic work is to provide descriptions and explications of how ordinary 
speakers go about participating in mutually intelligible, socially organised, interactional 
activities in a manner that explicitly recognises the indexical nature of context (Drew & 
Heritage, 1992a; Heritage & Atkinson, 1984). 
Psathas (1995) provides an outline of conversation analysis as comprising 
studies of the order, organisation, and orderliness of social action as demonstrated in the 
discursive practices of members of society. Psathas identifies a number of core 
assumptions of conversation analysis that are essentially predicated on an approach to 
the issue of social order as formulated within ethnomethodology. That is, social order is 
considered to be a produced orderliness, produced by members in situ, oriented to by 
members themselves, and is repeatable and recurrent. The pragmatic task of 
conversation analysis is to discover, describe, and analyse the produced orderliness of 
members‟ practices (ten Have, 1999). Questions concerning the frequency or the broad 
occurrences of particular phenomena should not be the focus of inquiry, but rather the 
concern is with efforts to discover, describe, and analyse the structures, practices, and 
procedures by which order comes to be produced. With such discovery, structures of 
social action can be described in formal terms (Psathas, 1995).  
In short, conversation analysis tries to provide analytic descriptions of the 
organisation of action and interaction of members abstract from the actions and 
interactions themselves, and as such represents a kind of „formal sociology‟ (ten Have, 
1997). Explicating the methods that members utilise to achieve the accomplishment of 
order in discourse, and not the specification of any specific properties of individuals or 
situations in isolation, is then the goal of conversation analysis.       
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The basic methodological approach of conversation analysis consists in the 
collection of empirically obtained samples of talk, with a preference for naturally 
occurring instances, by way of audio or video recording, and the detailed transcribing of 
such talk. While initial work on transcripts of such things as telephone conversations 
were similar in form to other text representations of speech such as plays or screenplays, 
the development of more technical transcription systems was undertaken primarily to 
allow for a greater sensitivity in revealing the functioning of a core conversation 
analytic concern, namely the sequential organisation of talk.  
In what could be considered a „foundational‟ paper with regard to conversation 
analysis Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson (1974) described what they considered to be a 
turn-taking system commonly found in mundane talk, and outlined a number of claims 
regarding how speakers (and analysts) understand particular utterances by reference to 
their sequential organisation. Briefly, they detailed how conversation unfolds in a turn-
based fashion, with one participant talking at a time, and while overlapping talk can 
occur between two or more participants, this is a common feature of talk with such 
overlaps being relatively short. The turn transitions between speakers often occur with 
no gap, or overlap. In addition, the order and size of turns of talk is variable, with 
particular conversations duration, content, or distribution of turns not specified in 
advance. Importantly, they suggested that a given turn of talk will be heard in relation to 
a prior turn of talk, and that the producer of a given turn will be heard to display an 
understanding of the previous turn as evidenced by the current speaker‟s responsive 
treatment of it (Heritage & Atkinson, 1984; Schegloff, 1984).  
Another of the major insights produced by conversation analytic studies is the 
observation that interlocutors conduct conversations with sensitivity to each other‟s next 
utterances, with such utterances being contingent on the previous utterance. By way of 
example, one of the ubiquitous features of conversation as demonstrated by      
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conversation analysis is the finding of adjacency pairs. These are adjacent utterances 
that are produced by two different speakers, where the production of the first part of the 
pair makes the production of the second part sequentially relevant. Examples include 
such things as „question-answer‟, „greeting-greeting‟, and „invitation-acceptance (or 
rejection)‟ (Sacks et al., 1974). One of the major implications of the sequential nature of 
talk is that no empirically occurring utterance can occur external to some specific 
sequence, and that anything that is said in a given conversation will be said in a 
sequential context (Heritage & Atkinson, 1984).   
Another important concern is that of „repair‟ (e.g., Schegloff, 1979, 1992b; 
Schegloff, Jefferson, & Sacks, 1977), which refers to mechanisms by which speakers 
can attend to problems in the management of talk-in-interaction (e.g., relating to 
speaking, hearing, and understanding). Generally, the organisation of repair is denoted 
with reference to the initiation of procedures to attend to a particular interactional 
problem, and in regard to whether such repair is initiated by a current speaker (to which 
there is a preference in terms of sequential organisation) or initiated by others. Further, 
while repair by a current speaker can be undertaken in a range of turn formations, such 
initiation is almost always undertaken by others in the turn that occurs following the 
turn in which the trouble has occurred. Schegloff also notes that „current speaker repair‟ 
involves moves to address the problem at hand directly, whereas „other initiated repair‟ 
generally raises the problem and leaves it as a matter for the speaker to undertake the 
repair (Schegloff, 1979).  
In regard to the types of conversational events that are available to participants, 
conversation analytic studies on „preference‟ (Schegloff et al., 1977) elucidate the range 
of alternate ways participants can choose among non-equivalent actions, and have 
examined such things as how people go about offering agreements or disagreements 
with assessments (Pomerantz, 1984a), offer or decline requests (Davidson, 1984), how      
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people go about pursuing responses (Pomerantz, 1984b), and how one might guess „bad 
news‟ (Schegloff, 1988).   
Other studies have focused on the issue of how „topics‟ are organised and dealt 
with in conversation, principally by following Sacks‟s suggestion (1992a) that a focus 
on content alone, without regard to the manner in which topic organisation might be 
related to the sequential organisation of conversation, might be insufficient or 
inadequate (Benson & Hughes, 1983). Some examples include examinations of how 
topics are introduced sequentially (Button & Casey, 1984), how problematic topics are 
managed and avoided (Jefferson, 1984b; Jones, 2003), the placement of topic changes 
in conversations (Maynard, 1980), how interview participants in news interviews 
manage topic change (Greatbatch, 1986), and how people can provide exaggerated or 
extreme claims to legitimise accounts (Pomerantz, 1986). 
In other words, conversation analysis is based upon the recognition that, rather 
than talk being something we all intuitively comprehend, it is in fact something worthy 
of investigation in its own right. For example, when we hear some talk as a conversation, 
with interlocutors talking in a non-predetermined sequential fashion, conversation 
analysis takes the constitutive sequential organisation of talk (Sacks, 1972a) and 
transforms it from something that is essentially unremarkable and unnoticed into 
something worthy of systematic inquiry (Hester & Francis, 2001). It is important to note 
that Sacks himself was not particularly interested in conversation, or language (Sacks, 
1984a), as much as he was concerned with how „ordinary activities get done 
methodically and reproducibly‟ (Schegloff, 1992a). In this regard, much of Sacks‟s 
work was directly concerned with developing and elucidating overtly 
ethnomethodological concepts and themes such as those relating to indexical 
expressions, the reflexive accountability of actions, and the production of moral order 
(Lynch, 2000b).       
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Where conversation analysis might be seen as a discrete enterprise is in its 
practical application to questions concerning the organisation of social action, by 
analysis of the discursive practices that occur in primarily naturalistic conversation, and 
to ascertain the organisational features of various interactional phenomena without 
reference to any external factors. In this sense, it represents a radically non-cognitive 
approach to the issue of language use and interaction (Psathas, 1995). The basic 
assumptions that inform the applied work of conversation analysis and 
ethnomethodology more broadly are that social actions (e.g., talk) are essentially orderly, 
and such order is situated and occasioned by participants, and that such order is oriented 
to by participants themselves (Psathas, 1995).  
The range of contexts in which conversation analytic work has been conducted 
is diverse, with a brief sample including investigations of calls to emergency hotlines 
(Parker, Pomerantz, & Fehr, 1995; Zimmerman, 1992), examinations of a broad range 
of medical consultations (Drew, Chatwin, & Collins, 2001; Heath, 1992; Heritage & 
Maynard, 2006; Maynard, 2004; Peräkylä, 1997), news interviews (Clayman & 
Heritage, 2002), court proceedings (Atkinson & Drew, 1979; Travers & Manzo, 1997), 
AIDS counselling sessions (Peräkylä, 1995; Silverman, 1997), interactions occurring in 
school classrooms (Baker, 1992; McHoul, 1978), interactions involving „disabled‟ 
persons such as those experiencing aphasia (Goodwin, 1995), and work settings such as 
aircraft cockpits (Nevile, 2004). Some work has also been conducted on fictional 
settings such as an examination of texts (McHoul, 1987) and film (Silverman, 1991).  
Institutional and Non-Institutional Concerns 
While such studies suggest that conversation analytic approaches could be 
applied to essentially any aspect of human interaction that can recorded with the use of 
audio or video technologies, a distinctive characteristic of the now considerable corpus 
of what could be described as „applied‟ conversation analysis (ten Have, 2001a) is that      
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it is concerned primarily with so-called „institutional‟ interactions. Now, the issue of 
what such „institutional interaction‟ might comprise warrants consideration in order to 
highlight a range of tensions that exist within the conversation analysis literature. Hester 
and Francis (2001) pose the question, can a meaningful distinction be drawn between 
„institutional‟ and „non-institutional‟ talk? And if so, are the observable characteristics 
of such „institutional‟ talk in some sense foundational for the recognisable production of 
particular institutional settings?  
In arguing against this position, they take issue with the basic assumption of 
what they call the „institutional talk program‟, as exemplified in collections by Drew 
and Heritage (1992b) and Boden and Zimmerman (1991), that the concepts of 
conversation analysis can be extended beyond ordinary, or mundane, conversation and 
applied to a range of institutional settings in order to demonstrate systematic differences 
between „ordinary‟ and „institutional‟ talk. As Hester and Francis (2001) argue, the 
notion of what „institutional talk‟ might be is unclear, and is not something that could be 
considered to be demonstrably oriented to as „institutional talk‟ by members. If one 
takes an ethnomethodological view of the question of „institutional talk‟, that is, 
„institutional talk‟ is made relevant in various interactions, such relevance is essentially 
a members‟ accomplishment and concern, with notions of „institution‟ and „institutional 
talk‟ being more or less conventional sociological categories. 
Drew and Heritage suggest that the use of the term „institutional interaction‟ 
does not encompass “mundane conversation about everyday topics while they happen to 
be working, for example on an assembly line or in a food-processing outlet” (1992a, p. 
59). But how exactly does one determine when „mundane conversation‟ begins and the 
„institutional interaction‟ ends? This presupposes that one can identify talk that is 
clearly „institutional‟ against types of talk that are not, and yet as they themselves assert: 
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We stress that we do not accept that there is necessarily a hard and fast distinction to be 
made between the two in all instances of interactional events, nor even at all points in a 
single interactional event, Nor do we intend to offer a definition of „institutional talk‟, 
nor to make any attempt at a synoptic description. Rather, our aim here is to point to 
some features that may contribute to family resemblances among cases of institutional 
talk … (Drew & Heritage, 1992a, p. 21, emphasis added)  
 
If „institutional talk‟ is not distinctively, definably, or otherwise describable as 
something other than „ordinary conversation‟, then what is the point of claiming that it 
is? For, talking of family resemblances between cases of talk already defined as 
„institutional‟ provides no firmer ground for establishing how any distinction might be 
made. Hester and Francis (2001) suggest that such attempts to elucidate generalities and 
similarities of talk across institutional contexts is a move away from Garfinkel‟s 
direction to uncover the formal properties of commonplace, practical common-sense 
actions from within actual settings. Such a move away from what could be considered 
foundational ethnomethodological principles is further indicated with the dichotomy 
between „ordinary‟ and „institutional‟ talk further extended to encompass a distinction 
between „lay‟ and „professional‟ identities, such that “talk-in-interaction is the principle 
means through which lay persons pursue various practical goals and the central medium 
through which the daily working activities of many professionals and organizational 
representatives are conducted” (Drew & Heritage, 1992a, p. 3, emphasis added). 
Again, is this nothing more than the use of essentially sociological categories 
(„lay‟ and „professional‟) to provide for a means by which talk can be carved up into 
various constituent components for analysts‟ purposes? Given that „lay‟ members could 
be categorised as „professional‟, and vice versa, depending on contextual features of 
particular settings and interactions, how does one go about correctly attributing 
appropriate categories when examining various „institutional interactions‟? This would 
suggest that conversation analytic studies can and should be undertaken to uncover the      
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way in which „lay‟ talk, characterised simultaneously as heterogeneous (in terms of 
content) and homogenous (in terms of categorical type) collides with discrete and 
distinct „professional‟ talk in situated institutional contexts, promising a literature 
comprising a plethora of conversation analytic studies of such things as „doctor-patient‟, 
„lawyer-client‟, and „police officer-criminal‟ type interactions. Clearly, the notion of 
„professional-lay person‟ is an idealised account, as it is not intelligible to talk of 
conducting studies of the talk-in-interaction between, for example a „doctor-lay person‟, 
„police officer-lay person‟, or „conversation analyst-lay person‟. The second pair in 
these binary sets is always characterised by a particular relation to the first, and it makes 
no sense to talk of „professional-lay‟ distinctions in abstract, generalised terms.  
For example, work in various health care delivery contexts, that examines 
asymmetries of turn-taking (Maynard, 1991a), the delivery of a diagnosis (Heath, 1992), 
and commentary provided by clinicians during an examination (Heritage & Stivers, 
1999), can be seen as representative of the view that there are differences between 
professionals and lay persons, institutional settings and non-institutional settings, and so 
forth. Indeed, the asymmetry of the „doctor-patient‟ relationship (e.g., Campion & 
Langdon, 2004; Heath, 1992; ten Have, 1991) could be taken as representing a 
prototypical example of the asymmetry in interactions that is considered one of the 
hallmark features of institutional interaction (Drew & Heritage, 1992a). However, to say 
that there exist particular patterns, styles, genres, or modes of talk that are 
demonstrative of some general phenomena that are exclusive to and constitutive of 
institutions themselves is not something that appears to be in keeping with the 
ethnomethodological concern shared by conversation analysis with “the objective 
reality of social facts as an ongoing accomplishment” (Garfinkel, 1967, vii, emphasis in 
original). In other words, a focus on the „institutionality‟ of such things as „doctor-
patient‟ asymmetries might undermine conversation analytic examinations that      
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otherwise seek to eschew invocation of superordinate sociological entities, by providing 
meaningful descriptions of locally produced, in situ, social order. Indeed, ten Have 
(1991) does argue that one should not approach asymmetries in „doctor-patient‟ 
interactions as a given, but as interactional achievements. 
Drew and Heritage (1992a) provide several conversational features that could 
serve as the focus for research into institutional talk, including such things as lexical 
choice, turn design, and sequence organisation. In their consideration of lexical choice, 
proffered as a significant means by which speakers orient to institutional contexts, Drew 
and Heritage discuss the ubiquitous use of pro-terms (e.g., Watson, 1987) of we in 
preference to I when people speak as a member of an organisation (1992a, p. 30). But, it 
would appear that the notion of the use of pro-terms as „institutional markers‟ is purely 
an analysts‟ device, for, if in every case of „institutional talk‟ a pro-term is found, it can 
be used as an „just-so‟ signifier pointing to and revealing of the „institutionality‟ of a 
given piece of talk. If it is not (as a deviant case one could argue) then it is suggestive of 
something unusual, some kind of breach. I would suggest that a focus on the use of we 
and I to illustrate institutional roles offers nothing beyond what a conversation analytic 
focus on these pro-terms in any context might provide.  
For example, a preference to use we over I might allow for a mitigation of 
personal responsibility if an operation was unwarranted, as suggested by Silverman 
(1987, p. 58) in the following data: 
 
1  Dr:    Hm (2.0) the reason for doing the test 
2    →  is, I mean I‟m 99 per cent certain that all  
3      she‟s got is a ductus 
4  F:    Hm hm 
5  M:    I see 
6  Dr:  →  However the time to find out that we‟re   
7      wrong is not when she‟s on the operating 
8      table      
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The shift from I (line 2) to we (line 6) provides a way for the doctor to diffuse 
personal responsibility in the event the diagnosis is incorrect, however, the fact that the 
doctor represents an institutional role is not particularly consequential to the sequence, 
as such formulations would be available to participants in any given contexts. In other 
words, what this „institutional incumbency‟ (Drew & Heritage, 1992a) might bring to 
bear on the use of pro-terms in „institutional‟ as opposed to any other kinds of talk is 
unclear, as the use of we is ubiquitous in what could be argued are non-institutional 
settings. The use of we, in the aforementioned case, might be appropriately described as 
a term that warrants affiliation rather than implicating a professional, institutional role. 
For example, when people talk about sporting teams, it is often the case that they may 
make reference to the team they support, their winning and losing, by reference to we.
7 
For example, „we got thrashed last weekend‟, or „we are a good chance for the finals‟. 
Notwithstanding the odd comments that might occur if one were to declare „I won!‟ (as 
opposed to they as a disaffiliative term) on viewing (or providing an account of) 
something like a winning goal being kicked by a favoured team, the question remains, is 
this everyday or institutional conversation? 
Similarly, if one considers turn design and sequence organisation, particularly 
with regard to studies on „doctor-patient‟ interaction, while particular instances of 
observed turn design and sequential organisation may have relevance in the delivery of 
a medical diagnosis, what is problematic is how such instances might be positioned as 
being essential for the production of discrete institutional activities (Hester & Francis, 
2001). For example, Maynard (1991b) describes a „perspective-display series‟ that is 
essentially a three-turn modification of the adjacency-pair format, in which a clinician 
provides an opinion query, the recipient provides a reply or assessment, and the 
clinician gives a report and assessment. Peräkylä (1998) outlines three formats that 
                                                 
7 For some consideration of how sport might „leak‟ into „everyday life‟ see McHoul (1997).      
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doctors use when delivering diagnostic news to patients, with the selection and 
sequencing of a given format sensitive to the evidence available to a patient and the 
possibility of a patient exhibiting resistance to a given diagnosis. And ten Have (1991) 
provides a summary of general conclusions to be drawn from a range of studies on 
medical interaction that is suggestive of two main trends of interactional style that are 
taken by doctors when interacting with patients, namely „monopolising initiatives‟ and 
„withholding information‟. What such analytic descriptions such as „perspective display 
series‟, „format type‟, and „interactional style‟ trade upon is study participants‟ 
competencies in recognising that particular utterances are performative of something 
that is recognisable as a „doctor‟s‟ action, and it is these same competencies by which 
an analyst can detail such things as turn design and sequential organisation (Hester & 
Francis, 2001). 
Perhaps, rather than assuming that the turn-taking system for everyday, 
mundane, or ordinary conversation is the basic constituent of any speech-exchange 
system (Sacks et al., 1974), with institutionality emergent from such a foundational 
system, one could argue that it might be profitable to consider institutional speech 
exchange systems as foundational, with everyday, mundane conversation emerging 
from this foundation. After all, for people to go about their daily affairs and undertake 
talk in such settings as school classrooms, doctors surgeries, university campuses, 
shopping centres, financial institutions, flying aircraft, being admitted to a psychiatric 
wards, operating subways, watching news interviews, performing tests, using the 
telephone and internet to request services, and perhaps even in talking to themselves – 
what remains as „non-institutional‟ would appear to be rather meagre.
8  
Or, perhaps it would be prudent to evaluate the literature on so-called 
„institutional‟ talk as being valuable when it provides for examinations that explicitly 
                                                 
8 Note that all of these (and considerably more) have been studied using conversation analytic methods.      
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“give close attention to how participants locally produce contexts for their interaction. 
By beginning with this question of „how‟, we can then fruitfully move on to „why‟ 
questions about the institutional and cultural constraints to which parties demonstrably 
defer” (Silverman, 1998, p. 171, emphasis added). 
This serves to illustrate a particular issue with regard to how proponents of 
„institutional‟ studies of conversation could be seen to drift from some important 
ethnomethodological commitments, in particular the desire to avoid providing accounts 
of people as engaged in doing things other than what they themselves might claim to be 
doing. In short, the danger with a focus on the „institutional‟ aspects of talk-in-
interaction is that of providing research accounts that are ironic with regard to members 
practices (Garfinkel, 1967). 
As McHoul (1982) has remarked, there is little reason to accept the apparently 
unquestioned assumption that there exists a priori some kind of „common‟ or „ordinary‟ 
stratum of the social world that serves to configure discrete discourses or practices. For 
example, how could one distinguish that the language of the mathematician is somehow 
„esoteric‟ while the language of the street cleaner is „ordinary‟? For that matter, do 
members generally talk about, orient to, or function according to the categories of 
„ordinary‟, „lay‟, or „mundane‟? McHoul suggests that one can talk of „ordinary‟ 
discourses as discrete where any ironic connotation is avoided, given that it would 
appear to be impracticable to undertake any investigation of social life that is somehow 
expunged of all theories, privileged analytical positions, or categorical assignments. 
While it may be sensible to talk of distinct „discursive formations‟ following from 
Foucault, it is problematic to treat these as somehow discrete entities (McHoul, 1988a). 
In undertaking ethnomethodologically informed inquiries, then, it may be problematic 
when conversation analysts describe the constitution of situated and consensual sense 
making practices by reference to „institutional‟ categories that might be subject to      
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rigorous contestation by participants. One might presume it is precisely this that 
ethnomethodological studies are conducted in order to avoid.  
Notwithstanding that in the „common-sense view‟ we can recognise without 
much trouble schools, offices, factories, and so forth, the task confronting the analyst is 
that these readily available understandings are the topic for analysis (Psathas, 1999). 
What is an „institutional‟ setting? What is „organisational context‟? What is an 
„institution‟? An ethnomethodological approach to such questions requires their 
relevance be demonstrable, that the requirements of „unique adequacy‟ (Garfinkel & 
Wieder, 1992) be met that specifies that investigations of such matters should be 
constructed from what the phenomena of interest itself provides. 
Psychological Categories 
While much of the preceding discussion has addressed issues pertinent to 
questions regarding the deployment of distinctly sociological categories, and the 
distinctions between various „structural‟ phenomena, what then of putative 
psychological categories? In this regard, Sacks was concerned with the problems 
inherent to the social sciences in the relationship between professional disciplines 
establishment of particular categories and those categories that are employed by 
members in general society. Topical to the present dissertation, Sacks noted that:   
 
One thing Freud was further concerned about was to somehow prevent persons from 
using his categories in just the fashion they used the ones they had before. And there‟s a 
very good reason for that, which is that if, say, „manic depressive‟ was a replacement 
for some lay term like „cranky‟, then whatever assessments that were made about 
somebody said to be „cranky‟ could be made about a person said to be „manic 
depressive‟, and that someone who was said to be manic depressive might hear it as a 
kind of attack. (Sacks, 1992a, p. 203) 
 
Unfortunately for Freud, and presumably problematic for those engaged in the 
social sciences that have become professional providers of psychological services,      
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people can and do utilise terminology in ways that have little, if anything, to do with 
such terms‟ presumed scientific correctness. And, crucially, people employ terms 
concerning such things as thoughts, feelings, memories, and beliefs (and the whole host 
of psychological terms) in ways which could not be seriously considered as representing 
grammatical or psychological confusion (McHoul & Rapley, 2003). Moreover, those 
within the scientific disciplines themselves utilise such language that, if approached 
literally rather than pragmatically, would suggest that they themselves are subject to the 
same types of cognitive distortions and error that the supposedly scientifically 
unsophisticated public are subject to. 
The perfectly commonplace way in which people employ psychological terms 
might suggest that, rather than these terms being representative of some underlying 
internal mental, emotional, intentional, or other states or processes (i.e., as might be 
suggested by mainstream cognitive psychology), that such „descriptors‟ do particular 
kinds of work. In short, one need not invoke any „ghost in the machine‟ (Ryle, 1949) 
when attempting to examine the use of such terms, rather one can and should attend to 
the local, situated character of talk itself as action (Sacks, 1992a). Moreover, an 
approach that assumes the deployment of a technically sophisticated and scientifically 
rigorous psychological thesaurus will invariably represent a form of advancement over a 
much maligned and trivialised „folk psychology‟ that people employ in everyday 
activities, will invariably fail to account for the complex uses to which such 
psychological terms lend themselves – with such „folk psychology‟ being dismissed as 
representing generally inaccurate or flawed accounts of mental life (Edwards, 2005).   
Sharrock and Coulter (1999) have argued that the social sciences, in particular 
psychology, lack genuinely technical vocabularies, with many key expressions being 
those that have been co-opted from an ordinary language use. They further make the 
point that this is not the same as asserting a position that ordinary language use should      
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be regarded as being somehow superior to the technical lexicon of the social sciences. 
Rather, they argue that such ostensibly technical use of ordinary language expressions 
often takes place when conceptual problems are being approached, and done with an 
unawareness of the ways in which psychological concepts function in ordinary language 
use (Sharrock & Coulter, 1999). Thus, the issue at stake is how ordinary words are 
deployed within the social sciences with technical uses, in ways that misunderstand the 
ways in which such words are ordinarily used, and which nonetheless trade heavily 
upon such ordinary uses. Simply stated, technical extensions to ordinary words in 
grammatically incorrect ways can only result in conceptual confusion. 
However, if one considers the conversation analysis of Sacks as congruent with 
an approach to social science research that considers disciplines such as psychology and 
sociology to be essentially parasitic upon everyday language use, Costelloe (1998) 
indicates that there remains an important tension in Sacks‟s approach to sociological 
description, namely that given members‟ social practices and the practices used to 
document them are not congruent, how can a description of the world be given without, 
for example, adopting a naive empiricism? Costelloe suggests that Sacks‟s aim of 
developing a science, one that might uncover the „machinery‟ of social organisation as 
explicated by the analysis of conversation (Sacks, 1992a, p. 40), leads to a separation 
between the object of study and the proposed mode of investigation, such that method 
replaces the phenomena of the world.  
Additionally, Costelloe suggests that while Sacks recognised a difference 
between sociological phenomena and the world he did not consider that to be an 
impediment to the undertaking of the development of his “natural observational 
science” (Sacks, 1984a, p. 21) in the form of conversation analysis. Costello argues that 
Sacks seemed to have not considered that there could be a difference between social 
phenomena in the world and the manner in which such phenomena could appear in a      
  83 
sociological account. Indeed, Sacks declared that “I intend that the machinery I use to 
explain some phenomenon, to characterize how it gets done, is just as real as the thing I 
started out to explain” (Sacks, 1992a, p. 315, emphasis added). In developing this 
argument, Costelloe makes the point that someone unfamiliar with the technical lexicon 
of conversation analytic techniques would be in all likelihood unable to interpret such 
materials.  
For example, within the conversation analysis literature, an extensive technical 
vocabulary has been developed, with such terms as „turn transition relevance place‟, 
„membership categorisation device‟, and „next turn repair initiator‟ deployed to describe 
and account for various organisational features of conversation. However, by way of 
deflecting critical commentary of the form offered by Costelloe, it is important to 
recognise that while they do in fact represent a genuinely technical vocabulary, they are 
not vernacular words and terms that ethnomethodologists, linguists, and analytical 
philosophers use as names for technical phenomena. Moreover, as Lynch (2004) has 
suggested, such terms need not be considered as isolated from common-sense 
understandings. Lynch suggests that, for example, „turn transition relevance place‟ boils 
down to the recognition of a place in an ongoing utterance that is locally recognisable, 
by an interlocutor, as being a relevant spot for someone else to begin a „turn‟ of talk 
(Sacks et al., 1974). Such „places‟ are not identified by some superordinate mechanisms 
or a priori structures, rather the presence of such a „place‟ is existential and suggestive 
of the situated understandings of interlocutors in a conversation (Lynch, 2004).  
Nonetheless, and as previously touched upon, the development of conversation 
analysis as a separate discipline from ethnomethodology is an issue of some debate 
(e.g., Bogen, 1999; Lynch, 1997; Watson, 1994b), in large part due to the 
aforementioned issues relating to the difficulty in offering descriptions of social life that 
are normatively intelligible to members. By way of comparison with other disciplines,      
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consider the technical terminology employed within the psychological literature, 
wherein vernacular words are deployed with ostensibly technical application, and where 
such hypothetical constructs as „intelligence‟ cannot be said, by those with a stake in its 
professional deployment, to have any necessarily clear translation into a „lay‟ 
discourse.
9  
Indeed it could be suggested that there should not, and cannot be, a requirement 
for any common-sense understandings if one wishes to preserve a professional distance 
between what constitutes expertise that may have some economic and social value on 
the one hand, and what „everybody knows‟ and essentially „owns‟ on the other. As 
Sharrock and Coulter point out, social scientists may still want to be understood to be 
talking about the same things as are spoken about in ordinary use, but not for reasons of 
philosophical and grammatical clarity (Sharrock & Coulter, 1999).  
Membership Categorisation 
What the aforementioned issues have touched upon is how, and to what degree 
of import, should consideration be given towards issues concerning the 
understandability, intelligibility, and recognisability of particular categorical ascriptions 
involving psychological terms, that appear invariably in both members‟ activities and 
analysts‟ transcriptions of such activities, and particularly when undertaking analysis 
that attends primarily to the sequential aspects of verbal interaction. One approach to 
addressing such concerns within the conversation analytic literature is concerned with 
the practices by which members themselves make relevant their own categorisations, 
identifications, labels, names, memberships and so forth (hereafter glossed as 
„categorisations‟), and how such categorisations are intimately related to how such 
things as „institutional‟ contexts might be made relevant. „Membership categorisation 
                                                 
9 For an example of a highly ironising „professional‟ account (provided by the American Psychological 
Association‟s Executive Director for Science) that suggests psychologists need to communicate clearly in 
order to defease „laypersons‟‟ misunderstandings of common words utilised by psychology, see Salzinger 
(2003).      
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analysis‟, then, involves a formal analysis of such sense making procedures, as tied to 
categorisation practices, that people employ to understand and make intelligible people 
and their activities, and can be traced to the work previously outlined on calls to a 
suicide hotline initially undertaken by Sacks (1967), and subsequently developed 
(among others) by Jayyusi (1984), Hester and Eglin (1997b), Lepper (2000), and 
Watson (1997).
10 
 One of the problems Sacks was interested in, in addition to how callers could 
avoid giving their name when calling a suicide prevention centre, was how a caller 
would come to categorise themselves as „having no one to turn to‟ (Sacks, 1972a), and 
Sacks detailed the systematic manner in which one could arrive at such a categorisation 
(Atkinson, 1981). While subsequent work by the early pioneers of conversation 
analysis, most notably Schegloff and Jefferson, focused more on issues pertaining to 
sequential organisation, the question of categorisation practices was essential to the 
original work undertaken by Sacks.
11  
Sacks‟s concept of a „membership categorisation device‟ can be understood to 
capture the ubiquitousness of social categorisations in people‟s everyday lives. A 
membership categorisation device is a collection of categories which can be applied to a 
population by the use of some rules to enable the classification of that population 
(Sacks, 1972c, p. 332). Sacks offered two rules for the application of such devices, and 
while there may be other rules, these two could be considered as primary or 
foundational. The first, the „economy rule‟, specifies that if a category from a device 
can be used to categorise another in a referentially adequate manner, then that device 
                                                 
10 For a detailed list of significant „ethnographic conversation analytic‟ studies, see Hester and Eglin 
(1997a, p. 7). 
 
11 Much of the following explication of the details of this work is drawn from Silverman‟s detailed 
overview (1998). While suitable for providing a general overview for my purposes, note that Silverman‟s 
overview, and those of ten Have (1999) and Psathas (1999) regarding Sacks‟s membership categorisation, 
are not without critics (e.g., Wowk & Carlin, 2004).      
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may be applied to the population (Sacks, 1992a, p. 246). The second, the „consistency 
rule‟, specifies that if a category from a device is used to categorise a member then  
that category or other categories from the same device can be used to categorise other 
members of the population (Sacks, 1972a, p. 33). Additionally, the corollary of the 
consistency rule (or the „hearer‟s maxim‟) is that if two or more categories can be used 
to categorise two or more members of a particular population, and those categories can 
be heard as categories belonging to the same collection, then treat them as belonging to 
the same collection (Sacks, 1992a, p. 247).  
Sacks further suggested sets of categories can be seen to define a unit, and 
members of a population can be placed as cases within that unit, such that one counts 
not the number of individual cases that make up the unit, but the units themselves 
(Sacks, 1972c, p. 334). In addition, the „hearer‟s maxim‟ for duplicative organisation 
specifies that if a population that has been categorised by the use of categories whose 
collection has the „duplicative organisation‟ property, and a member is presented with a 
categorised population that can be heard as co-incumbents of a case of that device‟s unit, 
then hear it that way (Sacks, 1992a, p. 248).  
Importantly the categorisations that people may make according to these rules 
cannot be said to be definitively correct or incorrect, in that any number of appropriate 
categorisations can be made about any particular X, but rather the use of a particular 
categorisation can be understood by reference to how it is made socially relevant. The 
rules, like the categorisations themselves, serve more as furnishing accountable actions 
rather than functioning as straightforward prescriptives. The descriptions that people 
can make about other persons and their actions can be heard to be more or less „correct‟ 
in an indefinite number of ways with the „correctness‟ of any particular description      
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insufficient as a basis for particular descriptions concerning specific occasions. In other 
words, descriptions can be seen to be indefinitely extensible (Sacks, 1963).
12 
With regard to the issue of categorising when many alternate categories are 
available, Sacks proposed that the problem of categorising a single individual can be 
resolved by using „standardised relational pairs‟, that is to say, by recasting the 
categorisation of a single individual as a two-person matter the categorisation of a single 
person can be made. These standardised relational pairs comprise what Sacks termed 
„collection R‟, a collection of paired relational categories that serve as a locus for a set 
of rights and obligations (Sacks, 1972a, p. 37). Importantly, these standardised 
relational pairs serve to join categories where there might be reciprocal rights and 
obligations between the two categories, and notably, the use of such pairs makes the 
absence of one of the pairs observable. Sacks described this as the „programmatic 
relevance of collection R‟, when R is relevant the non-incumbency of any of its pair 
positions can be seen as a relevant fact (Sacks, 1972a, p. 38). The categories that make 
up this collection can be seen as being more or less co-equal, with examples such 
categories as friend/friend and stranger/stranger (McHoul & Rapley, 2005a). In addition, 
Sacks proposed „collection K‟, a collection of paired relational categories that relate 
specialised knowledge with particular troubles (Sacks, 1972a, p. 37). The categories that 
make up this collection, in contrast with those of „collection R‟, can be understood by 
reference to an absence of co-equality, such as policeman/suspect or teacher/student 
(McHoul & Rapley, 2005a). 
Importantly, Sacks provided a mechanism by which members could come to 
regard categories of actions as intelligible, by reference to how activities imply 
identities of persons and vice versa, by way of „category-bound activities‟ (Sacks, 
                                                 
12 In this regard, consider that not only are descriptions indefinitely extensible, they may also be „non-
extractable‟ from their base language (see Sacks‟s comments on „extraction‟ in Hill & Crittenden, 1968, 
pp. 180-189).      
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1992a). Category-bound activities refer to those activities which could be understood by 
members to be performed by persons that belong to a certain category (or categories). In 
other words, category-bound activities are those activities that could be reasonably 
expected to be undertaken by persons who are incumbents of particular categories, and 
further, that the category and activity are co-selected, in that descriptions are related to 
the category (Psathas, 1999). In other words, if a particular action is known to have 
occurred if there is a category of person for whom such an action is „category-bound‟ it 
is a routine assumption that category of person was responsible for the action, and if 
such a person proves to be responsible the category can be used as an explanation.  
In an extension to Sacks‟s exposition of how activities may be bound to 
particular categories, Watson (1978) proposed that a class of predicates “can 
conventionally be imputed on the basis of a given membership category” (p. 106). 
These „category-bound predicates‟ refer to „category-owned‟ or „category-based‟ 
characteristics that in use encompass a range of rights, entitlements, knowledge, 
competencies, obligations, and so forth, rather than just actions or activities, and may 
thus be used in describing the activities of those so categorised in particular ways.  
Two „viewers maxims‟ are relevant to the use of category-bound activities. The 
first specifies that if a member sees a category-bound activity being done, if one can see 
it as being done by a member of a category to which the activity is bound, then see it 
that way (Sacks, 1992a, p. 259). The second specifies that if one sees a pair of actions 
that can be related by the operation of a norm that provides for the second given the first, 
and where the actions are performed by those who can be seen as members of the 
categories that the norm provides is proper for that pair of actions, then a) see that the 
doers are such members, and b) see the second as done in conformity with the norm 
(Sacks, 1992a, p. 260).      
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In a similar fashion to the „hearer‟s maxim‟ for duplicative organisation, a 
„hearer‟s maxim‟ related to predicates can be formulated, namely that if a category-
bound activity is asserted to have been done by a member of some category, when the 
category is ambiguous but where at least for one of those devices the asserted activity is 
bound to the given category, then hear that at least the category from the device to 
which it is bound is being asserted to hold (Psathas, 1999, p. 146). 
There is now a growing corpus of work concerned with membership 
categorisation practices, and while initial work  was concerned with what could be 
considered relatively straightforward expositions concerning „mothers‟, „fathers‟, 
„families‟, and so forth, more recent investigations have examined such things as the 
manner in which news reporting of „professional‟ and „lay‟ categorisations of the 
gunman involved in the shooting of 35 people in Tasmania in 1996 reveals congruities 
between methods of accounting (Rapley, McCarthy, & McHoul, 2003), the manner in 
which Bush, Blair, and Osama bin Laden distinguished between „us‟ and „them‟ in 
public addresses following attacks on New York and Washington in September 2001 
(Leudar, Marsland, & Nekvapil, 2004), and the book length examination of media 
descriptions and commentaries concerning the murder of women by a lone gunman in 
Montreal 1989 that details how media reports provided alternate categorisations of what 
the events constituted („a crime‟, „a tragedy‟, „a horror story‟) (Eglin & Hester, 2003). 
More striking applications of membership categorisation analysis include analysis of the 
local organisation of public spaces, with accounts of queues as membership 
categorisation devices (Lee & Watson, 1993).  
While membership categorisation analysis is considered as either an extension 
of, or as a coherent supplement to, conversation analysis by those working within the 
discipline (Silverman, 1998), it is important to note that there is some dispute over 
whether membership categorisation analysis should be regarded as representative of the      
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manner in which Sacks intended to further develop conversation analysis, with 
Schegloff noting that: 
 
In my view, Sacks abandoned the use of „category-bound activities‟ because of an 
incipient „promiscuous‟ use of them, i.e. an unelaborated invocation of some 
vernacularly based assertion (e.g. that some activity was bound to some category) as an 
element of an account on the investigator‟s authority without deriving from it any 
analytic pay-off other than the claimed account for the data which motivated its 
introduction in the first place. (Schegloff, 1992a, xlii)
13 
 
By contrast, Silverman suggests that the utility of membership categorisation 
analysis is that in principle and practice it requires (and demonstrates) an 
acknowledgement of members‟ use of categories and not social scientists, with activities 
becoming category-bound via members‟ invocation of particular categories (Silverman, 
1998). Categories are not immutable features about places, people, or events, perceived 
in more or less correct ways by members and „uncovered‟ by social scientists. Rather, 
categories are invoked with regard to the implications that particular categories may 
have at particular places, and this co-relation between sequential organisation and 
category invocation suggests that there is an “inescapable link” between membership 
categorisation and conversation analysis (Silverman, 1998, p. 90). If one considers the 
openings in telephone calls to the suicide agency that Sacks analysed, the “This is Mr 
Smith may I help you” provides not only a sequentially relevant place, or slot, for a 
response, but provides for a categorisation of the speaker as potentially someone that a 
suicidal caller may turn to for help.  
However, some issues concerning membership categorisation do warrant 
sustained attention, as it could be suggested that a focus on methodological matters in 
isolation from particular phenomena of interest within the conversation analytic 
                                                 
13 While Schegloff has essentially maintained this position, his more recent writings do nonetheless 
emphasise the importance of continuing the development of analytic tools to examine members‟ methods 
in regard to categorisation practices (e.g., Schegloff, 2006, 2007).       
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literature runs the risk of merely providing for the programmatic application of methods 
without due regard to the ethnomethodological foundations of Sacks‟s published work 
(for detailed critique see Lynch & Bogen, 1994). For example, such things as 
„collection R‟ and „collection K‟ were „devices‟ that could be utilised in order to 
specifically address the issue that concerned Sacks, namely, to “construct a description 
that provides the reproduceability of the conclusions a suicidal person may reach” 
(1972a, p. 31), such as: 
 
S1.  You don‟t have anyone to turn to? 
C1.   No. 
S2.  No relatives, friends? 
C2.  No.               
(Sacks, 1972a, p. 64) 
 
Consider that such collections are introduced by Sacks as being those “… we 
shall basically need in dealing with the materials this paper is concerned to describe” 
(1972a, p. 37). In other words, they are presented in order to construct a minimalist, 
formal, logical description that can provide an account describing how „suicidal‟ people 
seem to go about searching for help in his corpus of suicide hotline transcripts. This, 
then, is not to be considered as some kind of empirical claim or discovery about any and 
every „search for help‟. It is a „good enough‟ or „referentially adequate‟ description in 
the ethnomethodological sense, and not merely a causal explanation, of “Members‟ 
activities of categorizing Members [as] methodical” (Sacks, 1972a, p. 37), and 
moreover provides an account that attends to how activities themselves are methodically 
undertaken as they must be for Members to understand them. This is clearly 
underpinned by Garfinkel‟s recommendation concerning reflexivity, that members 
activities of production and management, in this case activities concerned with „a search 
for help‟, are in fact identical with members methods and procedures for making such a      
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„search for help‟ accountable (Garfinkel, 1967). To attempt to separate the 
ethnomethodological concern with reflexivity from the particular procedures Sacks‟s 
detailed examinations provided is to fundamentally misconstrue the nature of the 
investigations Sacks was conducting.
14   
In this regard, the work of Watson (e.g., Watson, 1978, 1997) arguably provides 
a means by which the sequential analytic concerns of conversation analysis and the 
categorical interests of membership categorisation analysis can be reintegrated as 
constitutive of accounts and their relevancy, within the ethnomethodological framework 
both were developed from (Wowk & Carlin, 2004). As Watson has argued, the very 
notion of „institutional talk‟ is produced through attributions made by analysts, who 
apply categorisations when this may be problematic with regard to members‟ 
orientations (Watson, 1997; Wowk & Carlin, 2004)  – and while he does not rule out 
that there might be differences (e.g., between „institutional‟ and „lay‟ talk) he does argue 
that one should not accept a priori that there are major differences, following from 
Sacks‟s injunction that questions concerning whether particular categories are to be 
considered members of particular collections of categories is to be considered as an 
empirical issue (Sacks, 1972a).  
While such tension between members‟ practices and analysts‟ descriptions could 
be considered concerns of ethnomethodology, conversation analysis, and membership 
categorisation analysis, and given the evolution of the approaches within a context of 
long standing disputes within the social science pantheon, when considered together 
they should be seen not as endeavours comprising pointless hyper-academic debate but 
as representative of a “genuine call to investigation” (Lynch, 2002a, p. 491). As ten 
Have suggests, ethnomethodology and conversation analysis have essentially the same 
mission, that is to provide for evidence-based, procedural studies of the constitution of 
                                                 
14 In this regard, consider that Schegloff (2007, p. 465) suggests that Sacks (1972a) should be read 
forwards, then backwards, and then forwards again!      
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local social order, with the differences between the approaches as discrete undertakings 
to be found in variations between the study policies and envisioned results of each (ten 
Have, 1997). And if one considers the work of Sacks as the common thread that unites 
the approaches, the insights of Sacks can have profound implications for the 
undertaking of sociological (and by extension psychological) inquiry as they are 
demonstrative of the problematic nature of sampling populations for the purpose of 
explaining behaviour by way of categorisations using vernacular categories (Coulter, 
1990).  
Some Contemporary Critique 
In this regard, a number of issues have been raised concerning 
ethnomethodology and its relation to mainstream sociological approaches, these have 
been elucidated in three particular forms by Dennis (2003). The first, and major issue 
raised is, is ethnomethodology offered as a critique of conventional sociology, or does it 
represent some form of correction. As Dennis argues, it is difficult to accept the notion 
that while Garfinkel has claimed an agnostic position regarding ethnomethodology‟s 
relationship to sociology, this appears to be undermined by a central tenet of 
ethnomethodology that concerns the idea that objective descriptions of social activities 
rely upon the very understandings they are meant to describe. However, as Dennis 
suggests, the issue becomes one where sociology is not considered in some sense to be 
wrong, rather, that the products of sociological inquiry are not qualitatively different to 
the kinds of accounts concerning social life that any member of society can produce. Of 
course, one could argue that a scientific discipline that can do no better than provide 
descriptions of human affairs that are commensurate with lay or folk accounts would      
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appear to be a discipline that in some danger of losing its status as a „scientific‟ 
enterprise.
15  
In this regard, ethnomethodology represents both a critique and a correction, in 
that it seeks to be an alternate, asymmetric, and indeed incommensurable approach to 
doing something like a contemporary form of sociology (Garfinkel, 1988, 2007; 
Sharrock, 2004).
16 In a more conciliatory fashion, there has been some moves towards a 
kind of „harnessing‟ of the asymmetry between, for example, traditional sociological 
approaches that undertake survey-based investigations and ethnomethodological 
approaches for the purposes of developing a „sociology of social scientific knowledge‟ 
(Maynard & Schaeffer, 2000). 
The second issue that Dennis (2003) addresses, and that is related to the first, is 
the turn towards making ethnomethodology more relevant to the concerns and 
requirements of conventional sociology and other practical activities. However, this 
would appear to be transgressing one of cannons of ethnomethodology, that of 
„ethnomethodological indifference‟, that stipulates one should adopt a principled 
indifference to the methods of analysis utilised in the social sciences (Coulter, 1999, p. 
178), and for that matter, this „indifference‟ should also be directed towards members‟ 
accounts (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970). By way of example, Dennis discusses the work 
done by Pollner (1974, 1975, 1987) which examined the „mundane reasoning‟ practices 
that people engaged in as they went about performing ordinary activities, and which 
elucidated the notion of „reality disjunctures‟ which occurred when members would be 
                                                 
15 “There would seem to be little room in the world for a science whose analytic culture was capable of 
appropriating the vernacular competences cultivated within each of the other sciences, not to speak of the 
many competence systems that advance no claim to scientific status” (Lynch & Bogen, 1994, p. 91). 
 
16 “The methods of ethnomethodological studies of work and sciences are incommensurable with methods 
of formal analysis. In any actual case ethnomethodological methods can be compared with methods of 
formal analysis but the policies and practices of ethnomethods cannot be reconciled with generic 
representational theoretic practices and policies of formal analytic methods. The two programs are 
disjunctively analytic and incommensurable” (Garfinkel, 2007, p. 14).      
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confronted with having to produce or deal with multiple versions or accounts of the 
world and how members resolved these disjunctures.  
Pollner (1975) claimed, in the context of an examination of the mundane 
reasoning practices of psychiatric patients who provided accounts of what psychiatrists 
considered to be delusional world views, that what was at issue was not events that 
constituted what really happened (for example, a patient‟s claim concerning a levitating 
table) but rather how the grounds for saying whether something happened or not are 
decided upon. Further, Pollner (1975) made the claim that as such grounds cannot be 
empirically validated, then social scientists have no basis for which to ascribe 
legitimacy to one particular claim (i.e., proffered by a patient) over another (i.e., 
proffered by a psychiatrist). Dennis (2003) suggests that this approach requires social 
scientists to design methods whereby members‟ alternate versions of how the world 
works can be elucidated in order to examine how such alternatives are constructed.  
This, according to Dennis, steers ethnomethodology away from having a 
concern with the study of practical actions, and renders it a far more political and 
philosophical enterprise. However, in this regard McHoul (1998) offers a challenging 
account of ethnomethodology, with its programme of explicating the self-revealing 
properties of everyday activities as possibly analogous to the Heideggerian idea of 
uncovering the self-revealing conditions of the being of everydayness.
17 Regardless of 
the merits of such an approach, in consideration of the tensions between members and 
accounts of members‟ practices, Edwards (1997) notes that while ethnomethodological 
studies place considerable emphasis on reflexivity as a feature of members‟ actions and 
their descriptions, ethnomethodologists in general have avoided adopting the extensions 
of reflexivity developed by workers in the area of the sociology of scientific knowledge, 
namely, the application of one‟s own analytic apparatus to ones own analytic and 
                                                 
17 For an earlier stab at a „critical ethnomethodology‟ see McHoul (1994). 
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descriptive activities (1997, p. 82). Indeed, notwithstanding the specific criticism 
directed at the characterisation of „mundane reasoning‟ (Bogen, 1990), it has been 
suggested that work such as Pollner‟s is more representative of a constructivist 
programme, and should not be considered representative of an ethnomethodological 
approach (Watson, 1994a).
18 
In conclusion, Dennis (2003) suggests that there remains considerable 
difficulties in establishing just what kind of discipline ethnomethodology should be 
considered, given that all attempts to formulate it as a programme of studies that are in 
some sense related by some form of disciplinary rationale have proven to be 
problematic. It is certainly the case that in establishing the „origins‟ of 
ethnomethodology, one is faced with the dilemma of having to confront a plethora of 
writings linking ethnomethodological „theory‟, „concepts‟, and „findings‟ to almost 
every tradition in the social sciences, and as Lynch remarks, there is some difficulty in 
accepting that ethnomethodology could be conceptualised as being all of these 
simultaneously (Lynch, 1999). What would be beyond dispute, however, is that 
ethnomethodology is essentially Garfinkel‟s creation (Lynch, 1999; Sharrock & 
Anderson, 1986) notwithstanding that it has provided the conceptual inspiration for 
work conducted across a range of settings in disparate locales. Nevertheless, Dennis 
considers that if ethnomethodology is to have an overarching objective, there are three 
viable possibilities. 
The first aim Dennis outlines concerns the specification and elucidation of what 
Garfinkel and Sacks (1970) described as the „formal properties‟ of everyday activities, 
as identified in Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson‟s (1974) seminal paper on the 
organisation of turn taking in conversation. Dennis suggests that while Sacks was 
                                                 
18 For one argument that suggests that ethnomethodologically informed work by „reflexivists‟ (e.g., 
Pollner, Woolgar, and Cicourel) and „antireflexivists‟ (e.g., Sharrock, Lynch, Bogen, and Watson) are 
both essentially constructivist enterprises, see Kim (1999). For a respecification of „reflexivity‟, see 
Lynch (2000a).      
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fundamentally concerned with demonstrating that one could empirically locate such 
formal properties, such as the normative orientation to turn taking rules in conversation, 
the absence of identification of additional organisational phenomena of „comparable 
formality‟ places the utility of a programme in serious question (2003, p. 155).  
Secondly, Dennis suggests that in response to the difficulties in empirically 
identifying additional formal properties, emphasis has been more directed towards 
studies that attempt to specify „interactional work‟, with such studies undertaken to 
elucidate how formal accounts of members are “the achieved outcomes of work” 
(Dennis, 2003, p. 155, emphasis in original). Moreover, that such work is considered as 
extraneous to any final product, with the task of ethnomethodology to describe this 
otherwise taken-for-granted interactional work itself (2003, p. 155). However, one 
counter to such criticism is that, rather than representing some new development, this is 
what Garfinkel was himself undertaking during the 1960s, as a kind of empirical 
extension of the philosophical work of Schutz (1962) as evidenced by the study of 
selection records of an outpatient psychiatric clinic as documented in Studies in 
Ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 186). Nevertheless, Dennis considers such work 
as parasitic on other disciplines, and that ethnomethodology lacks a distinctive research 
topic. However, given ethnomethodology is concerned with members‟ practices, 
wherever and whatever they might be, the charge that ethnomethodology is somehow 
lacking in some paradigmatic vision and rigid disciplinary boundaries is inconsequential 
given that sociological studies of work have almost entirely overlooked descriptions and 
analyses of the work people actually do in favour of topics that might be associated with 
the workplace, such as job satisfaction, obedience to management directives, and 
workplace friendships (Sharrock, 2004). 
Finally, Dennis suggests that ethnomethodology might best be approached as 
providing a kind of tool kit, that can be deployed to examine everyday activities for      
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their own sake. However, Dennis argues that with this approach, ethnomethodology 
becomes nothing more than a critique of other less rigorous approaches and can only 
“provide for empiricist solutions to sociological problems” (2003, p. 156). Lynch 
suggests that it is the case that ethnomethodology does provide for a platform to enable 
critique, but suggests that the advantages and problems associated with a position that 
attempts to maintain a critical distance between theorising about actions and the 
production of actions should be understood as similar to the issues arising in 
administration and consulting that draw upon and implement conventional social 
science, with academic theorists and administrators routinely constructing knowledge 
about action that is unconnected with specific practices (Lynch, 2002a).  
Returning to Dennis‟s notion that ethnomethodology should, or indeed can have, 
anything approaching an „overarching objective‟, perhaps an appropriate response 
would best be to provide no response (Lynch, 1999). While such a strategy does not 
provide for a sense of the unique contribution that the ethnomethodological approach 
has made to the social sciences, it is important to note that ethnomethodology has been 
continually reconceptualised, with the provisional and conditional nature of any 
particular conceptualisations making the „programme‟, if one could even be formulated, 
of ethnomethodology difficult to discern for outsiders. For example, the notion of the 
documentary method has been continually respecified as the result of it having been 
approached in a more formal manner than Garfinkel had originally intended (Wowk & 
Carlin, 2004).  
Indeed, if we take Lynch‟s cautiously fuzzy definition of ethnomethodology: 
“ethno-methodology n 1: an ethnoscience that studies the methods used in an indefinite 
range of native activities 2: endogenous investigation of the practices in, of, and as 
specific organizations, workplaces, or activities” (Lynch, 2002a, p. 486), it is apparent 
that the notion of investigating methods has reflexive implications that make it difficult      
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to pin down with any certainty how those methods are investigated, and thus the process 
of „doing‟ ethnomethodology is something that cannot easily be clarified by way of 
programmatic statements.
19 With regard to what it might be interested in, 
ethnomethodology is concerned with descriptions of investigations and performances of 
methods, attentive to practices of observation and description, and while it can be 
characterised as having an empirical research agenda it is informed by critiques of 
empiricist social science research programmes that transform ordinary language and 
linguistic concepts into operationalised variables, factors, traits, rules, mechanisms, or 
other generalised entities (Lynch, 2002a).  
In that regard, and given the difficulties in nailing down precisely what 
ethnomethodology‟s method is, perhaps it is appropriate to conclude with a brief 
comment on what ethnomethodology is most likely not. Ethnomethodology, in any but 
the most radical conceptualisations, has little overlap with cognitive psychology, social 
psychology, most forms of sociology, post-modern literary theories, or most of what 
could be subsumed under the rubric of social constructionism (Sharrock & Anderson, 
1986). Consider what Garfinkel and Livingston have to say about what an 
ethnomethodological investigation might be concerned with in examinations of a 
common enough thing, standing in a line: 
 
What more is there but NOT with social constructions. NOT with social  
definitions. NOT with empirical illustrations. NOT as an ideal. NOT in  
principle. NOT with conceptual objects. NOT with cost performance decision trees. 
NOT with script based interpretations of signed objects. 
 
But certainly with materials‟ practices. (Garfinkel & Livingston, 2003, p. 25) 
 
                                                 
19 About as close as one might get to such statements from Garfinkel himself is his recent suggestion that 
Eric Livingston‟s The Ethnomethodological Foundations of Mathematics (1986) is a kind of exemplar of 
“what is to be taught and what is to be learned” (Garfinkel, 2007, p. 12).      
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Some Connexions on the Surface 
With regard to the degree to which ethnomethodology can be considered a 
discrete theoretical position, given it has a history of being presented (or perhaps 
misunderstood) in somewhat oblique terms as an atheoretical sociological approach 
(e.g., Hill & Crittenden, 1968), it has been suggested that its silence in this regard is 
more than simply a refusal to reveal sources, rather, it is linked to an general unease 
with the provision of such things as “intellectual genealogies that commemorate notable 
authors and foundational writings” (Lynch, 1999, p. 212). In this regard, one might 
suggest that ethnomethodological investigations are undertaken to provide accounts of 
situated discourse and action that general theoretical undertakings cannot hope to 
provide. As ten Have suggests, ethnomethodological investigations can be characterised 
as being essentially concerned with studying the local rationality of members‟ 
practices, regardless of anything else (ten Have, 1999, p. 186). Indeed, Garfinkel has 
suggested that one should go directly „to the studies‟ as the empirical concreteness of 
such studies are seen to essentially speak for themselves (Garfinkel, 2002, 2007).  
In this regard, it is interesting to note that both Garfinkel and Foucault held in 
some regard the work of Maurice Meleau-Ponty, in particular his concern with never 
allowing oneself to become completely comfortable with one‟s own philosophical 
presuppositions (Foucault, 2000a; Garfinkel, 2002). Moreover, when Foucault suggests 
that “the ideas I would like to discuss here represent neither a theory nor a 
methodology” (Foucault, 2000c, p. 326) one cannot help but ponder the similarities with 
much of Garfinkel‟s project, for example by taking heed of his instructions that one 
should not set about constructing a “better textbook” (Hill & Crittenden, 1968, p. 29) 
when undertaking ethnomethodological studies. In a similar fashion, one might also 
consider the similarities of the early ethnomethodology of Garfinkel with Derrida (e.g., 
Derrida, 1976, 1982), particularly the manner in which Derrida‟s notion of      
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„deconstruction‟ might have some resonance with Garfinkel‟s recommendation that 
when undertaking studies of work in the sciences and professions it may be advisable to 
„misread‟ the writings of the phenomenologists and social theorists (for an account of 
Garfinkel misreading Husserl, see Garfinkel, 2007). And, as suggested by Lynch (2004), 
such advice to „misread‟ philosophers stands as an invitation to engage in a reading of a 
different kind, one that requires the abandonment of seeking any „correct‟ literary 
interpretations.  
Consider the „apparatus‟ of Foucault and the „device‟ of Sacks. While Foucault 
was ostensibly concerned with analysis of the mundane practices of the prison, the 
hospital, the courtroom, and Sacks was concerned with „ordinary conversation‟, both 
the „apparatus‟ and the „device‟ serve to cut across notions of cultures, institutions, and 
other overarching social entities and the attitudes, beliefs, and intentions that are 
traditionally considered as constitutive of the individual domain, in order to reveal what 
Foucault characterised as the „banal‟ and Sacks the „mundane‟. In short, both were 
undertaking investigations of the everyday, mundane, taken-for-granted aspects of 
human existence.  
Both held to the notion that there was no requirement to search for the „hidden‟ 
elements that might be responsible for what people come to do, rather, both advocated 
that any level of reality that might be of relevance was directly accessible, on the 
surface, and plain to view. In short, both sought to reveal the methods and practices that 
are constitutive of human societies, by analysis of their surfaces rather than any hidden, 
deep structures. Indeed, consider that “ethnomethodology starts with and dwells upon 
immediate appearances” (Garfinkel & Liberman, 2007, p. 7). In this regard, consider the 
similarities with the ordinary language project, with Ryle suggesting that “the idea I 
want to run with is all we need to know is right there in front of us” (Ryle, 1949, p. 302), 
and Wittgenstein:      
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The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their 
simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something - because it is always 
before one's eyes.) The real foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all. Unless 
that fact has at some time struck him. - And this means: we fail to be struck by what, 
once seen, is most striking and most powerful. (Wittgenstein, 1967a, §129) 
 
If one considers the utility of such a position for undertaking an empirical social 
science, consider Sacks‟s remarks that “I take it that lots of the results I offer, people 
can see for themselves. And they needn‟t be afraid to. And they needn‟t figure that the 
results are wrong because they can see them” (Sacks, 1992a, p. 488). This „difficulty‟ is 
given further explication by McHoul, who suggests that Garfinkel and Heidegger are in 
general accord in their considerations of the utter familiarity of everyday events, or in 
ethnomethodological terms everyday practices; a familiarity which serves to conceal 
their „work‟, or their „artfulness‟, as practical self-understandings (1998, p. 21). 
Now, while Foucault‟s apparatus could be approached as being essentially 
produced as strategic assemblages to particular historical problems (e.g., the prison, the 
family, the asylum), Sacks‟s devices are produced as strategic to immediately local 
social-interactional problems (e.g., production, recognition, description). However, this 
difference can be approached as representing not incommensurability, but rather as 
reflective of alternate analytic starting points. Consider that in the work of Garfinkel, 
Sacks, and Foucault, is a systematic avoidance of providing any stipulative renderings 
of social and historical materials (Laurier & Philo, 2004). And, if one considers 
Wittgenstein, there would appear to be no renderings of any such materials to be found 
at all. What one does find, however, is that the common focus of their investigations is 
how such materials might be used in order to disrupt the apparently unnoticed, unseen, 
unremarkable features of our everyday practices. One might suggest that a connexion 
between such analytic undertakings, in an ethnomethodological rendering, is to be 
found in examinations of the constitutive relations between the local production of      
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practices, the assemblages of such local practices, and the historically situated 
formations of knowledge of such practices (e.g., Crabtree, 2000; Laurier & Philo, 2004; 
McHoul, 1996; Plunkett, 2005). 
Consider that Sacks‟s insight was that in order to understand a culture, one must 
understand that a culture must demonstrably show „order at all points‟ (Sacks, 1992a, 
pp. 483-488) in contrast to the prevailing view that order is to be found at the aggregate 
level and is to be understood as principally statistical in nature. Firstly, Sacks notes that 
it is routine that in research practices that utilise statistical examinations of data, 
violations of often strict statistical procedures occur, and nevertheless orderly results are 
produced. Secondly, Sacks points to research that involves the detailed case studies of 
one or two people, which produce results that are often extremely generalisable. 
Consider the converse, that it would seem that contemporary approaches to empirical 
psychological programmes have ignored, or perhaps forgotten, the relevance of the 
longstanding problems associated with the „ecological fallacy‟ – the application of 
aggregate statistical probabilities to individual cases and the presumption that 
relationships observed for groups necessarily hold for individuals (Robinson, 1950). 
Sacks suggests that one could approach this curious convergence by asking how 
it could be that such order could be discovered, given that “it could be seen to be a 
consequence of the fact that it would be extremely hard, given the possible fact that 
there is overwhelming detailed order, to not find it, no matter how you look” (Sacks, 
1992a, p. 485, emphasis in original). As McHoul and Rapley (2001) demonstrate, such 
a position, understood within the context of Sacks‟s entire corpus of work, is 
representative of a highly original and unique take on culture that effectively repudiates 
both behaviourist/nativist and cognitive/innatist perspectives on what „being human‟ 
might comprise, and they suggest that for Sacks, what it is to be „human‟ is to be 
essentially a „cultural‟ being.       
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The „order at all points‟ conceptualisation, then, could be characterised as one of 
culture that represents a holographic sociological stance towards understanding human 
affairs in a manner not unlike that adopted by the natural sciences that seek 
understanding of complex physical systems by way of application of non-linear 
dynamical models, with things such as ecological, climatological, biological, and other 
physical systems shown to produce and exhibit order that is describable across levels of 
description without invocation of supra-ordinate organising mechanisms.  
However, application of such an understanding towards culture would appear to 
be misplaced as models of complex physical systems are concerned with identification 
of deterministic processes, and as such, there are considerable difficulties with assuming 
that one could clearly identify any such processes that could generate human culture in a 
relentlessly deterministic manner (cf. Wittgenstein, 1967a, on rules). In this regard, 
Sacks‟s notion of „order at all points‟ is not to be considered isomorphic with 
conceptualisations of complex physical systems that seek to model complexity as 
essentially statistically driven undertakings, rather the „Sacksian‟ approach is predicated 
on the discoverability of order in any empirical fragment (McHoul, 2001, 2004).
20 And 
as Sharrock notes, such order is “easy to find because it‟s put there to be found” 
(Sharrock, 1995, p. 4). 
Conclusion 
This chapter has presented an overview of ethnomethologically informed 
approaches to doing social science that stand in contrast to those that have been 
typically used in investigations of bipolar disorder, an approach that seeks to uncover 
the practices by which (for example) „bipolar disorder‟ is produced, recognised, and 
otherwise assembled as an „objective‟ and „real‟ social fact. My claim is that traditional 
social scientific studies of bipolar disorder, perhaps those we could describe as the kinds 
                                                 
20 In this regard Sacks‟ approach could be characterised as being logical as opposed to distributional 
(Coulter, 1983a).      
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of studies that might be “celebrated by the social science movement as its most 
demanded, professionally esteemed achievement[s] of science in social science” 
(Garfinkel, 2007, p. 11), invariably fail to provide for and take into account the work by 
which bipolar disorder is made a relevant concern by members. In other words, that 
formal social scientific accounts of bipolar disorder are often comprised of the 
descriptive work that has already been done by members themselves (a theme that is 
relentlessly pursued by Sacks and Garfinkel in Hill & Crittenden, 1968). 
Ethnomethodological investigations, in contrast, seek to examine and describe such 
work as members work, rather than leaving it as a kind of unacknowledged resource for 
the construction of social scientific accounts. As Sacks once (in)famously remarked 
“what we are interested in is, what is it that people seem to know and use” (Sacks, in 
Hill & Crittenden, 1968, p. 13).  
In outlining how one might profitably undertake providing descriptions of such 
work, I have suggested that in undertaking ethnomethodological investigations one can 
draw upon a range of disparate approaches to investigations of the „surface‟, the 
„obvious‟, and the „taken-for-granted‟. Such approaches, be those that incorporate the 
logical-grammatical focus of Wittgenstein (e.g., Coulter, 1979), the work of Foucault 
and Heidegger (e.g., McHoul, 1996), or the detailed analysis of the minutia of 
conversation as undertaken by Sacks (e.g., Drew & Heritage, 2006), can be taken as 
emphasising and recognising the practices and procedures that serve to bolster claims of 
scientificity in the social sciences, and illustrate how such claims can be understood as 
occluding the ubiquitous discursive nature of various practices. In ethnomethodological 
terms, practices of which accounts are seldom provided that attend to the local, situated, 
and reflexive nature of their discursive construction.  
However, given that this dissertation is undertaken from a disciplinary position 
that is firmly that of psychology, how might one go about undertaking such      
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ethnomethodologically informed investigations that are relevant to the concerns of 
psychology? As Zimmerman and Pollner have suggested “in contrast to the perennial 
argument that sociology belabors the obvious, we propose that sociology has yet to treat 
the obvious as a phenomenon” (1970, p. 80). In this regard, what then of the discipline 
of psychology, oft regarded as nothing more than the „distillation of common-sense‟ or 
the study of „what we already know‟ when applied under the rubric of such things as 
social psychology, organisational psychology, and clinical and counselling psychology? 
Does psychology also overlook the „phenomena of the obvious‟? A recent approach, 
that of „discursive psychology‟, would appear to suggest just that. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Discursive Psychology and Conceptual Confusions 
 
In one of the most infamous
1 sections of Wittgenstein‟s Philosophical 
Investigations appears the following passage: 
 
The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a 
“young science”; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its 
beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set theory.) For in 
psychology there are experimental methods and conceptual confusion. (As in the other 
case conceptual confusion and methods of proof.) (Wittgenstein, 1967a, xiv, emphasis 
in original)   
 
Given that psychology may yet still be a juvenile science, and arguably still 
grappling with unresolved conceptual confusions concerning the putative objects of its 
interest, what should be beyond dispute is the profound degree to which it has come to 
characterise, influence, and set limits upon what it means to be, essentially, „human‟ 
(e.g., Danziger, 1990; McHoul & Rapley, 2001; Rose, 1999). In this regard, what, if 
any, disciplinary areas exist within contemporary psychology that could be considered 
to meet, or at least take serious heed of, the cautions Wittgenstein presented? Cautions 
with regard to his arguments concerning the possibility of any „private languages‟, the 
nature of the „inner and outer‟, of knowing „other minds‟, and so forth? What 
approaches are available that explicitly avoid providing explanations based on scientific 
models in inappropriate domains, eschew generality when particularity is appropriate, 
and obviate the requirement for theory construction when description is required? 
(Hacker, 2001).  
                                                 
1 Or „notorious - and dismissive‟ as Candlish (2002, p. 1) describes it (and from where I take the idea to 
begin this chapter with the passage).      
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Discursive Psychology 
One candidate among the plethora of psychologies on offer is the 
ethnomethodologically informed discursive psychology of Edwards and Potter (e.g., 
Edwards, 1997; Edwards & Potter, 1992, 2005). Some recent empirical studies that 
draw inspiration from this form of discursive psychology
2 include the detailed 
examination of the local production of a psychiatric diagnosis and the manner in which 
professional and vernacular use of psychological terms can be the site of discursive 
struggle (McHoul & Rapley, 2005a), a critique of contemporary approaches to 
philosophy of mind that argue knowledge of the mental states of others represents a 
form of theoretical knowledge that enables persons with such ability to provide 
psychological descriptions of other persons‟ mental states (Antaki, 2004), and an 
examination of psychological reports given in parapsychological laboratory studies of 
ostensibly anomalous phenomena (Wooffitt & Allistone, 2005).  
Edwards and Potter provide a canonical definition of discursive psychology as 
“the application of discourse analytic principles to psychological topics” (Edwards & 
Potter, 2001, p. 12). Within this formulation, discourse is understood as all forms of 
spoken interaction and written texts (Potter & Wetherell, 1987), and as such, the 
analysis of discourse could be considered to be the central task of the social sciences 
(Potter, 2004a). Where the discursive psychology project differs radically from alternate 
approaches to questions of interest to the psychological sciences, can be explicated by 
reference to its identification and treatment of an apparent paradox. Namely, that within 
the vast bulk of the social sciences literature, while judgements about discourse and 
what it might be doing are pervasive, if one considers studies that employ 
experimentation, questionnaires, surveys, and so forth, the deployment of such practices 
serves to render discourse itself as essentially invisible (Potter, 2004a). In other words, 
                                                 
2 In contrast to other approaches that use the term „discursive psychology‟ (e.g., Harré & Gillett, 1994; 
Parker, 2002).      
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discourse is seen to be a transparent medium, a mediating factor, a kind of social or 
psychological ether, that serves as a conduit between whatever process or phenomena is 
of research interest and the researcher themselves. Discourse, implicitly regarded as 
communication, is ubiquitous, and as such there is no need to specifically attend to 
discourse as topic as it is essentially taken-for-granted. After all, we know what talk is 
like (Edwards, 1997), and thus the study of discourse-as-communication then becomes 
the domain of researchers interested in highly detailed examinations of the micro-
construction of such things as speech production, structural linguistics, artificial 
intelligence, and so forth.  
By contrast, discursive psychology regards the study of discourse as paramount 
and as something we perhaps should not take for granted, with discourse examined not 
as being merely a product of cognitive processes, for example, but as something that 
can be critically examined without regard to any presumed underlying representations, 
structures, or perceptual machinery. Discourse is understood, not as representative of a 
form of communication that takes place between minds that exist a priori, but as 
representing action (e.g., Schegloff, 1995). Importantly, the idea that discourse 
represents a form of social action is not equivalent with the conceptualisation of 
language as communication (Edwards, 1997). Cognitive accounts of language, 
communication, and by extension mind, are predicated on the modelling of theoretical 
assumptions and the deployment of hypothetical constructs to „stand-in‟ for putative 
hidden inference processes (Edwards & Potter, 1992). What is often (if not always) 
overlooked, as a trivial or confounding feature that needs to be controlled in scientific 
investigations of human behaviour, is the actual discursive practices of individuals as 
practices (Potter, 2000). Discourse analysis, in the discursive psychological sense, 
specifically attends to the way in which discursive practices are oriented to action, and 
how such practices are constructed in-and-through interaction.       
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The focus of discursive psychology, then, is the action orientation of discourse, 
and is undertaken by way of critical examination of how persons construct, describe, 
attribute, and otherwise perform social interactional work in discourse on such topics as 
knowledge, cognition, emotion, and the nature of reality (Edwards & Potter, 1992). 
These discursive constructions are examined as being situated and occasioned action 
oriented performances, rather than as expressions of underlying cognitive states, and are 
to be understood in terms of the social actions that they accomplish (Edwards & Potter, 
1992). Importantly, the term discursive psychology is deployed in order to denote a 
radical theoretical stance, and not just a methodological tinkering, towards the principle 
subject matter of psychology, with such topics as memory, cognition, emotion, the 
nature of knowledge, and so forth, reconstructed to reflect the notion that discourse is, 
primarily, the accomplishment of social action (Edwards, 2006a; Edwards & Potter, 
1992).  
Discourse as Resource and Topic 
There are a wide variety of approaches that employ the term discourse analysis 
to characterise both methodological orientations and broader philosophical 
commitments in disciplines ranging across psychology, philosophy, linguistics, literary 
theory, and cultural studies for example. With regards to discursive psychology, while 
initially drawing extensively on the writings of Micheal Foucault that examines 
discursive „formations of knowledge‟, as „resources‟ or „repertoires‟, which could be 
described as representative of a „Continental‟ tradition toward studies of discourse 
(Willig, 1999), more recent accounts have marked a move away from such and more 
towards work that has an action-orientation towards the discourse practices employed 
by individuals as they engage in talk, as represented by extensions of the previously 
articulated ethnomethodological oriented work that evolved into the applied      
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conversation analysis of Harvey Sacks and co-workers Gail Jefferson and Emanuel 
Schegloff (Sacks et al., 1974). 
Given that discursive psychology represents an alternative to cognitivist 
accounts of topics of psychological interest, it is necessary to provide a detailed account 
of the main features of discourse. As previously defined, discourse is taken to be talk 
and text of any kind, and of principal interest within a discursive psychological 
approach to discourse is the kinds of naturally occurring interactional talk that are 
produced as people go about their everyday lives (Edwards, 2005; Potter, 2004b). Thus, 
discourse is seen to be a central feature of everyday life, with most social activities 
mediated by the deployment of discourse (Edwards & Potter, 2001). Three features of 
discourse that are routinely described as being critical to pragmatic analysis from a 
discursive psychological stance are that discourse is action-orientated, situated, and 
constructed (Edwards & Potter, 2001; Hepburn & Potter, 2003; Potter, 2003a, 2004a). 
Action-orientation 
The consideration of discourse as action-oriented can be understood by reference 
to one of Wittgenstein‟s more infamous passages from Philosophical Investigations: 
 
For a large class of cases – though not for all – in which we employ the word „meaning‟ 
it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the 
meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer. (Wittgenstein, 
1967a, §43, emphasis in original) 
 
While a detailed examination of this particular passage would entail a 
dissertation of its own (and of these, there are a number), the relevance of “the meaning 
of a word is its use in the language” to the discursive psychological approach to 
language and behaviour is to be found in the notion that, the knowing of any meaning of 
a linguistic expression is to be regarded as knowledge, not of what something is, but of 
how to do something (Hacker, 1990a). It is meaning in actual use that is of      
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consequence, following from Wittgenstein, and that nothing about how language 
generally is can be said, with abstract descriptions about how language characteristically 
behaves or acts being redundant (Read & Guetti, 1999). This is in contrast to the focus 
on language knowledge as exemplified by the work of Chomsky (e.g., Chomsky, 1968) 
that attends to language competence, with performance only considered as something 
that represents a confound in the operation of underlying grammatical systems 
(Edwards, 1997).  
Perhaps of equal significance are the writings of Derrida (e.g., Derrida, 1976, 
1982) that provide a critique that challenges the view of meaning as representational; 
that meaning emerges from a relationship between objects in the world and the signs 
that describe such objects (Hepburn, 1999), and such critique suggests attempts to posit 
language‟s meanings as in any sense fixed and referential to an external reality are 
invariably doomed, in large part due to the demonstration that any given truth appears 
to be the product of various discursive elements (e.g., metaphor). As McHoul (1994) 
suggests, meaningful communication is an achievement that rests upon the in principle 
instability of the meaning of any linguistic sign, in other words “signs have meaning by 
virtue of their actual uses” (McHoul, 1996, vii). In this regard, Margolis suggests points 
of convergence between Wittgenstein and Derrida worth considering are that of the 
inseparable link between word and world, the impossibility of achieving an analytic 
position that remains outside of the confines of language, and the demonstration by both 
of what philosophy cannot do (Margolis, 1994). 
On first glance, language appears to be remarkably orderly and invariant, that is 
to say common features of linguistic structure can be ascertained on the basis of 
grammatical structure. However, if one moves from purely theoretical 
conceptualisations of language, and seeks to apply such theories to an empirical 
examination of language use in naturalistic settings, what is revealed is that for both      
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users and analysts meaning may often be unrecoverable, and as Derrida argues, 
interpretation becomes an endless process with meaning having only provisional 
significance. In this regard, while indeterminacy of meaning poses significant problems 
for any theory of language use, the fact remains that interlocutors seemingly know what 
is happening, and manage to get things done. Likewise, the problems of 
intersubjectivity appear to be continuously „solved‟ by interlocutors who cannot be 
claimed to have complete knowledge, in a cognitivist sense, of each others thoughts, 
feelings, desires and so forth, who nevertheless apparently understand each other well 
enough to interact in complex social interactions (Schegloff, 1992b).
3 Indeed, the entire 
question of how might any social order arise appears to founder on the problems 
associated with indeterminacy and intersubjectivity of language.  
However, such problems can be essentially dissolved by an examination of what 
it is that people do with and in discourse empirically (Button, 1991). Such empirical 
examinations have served to provide for a central conversation analytic insight, that 
orderliness makes sense if we consider language as talk-in-interaction (Schegloff, 1989) 
as opposed to conceptualising language as being merely a mechanism for the 
transmission of information. It would appear that any complete and prescriptive theory 
of language that postulates direct casual mappings between discrete variables (e.g., 
attribution of word to named object) in a rule-governed system of organisation, that 
does not consider variability anything more than just noise, will fail to be able to 
account for an infinite variety of things people do with language.  
It is important here to illustrate a point of departure from the speech act theory 
of Austin (1962), which has served as an important philosophical precursor to the broad 
discursive psychological approach to language use, and the specific development of 
conversation analysis. In contrast to Austin‟s philosophical work which was essentially 
                                                 
3 Consider also that appeals to „misunderstandings‟ and „failures‟ of knowledge concerning others are 
also a kind of resource available to members to make such interactions work.      
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concerned with artificial examples of speech, in other words „made-up‟ for the purposes 
of outlining a particular philosophical approach to language that served to draw 
attention to the practical as opposed to the truth value of statements, discursive 
psychology is concerned primarily with the study of language practices in actual use 
(Potter, 1996). In other words, rather than beginning with idealised speech acts and 
moving to an examination of speech in use, discursive psychology begins with an 
examination of the actual practical activities people engage in.  
This approach also illustrates a particular approach to dealing with variability, 
with speech act theory having to deal with variability by essentially requiring the 
development of an extensive taxonomy of speech acts (Potter, 1996). Discursive 
psychology, in contrast, is informed by Wittgenstein‟s notion of „language-
games‟(1967a) and Bakhtin‟s concept of a speech genre (1986), and recognises that 
given the infinite variety of possible utterances that people can make, it is necessary to 
attend to the many different actions that statements can do in the performance of 
situated and specific contexts (Potter, 1996). Additionally, it is important to note that 
speech act theory is predicated on the idea that people intuitively know about talk and 
are essentially experts (Searle, 1999). This is in contrast to the discursive psychological 
contention that while talk is something we are all no doubt exceedingly familiar with, 
the same could be said with equal truth or falsity about any aspect of our lives 
(Edwards, 1997). A subtle point, but important nevertheless.  
Thus, the discursive psychological approach to language considers discourse to 
be primarily performative, with discourse examined not in an attempt to elucidate how 
users of language might think about certain things, as is the case in research that 
examines attitudes or beliefs that attempts to elucidate underlying cognitive states are 
presupposed to underlie the deployment of specific terms, but rather how users of 
language employ various discursive resources to get things done. Indeed, two of the      
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central concepts that discursive psychology has adopted from ethnomethodology, those 
of indexicality and reflexivity (Potter, 1996), are clearly Wittgensteinian in orientation. 
Such a pragmatic, action-oriented approach to discourse suggests that the examination 
of data that is observed in naturally occurring interactions and settings should be of 
critical interest in any research project, and stands in contrast to that derived from 
artificially formulated settings such as those that employ experiments, surveys, and 
interviews. For, while such settings may provide data that can be of utility within 
particular theoretical frameworks, and for particular rhetorical purposes, they often 
cannot provide for meaningful accounts of social life if one considers discourse to be a 
(or possibly the) primary medium of human action and interaction.   
Situated  
Given the infinite potential variability of discourse, it is then critical to attend to 
the manner in which a given discourse is situated, or contextually bound. Discursive 
psychology considers discourse as situated, in three important ways (Hepburn & Potter, 
2003). Firstly, it is occasioned in that talk is oriented to in a manner that can be, but is 
not necessarily, a function of its sequential positioning and social setting (Edwards & 
Potter, 2001). In regards to positioning, this refers to the conversation analytic 
demonstrations that conversation takes place sequentially with participants taking turns 
at talk (Sacks et al., 1974), and with regard to setting, while particular institutional or 
organisational contexts may provide an interactional framework, unlike more rigid 
ceremonial types of interaction (Sacks, 1992a), participants can and do orient to 
institutional activities in a manner that is relevant for themselves (Schegloff, 1997b).  
Secondly, such sequential and social positioning requires an appreciation of the 
rhetorical organisation of discourse (Billig, 1987; Potter, 1996). With an infinite number 
of ways in which a description of anything can be seen to be plausible, the selection of 
any particular description, account, or assertion is often made with regard to possible      
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alternatives and counter-descriptions (Edwards, 1997). In other words, people do not 
merely provide neutral descriptions of the world that represent how they might actually 
feel, perceive, or think about something in a manner that is merely reflective of how 
things actually are, but rather engage in discourse that attends to the possibilities that a 
particular account could be seen to be false, contentious, or dismissed. Additionally, 
attempts to understand any particular discourse require an appreciation of not just the 
discourse that is actually produced, but also any possible discourse that might be 
produced (Potter & Wetherell, 1987).  
For example, to enable an understanding of an account proffered by a convicted 
sex offender (Auburn & Lea, 2003) that talks about a chance, apparently unremarkable 
encounter with a girl in the form of “and there was this girl that walked past” (p. 288), 
one would need to know that an alternate account suggested that the offender and an 
accomplice forced the woman into an alleyway where a van was parked and sexually 
assaulted her. Thus, the account provided by the offender is provided in a manner that 
provides a plausibly deniable inference against an assertion that the assault was 
premeditated. This serves to illustrate the important point, that in order to understand 
meaning one must attend to the ubiquitous rhetorical features present in the context of a 
given discourse (Billig, 1987). Indeed, one of the defining features of discursive 
psychology in practice is a concern with rhetorical processes in situations that might 
involve conflict, power, and manipulation (Edwards & Potter, 1992).  
Thirdly, discourse can be institutionally situated, with institutional identities and 
tasks relevant to the production of a given discourse. For example, consider the 
asymmetries in the number of questions asked between doctors and patients, with 
doctors asking patients more questions that patients of doctors (ten Have, 1999), the 
manner in which an initial service request to a city council can become progressively 
decontextualised and transformed into an official account (Kelly, 2001), or the way in      
  117 
which teachers‟ descriptions and categorisations of children as being deviant are 
designed for particular recipients, namely educational psychologists (Hester, 1998). Of 
particular interest from a discursive psychological perspective to institutional discourse 
is the manner in which psychological matters, for example discourses concerning 
„feelings‟, „thinking‟, „attitudes‟ and the like, are routinely employed in such settings as 
schools, public service organisations, and hospital settings. The issue is, from a 
discursive psychological position, how discourse concerning apparently inner mental 
and emotional states can be performative of various institutional business (Potter, 
2005a). 
Constructed 
Discursive psychology is broadly presented as a constructionist approach, with 
discourse viewed as being both constructed in the course of interaction and 
performance, and as being constructive of particular versions of the world (Edwards & 
Potter, 1992, 2001).
4 The emphasis is on how individuals and societies create versions 
of reality, as opposed to how reality is discovered. However, it is important to note a 
major distinction between discursive psychology and other approaches broadly 
characterised as representing forms of „social constructionism‟, namely that discursive 
psychology presents an epistemic, rather than ontological, position with regard to 
constructionism (Potter & Edwards, 2003). In this regard, the focus of discursive 
psychology is on the constructive nature of descriptions and accounts rather than of any 
particular things that might exist beyond such descriptions (Edwards, 1997). 
For example, when considering issues relating to understandings of personal 
identity, discursive psychology considers conceptualisations of „self‟ to be constituted 
by individuals in the performance of situated and occasioned actions, in other words 
                                                 
4By way of specification, the term „constructionist‟ as presented here, following from the publication of 
The Social Construction of Reality (Berger & Luckmann, 1966), is taken to cover a wide range of 
approaches including „constructionism‟, „social constructionism‟, the „empirical programme of 
relativism‟, the „strong programme‟, and „radical constructivism‟ (for reviews see, Gergen, 1985, 2001; 
Gergen & Gergen, 2003; Hacking, 1999; Harré, 1998; Potter, 1996; Shotter, 1993).       
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constructed, as opposed to realist assumptions that self discourse represents a relatively 
accurate description of inner mental states and entities that might be reliably measured 
with psychological and physiological instruments (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Gergen, 
2001). The focus, then, is on how people themselves utilise descriptive categories 
relating to social identities and memberships in order to perform social actions, rather 
than dealing with analysts‟ categorisations (Antaki & Widdicombe, 1998; Sacks, 
1992a). Moreover, it is the notion that such self and other categorisations are discursive 
actions done in talk and for a variety of discursive purposes, and are not just 
psychological mappings of inner states done by individuals rather than analysts, that 
further emphasises the constructivist character of discursive psychology (Edwards, 
1998).  
While the social constructionist position that discursive psychology adopts is 
likely to be characterised as an approach to „the psychological‟ as inspired by the work 
of Goffman and Garfinkel, that posits a „renewal‟ of the social world at each and every 
occasion of interaction in a form of radical situationalism (Mehan, 1991), the focus of 
discursive psychology is directed more towards providing accounts of „the 
psychological‟ that take as an analytic starting point the notion that one should deal 
with psychological accounts as being “generated very precisely for the occasion of their 
production” (Edwards, 1997, p. 290).  
While discursive psychology has been used to indicate how ostensibly factual 
descriptions can be deployed to implicate a wide variety of psychological states, and 
importantly, how such states themselves can be used to bolster factual accounts 
(Edwards, 2000; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter & Edwards, 2001), it is critical to 
acknowledge the constructive nature of any analyst‟s interpretations of any particular 
discourse, and the way in which analysis itself may be constructed in order to achieve      
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specific aims. As Wittgenstein cautioned “interpretations by themselves do not 
determine meaning” (1967a, §198).  
Discursive Psychology‟s Themes of Interest 
Broadly, discursive psychology has been described as having three major themes 
of interest, namely the investigation of how psychological categories are used by people 
in everyday (i.e., non technical) discourse, the study of how psychological business (e.g., 
intentions, motives, attributions concerning memory and so forth) are managed, and the 
respecification and critique of contemporary psychological topics and their explanatory 
frameworks (Edwards, 2005; Edwards & Potter, 2005). In a recent special issue of 
Discourse & Society on discursive psychology, Potter provides for a finer grained 
depiction of discursive psychology‟s themes, namely that it is practical, accountable, 
situated, embodied, and displayed (Potter, 2005b).  
By practical, Potter suggests that discursive psychology focuses on the manner 
in which people go about their everyday affairs, rather than attending to the more 
abstract and esoteric formulations that are the domain of studies of such things as 
cognition, memory, and perception. In other words, rather than assuming that 
underlying the day-to-day practical activities of persons is a hidden realm of 
psychological functioning that can only be addressed by way of highly developed 
technical and theoretical formulations, one can investigate how people manage to do 
whatever it is that they might be doing by examining what it is that they are doing. In 
other words, discursive psychology adopts a decidedly ethnomethodological orientation 
with an interest in practices. That is, it is a highly empirical approach to the study of the 
„psychological‟, with an interest in „naturally occuring‟ psychological activities (i.e., 
those that take place in the absence of direct manipulation by a researcher). 
In regards to accountable, Potter (2005b) suggests that psychology is bound up 
in everyday practices of accountability. While drawing heavily on Garfinkel‟s notion of      
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accountability, Potter focuses more on the notion of accountability as equivalent with 
responsibility. For example, he asks “how are individuals (or collectivities, 
organizations, or intra-individual entities) constructed as sites of responsibility” (Potter, 
2005b, p. 740). Potter suggests that such accountability works on two levels, for 
example in a speaker‟s construction of others agency and accountability in some 
reported events, and a construction of their own agency both towards such events and 
what they might be doing in speaking about such events. In this way, speakers can 
“construct their own accountability via the construction of others‟ and vice versa” 
(Potter, 2005b, pp. 740-741, emphasis in original).  
As for situated, three broad themes are outlined by Potter. These include a focus 
on psychological matters as they are embedded in interaction, the rhetorical orientation 
of such matters, and the manner in which such are institutionally embedded (Potter, 
2005b). Now, while these have been previously discussed in consideration of how 
discursive psychology approaches discourse, consider that one of the features that 
distinguishes discursive psychology from other forms of discourse analytic approaches, 
is the primary emphasis on how psychological themes are deployed and utilised 
(Edwards, 2005). That is, how does „psychological business‟ in its various forms get 
done? For example, discursive psychological investigations have examined 
psychological business in a diverse range of settings and for a diverse range of projects, 
including how participants manage topic in market research focus groups (Puchta, 
Potter, & Wolff, 2004), how descriptions of events are inextricably bound with actions 
in couples‟ relationship counselling sessions (Edwards, 1997), the sophistication with 
which interactions between staff and clients of a child protection telephone helpline 
service are conducted (Potter & Hepburn, 2003), how offenders and those they interact 
with manage versions of accounts of responsibility in prison based sex offender 
treatment groups (Auburn, 2005; Lea & Auburn, 2001; Lea, Auburn, & Kibblewhite,      
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1999), the manner in which medical professionals account for patients‟ illnessess as 
mental or physical (Horton-Salway, 2002), and the problematic use of quality of life 
measures with people with learning disabilities (Antaki & Rapley, 1996).  
Potter (2005b) distinguishes the discursive psychological take from direct 
studies of embodiment and points to an analytic concern with the „body‟ as constructed 
for particular purposes. This is an area that remains relatively unexplored by discursive 
psychology, however recent examples include the investigation of the manner in which 
body size and weight features in everyday and institutional discourse related to helpline 
interactions (Hepburn & Wiggins, 2005), and the exploration of „noise‟ as a 
sequentially and rhetorically organised social phenomenon that is made relevant in 
neighbour dispute mediation and calls to a child abuse helpline (Stokoe & Hepburn, 
2005). 
In regards to displayed, Potter (2005b) suggests that discursive psychology 
adopts a position towards „a psychology‟ as something that is displayed in interaction, 
whether that is in talk or action. In other words, rather than the „stuff‟ of psychological 
interest being hidden from direct observation (e.g., minds, intentions, beliefs, thoughts) 
whether that be by occlusion with neurophysiological mechanisms or inferred cognitive 
structures, discursive psychology takes it that “intentionality, states of mind, motives 
and thoughts (etc.) are matters at stake in discourse and social interaction” (Edwards, 
2006a, p. 46, emphasis in original). In short, discursive psychology represents an anti-
cognitive, anti-cartesian approach to the study of human interaction. 
Counter-Cognitivist Approach to Cognitive Topics 
The distinction between an inner, non-material world of mental experience and 
an outer, material world is the legacy of Descartes, and while it could be argued that 
Descartes‟s „substance dualism‟ holds little sway in contemporary philosophy and the 
social sciences more broadly, what does maintain considerable attraction, whether      
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explicit or implicit, in much contemporary undertakings is the Cartesian belief that 
„minds‟ are logically independent of behavioural manifestations (Schroeder, 2001).  
For example, one much remarked upon consequence of such a Cartesian dualism 
is the problematic nature of how people could come to have knowledge of other 
people‟s minds (e.g., Bakhurst, 2001). Indeed, considerable work has been undertaken 
in contemporary philosophy of mind that argues knowledge of the mental states of 
others is a form of theoretical knowledge, with the ability to provide psychological 
descriptions of other persons mental states, a „folk theory‟ of mind, something that 
young children somehow acquire or develop by way of social learning, 
neurophysiological maturation, or a combination of the two. However, drawing upon 
Wittgenstein, scholars have suggested that such accounts rest upon inherently flawed 
conceptualisations of what (for example) „mind‟ is (e.g., Antaki, 2004; Leudar, Costall, 
& Francis, 2004; Sharrock & Coulter, 2004).  
While Wittgenstein‟s conception of language remains influential in philosophy, 
it has less impact in areas such as psychology, possibly due to the unconventional 
manner in which his writings are presented as a sequence of seemingly unconnected 
numbered remarks, and more probably due to the radical nature of Wittgenstein‟s 
philosophical suggestions, particularly in regard to questions concerning the „mental‟ 
(Savigny, 2006). Now, while Wittgenstein‟s devastating critique of Cartesianism could 
be seen as having more interest as an historical, philosophical argument, rather than 
being a relevant matter for contemporary philosophy, Williams (1999) has forcefully 
argued such understandings critically misconstrue the nature and relevance of his 
critique to a broad range of disciplines, with contemporary cognitive theories of mind 
essentially extensions of Cartesianism.  
What exactly is this cognitivism that comes under such critical scrutiny? 
Williams (1999) suggests the principle goal of cognitivism is to discover the „internal‟      
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rules that are presumed to govern mental functioning, and can be understood by 
reference to a commitment to four philosophical positions. The first, „Methodological 
Individualism‟ approaches the question of mental functioning as essentially independent 
from constraints associated with environmental, social, or other individuals. In short, 
such a position advocates a psychology that is principally concerned with individuals‟ 
minds and their inner mechanisms. The second, „Methodological Structuralism‟ is 
concerned with the development of accounts of cognitive structures that are complete, 
that is to say, models of learning are developed on competencies that are fully 
developed. The third, „Intellectualism‟ commits to an understanding of behaviour as 
being able to be fully explained by reference to rule-governed cognitive activities. The 
fourth, „Psychological Realism‟ posits that „mind‟ is comprised of real cognitive 
structures that are isomorphic across cultures.  
Regardless of any particular flavour of cognitivism on offer, the present 
dissertation is undertaken from a position that posits that any undertaking that 
approaches „mind‟, the nature of language use, or indeed what it means to be „human‟, 
as requiring the incorporation of some form of cognitive theorising as fundamentally 
misguided, and essentially incoherent (Coulter, 2005).  
Private Language 
Wittgenstein demonstrated the problematic nature of constructing a psychology 
that is predicated on individuals being in possession of a world of mental objects that 
are linked or correlated with a lexicon of mental terms that are public resources 
(Wittgenstein, 1967a). These objects comprise the referents of the names in his famous 
„private language‟ thesis, which arguably remains problematic for accounts in      
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mainstream epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive sciences (Candlish, 
2004).
5  
Wittgenstein argued that the ontological distinction between thought and 
language does not matter in certain key cases (Harré, 1999), and what Wittgenstein 
demonstrated, to devastating effect, was that such mental objects that might comprise 
the vocabulary of a private language are necessarily inaccessible to others – they are by 
definition private objects. And, as a language that is in principle unintelligible to anyone 
but the originating user is impossible, such a „private language‟ solution to the question 
of how might one learn names for private sensations like „pain‟ is to be considered 
worthless, as it would be unintelligible to its originator as they would be unable to 
establish meanings for its putative signs. Following from this, Wittgenstein 
demonstrates that attempts to ascribe meaning to mental terms by reference to their 
presumed hidden processes is problematic, and renders such examinations of the mental 
as incoherent and essentially intractable .  
The question, then, is how can someone know about another person‟s private 
and personal experiences? In tackling this question, Wittgenstein started with the issue 
of how, if it were the case that all words are learned by attention to an example of what 
they refer to (for example the word „dog‟ is learned by relating the utterance „dog‟ to the 
shaggy, tail wagging, often barking animal) how do words for private sensations like 
„pain‟ ever get learned? How does one learn to relate the utterance of „I am in pain‟ to 
any specific referent? Given that such words are routinely learned, Wittgenstein argued 
that there were problems with any theory of meaning that exclusively interprets 
meaningful words as names for things. Words must be given meaning in some manner 
other than being pointed to by a teacher and noticed by a learner.  
                                                 
5 Although, as Candlish notes, it might be better described as an „intricate discussion‟ rather than a 
sustained argument.      
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A solution to this problem is of course the notion of „mental objects‟ that can 
stand for, or act as referents to, the objects to be named. If meaning can be mediated by 
some kinds of „mental objects‟, that might comprise the private language of an 
individual mind, then there would be no requirement to have every object and name 
shown referentially. However, there is a problem with this solution, as Coulter 
demonstrates by way of the parable of „Wittgenstein‟s Beetle‟: 
 
Imagine a community in which each member had a box with something inside it. 
Everybody calls the object in the box a „beetle‟, but no one can look in anyone else‟s 
box and can only determine the nature of „beetle‟ by looking into his own box. 
Wittgenstein proposes that, if „beetle‟ has a use in the public language, then the object 
in the box must be irrelevant to its meaning. If this private object does play a part in the 
understanding of „beetle‟, then intersubjective communication would be impossible. 
(Coulter, 1979, p. 78, emphasis in original) 
 
In other words, even if the „thing in the box‟ is considered to be real in some 
sense, what Wittgenstein shows is that „the thing in the box‟ cannot play a part in the 
language-game, that is to say, the meaning of a particular psychological term cannot be 
taken to be referential (McHoul & Rapley, 2003).   
Wittgenstein‟s solution to this problem is that words such as „pain‟ are learnt by 
a person being taught to substitute a verbal expression for a natural expression of pain 
(e.g., Hacker, 2006; Harré, 1999; Malcolm, 1986). In other words, what might count as 
a characteristic avowal of a pain (e.g., “I am in pain”) is not a description, it is an 
expression (Hacker, 2006). In other words, a painful sensation is not to be taken as 
evidence for a defeasible claim that one is in pain, notwithstanding that to be in pain is 
to be disposed to publicly available displays, for example moaning, grimacing, and 
writhing (Harré, 1999). In short, the substitution of a verbal expression for a 
behavioural one leaves this basic distinction between expression and description intact 
(Harré, 1999). That is to say, what is learnt are language use conventions, not the      
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identification, verification, and translation into ordinary language of some kind of 
private (pace mental, cognitive) objects.
6  
And yet, the role of private objects in psychological research would appear to be 
as important now as it was in the early 19th century (Candlish, 2002), with the 
voluminous literatures on social psychology, psychopathology, memory, intelligence, 
learning, and emotions all arguably representing the apparent hegemony of cognitivism 
in the domain of the human sciences. For example, social psychology becomes more or 
less approached as social cognition, problematic conduct (pace psychopathology) is 
understood as a product of faulty information processing systems, and emotions are 
more or less generated from cognitive processes that attempt to grapple with making 
sense of an external environment (Edwards & Potter, 1992).  
Rules  
Wittgenstein made the observation that one can work out a sum, for example, in 
two quite different circumstances (Harré, 1999). One may be performing public 
arithmetical operations with a pen and paper without a requirement that there be some 
form of private „mentalistic‟ calculations that accompany the public performance. 
Similarly, one can be doing arithmetical operations „in one‟s head‟ without any 
requirement that there need be some other „mentalistic‟ form of calculations that 
somehow map onto one‟s calculations „in one‟s head‟. Calculating is the exercise of a 
skill, that can be evaluated or judged as being exercised correctly or incorrectly, and 
such determinations could be made by reference to rules. Such determinations could 
also be made for other skills, such as remembering, which should not be understood as 
an example of a „process‟ verb (i.e., remembering as an ongoing process of activity) but 
                                                 
6 “The man who says „Only my pain is real,‟ doesn‟t mean to say that he has found out by the  
common criteria – the criteria, i.e., which give our words their common meanings – that the others who 
said they had pains were cheating. But what he rebels against is the use of this expression in connection 
with these criteria. That is, he objects to using this word the particular way in which it is commonly used. 
On the other hand, he is not aware that he is objecting to a convention” (Wittgenstein, 1960, p. 57, 
emphasis in original).      
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as an example of an „achievement‟ verb (i.e., remembering is not recollecting a past 
event, it is recollecting a past event correctly), and the basis of any judgement to as to 
what constitutes a correct versus incorrect recollection cannot be made solely by 
reference to an individual cognitive process (Ryle, 1949). 
However, for Wittgenstein, rules are not things that cause effects (Wittgenstein, 
1967a, §198-201), but are ways that criteria can be made meaningful for determinations 
as to the correct versus incorrect usage of arithmetic, the rightness versus wrongness of 
a particular activity, and so forth. In other words, such rules need to be shared, that is to 
say that “the objectivity of rule-following is essentially social” (Williams, 1999, p. 157). 
This is essentially predicated by the notion that a rule that only applies to an individual 
can allow for no determination as to its correct usage, and that any observed regularity 
(e.g., wittnesable performance of uniform activities by an individual) does not on its 
own entail rule-following (Malcolm, 1986, p. 175). Wittgenstein further showed that 
one can calculate „in one‟s head‟ and that may be done by imagining one is performing 
an arithmetical calculation with pen and paper, but on the other hand it may not, a 
different but related skill can be employed (Harré, 1999). The crucial point of this is the 
insight that performing arithmetic by calculating with a pen and paper and performing 
arithmetic by calculating in „the head‟ requires that, cast in terms of rules, both are 
governed by the same rules.  
In other words, what Wittgenstein showed was that there was no requirement for 
any mediating „mentalistic‟ apparatus between private performance and public display, 
no „cognitive‟ operations that are a function of some putative „mental machinery‟. One 
need not infer the existence of any screen between basic neurophysiological processes 
and public performance, as any rules that could be said to govern both are to be 
understood as being, for the purposes of any objective determination, essentially social  
(e.g., Savigny, 2006).      
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In his famous examination of Wittgenstein‟s analysis of rules and rule 
following, and the private language argument, Saul Kripke suggests that Wittgenstein‟s 
arguments concerning rule following represent an original type of skepticism (Kripke, 
1982). In his formulation, Wittgenstein‟s analysis of rule following involves a 
„sceptical‟ view in which a rule as stated essentially under-determines the actions that 
constitute its correct application. However, the nature of any perceived problem has 
been attacked by a variety of commentators as being essentially illusory (e.g., Baker & 
Hacker, 1984; Francis, 2005; Sharrock & Button, 1999), as any understanding of a rule 
involves knowing how to apply it. Further, the notion that someone can learn a rule but 
only in cases in which the rule has been exemplified makes no sense, as this is a kind of 
imitation and not rule following. As Francis (2005) makes clear, a rule and its related 
applications are not to be regarded as being contingent, that is to say rules standing as 
causal explanations of particular actions, they are to be approached as being related 
grammatically. In this sense, any investigation of social actions, or in 
ethnomethodological terms something like the study of practices, such practices cannot 
be fully explicated by endeavours to uncover networks, frameworks, or systems of 
proscribed and prescriptive rules (see Heritage, 1984b, pp. 103-134). 
Ordinary Language as Defining Psychological Phenomena  
Several important insights can be found in Wittgenstein's Philosophical 
Investigations with his treatment of how psychological science studies psychological 
concepts that are expressed in the vocabularies of ordinary languages. In short, he 
considered the misuse of everyday language in psychological contexts as leading 
psychology into “conceptual confusion” (Wittgenstein, 1967a, p. 232). Similar 
treatments that follow from Wittgenstein can be found in Ryle (1949), Winch (1958), 
and Coulter (1979). For example, following from an example provided by Harré (Harré, 
1999), consider the nouns „belief‟ and „cat‟. If one were to understand the way the noun      
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„belief‟ is used on the model of the way the noun „cat‟ is used, beliefs may be sought 
out in a similar manner to cats. However, one would be compelled to look for beliefs „in 
the mind‟, as opposed to looking for cats in a house or yard. Moreover, one might start 
investigating „beliefs about cats‟ in a manner that further tangles and muddles the 
everyday usage of such words, by attempts to understand both beliefs, cats, and beliefs 
about cats in ways that give unwarranted importance to psychological investigations of 
such.  
However, given that „belief‟ is used in a large number of different contexts and 
as a way of describing a variety of phenomena, whereas cat is used to refer generally to 
furry four legged animals with tails and a propensity to meow, it is apparent that the 
notion that belief, with all its possible denotative meanings, is in some way constitutive 
of a mental entity is problematic. As demonstrated by Ryle (1949) such things as 
beliefs, understandings, and a host of other „mental events‟ are to be understood as 
publicly verifiable achievements rather than events or processes. In short, what is 
revealed is that ordinary language defines the topics of scientific psychology (e.g., Harré, 
1999; Holth, 2001), and that what is investigated by scientific psychology, then, is 
essentially nothing more than the products of misunderstandings of the grammar of the 
psychological words utilised in ordinary language (e.g., Coulter, 1983b). 
In this regard, Winch, following from Wittgenstein, has suggested that in the 
social sciences there is the conflation of conceptual and empirical projects (Winch, 
1958), such that many so-called „problems‟ in the social sciences are in fact conceptual, 
grammatical problems, and as such they cannot be resolved by empirical means. This 
leads to formulations concerning such problems as being essentially incoherent. For 
example, consider Sharrock and Coulter‟s argument concerning the „problem of 
perception‟ in psychology, or as they suggest the „non-problem‟ (Sharrock & Coulter, 
1998, 1999, 2003; Wetherick, 1999). They argue against the notion of „perception‟, as      
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typically understood in psychology as involving some kinds of psychological processes, 
and they “do not accept any theory which requires the explication of the verb „perceive‟ 
(or „see‟) to incorporate processual matters, whether these be based on psychological or 
sociological postulates” (Sharrock & Coulter, 1999, p. 540, emphasis in original). In 
other words, they argue that many of the terms used in psychology as technical terms 
are in fact vernacular, everyday terms, and as such the grammar of such terms in 
ubiquitous usage problematises attempts to render such terms as „variables‟, „states‟, or 
„processes‟.  
An inversion of the role of cognition in psychological theory and method is 
central to discursive psychology, and is representative of its most striking, although 
generally unspoken specific claim – that mainstream psychology has gotten it wrong. 
Or, following from Wittgenstein, much of what is constituted as problems for 
psychology to solve might better be understood as problems of psychology, with a 
failure to attend to the importance of the primary medium by which psychological 
problems are framed, namely discourse. In this regard, the broad aim of discursive 
psychology is nothing less than a respecification of what psychology is considered to 
comprise (Potter, 2003a), and draws upon Garfinkel‟s notion of respecification as a 
project whereby, in the context of psychology, examination is directed towards the 
empirical description of work that contemporary psychological accounts depend on, but 
which are disregarded as irrelevant to their finished product (Garfinkel, 1988). 
 As a starting point for a serious consideration of such a proposal, one should 
consider that conceptualisations of such things as minds, motives, beliefs, attitudes, 
intentions, and the entire raft of psychological categories that ostensibly refer to 
„cognitive‟ or „mental‟ things in the world, are not a priori to discourse, they can be 
understood pragmatically as the products of discursive practices, or as Edwards 
suggests “talk‟s topics, assumptions and concerns” (Edwards, 2006a, p. 41). Thus, the      
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examination of how mental states might be accurate or inaccurate representations that 
are translated between the realms of public discourse and a hidden world of cognitive 
functioning is to be discarded in favour of an examination of discourse exclusively. In 
this regard, discourse analysis as practiced within a discursive psychological framework 
could be understood as representing a radically non-cognitive form of social psychology 
(Potter & Wetherell, 1987).  
What might this approach mean then, when considering the traditional topic 
matter of psychology? Firstly, it requires an applied research agenda that is essentially a 
reversal of the typical process that might take place within most psychological research 
contexts. Rather than starting with the technical vocabulary and explanatory 
frameworks developed by psychology, and then applying these in various research 
contexts, the starting point becomes an analysis of discourse in use, with an examination 
of how people may utilise what are taken-for-granted psychological themes and topics 
that may well be at odds with how such things are theorised within psychology 
(Edwards, 2005).   
Secondly and closely related to the first point, it suggests the primacy that 
should be attended to discourse as a medium for action. Language is not to be regarded 
as an abstract system that is „bolted on‟ to whatever psychological topic is under 
consideration, or as a transparent medium that has minimal or no influence on the 
observation and measurement of phenomena, but is itself a social practice.  In short, it 
requires an understanding that the study of behaviour cannot be sensibly undertaken 
separately from language (Potter, 2003b). 
And thirdly, such respecification is not simply the undertaking of discourse 
based research into areas traditionally theorised by psychology, with a reworking of 
such things as memory and attitude in discursive terms, the enterprise entails a 
fundamentally different way of reconceptualising many of the basic phenomena that      
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comprise the bulk of psychological theorising and research (Edwards, 2005; Potter, 
2005b). This is similar to the position advocated by Lynch with regard to 
ethnomethodological (and conversation analytic) treatments of „cognition‟, that while 
they could be allied with a range of cognitivist projects for „professional‟ reasons, this is 
problematic as “ethnomethodology empirically investigates practices, and that such 
practices differ qualitatively from any real or imagined cognitive domain” (Lynch, 
2006, p. 102).  
For example, while Sanders suggests that discourse based studies need to take 
account of the findings of cognitive science investigations in order to avoid invalidating 
discourse based observations, consider the definition of „cognition‟ that Sanders 
provides: 
 
The term can refer to speakers‟ underlying inner states at the moment of producing 
discourse objects (perceptions, emotions, wants, intentions, etc.), and also applies to 
more enduring cognitive content (beliefs, concepts, knowledge structures, values, 
memories) and response biases (e.g., personality traits, habits, attitudes), as well as to 
processing algorithms that are of interest in cognitive science. (Sanders, 2005, p. 57) 
 
The problem here is that the enunciated features of such things as „inner states‟, 
„cognitive contents‟, and „response biases‟ can all be approached as vernacular terms, 
with everyday, common-place uses. In other words they become hopelessly confounded 
with any particular scientific, psychological uses with which such terms may be argued 
to explicitly reference. 
Another problem with this type of argument is that the ontological status of such 
things as „underlying inner states‟ and an „attention to cognitive processing‟ (Sanders, 
2005, p. 57) is presupposed, and thus before any investigations are undertaken of 
situated discourse, some form of cognitivism will have already defined the course that 
any investigation can take. And, more importantly, may serve as a resource by which      
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explanations can be made of phenomena that entail no requirement for any explication 
of method. Indeed, if one considers both that the „cognitive sciences‟ represent a 
heterogeneous collection of undertakings (Potter & te Molder, 2005), and that 
considerable empirical work that has examined how ostensibly „cognitive‟ topics can be 
approached in-and-through the study of discourse without recourse to any hidden, inner, 
psychological functions or processes (te Molder & Potter, 2005), then the utility of 
retaining „cognitivism‟ would appear to be mainly a pragmatic concern with aligning 
ones‟ research project to the cognitive sciences. In short, a concern perhaps that a given 
account can be legitimised, or bolstered, by situating it within the confines of the 
dominant „cognitivist‟ research tradition, which after all is “doing rather well at the 
moment” (Lynch, 2006, p. 96).  
However, appeals that may seek to legitimise a theoretical position by inclusion 
of some form of cognitivism, particularly from within such disciplines as psychology 
and sociology, may do very little to actually secure one‟s scientific standing with regard 
to, for example, the physical sciences. Indeed, as Pleasants (2003) comments: 
 
I have no objection to academics calling themselves „social scientists‟ if they wish to. 
But I do think they should be under no illusions as to the „scientificity‟ of their 
activities. This is not a „metaphysical‟ injunction; it is a political and institutional 
caution. (Pleasants, 2003, p. 83, emphasis in original) 
 
Discursive Psychology: Conceptually Confused or Just Misunderstood? 
However, it is important to acknowledge there are tensions that have emerged 
among various proponents of what could be described broadly as an anti-, or counter-
cognitivist position in the disciplines of conversation analysis, discourse analysis, 
ethnomethodology, and discursive psychology. According to Coulter (1999) these seem 
to be between, essentially, those who advocate the use of conceptual analysis, in the 
form of logical-grammatical investigations (e.g., what could be considered a „strong-     
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Wittgensteinian‟ approach as championed by Coulter),
7 and those who place significant 
importance on the analysis of empirically derived data (e.g., as practiced by discursive 
psychology). Unfortunately, while it would appear that the two enterprises could 
profitably inform each other, there continues to be a fundamental failure to 
acknowledge that these two undertakings represent different modes of inquiry that 
nonetheless converge on the same goal. That is, to provide descriptions and not 
explanations of ostensibly mental phenomena.  
One might ask, then, what is the preoccupation with description? Read (2001) 
provides a clear enunciation of the position that seeks to avoid providing explanations, 
and thus interpretations, of peoples‟ activities: 
 
If one not only avoids explaining but avoids interpreting, then one avoids a 
hermeneutic. One hopes, that is, to avoid adding anything to people‟s practices as they 
themselves understand them (both explicitly--if and when (self-)interpretation is 
actually called for, and--the usual case-- “implicitly” in practice). One hopes not to 
change the norms and rules which they are following.  (Read, 2001, p. 456, emphasis in 
original) 
 
Perhaps it is in this injunction to avoid explanation that there is some connection to be 
found between the projects of ethnomethodology, ordinary language philosophy, and 
discursive psychology in investigations of the putatively „psychological‟, in that, the 
broad discipline of psychology appears to come pre-configured with the task to not only 
provide explanations of human activities, but to configure individuals as able to furnish 
explanations of their own conduct warrantable in the same manner as the disciplines 
themselves. It is, indeed, precisely the task of what Rose (e.g., Rose, 1996a, 1999) calls 
the psy disciplines, to change the norms and rules that persons might orient to, and to 
ensure that such orientation takes place in a „self-managed‟ fashion.  
                                                 
7 As characterised by McHoul and Rapley (2003, 2006) rather than Coulter himself.      
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In this regard, if one considers that explanation should be regarded in essentially 
epistemic terms, as involving a wide range of rhetorical practices (Faye, 1999), then one 
can grasp what is essentially a fundamental moral and ethical division between those 
who posit that a goal of the „human‟ or „social sciences‟ should be towards establishing 
better explanations versus those who argue for the provision of better descriptions. For, 
if the difference between explanation and description is to be found by reference to 
rhetorical practices, then perhaps one should seriously consider the charge that claims 
concerning the provision of better explanations can be understood as legitimisations for 
greater control. Having a better description of a particular practice, in no sense entails 
that one can, or would seek to, develop a more efficient technique that could be applied 
to such a practice – this is something that one could argue having a better explanation 
might provide for.  
The interest in description in the social sciences, then, allows one a principled 
position from which to avoid supplanting members‟ own explanations of their practices 
with social scientific correctives. Importantly, when one is conducting social scientific 
examinations of members who are in the business of doing just that, namely, to provide 
correctives (e.g., clinical psychologists), the task should nevertheless remain one of a 
steadfast commitment to description. The alternative is to fall into the trap of having to 
confront an endless regress of critique and explanation of „professional‟ explanations, 
with such explanations undoubtedly figuring in-and-as situated, contextual, social 
practices (e.g., psychotherapy). As Berard notes “it was a hard-won heuristic insight for 
the human sciences that description can be analyzed as a variety of practical activity, 
and can be taken as a topic for social inquiry rather than serving as its unacknowledged 
analytic resource” (Berard, 2005, p. 5, emphasis in original).  
Now, as with Wittgenstein‟s claim that the task of philosophy was essentially to 
destroy the illusion that theories could be constructed of cognitive processes that could      
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be tested empirically (Hacker, 1990b), so too does discursive psychology attempt to 
destroy such notions, but by a different route, by providing empirical explications of 
ostensibly cognitive phenomena that show rather than tell how such theories are of 
dubious utility as explanatory or descriptive devices. The issue is not that individual 
cognitive theories might be wrong, but rather, that the entire enterprise of constructing 
such theories may be misguided in the first instance. From this perspective, it is 
important to acknowledge that such a dismissive account of what serves to underpin the 
majority of contemporary scientific accounts of „mind‟ is not an undertaking to 
demolish anything of real substance, but rather that “what we are destroying is nothing 
but houses of cards and we are clearing up the ground of language on which they stand” 
(Wittgenstein, 1967a, §118, emphasis added). 
Coulter argues that for discourse analysts, they are trapped within a dilemma 
created by a misunderstanding of Wittgenstein, in which „mental‟ predicates are either 
names for real things or they are names deployed in discourse as ways-of-speaking 
(Coulter, 1999). This notion of ways-of-speaking, or how people may come to speak of 
things „as if‟, can be understood as representing a kind of „folk-cognitivism‟ (Bilmes, 
1992). Given that discursive psychology, as an example of one of the discourse 
approaches Coulter is taking issue with, rejects the first consideration of the use of 
„mental‟ predicates as its starting point, the conclusion can only be that discursive 
psychology is somehow still bound to muddled Cartesian conceptualisations of the 
mind, with an interest in examining how people deploy „mental‟ predicates in discourse 
as ways-of-speaking about the mental.  
In other words, Coulter posits that „mind‟ for discursive psychology is either a 
lay notion or a theorist‟s reification (Coulter, 1999). That is to say, by focusing on what 
people might say about the „mental‟ a major concession is made, to the cognitivist and 
Cartesian positions, that undermines the whole point of engaging in an enterprise called      
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discursive psychology. Indeed, Coulter suggests that such a process is nothing less than 
a form of “theoretical dilution” (Coulter, 1999, p. 164). Interestingly, while other 
commentators are also critical of how discursive psychology approaches what people 
have to say about the world, their concern is on how discursive psychology ignores or 
rejects such talk (Hammersley, 2003b). 
The dichotomy that Coulter presents, in an attempt to essentially show that 
discursive psychology must reify the „mental‟ however is flawed, in that discursive 
psychology does not approach „mind‟ as a lay notion or a theorist‟s reification, but 
rather “mind and reality are treated analytically as discourse‟s topic and business, the 
stuff the talk is about, and the analytic task is to examine how participants descriptively 
construct them” (Edwards, 1997, p. 48, emphasis added).  
In short, discursive psychology both explicitly rejects cognitivist accounts, and 
moreover rejects a focus that is concerned simply with what people say about mental 
concepts (Potter & Edwards, 2003), and it is interesting to note that Coulter uses the 
aforementioned quotation in order to suggest precisely the opposite. By way of 
clarification, when Edwards remarks “I have analysed emotion words and other mental 
predicates as ways of talking” (Edwards, 1997, p. 298, emphasis in original) this is not 
to be understood as meaning the same thing as analysing mental predicates „as ways of 
talking about‟ such predicates. One way of approaching this distinction is to consider 
that discursive psychology undertakes empirical investigations of „language-games‟ 
(Wittgenstein, 1967a), and not of any theorised mentalistic or physiological 
mechanisms presumed to underlie language production in a manner that has been the 
focus of the majority of psychological research undertakings. For example, as Edwards 
makes clear: 
 
The focus on cognition is part of an abiding interest in discursive psychology, which 
has sought to establish itself in contrast to the dominant perspective of the discipline,      
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which is cognitive psychology, while at the same time shifting the focus of analytic 
attention. (Edwards, 1997, p. 1) 
 
Coulter, more specifically, suggests that the dispute is between advocates of 
various forms of social constructionism and ethnomethodologists of a Wittgensteinian 
orientation (Coulter, 1999). Coulter makes his position quite clear with regard to 
discursive psychology, which he contends is an ontological position that proposes mind 
to be generated through discourse, when he states “if you concede the ontological status 
attributed to the „mental‟ and the „cognitive‟ by your opponents for one moment, you 
have undercut the requirement that your own alternative modes of inquiry be taken at all 
seriously” (Coulter, 1999, p. 165). By contrast, Hammersley argues
8 that conversation 
analysis and discourse analysis represent new forms of behaviourism, and are limited 
by: 
 
A tendency to treat anything that is not observable in the defined sense as having a 
different ontological status from that which is. At the very least, it is treated as 
constituted rather than constituting: and, therefore, even if it is not presented as less 
real, it is treated as less fundamental and determinate in character. (Hammersley, 2003b, 
p. 771) 
 
Such claims might suggest that, on the one hand, discursive psychology is 
concedes philosophical ground by a failure to repudiate an apparent commitment to the 
ontological status attributed to psychological terms and mental predicates, and on the 
other that it is flawed by attributing ontological status only to observables. Where does 
this leave discursive psychology? Such claims are illustrative of a misunderstanding of 
how various forms of social constructionist approaches to social science, and in 
                                                 
8 Which might rightly be said to represent not a critique of discursive psychology per se, but rather, a 
critique of some earlier work (e.g., Wetherell & Potter, 1992). I also note that Potter and Hammersley 
deal with this issue (Hammersley, 2003c; Potter, 2003c). Here, I draw upon Hammersley‟s critique in 
order to illustrate the delicate position discursive psychology often finds itself in with regards to 
comparisions with and between conversation analysis, ethnomethodology, ordinary language philosophy, 
and variants of discourse analysis (to name but a few).      
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particular discursive psychology, proceed in practice. Both represent a failure to 
appreciate a distinction between two forms of social construction, that is, between 
ontological and epistemic forms (Edwards, 1997). In this sense, discursive psychology 
configures explanation as needing to be conceptualised in the context of interpersonal 
communication, understood by reference to a complex of rhetorical practices (Billig, 
1987), and approached as a fundamentally epistemic category with the distinction 
between explanation and description not one of logic or semantics, but a question of 
pragmatics (Faye, 1999). 
 Pragmatically, discursive psychology employs such an epistemic sense of social 
construction with a concern toward the constructive nature of descriptions and accounts, 
and not that of any entities that might be claimed to underlie them (Edwards, 1997; 
Edwards & Potter, 2005). As Edwards makes clear, in much of cultural psychology 
mind is real for analysts, theorists, and lay persons, and the task for the analyst is to 
explicate how mind is constructed within the context of various cultural practices. In 
contrast, a discursive psychological approach treats mind and reality analytically as 
topic and business, that is to say, cognition is not examined as an entity in its own right, 
it is examined as being something that people deal with in discourse pragmatically 
(Edwards, 1997). 
Coulter poses the rhetorical question that “the abrogation of the reification of the 
so-called „mental‟ has already been pretty thoroughly accomplished by the 
Rylean/Wittgensteinian critique of Cartesianism, so what is left for „discursive 
psychologists‟ to do in this respect?” (2004, p. 336). Following from Wittgenstein‟s 
repudiation of the philosophical inclination to posit first-person mental predicate usage 
as always referencing inner mental states, not that they never can be (Malcolm, 1986, p. 
141), discursive psychology posits that mental predicates and psychological terms 
should not be understood as only referential (McHoul & Rapley, 2003) and that persons      
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who only take them to be referential by way of adopting a semantic view of 
psychological language (i.e., referentialism) are mistaken (ter Hark, 2001). Now, while 
the possibility that people do make mistakes in this manner broadly suggests that if 
people do not take a philosophical approach to the language that they use they will 
invariably make conceptual mistakes, a critical point is that when applied to ordinary 
language usage, it can at least imply an ironic treatment of such usage on the part of a 
professional analyst (McHoul & Rapley, 2003). It is this ironic stance towards 
members‟ ordinary, everyday, unremarkable language by professionals, be they analysts 
of discourse, psychologists, linguists, or logical-grammatical philosophers, that 
discursive psychology takes issue with.  
Rather than being concerned with how people might „get things wrong‟, of how 
people invariably make „category-mistakes‟ (Ryle, 1949), the interest is in the practices 
that use psychological terms and mental predicates and how such words might be 
functioning within such practices, and for analytic purposes the correctness of what 
people might say is considered to be irrelevant (Potter & Edwards, 2003). After all, if 
people were as mired in confusion as both some post-Wittgensteinian scholars and 
cognitive psychologists might suggest, we would need to reconcile this with the 
astonishing observation that people are not seemingly stumped by intractable problems 
with the intelligibility of everyday discourse (e.g., McHoul & Rapley, 2003). 
This appears to be glossed over by those undertaking primarily conceptual 
analytic investigations like Coulter, notwithstanding the importance accorded to 
obtaining empirical examples of what people happen to say about mental concepts as 
instances of „perspicuous representation‟ to enable for distinguishing between 
“intelligible vs. unintelligible uses, correct vs. incorrect, appropriate vs. inappropriate, 
etc., uses vs. misuses” (Coulter, 1999, p. 171). Interestingly, when examples are 
provided, as “invented, normatively intelligible examples” (Potter & Edwards, 2003, p.      
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176), rather than show how linguistic philosophy triumphs analysis of empirical 
examples of talk, what is often revealed is how a grammatical analysis can reveal very 
little about actual usage. By way of example, Coulter (2004) provides an example of an 
empirical
9 instance of talk (p. 338): 
 
  My wife: Jeff, did you check the mail? 
  JC: Sorry, honey – it slipped my mind. 
 
This is presented as showing that there is no difference between using actual, 
empirical examples of discourse and invented or disembedded examples to make logical 
arguments, and as such nothing is to be gained by the invocation of empirical examples. 
After all, what possible difference could there be, with a paraphrase of „it slipped my 
mind‟ to something like „I forgot (about) it‟, between the transcript presented (as 
empirically derived) and an invented example? Indeed, such a paraphrase in no way 
commits its user to some form of Cartesian theory of mind. 
However, discursive psychology does not suggest that by reference to empirical 
examples of discourse or paraphrasing of what people may say concerning the mental 
one can commit members to possessing any theory of mind, or for that matter any 
theory about anything much at all. What discursive psychology attends to is what such 
talk might be doing, in particular talk that features psychological terms, and in this 
regard paraphrasing members talk runs the risk of ignoring the situated and indexical 
uses of particular expressions (Potter & Edwards, 2003).  
Now, while „it slipped my mind‟ can indeed be paraphrased without residue into 
„I forgot (about) it‟ (Coulter, 2004; Sharrock & Coulter, 2004) to allow for the 
clarification and dissolution of misguided psychological theorising about the nature of 
„minds‟ and so forth on conceptual grounds, the point is that this provides little 
                                                 
9 “If anyone dares to challenge this as a merely „invented‟ instance, let him or her call my bluff, or, better, 
my wife! I have a tape, to boot” (Coulter, 2004, p. 338).      
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purchase analytically of what it is that interlocutors, the talk, the interactional business 
of saying „it slipped my mind‟ might be doing in particular, situated contexts, as this is 
an empirical question. While conceptual analysis may well posit that “meaning is a 
normative matter, not an empirical one” (Sharrock & Coulter, 2006, p. 283), what 
counts as normative is surely to be found by an examination of empirical materials. 
What if Coulter‟s example looked something like this: 
 
JC: Honey, did you check my dinner? 
My wife: Sorry, honey – it slipped my mind. 
My wife: Jeff, did you check the mail? 
JC: Sorry, honey – it slipped my mind. 
 
How can a logical-grammatical analysis of this, then, help us in establishing the 
suitability of using any particular paraphrase for “it slipped my mind”? Could the “it 
slipped my mind” offered by JC and My Wife be paraphrased identically, without 
residue as “I forgot (about) it”, and if not, how would one go about determining 
alternative paraphrases? One could imagine that if more of this talk was made available, 
with considerably more detail concerning the sequential organisation available (Sacks et 
al., 1974), we might examine the notion that “it slipped my mind” is being deployed by 
JC in a rhetorical fashion, that ironises My Wife‟s usage of “it slipped my mind”; or that 
it is deployed in a manner that attends to issues of accountability; or that JC‟s usage 
could be paraphrased as something other than “I forgot (it)”, as something like “I don‟t 
care”, or any number of possible alternatives.  
However, such an exercise would be fruitless as this is a made-up, constructed, 
rhetorically positioned piece of discourse, and as such we are confronted with the 
absurd situation of having to consider an almost limitless number of possible discourses, 
with an almost limitless number of possible paraphrases. Sacks was clear on why      
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investigations of actual talk were significantly more compelling than dealing with 
invented examples of discourse:
10 
 
One cannot invent new sequences of conversation and feel happy with them. You may 
be able to take a „question and an answer‟, but if we have to extend it very far, then the 
issue of whether somebody would really say that, after, say, the fifth utterance, is one 
we could not confidently argue. One doesn‟t have a strong intuition for sequencing in 
conversation. (Sacks, 1992b, p. 5) 
   
This is why detailed, empirical examinations of talk, such as those undertaken 
by discursive psychology, are of utility. They provide for an analytic orientation to what 
people do with talk, and not what we might have to say (as analysts) about what people 
might say about talk. This in no way makes conceptual investigations otiose, but rather, 
reflects a fundamental limit in their ability to describe actual practices when divorced 
from those practices. And as Sacks cautioned, the temptation to paraphrase “rather than 
having to stick to what was heard to find out what it might be about” (1992a, p. 621), 
while perhaps being a way to manage the complexities of a given discourse for analytic 
purposes, may well result in an explication not of participants‟ talk-in-interaction but 
merely analysts‟ own preconceptions about what might be happening. As Sacks dryly 
notes “what I‟m saying is, if anyone wants to paraphrase, that‟s their business” (1992a, 
p. 621). In addition, the importance of approaching ostensibly psychological talk 
empirically is made clear by McHoul and Rapley (2003): 
 
That is, we don‟t just have wonderings, memories, thoughts, and the rest in some 
department of internal affairs: and we don‟t just say we have them at any old points in 
the talk; we routinely talk of them in ways that turn out to be topical, and in ways that 
get recognised by others for the topicality of that talk. (p. 513, emphasis in original)   
                                                 
10 As is Coulter (e.g., Coulter, 1991). Note that I am not suggesting that one cannot undertake 
examinations of „made up‟ talk, such as fictional texts (e.g., McHoul, 1987) or film dialogue (e.g., 
Silverman, 1991), but rather, I am advocating that discursive psychological examinations of discourse do 
(or should) attend to the locally produced and occasioned features of such talk, be that in examinations of 
talk-in-interaction or texts.       
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Discursive Psychology‟s Raison d‟etre 
The general approach that discursive psychology brings to the study of 
„cognition‟, then, might best be understood by reference to three particular concerns, 
namely a concern with analytic accounts of putative „cognitive‟ products, the 
pragmatics of „cognitive‟ practices, and the provision of non-ironic accounts of 
members‟ reflexive „cognitive‟ discourse. Firstly, it represents an attempt to undertake 
an examination, in the first instance by way of conceptual analysis, of what have hereto 
been regarded as the taken-for-granted products of cognition, such as beliefs, values, 
intentions, attitudes, memories, and so forth, by analysts (in particular those working 
within the discipline of psychology). Discursive psychology examines how analysts 
come to categorise, define, and explicate taxonomies detailing the putative products of 
the „cognitive‟, the „mental‟, and the „mind‟ that are ironic with regard to everyday 
members (e.g., Rapley, 2004; Rapley et al., 1998). 
Secondly, in the practice of discursive psychology, where the interest is in 
members‟ everyday practices, attention is directed toward the pragmatic nature of such 
„discourse of the mental‟ and the practices in which such discourses are routinely 
deployed. Such discourse is approached by discursive psychology as representing social 
action (Edwards & Potter, 1992), rather than talk about, or revealing of, the putative 
operations of any underlying cognitive machinery. From this perspective, collection of 
empirically derived data is a requirement for any form of cogent analysis, as the 
emphasis is not on individual use or misuse of language, it is on providing descriptions 
of situated and occasioned social activities.  
Finally, it examines the manner in which discourse by members about cognition 
itself has pragmatic implications, and not by way of analysts‟ considerations of such 
talk as being indicative of members‟ faulty reasoning, misunderstanding of grammar, or 
some form of „folk-cognitivism‟ (Bilmes, 1992). Importantly, the goal is not to identify      
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theoretically derived causal mechanisms in an attempt to explain „cognition‟, but 
following from Wittgenstein on the nature of philosophical investigations “we may not 
advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our 
considerations. We must do away with explanation, and description alone must take its 
place” (Wittgenstein, 1967a, §109, emphasis in original).
11 
In this light, are claims that discursive psychology represents “a programme 
without a genuinely distinctive raison d‟etre” (Coulter, 2004, p. 340), and that it might 
not be readily distinguished from such approaches as conversation analysis and 
linguistic pragmatics, accurate and adequate? If there is little or no difference between 
discursive psychology and other methodological approaches to discourse analysis and 
the study of conversation, what exactly is the point of discursive psychology? The most 
readily discernable difference of some import is that discursive psychology should be 
understood principally as a position that has developed within the discipline of 
psychology, and that it allows for the doing of a variety of empirically and conceptually 
driven social science projects that would otherwise be effectively ignored from within 
that discipline.  
It draws upon insights from ethnomethodological, conversation analytic, 
discourse based, and ordinary language philosophy traditions, and seeks to develop 
them within a discipline that has arguably come to dominate the social sciences. It is an 
alternate empirical as opposed to empiricist psychology, sensitive to the concerns of 
contemporary psychological theorising and research, that nonetheless seeks the 
respecification and critique of mainstream psychological accounts of such things as 
„attitudes‟ (Wiggins, 2004), „false beliefs‟ (Antaki, 2004), and „cognitive distortions‟ 
(Auburn, 2005; Auburn & Lea, 2003). 
                                                 
11 One might also take this to support the view that, unlike the physical sciences, the social sciences are 
yet to provide adequate descriptions of their basic objects of interest (cf. Faye, 1999; Lynch & Bogen, 
1994; Read, 2001).      
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While the general position outlined here might be construed as an argument that 
seeks to position philosophical, conceptual investigations as subordinate to empirical 
studies of language, such a charge fundamentally misconstrues the nature and scope of 
the discursive psychological project. Such a project is sensitive to the concerns 
enunciated by Sharrock and Button (1999) that there has been a failure in the social 
sciences to take Wittgenstein‟s resistance to theory seriously, with the „craving for 
generality‟ he despaired against representative of a misguided response to a real need 
for clarification of the workings of language. Wittgenstein urged that one consider the 
possibility that conceptual, philosophical „problems‟ that may appear to require 
theoretical solutions might best be considered as a non-problems, that is to say that 
conceptual, philosophical problems should be considered and treated as such, and one 
should be wary of conflating such pseudo-problems with a need for theory that could 
direct attempts for empirical resolutions.  
This is precisely what underpins the discursive psychological approach, or at 
least the one described here, to issues of „the mental‟, in that there is no „theory of 
mind‟ on offer, no mechanisms posited that explain „thought‟, no explanations of any 
particular „cognitive‟ mechanisms, and importantly no attempt to subvert the nature of 
post-Wittgensteinian philosophical investigations of language in use. Rather, it is 
congruent with Hacker‟s injunction that there can be “no substitute in philosophy for the 
description of the particular case” (1990b, p. 312), and is in accord with Wittgenstein 
himself: “One cannot guess how a word functions. One has to look at its use and learn 
from that” (Wittgenstein, 1967a, §340, emphasis in original). 
Empirical accounts of language-in-interaction involving „mental‟ discourse 
serve to stand alongside conceptual investigations, with this form of social science 
representing an approach that is essentially „empirically grounded, philosophically 
reflective‟ (Pleasants, 2003). In a sense, it is an empirical social science that endeavours      
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to adopt a kind of Wittgensteinian „attitude‟
12 towards providing perspicuous 
representations of cumulative corpora of discourse that might provide for some 
dissolution of „psychological‟ confusions. As Edwards notes “the discourse-based study 
of psychological themes looks both ways, then, to the nature of discourse, and to the 
established nature of psychology as a discipline. It does that in order to have something 
to say, and somebody to say it to” (Edwards, 1997, p. 1, emphasis added). 
Now, while both the discursive psychological and the post-Wittgensteinian 
ethnomethodological projects seek to repudiate the notion that „minds‟ and related 
concepts have some existence ontologically, the issue of how one is to describe such 
things given that some people may in fact live in a world where such things as „minds‟ 
are apparently internal phenomena places both in a position, potentially, of considerable 
irony with regard to members‟ practices (McHoul, 1988a). And, indeed, such a situation 
becomes even more problematic for logical-grammatical investigations in that any 
description of such members‟ avowals, attributions, or displays of „internal‟ phenomena 
that are oriented to as such, may well entail a breaching of the logical grammar of 
ordinary language itself (McHoul & Rapley, 2003). That is to say, what is not at issue is 
the difference “between „lay‟ and „scientific‟ use but between language at work and 
language gone on holiday” (Sharrock & Coulter, 2006, p. 282).  
By way of explication, consider Ryle‟s enunciation of the “Bogy of Mechanism” 
(1949, p. 74), as elucidated by reference to a hypothetical illustration of an observer to a 
game of chess who is unfamiliar with chess (or any other game) permitted views of the 
chessboard at the completion of each „move‟. An astute observer would undoubtedly 
notice regularities in how the various pieces are positioned. However, as Ryle makes 
clear, while the rules of the game may be discovered, such that the rules prescribe what 
players may not do, any „explanations‟ can only be provided in terms of those rules – 
                                                 
12 As involving undertakings that provide for the dissolution of philosophical „problems‟ and „conceptual 
confusions‟ by way of investigations of perspicuous segments of grammar.      
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further „explanations‟ can not be provided in terms of rules but require explanations “in 
terms of some quite different things” (Ryle, 1949, p. 75). The point is that the issue of 
how to describe the rules of the game may be highly contested, after all, what counts as 
a meaningful ascription concerning such rules is based upon the use of public criteria 
(Buttny, 1986). Nonetheless as McHoul (1988a) has suggested, the logical grammar is 
critical for any pragmatic analysis of language.  
However, while such logical-grammatical investigations might be considered the 
bedrock on which to undertake any empirical examinations, it is important to note that 
in any pragmatic examination of social life any description proffered by an analyst 
cannot be unaffected by ethical and moral concerns, and as such any description 
invariably requires some form of evaluation. In other words, there can be no analytic 
interpretation qua description that can be offered as bootstrapping its own historically 
situated, socially constrained and enabled, contextual dependencies, that serve to 
surround and infuse in its very formulation (Laurier & Philo, 2004; McHoul, 1988a; 
Rapley, 2004).  
It is in this attention to a kind of local, specific, and yet simultaneously extensive 
historicity, in which power
13 operates in both the Foucaultian sense, and in a manner 
implicative in the operations of Sacks‟s specific and yet general social „machinery‟ 
(McHoul, 2005), that one might find a marked departure from both the canonical 
discursive psychology of Edwards and Potter and the Wittgensteinian conceptual 
analysis advocated by Coulter. Namely, that this form of discursive psychology,
14 while 
strongly influenced by ethnomethodological strictures and the later philosophy of 
Wittgenstein, is in practice constrained by the notion that any investigations of, and that 
                                                 
13 Consider that Foucault‟s conceptualisation of power could be approached as a kind of Sacksian 
„device‟. That is, it is a device that can produce, and is produced by, various interactional practices. 
“Power is not a substance. Neither is it a mysterious property whose origin must be delved into. Power is 
only a certain type of relation between individuals” (Foucault, 2000b, p. 343, emphasis added). 
 
14 Of which Semiotic Investigations (McHoul, 1996) could be considered a foundational source.      
  149 
are predicated upon, what passes for „common-sense‟, comprised as it is from the 
mundane, the taken-for-granted, the everyday forms of language-in-use, are to be 
considered highly contested matters as is the logical grammar itself (McHoul, 1988a) 
Indeed, while Coulter (1999) is correct in asserting that people can say whatever 
they like but what that might mean is something that is bound normatively by grammar, 
that very normativity can be the site of discursive struggle (McHoul, 1988a, 1996). And, 
moreover, such contestation is to be found by way of empirical examinations. Such 
contestations, while resistant to any form of singular identification, calculation, or 
aggregation, might be tentatively felt operating „at the margins‟ in such empirical 
interactions as those detailed by McHoul and Rapley that focus on such things as the 
conversation between an „intellectually disabled‟ person and a „clinical psychologist‟ 
(McHoul & Rapley, 2002) and the „diagnosis‟ of a child with ADHD (McHoul & 
Rapley, 2005a).  
Nevertheless, following from McHoul‟s (1988a) remarks on the critical 
discourse analysis of Fairclough (1995), it would appear there remains considerable 
disparities between advocates of critical discourse analysis that portray „power‟ in a 
liberal or Marxist form, with such a charge having been made with regard to work 
conducted under the rubric of „critical discursive psychology‟ (Parker, 1999) by those 
with some stake in the development of a „discursive psychology‟ more generally (Potter, 
Edwards, & Ashmore, 1999), and more specifically those employing a Foucaultian 
inspired analysis of „power‟ as the relationships between knowledge, power, and their 
conditions of possibility (e.g., Rapley, 2004).  
In this sense, McHoul suggests that to be „critical‟ should be primarily regarded 
as not to offer explanations, presumably ones that point to the workings of ideological 
mechanisms that somehow produce various discourses, but rather to entertain the notion 
that what is required is the wholesale destruction of a priori conceptualisations that posit      
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differences between observers and observed, members and analysts, and most definitely 
theory and practices (cf. McHoul, 1994, 1998, 2004). Perhaps, as suggested by some 
(Laurier & Philo, 2004), at a broad level there is some warrant to give serious 
consideration to both the archaeological focus on documents and discourses and an 
ethnomethodological project of investigating practical action and reasoning.
15 
Such examinations, in managing the tensions between the ethnomethodological, 
Wittgensteinian, and discursive psychological concerns with the „psychological‟, do not 
a priori assume that the conceptual underpinnings of the investigation are somehow 
transcendent to the entire enterprise. While such investigations are sensitive to 
requirements that one undertake a surview of the local grammar (Wittgenstein, 1974), or 
indeed the „conditions of possibility‟ (Foucault, 1972), they are nonetheless firmly 
rooted in the everyday discourse that they seek to describe. Nevertheless, attention 
directed towards these concerns does provide for pragmatic determinations by which 
one can obviate the need to undertake extensive empirical studies of specific 
phenomena that are appropriately addressed by way of purely conceptual analysis. It is 
important to bear in mind that such examinations are not to be regarded as discrete from 
any specific research undertakings (Lynch, 1993), but that at all times attention is 
directed towards the possible conceptual muddles and tangles that analysts may 
incorporate unwittingly into applied empirical research frameworks.  
„Trains of Thought‟ 
By way of example, consider the commonplace, vernacular expression (or 
„idomatised talk‟, Sacks, 1992a) „train of thought‟. Does it require, to speak of a „train 
of thought‟, conceptually and pragmatically, an appreciation of what a „train‟ might be, 
as opposed to say a „truck‟? Is it that any substitution X in „X of thought‟ requires 
consideration not principally of „thought‟, but of the way in which it can be describable 
                                                 
15 For an excellent example of such an „effective semiotic‟ or „ethnogenealogical‟ project, see Plunkett 
(2005).      
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by X? Would a failure to appreciate that „train‟ is something that is, or can be, 
comprised of some form of engine, carriages, that is limited to travelling along tracks 
and so forth render something like „I‟ve lost my train of thought‟ as conceptually 
senseless – as senseless as taking „train‟ to imply the activity of teaching or learning? 
Seemingly, in this case it is appropriate to link „train‟ and „thought‟, and not for 
example „banana‟, in that „I‟ve lost my banana of thought‟ makes no sense, whereas 
„I‟ve lost my truck of thought‟ while humorous, and somewhat odd, is nevertheless 
understandable in the same way as „I‟ve lost my train of thought‟.
16  
Consider that one could, or might, undertake empirical scientific examinations 
of „thinking‟, of quanta being somehow linked together like carriages or boxcars (e.g., 
„thoughts‟), being constrained by rails (e.g., „context‟), and having some kind of prime-
mover (e.g., „intention‟), that would have at their core conceptual problems associated 
with the rendering of „thought‟ shorn of any situated and indexical features that inform 
in its use. Further, while „train‟ might appear to warrant conceptual clarification in order 
to provide for a description of what „train of thought‟ might mean, what of the nebulous 
concept of „thought‟? In this regard, following from Wittgenstein, perhaps it might be 
appropriate to ask the question “is it even always an advantage to replace an indistinct 
picture by a sharp one? Isn‟t the indistinct one often exactly what we need?” 
(Wittgenstein, 1967a, §71). In other words, perhaps „thought‟ does not, or should not, 
indeed cannot, stand in need of conceptual clarification; it is to be understood as 
operative in ways in which its meaning cannot be clearly ascertained divorced from the 
circumstances of its use. 
The alternative, if one were to attempt to provide for a conceptually unassailable 
account of the way in which words such as „thought‟ can be deployed in ordinary 
discourse, is to undertake conceptual investigations that are attentive to the historical 
                                                 
16 Note that I am not suggesting that idioms and proverbs cannot be adopted and used fluently without 
being understood.           
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foundations on which the very possibility of the meaning of such words rests, and on 
which any conceptual investigation itself depends. A tall order indeed, and one to which 
a pragmatic orientation toward the ways in which such discourse operate as practices 
within forms of life seeks to attenuate. Drawing from McHoul‟s (2005) reading of 
Sacks (Sacks, 1970?), one should perhaps look to undertake investigations of the 
„machinery‟ that generate such practices, where such „machinery‟ “is what people have 
to know-and-use in order to know-and-use what they manifestly can be analytically 
proven to know-and-use in the conduct of their everyday affairs” (p. 125, emphasis in 
original).   
In then moving towards such empirical investigations of talk-in-interaction it is 
an inevitable consequence that both members, and analysts seeking to describe 
members‟ practices, may employ language in ways that can be demonstrably shown to 
have the possibility of containing instantiations of conceptual confusions. That is to say, 
any attempt to investigate members‟ practices might inevitably reveal, to a greater or 
lesser extent, such practices to contain logical-grammatical errors (and likewise for 
analysts). After all, Wittgenstein was quite clear on such matters, that “philosophical 
problems and confusions are not the province of „professional philosophers‟ but can 
arise in anyone‟s life when people attempt to step back from their matter-of-course 
affairs” (Sharrock & Coulter, 2006, p. 282, emphasis in original). Importantly, this is 
not the same as assuming problems of measurement on the part of the investigator of 
particular phenomena, such that error can be attributed to a particular measuring 
instrument (including an investigator‟s perceptual system, for example); it is a 
recognition that the very structure and form of our language is subject to conflation of 
usage and meaning when language itself is examined.  
Consider the following orthographic extract that details an interaction between a 
researcher (I)  undertaking interview based research into the relationship between      
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peoples‟ experiences of „mental illness‟ and „spirituality‟, and a participant identified as 
„Paul‟ (P).
17   
 
Extract 3.1 
I:  Ok. So if you think back to the spiritual beliefs you had er, 
around the time you first had a breakdown, and the kinds of 
spiritual beliefs you have now, can you tell me, er, have they 
changed? 
P:  Yeah. 
I:  Can you tell me, describe to me what that change has been? 
P:  My faith is a lot stronger, now than what it was. And I’ve 
accepted it. Um, I still don’t know why, but I’ve accepted it 
now that I’ve got to go through with this, it’s a journey I’ve 
got to take, and um, I’ve forgot me thought! 
I:  Sorry? 
P:  I’ve lost me train of thought. 
I:  You’ve lost your train of thought? Well I was just trying to get 
you to compare the kinds of beliefs you had around the time that 
you first had a breakdown, and the beliefs you have now. You 
were saying that you were more accepting now even though you 
still don’t understand why you have to go through with it. 
P:  Um, no answer. 
 
Here, then, is an empirical example of the aforementioned „train of thought‟ 
phrase, whereby one could posit its occurrence as potentially grammatically incorrect in 
the Wittgensteinian and the traditional syntactical senses. Can you forget a thought, and 
moreover, can one lose an entire train of them? Regardless, Paul‟s interlocutor does not 
attempt to correct or admonish his usage but demonstrably orients to this as an act of 
forgetting, that is to say, that Paul is required to give a response to a previous question 
concerning whether his “spiritual beliefs” had changed, and in what manner, since he 
had “first had a breakdown”. One could suggest that “I‟ve forgot me thought!” occurs in 
the conversational slot that might otherwise be occupied by the third part of a „three-part 
list‟(Jefferson, 1990), with the first part “I‟ve got to go through with this” and the 
                                                 
17 Taken from a corpus of unpublished, semi-structured orthographic interviews, produced by Vivien 
Kemp. Used with permission.       
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second part “it‟s a journey I‟ve got to take”. In short, “I‟ve forgot me thought!” might 
be paraphrased, if Paul were of a conversation analytic leaning, to something like “I 
don‟t have anything that rounds out this three-part list!”. Is the “thought” not to be 
regarded, ontologically, as a „thought‟ in a referential sense, but rather as lacuna, 
„interactional filler‟, that can serve as content to maintain the sequentially organised 
structure of this particular interaction?  
However, note that Paul does not, on prompting, report something to the effect 
that he has forgotten the question, or forgotten what he was going to say, but rather he is 
quite clear that what has been lost involves thought. While, analytically, we might 
choose to describe the „thought‟ and „train of thought‟ in terms other than those of a 
putative „mental‟ nature, such „thoughts‟ (and related mental objects and processes) are 
indeed things that can be, and are, performative of certain kinds of interactional 
business for people regardless of their ontological status, dubious conceptual 
foundations, and irrespective of Wittgensteinian protestations that such things represent 
potential transgressions of grammar. 
Notwithstanding the recognition that members and analysts are subject to the 
same conceptual problems and confusions, this has no consequences for members‟ 
practices, only analysts‟ attempting to provide accounts of those practices. This can be 
understood as analogous to the notion that philosophical problems are conceptual 
entanglements that arise only when such problems are specifically addressed as such. 
For members, one might suggest, there are no philosophical problems, rather there are 
only problems associated with the multiform practices of accountability (i.e., Garfinkel, 
1967). 
Consider the following extract in which Paul‟s talk has been transcribed in more 
detail,
18 using conversation analytic notation, in contrast to the first extract (and much 
                                                 
18 Transcribed by the present author.      
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like the one presented by Coulter) that is rather „sparse‟ on detail that might otherwise 
provide for an alternate reading (see Appendix B for glossary of transcription notation). 
 
Extract 3.2 
1    I:   .hhhhh So, if you think back to: the >like the< spiritual  
2      beliefs you had (0.5) u:m .hhhh around the time that you  
3      first had a breakdown, (1.0) and the kinds of spiritual 
4      beliefs you have now, (0.8) can you tell me (0.2) u:m  
5      (0.3) have they ↑changed? 
6         (0.2) 
7    P:   Yeah. 
8      (0.8) 
9    I:   Can you describe to me what that change has been? 
10      (6.0) 
11   P:   Hrm:: my faith is a lot stronger now than what it was 
12        (5.0) 
13   P:   And I accepted thet 
14      (4.2) 
15   P:   u::m:: 
16      (2.5) 
17   P:   >I still don’t know why< 
18      (1.0) 
19   P:   but I’ll get through jus >livin with it< 
20      (1.8) 
21   P:   I’ve gotta go through this, (0.5) and it’s a journey I  
22        gotta ↑take 
23      (4.5) 
24   P:   and um 
25      (10.9) 
26   P:   ººI lost me thoughtºº 
27      (2.5) 
28   I:   Sorry? 
29   P:   I’ve lost me train [of thought.] 
30   I:                      [Lost   your] train- .hhh 
31      Well I- I’m just trying to ask- ((muffled thud))  
32      um get you to compare the kinds of spirit- the the  
33        beliefs you had, y’know around the time that you first 
34        had a .hh breakdown, .hhhh and the beliefs you have  
35        ((muffled thud)) no:w (0.8) An you were saying that (.)  
36        you were more accepting now even though you still don’t  
37        understand why (1.2) you have to go through it.      
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38      (15.3) 
39   P:   Hrm:: (12.6) 
 
Now, while in the first extract “I‟ve forgot me thought” and “I‟ve lost me train 
of thought” could be paraphrased, without too much quibbling, as „I‟ve forgotten the 
question‟, clearly in the second extract a determination of the status of both these 
statements is considerably more problematic. Consider also, that a closer examination of 
both transcripts reveals a curious discrepancy in Paul‟s reported speech concerning 
“I‟ve forgot me thought!” as presented in Extract 3.1 and the “I lost me thought” (line 
26) in Extract 3.2. It would appear that in the original orthographic transcription of the 
talk, undertaken by Paul‟s interlocutor, “I lost me thought” has not only been oriented to 
as something akin to an act of forgetting, but has been further rendered as such in being 
transcribed as “I‟ve forgot me thought!” in the analytic transcript. In other words, the 
difference between „I lost me thought‟ and „I‟ve forgot me thought!‟, rather than 
something that should be considered as trivial to the interaction, the analytic account of 
the interaction, or as a purely conceptual matter, might be more profitably approached 
as something that points to the significant interactional implications of their discrete 
usage. Consider the differential accountability that could be posited between the actions 
of avowing a „loss‟ versus the „forgetting‟ of a „thought‟.
19  
Turning to the significant pauses that occur between Paul‟s utterances, and the 
almost total lack of any response on the part of his interlocutor in conversation as 
revealed in Extract 3.2, these appear to be illustrative of some interactional failure, or 
problem, particularly with regard to the interviewer‟s attempt to elicit talk concerning 
Paul‟s „spiritual beliefs‟. Perhaps „I‟ve lost me train of thought‟ might be more 
appropriately described in this instance as the final segment of a sequence in which Paul 
                                                 
19 For something to be „lost‟, there needs to be a publicly ratifiable „thing‟ that can be agreed upon to be 
„lost‟. That is to say, in a community of language users, things can be lost, and understood to be lost, 
provided that such things can (in principle) be found. And, such things can clearly comprise a range of 
psychological objects. While this also holds for „forget‟, consider that to „forget‟ something may well 
involve a more volitional or intentional aspect.       
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fails to provide (perhaps in order to avoid giving) a response to his interlocutor‟s 
question altogether. Would one suggest that Paul must grapple with a philosophical or 
metaphysical problem concerning the forgetting, or losing, of his thoughts when queried 
by his interlocutor, or could this be described more appropriately as something that Paul 
might do in order to avoid having to talk about a particularly sensitive issue (i.e., 
spirituality)?  
Consider that the slow pace of delivery, frequent pauses, and reference to a „loss 
of thought‟ might well be taken as characteristics of „mental illness‟, in the form of 
„disorganised speech‟ such as that associated with schizophrenia, or a „diminished 
ability to think or concentrate‟ as associated with major depression (APA, 2000), and 
one could well understand that the status of „I‟ve lost me thought‟, in an interaction in 
which the „thoughts‟ of one participant may be considered as potentially suspect or 
problematic (i.e., as being those of someone with a „formal thought disorder‟), might be 
one which risks instantiation of conceptual confusions.  
In other words, in the examination of members‟ practices of accountability by 
way of conceptually flawed methodologies that presuppose members‟ competence to be 
variable, and subject to error, further conceptual problems arise. One of the clearest 
contexts in which this is likely to be of considerable issue is in interactions involving 
matters of „mental illness‟ or competency. For example, if Paul‟s interlocutor considers 
his talk concerning the forgetting or losing of his thoughts as evidence of his mental 
illness, namely, that people with particular mental illnesses are likely to forget things, 
become confused, have problematic mental functioning, or that much of their reference 
to „mental states‟ transgresses the logical grammar – and provides an account in those 
terms, one can posit that such accounts of members‟ practices of accountability do 
instantiate conceptual confusions and misunderstandings that can come to be 
constitutive of members‟ practices of accountability.       
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This can be seen in such contexts as medical interviews, counselling sessions, 
competency determinations (or indeed, in psychologically oriented research interviews 
as presented in the case of Paul) and so forth, where things such as „racing thoughts‟, 
and „slowed thinking‟ are ubiquitous features of discourse. This occurs where the 
ontological status of such things as „thoughts‟ are specified and operationalised by 
disciplines such as psychology and psychiatry – however much we may want to consign 
their use to a metaphysical dustbin – it is in precisely those contexts that their situated 
and occasioned uses as „thoughts‟ is made relevant. How might one proceed in 
providing non-ironising, ethnomethodologically informed, descriptions of interactions 
that might occur in such contexts? As McHoul and Rapley (2003) remark, are members, 
if they do something like refer to mental states, just plain wrong?
20 
On this issue, Coulter makes a distinction between members‟ use of concepts 
pertaining to mental discourse, that of members‟ lay theorising using such concepts and 
members‟ engaged use of concepts devoid of theoretical purposes (Coulter, 2004, p. 340, 
emphasis in original). Quite apart from the difficulties that are entailed in attempting to 
ascertain exactly how one could make such distinctions, such a position, while 
providing a means by which one can gain analytic purchase by securing one‟s 
conceptual grounds, cannot but undermine one‟s ethnomethodological grounding 
(McHoul & Rapley, 2003). 
In this regard, consider the following extract
21 between an interviewer (SA) 
conducting research into user experiences of a drug and alcohol support service, and a 
client of the service (JB) who talks about issues concerning both drug use and treatment 
for „attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder‟. 
                                                 
20 Here I am reminded of the following anecdote concerning Wittgenstein: “I had my tonsils out and was 
in the Evelyn Nursing Home feeling sorry for myself. Wittgenstein called. I croaked: „I feel just like a 
dog that has been run over.‟ He was disgusted: „You don‟t know what a dog that has been run over feels 
like.‟” (Pascal, 1984, as cited in Frankfurt, 2005, pp. 24-34). 
 
21 Data taken from a corpus of semi-structured, unpublished interviews, produced by Sarah Schubert. 
Used with permission.       
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Extract 3.3 
1    SA:   ºI can understandº 
2          (1.1) 
3    SA:   U:m: (0.8) So (.) in your opinion: do you think that (.) 
4          your use of um: (0.3) like speed (0.4) is related  
5       (0.7) to the fact that you’ve ↑got ADHD (.) ºIs thatº= 
6    JB:   =Ye::a::h:: sometimes it is (.) sometimes I think I’m  
7          sma::ter on (0.5) speed (1.0) My brain j- (0.4) my brain  
8          pattern just thinks so: much quicker so much cle:arer  
9          (0.8) jst everythn (0.3) yeah (.) 
10   SA:   Clearer when your on= 
11   JB:   =Yeah. (0.2) Yeah he:aps clear (0.2) like jus (0.7) I  
12         think >yano like< ma bra:in actually: (.) comes out with  
13         (1.2) I dunno ºjusº s- sentences an wo:rds n stuff that  
14         I- (   ) I usually jus don’t go: like how so I say ↑this  
15         stuff like heh HEH HEH heh heh [heh heh heh       ]= 
16   SA:                                [Surprise yourself.] 
17   JB:   =YE(H)AH heh full on heh heh heh hhh  
 
Are we to point out here that JB‟s obviously lay theorising concerning the effect 
of „speed‟ on his “brain pattern” (lines 7-8) is conceptually misguided or in error? Is 
“my brain pattern just thinks” (lines 7-8) to be regarded as comical? Questions 
concerning JB‟s competence as a theoretical psychologist or neuroscientist aside, 
clearly when JB reports (in lines 7-8) that his “brain pattern just thinks so: much quicker 
so much cle:arer” he is making a claim to being better, that he is “sma::ter on (0.5) 
speed” (line 7) when taking amphetamines. Indeed, JB appears to express surprise that, 
when taking dexamphetamine his “bra:in actually: (.) comes out with” “s-sentences an 
wo:rds n stuff” (lines 12-13). Compare this with Sharrock and Coulter‟s description of 
whether „Jack remembers‟ or „Jack‟s brain remembers‟ in their critique of Churchland 
(Sharrock & Coulter, 2006). What does it mean when JB says that his brain and not he 
comes out with „sentences and stuff‟ while taking dexaphetamine? Or that his brain 
pattern and not he (or perhaps even his brain) thinks more clearly?       
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Consider that when the interviewer asks whether JB‟s use of speed is in some 
manner related to his having „ADHD‟, note that JB does not provide an account or 
formulation of how such use might be implicated as a prodrome of the disorder, but 
rather, attends to how such use is therapeutic. In other words, the issue of accountability 
looms large. Given that, in earlier transcript,
22 JB talks about his participation in a drug 
and alcohol program, and that he finds it almost impossible to receive dexamphetamine 
for the treatment of his ADHD due to his previous history of illicit drug use, JB‟s 
response to the question could be seen to serve as providing an account that justifies his 
previous use of illegal amphetamines, and as also providing a warrant for their further 
use – dexamphetamine treatments are available for those identified with ADHD. 
In short, JB‟s talk about his „brain pattern‟ and the like can be describable as 
tailored quite precisely to be compatible with questions concerning both illegal, and 
medically sanctioned, uses of psychostimulants. It is not „language gone on holiday‟, 
rather, it is demonstrative of normative language use, involving psychological and 
physiological terms, and does not stand in need of either logical-grammatical or 
ostensibly scientific correction. I would suggest that this kind of attention to the 
rhetorical construction of facticity and normative accountability is something in which 
discursive psychology has an abiding interest (Edwards & Potter, 1992). 
Conclusion 
Returning to where we began, with Wittgenstein‟s comments on the state of the 
psychology of his day that make reference to its experimental methods and conceptual 
confusion, he suggested that “the existence of the experimental method makes us think 
we have the means of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem and 
                                                 
22   1    JB:   =I think I tried bef:or:e (.) but it was just an  
  2    endless ↑avenu:e (0.2) ºit jusº (1.1) ºwasº (0.3)  
  3    ya know basi- they all said (0.2) if ya u:sed 
  4    amphetamines theres no chance of ya getting (0.3) 
  5    on the dexamphetamine pro:gramme (.) so:: (0.9) an  
  6       it ws jus (0.7) SHOT DOWN before ya sta::rt ya  
7       know.      
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method pass one another by” (Wittgenstein, 1967a, xiv). Such comments could be 
regarded as part of the discursive psychological manifesto, in that they are entirely 
congruent with the approach discursive psychology takes toward its topics of interest, 
namely the respecification and critique of standard psychological themes, the manner in 
which psychological terms and expressions are deployed rhetorically, and the mutual 
implicativity of such psychological discourse and matters pertaining to facticity and 
accountability (Edwards & Potter, 2005; Potter, 2005b). 
In regard to the discipline from which discursive psychology takes its name, it is 
important to consider that psychology as a social science discipline, or indeed as it is 
becoming more commonly characterised a health sciences discipline, is in no danger of 
becoming irrelevant to either its practitioners, the consumers of its products and 
services, nor indeed its critics in the foreseeable future. If one were to accept the charge 
levelled against discursive psychology, that it represents nothing new or innovative in 
the social science pantheon, then by abandoning it one would be left with either 
conducting investigations of psychological matters from outside the discipline, possibly 
resulting in no more than the usual bickering that occurs in the interminable 
interdisciplinary „turf-wars‟, or from within, confined to utilising well established 
research frameworks that arguably perpetuate and instantiate conceptual confusions. 
However, if one were to adopt a slightly more charitable position, that discursive 
psychology at the very least provides for descriptions of empirical phenomena that 
bring into question some of the taken-for-granted understandings that underpin 
psychology as a discipline, from within the discipline itself, perhaps it may be making a 
useful and timely contribution towards establishing a fruitful collaboration between the 
empirical and conceptual projects that seek to clear away the tangled conceptual 
undergrowth which lies at the base of much contemporary social scientific (and 
particularly psychological) theorising. After all, attempts to describe discursive      
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psychology in isolation from its situated and occasioned contexts, in much the same 
way that criticism is directed towards the manner in which various social sciences 
provide ironising depictions of members‟ affairs, may well risk overlooking the 
essential haecceities of its practices. 
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CHAPTER 4 
A Massively Consequential Site for the Doing of Psychological Business 
 
Methods descriptions are certainly not useless, and learning to compose and use step-
by-step instructions is an important part of scientific training, but such accounts do not 
provide the stable grounds for reproducing a practice. (Lynch & Bogen, 1994, p. 94)  
 
While the substantive topic of the present dissertation is firmly that of bipolar 
disorder, as the project was developed, more attention and consideration was directed 
towards issues concerning methodology. In this regard, and in relation to the form in 
which any empirical „data‟ pertinent to bipolar disorder might be collected and 
examined, an essential methodological underpinning of the current dissertation is an 
explicit acknowledgement that any examination of so-called scientific and lay accounts 
of bipolar disorder must be undertaken from a position that does not privilege any 
particular form of discourse. In other words, in keeping with the theoretical orientation 
of a form of discursive psychology to an examination of particular topic, the 
methodological focus is relativist, and importantly is epistemic rather than ontological 
in nature (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Potter, 1996).  
From a discursive psychological perspective, issues pertaining to bipolar 
disorder might be profitably examined by a consideration of how, in such seemingly 
disparate contexts such as the scientific literature on bipolar disorder and in people‟s 
„everyday‟ talk-in-interaction, versions and accounts of psychopathology are produced 
and constructed, without regard to the necessary validity of such accounts. In other 
words, what is crucial is not whether a particular discourse concerning some aspect of 
bipolar disorder is correct,
1 but rather how such discourse is constructed in particular 
settings to sustain the credibility and legitimacy of any specific premise.  
                                                 
1 As in, not standing in need of a better explanation. 
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The Development of the Empirical Investigation
2 
Of principle interest, then, is an investigation of the mundane, ordinary, practical 
discursive work that might get done in professional-client interactions when bipolar 
disorder is of topical concern. Importantly, the dissertation is not constrained by a set of 
particularised questions about any causal mechanisms of bipolar disorder, but is rather 
constrained by more pragmatic concerns relating to access to various settings and 
practices that might provide for some empirically based descriptions of the „doing‟ of 
bipolar disorder. In other words, the dissertation is not concerned with „how X 
influences Y‟, but rather „how is X done in setting S?‟ (e.g., Edwards & Potter, 1992).  
As previously discussed, the focus is firmly on providing descriptive, epistemic 
accounts, and not ontological, reductionist explanations of bipolar disorder. For 
example, how might psychological and psychiatric accounts of bipolar disorder be 
produced by mental health professionals in talk-in-interaction? How might such 
knowledge be deployed in interaction between professionals and those diagnosed with 
bipolar disorder? What might pragmatic analysis of various discourses concerned with 
bipolar disorder reveal about the production of individual and socially constructed 
understandings of bipolar disorder in situ? How might accounts concerning such things 
as symptoms and treatments be ratified or indeed challenged between professionals and 
clients? In short, what actually happens in settings where bipolar disorder may be of 
significant concern to participants? Depending on the empirical materials that could be 
obtained, the overarching aim was the provision of an account of how individuals 
diagnosed as having bipolar disorder and mental health professionals interact, in sites in 
which the business of bipolar disorder gets done. 
                                                 
2 Note that this section is a reworked version of materials that I had written prior to collecting any 
empirical data, and as such, could be read as a prospective account. However, it also functions as a 
retrospective account, as at the time of writing this footnote, I am still analysing the empirical materials. 
This, then, is my attempt to attend to some kind of reflexivity, which as Lynch cautions with regard to 
ethnomethodological reflexivity “can become vicious because the conditions for making sense of a 
document are not „contained‟ within it; they are reflexive to the circumstances of use” (2000a, p. 34).       
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A word of caution is warranted at this point about the broad scope of the 
dissertation. It is important to consider that accounts of bipolar disorder found within 
the scientific literature, the mass media, and broader cultural milieus, are ubiquitously 
characterised by a discourse that, at least on an initial examination, constrains 
examinations to questions concerning things such as „what drugs are the most effective‟, 
„how can we improve treatment compliance‟, „who is the appropriate professional to 
consult‟, „how do I treat symptoms‟, „what are the warning signs of relapse‟, „have the 
genes been identified‟, and so forth. In short, research endeavours have attended to 
questions that are often biomedical in orientation.  
Moreover, it would seem that if one were to adopt an agnostic position with 
regard to the biomedical position and to undertake research that does not attend to such 
questions, such a position might be mistakenly interpreted as a return to the anti-
psychiatry movements of the 1960s, that it is unscientific, some kind of fuzzy social 
constructivism, and of a trivial importance. After all, we know that bipolar disorder is a 
disease, that it is one of the most stable and persistent of all mental disorders, 
undoubtedly genetically inherited, that places a great burden on both the individual and 
society, and we need to identify and treat those afflicted with the disorder‟s terrible 
effects.  
In this regard, the dissertation is not concerned with what bipolar disorder really 
is or is not – it is concerned with how bipolar disorder is made relevant as a members‟ 
concern. The dissertation is not an attempt to argue, à la Szasz (1971), that mental 
illness does not in fact exist – for that would presuppose that something must exist to 
begin with, and the task is to correctly identify what exactly that might be. Nor is it an 
attempt to show that key researchers or practitioners are mistaken, with their endeavours 
in a particular field representing fundamentally incoherent work of little value. And, it is 
certainly not undertaken in order to suggest that persons diagnosed and treated for      
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bipolar disorder are in some sense ill-informed consumers of mental health services, 
„big pharma‟, or are in some sense „victims‟ of repressive systems. Rather, the emphasis 
is on an examination of individuals‟ talk-in-interaction in settings which, for those 
identified as having bipolar disorder, may be massively consequential.  
Massively Consequential Settings 
By „massively consequential‟ I wish to draw attention to the notion that while 
some have argued that psychological knowledges, technologies, and practices have 
come to infuse almost every facet of persons‟ lives and be otherwise invisible (e.g., 
Rose, 1996a, 1999), there might be occasioned settings in which unnoticed and unseen 
practices might become visible against an otherwise normative horizon. And, such 
practices may likely be consequential with regard to a person‟s life (e.g., medication, 
institutionalisation, surveillance, and so forth). 
Consider the following, somewhat divergent examples. Frankel (2001) 
introduces a case study in which a patient, after receiving information from her health 
care provider concerning some diagnostic „good news‟ (“All of your test results are 
normal. There is nothing wrong with you. You can go home now.” Frankel, 2001, p. 84) 
several hours later commits suicide. While Frankel does not provide a detailed analysis 
of this case study, he provides detailed analysis of other doctor-patient interactions to 
suggest that misalignment between (for example) a patient‟s problem statement and a 
clinician‟s diagnosis can have significant implications. With regard to the case study, 
the lack of a finding of any „physical‟ pathology in a medical interaction renders patient 
symptoms as being psychological, and thus of no interest.  
In contrast, McHoul and Rapley (2005a) present a detailed analysis of a 
diagnostic session, involving a young boy, his parents, and a paediatrician, to suggest 
that the diagnosis (and subsequent treatment) of ADHD is to be considered as a likely 
outcome when any child with some documented history of school related conduct      
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problems presents to a physician. In other words, an absence of „physical‟ pathology 
(symptoms for ADHD are assessed with regard to problematic conduct and the use of 
psychological tests) is in a sense unremarkable.   
If one takes a more extreme view, consider there has been a panoply of 
treatments visited on the unfortunate manic or melancholic including physical labour, 
purging by means of sweating, administering laxatives, waist-coats, straightjackets, 
immersion in freezing water, bloodletting, solitary confinement, the application of 
leeches to the body, electric shocks, and a host of other apparently therapeutic physical 
interventions (Valenstein, 1986). Indeed, as recently as the mid-twentieth century many 
somatic therapies for bipolar disorder that would be considered today to be unwarranted 
in both theory and application, were developed and advocated by those who were 
regarded as beyond reproach scientifically, and moreover, such therapies were declared 
to be effective treatments (Braslow, 1999).  
While such activities could be said to have occurred in „obviously‟ massively 
consequential settings (e.g., asylums), this is not to suggest that the materials likely to 
be examined in the current inquiry are to be evaluated as if they were analogous to the 
application of leeches in an asylum or the undertaking of psychosurgery in a sitting 
room. Rather, what counts as-and-for a contemporary massively consequential setting is 
likely to appear as an entirely mundane and unproblematic locale, setting, or 
interaction.
3  
The dissertation, therefore, is undertaken in order to provide an original, detailed 
examination that specifically attends to some of the practices by which bipolar disorder 
features as a taken-for-granted entity in local settings. In this regard, the current 
research could be perceived as having some overlap with investigations undertaken of 
                                                 
3 I acknowledge that I run the risk of reifying „massively consequential settings‟ here (not to mention 
presenting possibly tautological or pleonastic rhetoric). These are not a priori features of specific settings 
or practices, for example. What I wish to suggest is the notion that while „massively consequential‟ things 
are likely to happen in such settings, the ordinariness of such „massively consequential‟ settings belies 
their significance.      
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how various conduct might be constructed as pathological, for example in 
investigations of „ADHD‟ (McHoul & Rapley, 2005a, 2005b), „intellectual disability‟ 
(Rapley, 2004; Rapley et al., 1998), and the identification of „delusions‟ (McCabe et al., 
2002; Palmer, 2000). 
Moreover, the main empirical thrust of the dissertation involves an examination 
of the perfectly ordinary ways in which someone may come to be seen, and come to 
view themselves, as suffering, possessing, displaying, or otherwise demonstrating 
bipolar disorder – principally by an explication of the features of naturally-occurring 
talk-in-interaction between mental health care practitioners and clients – wherever and 
however such interactions might be recorded. In other words, the focus is on an 
examination of the ways in which discourse about bipolar disorder is produced in 
naturalistic settings. The challenges involved with such undertakings are of course 
considerable, and include concerns relating to obtaining access to sites in which such 
professional-client interactions take place, establishing data collection procedures that 
do not require participants external to such interactions to be present (e.g., participant 
observation), and identifying settings that are routinely (or have the potential to be) 
recorded as part of typical practice.  
Given that the precise context of such interactions would require negotiation 
with interested research participants, and would be subject to participants‟ 
determinations concerning the appropriateness and unobtrusiveness of any proposed 
data recording, a number of settings were identified that might be suitable for such an 
undertaking. These included support group sessions conducted at hospitals as outpatient 
services, brief consultations between single clients and health care workers (e.g., 
clinical reviews undertaken by psychiatrists or psychologists conducted in hospital), and 
brief counselling sessions. Professional participants might include workers in both 
public and private sectors, such as psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, mental health      
  169 
nurses, and counsellors. There was no particular focus on obtaining access to specific 
sites, rather, the focus was on gaining access to any site in which persons might attend 
to bipolar disorder as a routine concern.
4 
In this regard, providers of health care services (e.g., hospitals, professionals in 
private practice, community based mental health organisations) in the Perth 
metropolitan area, Western Australia, were to be contacted, initially by mail and 
telephone, and invited to participate in the research project. Individual clients of these 
services were not directly recruited. Rather, professional participants would be invited 
to employ their „clinical judgement‟ as to the suitability of inviting any particular client 
to participate. Information pertaining to the research project (e.g., consent forms and 
information leaflets) would be provided to professional participants, who could then 
provide these to clients they would feel comfortable approaching in relation to research 
participation. 
The Massively Consequential Site 
The setting that was to eventually provide the empirical data for the study, the 
„site of psychological business‟ that might be „massively consequential‟ for those 
categorised as having bipolar disorder, was chanced upon serendipitously. Now, while a 
detailed account of the particular setting and how it came to be examined for the 
purposes of the current study cannot be provided to ensure participant confidentiality, a 
gloss can of course be provided – the „psychotherapy session‟. Or, perhaps the more 
unwieldy „psychotherapy sessions conducted by a clinical psychologist‟.
5 
                                                 
4 Of course, a number of tensions are glossed over in this account, for example attempting to maintain 
some kind of „unmotivated‟ analytic mentality towards whatever materials might be available given that 
the a priori concern was with bipolar disorder, and managing institutional requirements that require 
specific and detailed information that are often challenging to provide when undertaking (what could be 
described as) exploratory, qualitative, and non-hypothesis driven research. 
  
5 Note that I will continue to make use of glosses, such as  „psychotherapy‟, „psychotherapeutic‟, 
„therapy‟, „clinical‟, and „session‟ to frame my descriptions of what takes place „in‟ the interactions. 
Hopefully, this is done without ironic connotations.      
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This proved to be fortuitous, given there has long been an interest in such 
settings from an ethnomethodological and conversation analytic perspective, going back 
to work done by Sacks on emergency telephone hotlines (e.g., Sacks, 1967) and his 
analytic comments pertaining to a group therapy session (Sacks, 1992a, 1992b). 
Moreover, further work has examined how therapy, and in particular therapy talk, might 
be produced as therapeutic (Turner, 1972). That is to say, considerable attention has 
been directed towards the discursive practices involved in therapy settings, given that it 
is talk itself which could be considered the principal tool in any professional‟s 
therapeutic armamentarium (with psychotherapy, after all, known as the so-called 
„talking cure‟). In this regard, more recent ethnomethodologically informed work has 
examined a range of psychotherapeutic contexts in order to elucidate the techniques 
employed by therapists and clients as practical skills and the products of their work as 
demonstrable achievements. 
Briefly, examples of this type of work include the detailed examination of a 
range of concerns relevant to the provision of HIV counselling (e.g., Peräkylä, 1995; 
Silverman, 1997); the manner in which therapists may provide reformulations of 
clients‟ talk in order to achieve therapeutic aims (e.g., Antaki, Barnes, & Leudar, 2005a; 
Buttny, 1996; Davis, 1986; Hak & de Boer, 1996); consideration of materials from child 
counselling settings (e.g., Hutchby, 2002, 2005); inquiry into psychiatric consultations 
(e.g., Bergmann, 1992); examinations of „psychodynamic-interpersonal‟ therapy (e.g., 
Madill, Widdicombe, & Barkham, 2001); the detailed examination of a single family 
therapy session (Gale, 1991); the study of group therapy in Alcoholics Anonymous 
meetings (Arminen, 1998); investigations of psychotherapy intake interviews (e.g., 
Czyzewski, 1995); analysis of the practices by which interpretations are produced in 
psychoanalytic therapy (e.g., Forrester & Reason, 2006; Peräkylä, 2004; Vehviläinen, 
2003); accounts of how „idiomatic‟ expressions feature in therapy (Antaki, 2007); and      
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treatments detailing how core concepts in psychotherapy such as „empathy‟ can be 
understood as interactionally produced in telephone counselling (Pudlinski, 2005) and 
face-to-face settings (Wynn & Wynn, 2006). The current investigation represents, to the 
best of my knowledge, the first such treatment of therapy talk involving persons „with‟ 
bipolar disorder.  
Production of the Data Corpus 
The clinical psychologist (a highly experienced, doctoral level trained therapist) 
was given a small digital audio recorder, consent and information forms, and was 
instructed that they should feel free to invite any of their clients that they deemed 
suitable for inclusion for participation. There was no direct contact between the 
researcher and any client participants, and minimal contact between the researcher and 
the clinical psychologist. The clinical psychologist was contacted for an initial meeting 
to describe and discuss the research project, and to be given consent forms and the 
digital audio recorder. Following this, the psychologist was contacted once to collect the 
digital audio recorder to transfer audio files onto a notebook computer, and a final visit 
to collect the digital audio recorder and remaining consent forms. 
Apart from the information collected on the client consent forms (i.e., name of 
participant, signature, and date) no other demographic information was collected from 
participants. This was also the case with regard to the clinical psychologist (i.e., the 
professional participant). The clinical psychologist was shown how to operate the 
digital audio recorder, which was small, unobtrusive, and easy to operate (with a one 
button record function), and asked to record sessions with clients that they felt might be 
suitable for inclusion in the research project and who had signed consent forms. 
A total of seven, two-party sessions were recorded, involving five client 
participants (one participant was in three sessions). These recordings were made over an 
approximately two month period. A number of recordings were made that appeared to      
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be inadvertent, that is, appeared to be made when a therapy session had concluded, or 
were fragmentary and possibly not related to the conduct of therapy. These recordings 
were discarded, and only those recordings that were continuous (i.e., recordings that 
were of at least 30 minutes duration and that evidenced no interruptions from beginning 
of recording to end) and clearly therapy sessions retained.
6 The duration of the audio 
recordings of individual sessions ranged from approximately 38 minutes to 70 minutes 
(with an average session duration of approximately 52 minutes). The total duration of 
all sessions combined was approximately 371 minutes. The audio recordings of these 
sessions comprise the data corpus. 
The raw audio data from were transferred from the digital audio recorder to a 
personal computer, and were converted to WAV format with a sample size of 16 bits, a 
sampling bit rate of 192 kbps (mono). The audio sample rate was 12 kHz. Processed 
WAV files were manipulated using digital audio software (Audacity, version 1.2.3)
7 on 
a personal computer. Software manipulation included measuring waveform duration, 
transition, and fall-off periods of the digitised speech using an interactive procedure, 
whereby cursors were placed on a visual waveform display that corresponded with 
waveform peaks and troughs. This enabled a temporal resolution of >0.1 seconds when 
determining pauses and gaps between and within utterances.  
The audio data (i.e., all of the sessions) were then fully transcribed to text in 
general accord with the transcription notation developed by Gail Jefferson (e.g., 
Jefferson, 2004b, see Appendix B). Information that might identify participants was 
either altered (e.g., person and place names) or redacted (e.g., when substitution made 
intelligibility of talk problematic) in order that any analysis (or inadvertent disclosure) 
                                                 
6 I acknowledge that my gloss „clearly therapy sessions‟ may well warrant a sustained examination in its 
own right. Nonetheless, given the „off the record‟ nature of the „not clearly therapy sessions‟ talk, it was 
deemed to be inappropriate (with regard to an ethical treatment of the data and participants) to retain for 
analysis. 
 
7 Open-source software available for download from http://audacity.sourceforge.net/      
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of extensive sections of transcript could not afford data mining, data matching, or other 
disclosure of participant relevant information. The research was fully conducted within 
the ethical guidelines pertaining to the use of human research participants, established 
by the Australian Psychological Society, Murdoch University, and the National Health 
and Medical Research Council of Australia. 
„Bipolar Disorder‟ as Participants‟ Category 
Given that there was minimal contact with research participants, and no direct 
contact with client participants, it is important to comment briefly on the consent forms 
that were given to all participants. Two consent forms were constructed, one to be given 
to those providing some form of mental health service (i.e., the professional form), the 
other to be given to the clients of a service (i.e., the client form). In addition, an 
information letter was constructed which briefly outlined the research project, and 
provided contact information should persons have questions with regard to the research 
rationale or research procedures. On all documentation provided to participants the 
project title was given as „Discursive Psychological Examination of Bipolar Disorder in 
Professional-Client Interactions‟.  
While most of the information on the professional and client forms was identical, 
there were two notable differences. The first difference was that each form used a 
different heading, with one labelled „Consent Form – Professional‟ and the other 
labelled „Consent Form – Client‟. The second difference was the wording of the first 
paragraph of each of the consent forms. In the first paragraph of the client consent form 
was the following: 
 
I am investigating how people talk about their experiences of bipolar disorder, with the 
purpose of this study to provide an examination of the rich and diverse range of 
naturally occurring talk that is produced between people diagnosed with bipolar 
disorder and health care professionals. You can help in this study by consenting to 
allow an audio recording to be made of your interaction with a health care professional.      
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The professional consent form had the last sentence of this paragraph amended to read: 
 
You can help in this study by consenting to allow an audio recording to be made of your 
interaction with a client with bipolar disorder. 
 
This is relevant to issues concerning the salience of the category „bipolar 
disorder‟ to the client participants. While no formal tests, interviews, or examination of 
clinical records were conducted by the researcher in order to ascertain whether 
participants in some sense „have‟ bipolar disorder, clients were required to sign consent 
forms that clearly identified both the nature of the study (that it is an examination of 
“how people talk about their experiences of bipolar disorder”), the relevance of the 
category (“talk that is produced between people diagnosed with bipolar disorder and 
health care professionals”), and how this would be relevant for them as possible 
incumbents of the category (e.g., “You can help” and “your interaction with a health 
care professional”).  
For the purposes of the present investigation, then, „bipolar disorder‟ is a 
category that can be demonstrably shown to be a members‟ category. It is relevant for 
the client participants given that it served as the basis on which they were initially 
invited to participate by a professional, and further, that they provided their consent to 
participate in the research study having been informed that it was concerned with an 
examination of bipolar disorder (e.g., signing consent forms). And, as I will further 
demonstrate in consideration of the empirical materials, while the category is introduced 
by the analyst, it does feature as a participants‟ concern in the recorded interactions. 
Assigning Categories to Participants‟ Utterances 
With regard to the production of transcripts, Sacks raises the issue of the 
analytic difficulties in assigning categories to research participants, and for the purposes 
of the current investigation I have taken the following „conservative‟ approach:      
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Suppose you're an anthropologist or sociologist standing somewhere. You see 
somebody do some action, and you see it to be some activity. How can you go about 
formulating who is it that did it, for the purposes of your report? Can you use at least 
what you might take to be the most conservative formulation - his name? (Sacks, 1992a, 
p. 467)  
 
Participants‟ utterances are identified in transcripts by being attached to the 
pseudonyms „Phil‟, „Dave‟, „Jane‟, „Kate‟, „Mike‟, and „Luke‟. The clinical 
psychologist appears as „Phil‟. Drawing from Watson (1997), I acknowledge that one 
should be cautious when attempting to provide analytic descriptions of interaction in 
which, for example, one might posit that because a „therapist‟ makes an utterance it 
automatically makes salient a categorical relationship such as „therapist‟ – „client‟. The 
production-recognition of categorical ascriptions, avowals, and orientations is of course 
part of members‟ practical activities, the practical work that members may engage in, 
however as Watson makes clear one should maintain “reservations about those 
conversation analyses whereby such orientational problems are, by dint of transcription 
and other textual procedures, treated as already- settled” (1997, p. 74). In this regard, 
while I have assigned „Phil‟ rather than „clinical psychologist‟, „therapist‟, „clinician‟, or 
some other pseudonym for the purposes of avoiding such problems (similarly assigning 
names rather than „client‟, „patient‟, and so forth to the other participants) – at least in 
the production and presentation of the transcription materials – it is important to note 
that I will in my analytic comments draw upon a wide range of categorisations (e.g., 
„therapist‟, „client‟, and „psychologist‟).
8  
Naturally Occurring Data?  
Borrowing from Laurier and Philo (Laurier & Philo, in press) the question might 
be cast as „doesn‟t recording alter what people do?‟. Is there an inbuilt problem with 
                                                 
8 And of course, this document can be examined with regard to the categorisation practices realised in its 
construction as a formal account of categorisation practices.      
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regard to the „naturally occurring‟ status of the data? As some have suggested, rather 
than being overly concerned with issues relating to how recording devices might 
„contaminate‟ the interactions that they are presumably deployed in order to preserve, 
attention can be directed instead to what participants might be doing when such devices 
are noticed, witnessed, or otherwise oriented towards (Speer & Hutchby, 2003). By 
contrast, Hammersley suggests that one might profitably undertake examination of the 
effects of using recording devices on what people say, by comparing people‟s behaviour 
across situations where recordings are and are not produced, and that interviewing 
people who have had their talk recorded might be a way in which their „attitudes‟ to 
such recordings can be explicated (Hammersley, 2003a, p. 346).  
Notwithstanding that such suggestions are predicated on a notion of doing a kind 
of social science that is antithetical to the one adopted here, exactly how such 
suggestions might be put into practice in examinations such as the current is unclear. 
One of the central aims of the project is to undertake an examination of „naturally 
occurring‟ interactions in which bipolar disorder might feature as a matter of concern. 
By „naturally occurring‟, I mean to refer to interactions which are not subject to some 
form of a priori specification by the researcher, that is, that they are uncontrolled, 
unmediated, and undirected by the researcher during their occasioned production 
(Lynch, 2002b). Note that such data are not presented as meeting the criteria for 
something like the „dead social scientist test‟ (Potter, 2002) that the actual interactions 
would have occurred if the researcher was dead, or had not been born. The focus here is 
not whether the data is conceptually or absolutely „naturally occurring‟ or not, rather, 
one might approach the data presented herein as artefacts of therapy sessions that are 
occasioned as recorded therapy sessions. In ethnomethodological terms, the data is 
produced by way of practical reasoning by which naturally organised activities are      
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constituted (Lynch, 2002b). I will examine this issue in more detail in the following 
analytic sections.  
Openings 
My focus here will be on providing a brief examination of issues relating to the 
„openings‟ of each of the recordings that comprise the data corpus. By „openings‟ my 
focus is on the coordination of talk that occurs at the beginning of the recordings, that is 
to say, oriented to the recording as a practical activity, and not just the coordinated entry 
into a particular kind of institutional interaction (e.g., Drew & Heritage, 1992b; 
Heritage & Maynard, 2006). In addition, I will further examine the demonstrable 
relevance of the category „bipolar‟ to participants (and related matters such as talk 
pertaining to symptoms and treatment), hint at some issues regarding the use of 
psychological terms, and consider the issue of a possible „hidden‟ participant in the 
interactions (i.e., the researcher). 
As previously indicated, while the unedited recordings contained material that 
could possibly be considered as comprising „pre‟ and „post‟ therapy talk, this material 
was discarded. In this regard, the beginning of each recording (in the data corpus) was 
approached as a kind of „official‟ commencement to the therapy session proper. This is 
not to suggest that the „doing‟ of therapy talk begins immediately, given that there 
might be transitions from ordinary, informal talk to the „doing‟ of therapy proper (e.g., 
Turner, 1972) but rather that the requirements of producing the recording may be of 
some concern to participants. Consider that with the use of video recordings in public 
spaces, there are ways in which persons can „enter into scenes‟ or „come into shot‟ 
(Laurier & Philo, in press). In the current setting, we can examine how people do a kind 
of coordinated entry „into‟ an audio recording, how they coordinate their actions with 
other persons, and how they coordinate such activities with the recording device to 
produce such interactions as recordable.       
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Now, while one of the most obvious things that can be examined at the start of 
any therapy session is how a therapist and client might undertake the doing of 
introductions (e.g., Sacks, 1992a, pp. 281-299), consider that introductions can also be 
approached as being done for the purposes of making the start of the interaction relevant 
for a physically non-present audience; for an absent over-hearer to the session. In other 
words, a recording device can be brought into an existing conversation and a greeting 
done which serves to accountably mark the start of the recording. Consider Sacks‟s 
(Sacks, 1992b, pp. 104-113) description of a group therapy session, where after his 
introduction to the participants (and observing from an observation room with a one-
way mirror) the following was recorded from a ceiling mounted microphone: 
 
Roger:     Turn on th‟ microphone. 
                                    (1.0) 
             Al:           T(h)esting, 
             Roger:     We‟re about to sta(hh)rt. Hehh hh heh 
                                     ((thump)) 
             Al:           We ah gathuhd heah(h), on this day(hh), 
                                     (4.0) 
(Sacks, 1992b, p. 104) 
 
Here, one can provide a description of the participants‟ talk as involving 
something of a kind of performance, in which they undertake the practical work of 
doing the „start‟ of a recording of a group therapy session. Now, while this can be taken 
as suggestive that something like „group therapy participant‟ is likely to be a contested 
category, with Roger and Al‟s joking indicative of an attempt to „hide‟ something from 
later analysis (Laurier & Philo, in press), it can also serve as a reminder that participants 
involved in „serious‟ research undertakings often engage in a range of activities that, 
while recorded, are generally excluded from formal reports of such undertakings. And,      
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rather than being merely regarded as extraneous to a research project, these materials 
can themselves be of significant interest. With such considerations in mind, I now turn  
to an examination of „opening‟ materials drawn from the data corpus.
9 
 
Extract 4.1 
1    Phil:   OKAY (0.6) Good afternoon welcome .pt Do your bit ask  
2            your question [that you want to ask] ((smiley voice)) 
3    Jane:                 [Aw    I   was   just]  
4     wondering cause u:m: (0.7) Like I told a friend the  
5     other day I said I’ve been diagnosed with bipolar and  
6     they said um (0.4) ((clicking sound)) >They go “oh but<  
7     you don’t ↑li:e” heh .hh and apparently just these two  
8     people that (0.2) she’s known like they’re com- 
9     absolutely compulsive li:ars: (0.2) 
 
Here, Phil provides a kind of unmarked (i.e., one that is not explicitly referenced 
in the talk) indication that the recording device is operational and recording, with his 
loud “OKAY” (line 1). This can serve to provide some indication to his interlocutor and 
any listener to the recording (in addition to serving as a kind of self-confirmation) that 
the recorder is working and that he might continue with the business at hand. This is 
followed by a greeting “Good afternoon welcome” (line 1), after which Phil invites Jane 
to ask her question (lines 1-2) which presumably indexes some talk that occurs prior to 
the recording. Interestingly, Phil invites Jane to “Do your bit” (line 1) which can be 
approached as Phil inviting Jane to do what persons do when they are being recorded, or 
observed, as kinds of actors or performers (Sacks, 1992b).  
In this regard, note also that Phil delivers his invitation with some humour (i.e., 
the prosodic „smiley voice‟ delivery) which serves to make such a request and its uptake 
                                                 
9 Extract titles are presented in the form „Extract 1.2A‟, with the number preceding the dot referencing the 
chapter number, the number following the dot the number of the extract within each chapter, and the 
presence of a letter code indicating that sequentially adjacent material has been split across several 
consecutive extracts (e.g., a sequence detailed in Extract 1.2A would be continued in Extract 1.2B). Note 
that temporal markers and other codes are not presented in order to avoid inadvertently „building in‟ or 
affording particular kinds of analytic categorisations (e.g., Watson, 1997).      
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more of a „play sequence‟ or a „game‟ than a formal undertaking (Sacks, 1992b, p. 105). 
Moreover, it serves as a kind of „getting it on the record‟, and one might infer that at 
some point prior to the recording Jane has launched into a particular bit of talk, and Phil 
has possibly made a request that she wait until the recording begins before proceeding 
with (or repeating) her question. Nonetheless, Jane begins her question proper at line 4 
with “Like I told a friend”. 
 
Extract 4.2 
1    Phil:   Good afternoon. 
2            (1.2) 
3    Phil:   OKAY 
4            (0.9) 
5            ((throat clear)) 
6            (1.5) 
7    Phil:   Dave good afternoon now first things first. 
8    Dave:   ºMmº 
9            (.) 
 
In this sequence, Phil begins with a greeting (“Good afternoon”, line 1), and 
then produces an “OKAY” at line 3 (cf. Extract 4.1 in which the „okay‟ precedes the 
greeting). This is followed by another greeting, packaged with an idiomatic expression 
“now first things first” (line 7) which serves as a kind of agenda setting device. Note 
how, as with the previous extract, there is no explicit, or marked, talk relating to the 
recording device. Rather, there is unmarked talk that might be related to the presence of 
the recording device and its operation, with the repeat of a greeting and the „okay‟ 
marker. 
 
Extract 4.3 
1    Phil:   Set and recording okay we’re in business. 
2    Mike:   Okay. 
3            (0.4) 
4    Phil:   Mike thank you for that (.) sorry to (0.7) have  
5            complications and everything (  )      
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6    Mike:   Nah you’re right. 
7            (0.3) 
 
In this extract the recording begins, in contrast to the previous openings, with 
some marked talk by Phil pertaining to the recording and the recording device, with his 
“Set and recording okay we‟re in business.” (line 1). Following Mike‟s 
acknowledgement (“Okay”, line 2), Phil then thanks Mike (“Mike thank you for that”, 
line 4), and then provides an apology across lines 4 and 5 (“sorry to (0.7) have 
complications and everything”). Mike provides for an acceptance of the apology, with a 
discounting of any „complications and everything‟, and displays a degree of affiliation 
with his “Nah you‟re right.” (line 6) before talk turns to other matters. Notwithstanding 
that what such complications (and indeed Phil‟s thanks and apology) might be indexing 
is unrecoverable from the available data, one might reasonably infer that they index 
matters relating to the use of a recording device (both prior to and during its operation) 
and obtaining informed consent.  
 
Extract 4.4 
1    Phil:   Yeah yeah here we go (.) record (0.3) .hhh (0.2) I  
2            think we’re going. 
3            (1.2) 
4    Phil:   ºOkay I guess we’ll put that quietly hereº (0.5) .hhh  
5            and off we will go. 
6            (0.2) 
7    Luke:   ºAl*ri*ghtº= 
8    Phil:   =.hhhh RIGHT thank you for that (0.4) now (0.3) 
 
Again, as with the last extract, Phil begins by producing some marked talk 
concerning the recording, that the recorder is functioning and currently recording (e.g., 
“record”, line 1; “I think we‟re going.”, lines 1-2), and in addition provides some talk 
pertaining to the physical placement of the recording device (“ºOkay I guess we‟ll put 
that quietly hereº”, line 4). Putting the recorder „quietly here‟ might be hearable as an      
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utterance that is designed to be „overheard‟, that is to say, moving a recording device 
may well entail producing a recording that has sudden, loud „artefacts‟ that might prove 
to be somewhat irritating for a later listener to the recording. Nevertheless, once this 
matter has been attended to, there follows a kind of initiation marker (“and off we will 
go.”, line 5) that serves as a terminator to whatever actions were taking place 
beforehand (i.e., the placement of the recording device) and as an announcement of the 
session proper. This is met with Luke‟s acknowledgement (“ºAl*ri*ghtº”, line 7), to 
which Phil provides a latched thank you (“.hhhh RIGHT thank you for that”, line 8), 
before proceeding with other matters.  
 
Extract 4.5 
1    Phil:   ºIs it working?º >Yes it is working okay I’ll leave 
2            that there and see how we go< .hh Right Mike. (.) How     
3            has your week been? 
4            (0.6) 
 
In this extract (taken from a later session with Mike) there is marked talk 
concerning the operational status of the recording device, with Phil producing a kind of 
rhetorical question “ºIs it working?º” (line 1) which he immediately answers in the 
affirmative “Yes it is working” (line 4). As with the previous extract, there is also some 
marked talk concerning the placement of the recording device (“okay I‟ll leave that 
there and see how we go”, lines 1-2). Phil then provides an acknowledgment to Mike, 
but note that he does not provide either a greeting or an apology. Rather, his “Right 
Mike” (line 2) serves as a more abrupt marker of topic change, and he moves directly on 
to his question “how has your week been?” (lines 2-3) which might be regarded as a 
„how are you‟ question, or what Heritage and Robinson (2006) refer to as a „Type 4‟ 
question in medical encounters.      
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Now, up until this point, I would suggest that the „openings‟ presented here are 
relatively unproblematic. That is to say, one can undertake, for the purposes of my 
investigation, a brief consideration of the overt and demonstrable orientation by 
participants to the recording device and its functioning without providing for a more 
detailed account of how the presence of a recording device (and its operation and 
deployment by one of the „observed‟ participants) might involve other „reactive‟ issues 
(e.g., Hammersley, 2003a). However, the following two extracts might warrant a more 
sustained inquiry. 
 
Extract 4.6 
1    Phil:   Dah! (.) We’r- we’re off. 
2            (1.3)   
3    Mike:   Okay= 
4    Phil:   =I really must one day learn how to use this= 
5    Mike:   =Oh look I wouldn’t wanna (          ) I’m used to  
6     those little um ones with the tapes in em. 
7            (0.2) 
8    Phil:   >Yeah yeah [yeah.<] 
9    Mike:              [Like I] don’t know that much about those  
10           [ones     ] 
11   Phil:   [Now that-] that’s all electronic and [you ]= 
12   Mike:                                         [Yeah] 
13   Phil:   =just plug it into your laptop and it just downloads.= 
14   Mike:   =Ah:: ↑ha::: sneaky= 
15   Phil:   =It’s just recorded and then you just (.) play it in  
16           your ears and type it out [transcribe it]= 
17   Mike:                             [A:::h::::    ]  
18   Phil:   =so it’s very- it’s very smart [the guy’s-]= 
19   Mike:                                  [↑Yeah     ] 
20   Phil:   =t- the guy’s done a very (.) clever job 
21           (0.3) 
22   Mike:   O ↑Yeah 
23           (0.2) 
24   Phil:   All setting it up, but I- I also think he should have  
25           voice recognition [so ] the whole thing just= 
26   Mike:                     [Mm.] 
27   Phil:   =comes out in words but (.)      
  184 
28   Mike:   Yeah that would be nice wouldn’t it= 
29   Phil:   Yeah >but that I don’t think the voice recognition  
30           stuff works that well.< How’s Mike been travelling= 
 
Here we see more than just some passing displayed orientation to the recording 
device as evidenced in the preceding extracts (e.g., Phil‟s marked/unmarked talk 
followed by an acknowledgement, and then a move on to other business). Here, the 
recording device itself is constituted as a topical concern. Following Phil‟s initial “Dah! 
(.) We‟r- we‟re off.” (line 1) which, as in previous extracts, might best be seen as 
indicating that the recorder is operational and that they are now „on the record‟ (note the 
acknowledgment by Mike with an “Okay” at line 3), Phil then makes a kind of self-
mocking evaluation concerning his operation of the recording device, that he “really 
must one day learn how to use this” (line 4). Mike then provides a kind of softener to 
Phil‟s self-criticism (or apology) by declaring that he “wouldn‟t wanna” (line 5), with 
his expertise limited to “little um ones with the tapes in em” (line 6). Clearly, then, 
Mike has some appreciation concerning the technical aspects of the recording, for 
example that the recording device is digital rather than an analogue.  
Following this is some extended topical talk in which Phil and Mike discuss 
some technical matters concerning the recording device, and what is of note for our 
purposes here, is that the general gist of the talk concerns Phil accounting for the use of 
the recording device. That is, there is some instructive comment provided by Phil 
concerning the research project which might be otherwise inaccessible for Mike. Such 
matters include how the recorder can be „plugged into a laptop‟ (line 13), how it can be 
„transcribed‟ (line 16), and notably how „it is very smart‟ (line 18) and the „guys done a 
very clever job‟ (line 20). Here, not only the recording device and the act of recording 
are produced as „mentionables‟ (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973), but also “the guy” – the 
researcher – becomes a topic.       
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After Phil‟s provision of a positive assessment concerning the „guy‟ (and by 
implication the recording and the project) note how he provides an extension (and 
disclaimer) “but I- I also think he should have voice recognition” (lines 24-25) which 
provides for a display of affiliation with Mike, in that Phil can provide some comment 
concerning the research materials as a kind of active participant. This is met with 
Mike‟s agreement “Yeah that would be nice wouldn‟t it” (line 28). In other words, one 
could argue that the presence of a recording device, rather than being a hindrance or as 
presenting some kind of problem (for the participants and for later analysis), could be 
seen as facilitating particular kinds of interaction (Speer & Hutchby, 2003). While one 
should be wary of making general claims that interactions might be „better‟ or „worse‟ 
as opposed to different (i.e., as substantially altering its „naturally occurring‟ status), in 
this case one might approach Mike and Phil‟s interaction involving the recording device 
as fostering of a kind of „rapport‟, which is often regarded as one of the canonical 
features (or pre-requisites) of good therapeutic relationships. 
Consider that after this sequence, Phil moves smoothly from talk concerning the 
recording to initiating the business end of the „opening‟ with “Yeah >but that I don‟t 
think the voice recognition stuff works that well.< How‟s Mike been travelling” (lines 
29-30). Note also that Phil‟s descriptions of the recording device its utilisation are met 
with a uniformly positive acknowledgment by Mike.  
 
Extract 4.7A 
1    Phil:   We’re off and running. 
2            (0.6) 
3    Kate:   Oh right. 
4            (1.1) 
5    Phil:   Okay.   
6    Kate:   ((cough)) 
7            (6.9) ((sounds of writing)) 
8    Phil:   >Okay.< (0.4) >Now.< (0.8) 
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In this extract, Phil produces a marked comment concerning the recording 
“We‟re off and running.” (line 1), which serves to indicate that the recording device is 
operational and that the session can begin. This is met with Kate‟s acknowledgement 
“Oh right.” (line 3), and after some delay Phil initiates a topic change onto other matters.  
At this point, it can be noted that in all of the extracts it is Phil who has the first 
turn at talk. That is, on the recordings it is Phil who „speaks first‟ (or it is Phil‟s voice 
that one can hear first). While this might merely be coincidental, that the person 
operating (turning on) the recording device is the first recorded speaking,
10 it can also 
be taken to suggest a kind of sequential organisation whereby Phil (as the operator of 
the recording device) can maintain rights to the first turn of talk (e.g., by way of an 
adjacency pair), which can allow Phil to select topic for any kind of post-„recording 
talk‟, and might also provide a kind of initial marker on the recording of who had the 
responsibility (and indeed the rights) to operate the recorder and initiate the recording. 
Such organisation might also be akin to other turn-generated categories involving 
„technologically mediated‟ talk such as „caller‟ – „called‟ in telephone conversations 
(Sacks, 1992b). 
Now, at first glance this extract would appear to be entirely unproblematic for 
the purposes of the current analysis, with no marked or unmarked talk pertaining to the 
recording or any overt talk pertaining to research purposes (as in the previous extract). 
However, consider the following extract which follows directly from Extract 4.7A. 
 
Extract 4.7B 
1    Kate:   I Kate Smith (    [              ) ↑bipolar] 
2    Phil:                     [        (laughter)      ] heh heh ah  
3            heh= 
4    Kate:   =question whether I have bipol[ar] or whether= 
5    Phil:                                 [A-] 
                                                 
10 One could easily imagine the recorder being turned on while a client was speaking, which might be 
followed by some „recorder talk‟ by the operator to announce that it is „on‟. However, this is not 
empirically the case in the current examination.       
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6    Kate:   =I’m just ay: u:m  
7            (1.7)   
 
Here Kate does a kind of performance, which she begins with the declaration “I 
Kate Smith” (line 1), which is similar to what occurs in the previously considered data 
analysed by Sacks, and in particular the section where Al delivers a solemn (yet 
humorous) “We ah gathuhd heah(h), on this day(hh),” (Sacks, 1992b, p. 104). This is 
oriented to by Phil as the occasioning of a kind of funny performance – his laughter 
overlapping with the rest of Kate‟s turn. Kate then continues, with her talk latched to 
Phil‟s laughter (possibly in persuit of the topic initiated in line 1, e.g., Jefferson, 1979), 
and produces a kind of tendentious rhetorical question “whether I have bipolar or 
whether I‟m just ay: u:m” (line 4) which is left hanging. Is Kate‟s performance 
undertaken for Phil, directed towards the recording device, a later hearer of the 
recording, or perhaps all of these? Regardless, the status of „bipolar‟, and whether Kate 
actually has bipolar, is a matter that is clearly of some relevance for Kate. 
Consider that it might be inappropriate for a therapist to laugh in response to a 
client‟s concern over the appropriateness or correctness of a psychiatric category. In the 
current case, consider that while Kate provides for some challenge to the 
appropriateness of the category „bipolar‟, which is met with Phil‟s laughter, note 
however that Kate does not challenge his laughter. One candidate description is that 
Kate is doing „being a research participant‟ albeit in a highly ironic manner.
11 In other 
words, Phil‟s laughter can be approached less as laughter directed at Kate, and more at 
Kate‟s performance, a performance which is constrained by the formal requirements of 
conducting (at least the initial stages) the therapy session as a research undertaking. 
That is, both Phil and Kate are oriented to the setting as coparticipants in a research 
                                                 
11 And one might speculate that Kate is „reading‟ a recently completed declaration section on a client 
consent form, thus her ironic self-reference.      
  188 
project, and not as therapist-client. The actual therapy session, one might argue, has not 
yet demonstrably begun (e.g., Turner, 1972). 
 
Extract 4.7C 
1    Phil:   º(Yes)º (0.5) >Okay- t- tell me about this< (0.3) sense  
2            of burnout and where you’re doing an (0.3) 
3    Kate:   Okay [so what I’ve] 
4    Phil:        [cont-       ] continue the  
5            con[versation (         )] 
6    Kate:      [Right. What I’ve done] is I’ve actually: ah:m burnt  
7            ↑out (.) a::nd u:m hhh I’m at a point now where I’m  
8            like o↑kay (1.1) .pt I need to be: (0.2) at a level  
9            where I can exist on (.) t- for a long ↑term (.) I mean  
10           I can actually .h the pursuit of happiness is always  
11           ↑there an I can pursue that to .h a very (.) quick  
12           harmful death:  
13           (0.4) 
 
Here, Phil moves towards initiating the session proper, by asking Kate about a 
“sense of burnout” (lines 1-2). Interestingly, and similar to Extract 4.1, there seems to 
be some unmarked talk concerning the recording, or some „off the record‟ prior talk, 
with Phil introducing the „burnout‟ topic in the absence of any related talk by Kate (i.e., 
this presumably refers to a topic raised before the start of the recording) followed by his 
request for Kate to “continue the conversation” (lines 4-5). This also serves to mark 
some previous talk as relevant material that should be recorded as part of the „doing‟ of 
the therapy session as a recorded interaction. 
Following this, Kate provides an account concerning being currently “burnt 
↑out” (lines 6-7), and that she “need[s] to be: (0.2) at a level” (lines 8-9) where she can 
“exist on (.) t- for a ↑long term” (line 9).  She then provides for a possible alternative 
course of action, that she could undertake the “pursuit of happiness” (line 10), however 
this may well lead to a “very (.) quick harmful death:” (lines 11-12). Interestingly, such 
an account could well be taken as a kind of analogue to what a person diagnosed with,      
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or legitimately describable as, bipolar might describe when providing an account 
concerning prototypical bipolar disorder symptoms. For example, „burnt out‟ sounds 
like something that might involve having recently experienced a „manic‟ or 
„hypomanic‟ episode (see Table A1 and Table A3), which we may well wish to gloss as 
possibly involving features of a „depressive‟ episode (see Table A2).  
However, this account is delivered after Kate‟s ironic commentary concerning 
the relevance of the category „bipolar‟ – and as such, one would need to be wary about 
considering such talk as being a straightforward explication by Kate of any bipolar 
disorder symptoms (for example). Rather, there appears to be a kind of tension 
concerning the category, whether it is indeed an accurate description of Kate, as both a 
kind of medical, psychiatric term (e.g., “question whether I have bipolar”, Extract 4.7B, 
line 4), and as a moral category (e.g., “or whether I‟m just ay: u:m”, Extract 4.7B, lines 
4-6). Nonetheless, both Kate and Phil have signed consent forms (presumably just prior 
to the recorded interaction) which make relevant the category bipolar in some sense, and 
as such, it would appear to warrant further examination of how this might play out in 
subsequent interaction – even if that were to only consider issues involving possible 
resistance to an ascription of a tendentious category (e.g., McHoul & Rapley, 2005a; 
Rapley et al., 1998). 
Topicalisation of Bipolar Disorder 
What this touches upon is how might one conduct a discursive psychological 
examination of the psychotherapy sessions that topicalises bipolar disorder as a 
participants‟ concern? Returning to the issues introduced at the beginning of this 
chapter, what might a discursive psychological examination of such materials yield in 
terms of any practical utility? It is perhaps relevant to make some points about this in 
relation to the kinds of analytic themes that will not be undertaken. Firstly, the current 
examination is not concerned with providing some kinds of practical findings, insights,      
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or recommendations with regard to the merits of any particular treatment of persons 
with bipolar disorder. Secondly, one will not find anything in the way of an overtly 
critical treatment of mental health delivery by an examination of professional 
competency – involving evaluations of the merits of what the therapist might be doing, 
or not doing, in the therapy sessions. And thirdly, one will not find any analysis 
pertaining to the provision of evaluations of client competency or pathology, in order to 
establish or discount particular claims concerning bipolar disorder as a putative medical 
condition.
12 
With regard to the first point, consider the disparate claims in the psychiatric 
literature that particular psychopharmacological agents are more-or-less effective in 
treating the symptoms of depression and bipolar disorder, as indicated by the use of 
evidence based medicine (Hickie, 2004), in contrast to claims that the efficacy of 
particular medications are clear in spite of the use of evidence based medicine (Parker, 
2004).
13 Some consideration of such claims might be relevant to the current inquiry, 
when one considers that specific medications such as sodium valproate are commonly 
recommended for use as prophylactic treatments (as „mood stabilisers‟) for bipolar 
disorder (e.g., Yatham et al., 2006) – notwithstanding serious concerns relating to the 
marketing of such „mood stabilisers‟ (e.g., Healy, 2006b).  
Now, one could profitably undertake discursive psychological examinations of 
such discourse, not in order to adjudicate which claims concerning „bipolar disorder‟ or 
particular medication strategies are correct, but to examine how the construction of all 
such claims, for their very intelligibility, require at least a conceptualisation of bipolar 
                                                 
12 For one example of a principled approach to the integration of conversation analytic findings and 
professional „stocks of interactional knowledge‟, see Peräkylä and Vehviläinen (2003). 
 
13 I use this as but one example of the many points of disputation in the literature relevant to mental health 
research and clinical practice, in which one might wish to pursue issues pertaining to „facts‟ as „what 
counts as‟ (e.g., Edwards, 1997), the rhetorical construction of the „reality of‟ (e.g., Edwards, Ashmore, & 
Potter, 1995), or indeed how they may be „constructed in flight‟ (e.g, Garfinkel, 1967, p. 79), rather than 
examining the ontological status of any particular „facts‟.       
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disorder as being a biological disorder. However, given that talk about such matters is 
likely to occur in any clinical setting in which bipolar disorder is of relevance, one 
could examine talk-in-interaction to elucidate the ways in which members‟ make such 
concerns relevant for themselves, and how such matters can be demonstrably shown to 
be members‟ concerns.  
Consider the following extract (which includes transcript from Extract 4.3) in 
which Mike describes to Phil his recent encounter with a psychiatrist following his 
diagnosis of „bipolar disorder‟ and commencement of psychopharmacological treatment 
with „Epilim‟.  
 
Extract 4.8 
1    Phil:   Set and recording okay we’re in business. 
2    Mike:   Okay. 
3            (0.4) 
4    Phil:   Mike thank you for that (.) sorry to (0.7) have  
5            complications and everything (  ) 
6    Mike:   Nah you’re right. 
7            (0.3) 
8    Phil:   O::kay:: so you’ve been given [epilim] 
9    Mike:                                 [hh    ] That’s right:  
10           (0.2) 
11   Phil:   Okay: and (0.5) S- Steve was a little unhappy about (.) 
12   Mike:   He was n- not so much unhappy as he was a little bit  
13           (0.6) apprehensive cause [it’s] not really= 
14   Phil:                            [Yeah] 
15   Mike:   =his sphere. 
16   Phil:   No, okay. 
17   Mike:   So he sent me to: um: .tch More- Doctor- Doctor  
18           Morebell? 
19   Phil:   >Yeah yeah< 
20   Mike:   At City Clinic. 
21   Phil:   Yes, (0.2) okay. 
22   Mike:   I couldn’t get in to see him so I’m seeing Michael  
23           Canard? 
24   Phil:   Okay. Don’t know. 
25           (0.3)      
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26   Mike:   Seems to be very good. 
27           (0.2) 
28   Phil:   Okay. 
29           (0.2) 
30   Mike:   Seems very nic:e (.) 
31   Phil:   Okay. 
32           (0.3) 
33   Mike:   Pegged me straight awa:y: 
34           (0.2) 
35   Phil:   What did he say? 
36   Mike:   He said (0.3) we went through the (0.2) the whole (   )  
37           he says obviously you’re bi↑polar (.) [.hh]= 
38   Phil:                                         [Mhm] 
39   Mike:   =I’ve seen a thousand patients (0.2) with bipolar so   
40           to speak and ah .hh (0.6) ah: You’re on epilim so (.) 
41           we’ll keep going with that. He’s upped my dose about  
42           ( ) up to six: hun:dred (0.3) .hh= 
43   Phil:   =Right. 
44           (0.4) 
   
Is the diagnosis correct? Is the psychopharmacological therapy that Mike claims 
to be currently receiving appropriate? Is Mike providing an accurate account concerning 
his meeting with the psychiatrist? If so, is the psychiatrist undertaking some form of 
evidence based approach or perhaps a more „clinical experience‟ oriented practice, with 
regard to both diagnosis (e.g., “Obviously you‟re bi↑polar”, line 37; “I‟ve seen a 
thousand patients with bipolar”, line 39) and subsequent treatment (e.g., “You‟re on 
epilim so (.) we‟ll keep going with that.”, lines 40-41)? Note that „Epilim‟ is a 
trademark name for sodium valproate, an anti-convulsant medication that is routinely 
used in the treatment of epilepsy, and a medication often used in the treatment for 
bipolar disorder as a „mood stabiliser‟. Would it be profitable to examine this in light of 
the aforementioned debates in the literature concerning best practice with regard to 
treatment recommendations? Consider that both Phil and Mike report that „Steve‟ was 
either “a little unhappy” (line 11) or “apprehensive” (line 13) about the treatment. What      
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kinds of commentary would be appropriate by Phil, as a clinical psychologist, 
concerning the medical treatment Mike is currently receiving? 
Such questions are of no interest in the current inquiry, rather, there is an 
analytic interest in such things as (for example) how Mike‟s description of bipolar 
disorder is made relevant; how it is „brought off‟ as a kind of „update‟; and the methods 
by which Mike can provide relevant information to Phil that is (possibly) pertinent to 
the business of the psychotherapy session. In the current dissertation, their talk, and my 
text concerning their talk, might best be seen as involving practices of fact construction 
rather than as some kind of transparent form of idea transmission (Edwards, 1997). 
 
Extract 4.1 
1    Phil:   OKAY (0.6) Good afternoon welcome .pt Do your bit ask  
2            your question [that you want to ask] ((smiley voice)) 
3    Jane:                 [Aw    I   was   just]  
4     wondering cause u:m: (0.7) Like I told a friend the  
5     other day I said I’ve been diagnosed with bipolar and  
6     they said um (0.4) ((clicking sound)) >They go “oh but<  
7     you don’t ↑li:e” heh .hh and apparently just these two  
8     people that (0.2) she’s known like they’re com- 
9     absolutely compulsive li:ars: (0.2) 
 
Returning to an examination of Extract 4.1, here, as matter of first business, Jane 
provides an account in which she details an avowal of having “been diagnosed with 
bipolar” (line 5) to a friend. In this regard, the categorical ascription of „bipolar‟ is made 
a relevant matter by Jane early in the therapy session. It is with Jane‟s first turn at talk 
that bipolar is topicalised as an initial therapy topic, as one that is „on the record‟ for the 
purposes of the recording, and also as one that has featured in some prior „off the 
record‟ talk.       
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Extract 4.9 
1    Phil:   ºIs it working?º >Yes it is working okay I’ll leave  
2            that there and see how we go< .hh Right Mike. (.) How  
3            has your week been? 
4            (0.6) 
5    Mike:   Hm: .hhhhhhhh alright u::m hhhhh saw you last  
6            Wednesday wasn’t it= 
7    Phil:  =Mm (.) 
8    Mike:  .hhh and I had some (.) good days u::m Wednesday (0.7)  
9            ºThursday Friday Saturdayº S::unday, (1.3) M:onday and  
10           I seem to have a hit a bit of a (.) brick [↑wall]= 
11   Phil:                                             [↑Aha ] 
12   Mike:  =again ↑yeah= 
13   Phil:   =Oh right okay.  
14   Mike:   Mm. 
15           (0.2) 
16   Phil:  How’s the epilim going 
17           (0.2) 
18   Mike:  .pt .hh Tolerating it quite well. 
19   Phil:  Yep= 
20   Mike:   =Um last (  ) last week I had some good days and like I  
21           felt (0.2) sort of (.) pretty ↑level (.) 
22   Phil:  Mm. 
23          (.) 
24   Mike:  U:m: no major depression (0.3) or anxiety but no highs  
25           either. 
26           (0.2) 
27   Phil:   No. 
28           (.) 
29   Mike:  U:m: (0.5) and no manic just- (.) is cruising ↑along  
30           >do ya know what I mean?<= 
31   Phil:  =Yeah yeah= 
 
In this extract (which opens with transcript previously presented in Extract 4.5) 
which is taken from the second therapy session between Phil and Mike, after the initial 
„recording talk‟ across the first two lines, Mike provides a kind of summary or history 
of how he has been over the last week across lines 2 to 14. Phil‟s question “How‟s the 
epilim going” (line 16) makes relevant previous talk which presumably comes from an      
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earlier session. Indeed, in the opening of the earlier session is Phil‟s “O::kay:: so you‟ve 
been given epilim” (Extract 4.8, line 8). Now, as previously indicated, while „Epilim‟ is 
an anti-convulsant medication that is routinely used in the treatment of epilepsy, here it 
is clearly oriented to as a treatment, not for epilepsy, but for bipolar disorder. In contrast 
to the previous extracts featuring Jane and Kate, in which the status of bipolar appears 
to be somewhat problematic and possibly subject to some degree of disputation by the 
clients, Mike provides what appears to be a fairly unambiguous evaluation with regard 
to bipolar over the previous week, with the use of terms such as “major depression” 
(line 24), “anxiety” (line 24), “highs” (line 24), and “manic” (line 29). 
In this regard, and at the risk of belabouring the point, it is important to consider 
that clients may participate in such things describable as „consultations‟, „therapy‟, and 
„counselling‟ without prior experience of what such interactions may entail. In other 
words, while an experienced mental health professional may demonstrate (or provide a 
convincing account concerning) knowledge of the practices and procedures that 
routinely occur in such things as „therapy sessions‟, a client who has limited or no 
participation in such interactions might have little, if any, demonstrable knowledge (or 
provide a rhetorically weak account) concerning the local practices of „doing therapy‟. 
What is not of concern here is undertaking analysis of what any particular therapist 
might be doing in a technical sense, as a kind of evaluation of the technical proficiency 
of a therapist as a therapist. Nor is it to examine the „lay knowledge‟ of a client as a 
client. Rather, the analytic focus might be more readily described as being directed 
towards how a therapist and a client interact to produce something describable as 
therapy (Turner, 1972), with the doing of such therapy a kind of interactional problem 
that is worked out by participants as an occasioned, in situ, collaborative undertaking.      
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Moreover, such therapy can be examined without consideration of any particular 
technical competencies which might in some sense exist prior to its undertaking.
14 
Conclusion 
The aforementioned descriptions of the research data, participant selection, and 
transcription procedures are a gloss, in that they cannot hope to provide a fully realised, 
self-contained, and replicable account of the activities involved in the „collection and 
analysis of the data‟ (e.g., Garfinkel, 1967; Lynch, 1993). However, given that the 
dissertation is not concerned principally with providing an account of its own 
production, they are presented as a „good enough‟ account, as being sufficient for 
„practical purposes‟ (Garfinkel, 1967). This chapter serves as an introduction to more 
detailed analytic chapters, which should nevertheless also be approached as provisional, 
subject to alternate descriptions, and not as something rendered with absolute certainty. 
These chapters will focus on a number of related topics in which the data corpus can be 
considered as produced within something that is arguably a prime site of psychological 
business (e.g., Edwards, 2005; Edwards & Potter, 2001).  
Firstly, the issue of how possible „symptoms‟ of bipolar disorder come to feature 
as significant matters of therapeutic concern will be examined. For example, consider 
that in Extract 4.7C Kate provides an account of becoming „burnt out‟, which could be 
taken as a report detailing symptoms of a possible „depressive‟ episode (see Table A2). 
And, in Extract 4.9, Mike provides an account of how his week has been which features 
terms such as „major depression‟, „anxiety‟, and „manic‟, in addition to reporting his 
treatment with a psychopharmacological agent presumably to alleviate symptoms. How 
such descriptions might count as „symptoms‟ will be the focus of Chapter 5. 
                                                 
14 In this regard, see McHoul‟s brief explication of Sacks‟s materials on group therapy sessions (Sacks, 
1992a, pp. 137-141), in which members do the constitutive work of specifying what „therapy‟ is, in and as 
the work of doing therapy itself (McHoul, 2004, pp. 430-432).       
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Secondly, when one considers that bipolar disorder is characterised as being a 
„mood disorder‟ (e.g., APA, 2000), the manner in which „moods‟ may feature as matters 
of therapeutic concern for participants will be considered. For example, consider Mike‟s 
account in Extract 4.9 that he felt “pretty ↑level” (line 21), with “no highs” (line 24), 
and that he has been “cruising ↑along” (line 29), which could be taken as involving 
some description of his most recent and current „mood state‟. Such matters will be 
examined in Chapter 6.  
And finally, given that the dissertation has presented an argument that can be 
characterised as counter-cognitivist towards matters pertaining to contemporary 
psychological theorising and research undertakings, how might one profitably undertake 
examinations of the use of psychological terms in actual practice? One might well 
imagine in interactions between a clinical psychologist and clients identifiable as having 
a mental health issue that involves problematic „feelings‟ and „thoughts‟, that 
psychological terms related to such „feelings‟ and „thoughts‟ in talk-in-interaction are 
ubiquitous, and possibly used in ways in which they have some technical or clinical 
utility. An examination of the use of mental predicates and psychological terms in 
psychotherapeutic interactions will be undertaken in Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 5 
The Production of Bipolar Disorder Symptoms 
 
Consider that in clinical settings involving the assessment and treatment of 
psychiatric/psychological disorders, an important concern for both clinicians and clients 
is to be found in the observation, reporting, and identification of particular „symptoms‟. 
This can allow for such things as the diagnosis of psychopathology, the development of 
case formulations, and the planning and implementation of treatment programmes. 
Indeed, the presence or absence of particular symptoms is an important precursor for the 
form that any particular therapeutic intervention may take, or even if an intervention is 
in fact warranted. This serves as the focus of the current chapter, which involves an 
examination of the situated, practical methods by which symptoms of bipolar disorder 
can be produced as „symptoms‟ in psychotherapeutic interactions, and the manner by 
which such symptoms may come to feature as significant matters of therapeutic concern.  
I would like to suggest that in a detailed explication of „symptom production‟, 
one might find that „symptoms‟ might best be approached as serving as a kind of gloss 
for a range of subtle and highly sophisticated interactional phenomena – firmly rooted 
in ordinary, mundane practices. Further, many psychological/psychiatric disorders 
depend heavily on the specification of particular forms of psychological functioning that 
are themselves describable in-and-as vernacular, everyday terms. In this sense, the 
symptoms of such disorders might best be understood as produced in-and-as complex 
social practices – often discursive in form, that elude attempts to provide for a clear 
description of their functioning. Consider that “it appears that episode definition in BD 
[bipolar disorder] may need substantial clarification. In practice this may mean that 
symptoms of both mania and depression should be carefully delineated, even when an 
episode appears to be „obvious‟” (Yatham et al., 2006, p. 722). What the current      
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investigation is concerned with, then, is the practices by which such symptoms are made 
to be obvious by, and for, participants in talk-in-interaction.  
Symptoms Respecified 
Rather than providing some definitions of symptoms drawn from a range of 
authoritative sources, I would like to begin by suggesting that any „symptom‟ of a 
mental illness most likely requires for its intelligibility judgements and determinations 
that could be made by any member of a given culture (Coulter, 1979). And, that this 
holds regardless of claims that might suggest that such symptoms may have (for 
example) little or no scientific merit (e.g., Boyle, 2002), that they are essentially „social 
constructions‟ (e.g., Horwitz, 2002; Maddux, Gosselin, & Winstead, 2005), or that they 
may be mistakenly identified (e.g., Rosenhan, 1973). Now, notwithstanding arguments 
that there might be some distinction between what „professionals‟ and „lay persons‟ take 
to be a symptom of a mental illness in terms of the „languages‟ (i.e., vernacular versus 
technical) by which such symptoms come to be described and categorised (McHoul, 
2004, in particular p. 434), in the undertaking of therapeutic matters professionals (e.g., 
therapists) and lay persons (e.g., clients) produce and recognise some description (for 
example) as being adequate as a symptom. In other words, that both therapists and 
clients have some sense that a symptom is indeed just that – a symptom of something 
problematic.  
By way of explication, consider that the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) 
provides a definition of the „technical usage‟ of symptom as referring to a “(bodily or 
mental) phenomenon, circumstance, or change of condition arising from and 
accompanying a disease or affliction, and constituting an indication or evidence of it; a 
characteristic sign of some disease” (OED, 1989, n.p.). It goes on to indicate that in 
contemporary usage symptom refers to “a subjective (perceptible to the patient)      
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indication as opposed to an objective one or sign”, and that in general use symptom 
indicates “a sign or indication of something” (OED, 1989, n.p.).   
When one consults the DSM-IV-TR diagnostic criteria associated with the 
specific mood episodes that comprise bipolar disorder (manic, major depressive, 
hypomanic, and mixed), there is a distinction made between „mood periods‟ and the 
relevant symptoms pertinent to each diagnostic category. For example, criteria A for a 
manic episode requires “a distinct period of abnormally and persistently elevated, 
expansive, or irritable mood” (Table A1), and then specifies in criteria B what 
symptoms need to be observed that occur during the “period of mood disturbance” in 
order to enable a diagnosis (Table A1). Similarly, criteria A for a hypomanic episode 
begins with the same requirement of a “distinct period of persistently elevated, 
expansive, or irritable mood”, and then specifies in criteria B what symptoms are 
required (see Table A3). In contrast, when one examines the criteria for a major 
depressive episode, criteria A specifies that one of the symptoms is either “depressed 
mood” or “loss of interest or pleasure” (Table A2). In short, the distinction between a 
disordered „mood‟ and a symptom is collapsed in the criteria for major depressive 
episode. 
Nonetheless, it would appear that „moods‟ are a basic component, which can be 
determined to be abnormal, elevated, expansive, irritable, and that last for a period of 
time, which serve for a determination of a „mood disorder‟. To make such 
determinations, an additional collection of symptoms (which can also involve „mood‟) 
are available from which identification can be made of problematic instances of 
conduct, such that a particular person can be determined to have a disorder of mood. We 
might characterise what is required, at least officially (and notwithstanding the 
apparently circular DSM reasoning e.g., Boyle, 2002), as something like: Problematic      
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Mood + Symptom(s) = Mood Disorder. What remains somewhat unclear, however, is 
the extent to which symptoms stand as discrete entities from problematic moods.   
I draw attention to this in order to highlight the problematic nature of both 
diagnostic formulations and the utility of undertaking meaningful critique of such 
formulations. The determination that one may be dealing with a person presenting with 
some symptom of bipolar disorder, rather than involving some form of comparison with 
an „official‟ psychiatric definition that specifies some discrete, unambiguous definitions 
of human conduct, might best be considered as involving a range of interactional 
practices that are not, and perhaps cannot be, incorporated into any „official account‟ 
that could in turn be used as the means by which one makes a determination that 
someone may have bipolar disorder. So, this represents a challenge to undertaking 
studies of symptoms. On the one hand, the practices by which clinicians and clients go 
about the business of „mental health production‟ are largely unknown and 
undocumented in a vast literature that purports to detail clinical practice. On the other 
hand, so called „critical‟ approaches to investigating „mental health production‟ appear 
to belabour the obvious shortcomings and deficiencies in such things as psychiatric 
nosologies and treatment guidelines, and focus on how these are constructed divorced 
from actual practice.  
Now, while touching upon the criteria required for the diagnosis of a mood 
disorder, my examination is principally concerned with what could be regarded as „post-
diagnosis‟ materials where the primary concern is not in establishing the validity of a 
given diagnosis, but rather, may involve the management and monitoring of symptoms 
against diagnostic criteria. Moreover, such takes place in a psychotherapeutic context in 
contrast to a more formal assessment context (e.g., a psychiatric intake interview). 
Given the post-diagnosis nature of the interactions examined in the current investigation, 
one might consider that clients might provide accounts of a wide variety of troublesome      
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matters, of problems, which may be glossed or formulated (by clients and therapists) as 
possible symptoms related to bipolar disorder. These formulations might be in the form 
of summaries of previous talk that may provide for a means by which both clients and 
therapist can understand their joint actions (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970; Heritage & 
Watson, 1979). Or, as Davis (1986) suggests, a therapist can provide reformulations 
that might enable a recasting of a client‟s problems and troubles into matters more 
amenable to therapeutic intervention – specifically, by transforming them into 
psychologised objects (e.g., Antaki et al., 2005a; Buttny, 1996; Hak & de Boer, 1996; 
Hutchby, 2005; Peräkylä & Vehviläinen, 2003).  
Selection and Categorisation of Data Extracts 
As a starting point, consider that common, indeed ubiquitous, descriptions of 
bipolar disorder that appear in both vernacular and scientific accounts are that sufferers 
may experience terribly incapacitating „lows‟ or „downs‟ (i.e., depressions) and „highs‟ 
or „ups‟ (i.e., manic/hypomanic elevations). In addition, one can be described as „up and 
down‟, „all over the place‟, or „unstable‟ (i.e., mixed episodes) which might also be 
taken as an indication of a possible transition between such „ups‟ and „downs‟ and some 
presumed „normal‟ range of functioning. Members‟ accounts pertaining to such 
„highs/ups‟ and „lows/downs‟ could perhaps be seen to provide prototypical symptom 
talk. In this regard, I will examine extracts from the data corpus that feature „ups‟ and 
„downs‟ (as these terms feature as participants‟ descriptions and categorisations) 
packaged in accounts and formulations that touch on matters relating to the symptoms 
that might be associated with possible mood elevations. My concern here is on the local 
production of what might count as symptoms of bipolar disorder, it is not to delineate 
what is or is not a symptom as a clinical exercise (i.e., as directly relating the talk to 
specific symptoms that one finds in official psychiatric nomenclatures such as the DSM 
or ICD).       
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Rather, extracts are collected under such categorisations to reflect participants 
„demonstrable orientations‟ to such categories, which might allow for analytically 
providing a respecification of „symptoms‟ as functioning as particular types of 
interactional devices, that index a range of what could be glossed as „troubles‟ (e.g., 
Jefferson, 1980; Jefferson & Lee, 1981), „complaints‟ (e.g., Drew, 1998; Drew & Holt, 
1988), „problems‟ (Turner, 1972), or what might otherwise be relevant as 
„complainables‟ (e.g., Schegloff, 2006). While some work has examined how 
psychiatric accounts (i.e., case notes) can be produced as factual, by way of clinicians 
using clients‟ talk as a source of „mentionables‟ that can be in a sense transformed, or 
documentarily interpreted, as psychiatric symptoms (e.g., Hak, 1998; Smith, 1978), the 
focus here is on how symptoms are produced in talk-in-interaction. Indeed, as the 
interactions detailed are not „intake interviews‟ that might relate to some specific 
institutional business such as making determinations concerning possible hospital 
admission (e.g., Cuberes, 2001), one might profitably recast „symptoms‟ as possible 
„trouble markers‟, and as Silverman notes “without troubles, counsellors have no reason 
to intervene in their clients‟ lives” (1997, p. 197).  
„Up‟ Symptoms: Therapist Question, Client Account 
In the following extracts, the client (Mike) provides for some description of 
what could be regarded as bipolar disorder symptoms, and an account that allows for an 
understanding of the relevance of such symptoms. The focus of analytic interest with 
these extracts is on descriptions and accounts that involve „ups‟. The following occurs 
in a sequence in which Phil describes three things to watch with regard to Mike‟s 
chronic bipolar disorder symptoms. The first concerns keeping a level „emotional tone‟ 
(not detailed here), with the extract opening with the second of Phil‟s recommendations.      
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Extract 5.1A 
1    Phil:   .hhh (.) T- the second one of course is to watch: (0.4)  
2     if you are going (0.3) up or down (.) 
3    Mike:   Mhm= 
4    Phil:   =.h So what ma:rker would you kno:w:: (0.3) if you were  
5     going, (0.3) up? 
6     (0.4) 
7    Mike:   Aw: if I um: (1.2) Aw t’s the money thing (0.2) for me  
8     mainly.  
9    Phil:   Mm. 
10   Mike:   So if I say get the urge to- to bid on ebay and (.) buy  
11     a new watch when I’ve got four hundred others: (.) 
12   Phil:   >Mhm.< 
13   Mike:   I realise that (.) ↑okay (.) steady down, (0.2) 
14   Phil:   Okay (0.5) .hhh I want you to really hear ↑that  
15     be[cause]= 
16   Mike:     [Mhm  ] 
17   Phil:   =.h at the time you do it you’ll think >oh no no no 
18           this is quite< (.) justified. 
19           (0.2) 
20   Mike:   Mm (0.3) Oh yeah I’ve done that bef- I know that  
21     feeling= 
22   Phil:   =>Yeah<= 
23   Mike:   =where you feel (0.3) ( ) happy (.) why shou- why  
24     shouldn’t you spend money (.) go for your life. 
25           (0.3) 
26   Phil:   Yeah [but] 
27   Mike:        [And] you don’t care= 
28   Phil:   =But as your mood changes and so your (.) 
29   Mike:   Yeah= 
30   Phil:   =logic logic (0.3) changes and it becom:es (0.4) quite  
31     the thing to do (0.2) 
 
Here, Phil asks Mike (across lines 4-5) what „marker‟ would indicate he is 
„going up‟, which could be glossed as „what are the symptoms that indicate you are 
having a mood elevation‟. Note that Phil requires Mike to provide an account of 
symptoms without providing a candidate list; it is for Mike to provide the relevant 
detail, notwithstanding that Phil asks about a singular „marker‟ which might serve to      
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constrain Mike‟s possible responses (while specific to medical consultations, see Boyd 
& Heritage, 2006; Stivers & Heritage, 2001). In one sense, consider that Phil‟s question 
could be approached as a combination of (or as a „fitting between‟) what Heritage and 
Robinson term a „Type 1‟ or „history taking‟ question with a „Type 3‟ or „symptoms for 
confirmation‟ question (Heritage & Robinson, 2006). That is, Phil‟s question does not 
relate to a specific time-frame, or instance, but does project for an answer in which 
concrete symptoms may be detailed.  
Mike suggests that it‟s “the money thing” (line 7), and proceeds across lines 10 
to 11 to detail how such a „money thing‟ might become manifest in practice. The “buy a 
new watch when I‟ve got four hundred others:” (lines 10-11) is interesting, as it is 
clearly an exaggeration. One would imagine that if queried further, Mike might reveal 
that he does not actually own „four hundred‟ watches. Regardless, the inference is clear, 
that engaging in an unwarranted, unjustifiable course of action (i.e., spending money on 
things that are not needed and for which perhaps even a desire to obtain such things is 
unreasonable) is a marker that something might be afoot in terms of a „mood disorder‟. 
Nonetheless, this is a kind of exaggeration, or extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 
1986), that one can find littered throughout the clinical literature on bipolar disorder. 
For example, Belmaker (2004) offers (in the opening paragraph of a review of bipolar 
disorder published in The New England Journal Of Medicine previously discussed in 
Chapter 1) the example that a person suffering mania may “decide to purchase 500 
television sets if he or she believes that their price will go up” (p. 476). Note that this is 
a gloss, not a specific recitation of a particular case. Not only are bipolar disorder 
symptoms marked by their apparent extreme nature, they appear to be reported by 
clients in rhetorically extreme ways, and appear in scientific accounts as extreme. So, 
one might approach reports of persons „buying hundreds of shoes‟, having „hundreds of      
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sexual partners‟, and so forth, as indicative of one of the defining features – as a 
prototypical symptom – of the disorder. 
However, the occasioning of something like an extreme case formulation can be 
seen routinely as a way to mark a contrast, draw attention to a particular claim, and so 
forth (e.g., Edwards, 2000), and is of course not solely a marker for pathological 
behaviour. However, in a site that is overtly concerned with the undertaking of 
psychological business, the use of an extreme case formulation might well be taken as a 
kind of symptom explication. In this regard, consider that this prefaces Mike‟s “I realise 
that (.) ↑okay (.) steady down,” (line 13) which highlights the significance of the „urge‟ 
as a marker of „going up‟ for Mike, and which is followed by Phil‟s pointed directive 
that “I want you to really hear ↑that” (line 14).  
Phil then proceeds to construct a formulation that links „mood‟ to „logic‟, and 
details the consequential nature of such a linkage (across lines 28-31). In other words, a 
„mood‟ that is „up‟ affects „logic‟ such that the former presumably overrides the 
normative functioning of the later, such that one could do something with possible 
negative consequences (i.e., overspend). Here we can see the interplay of various 
psychological terms (e.g., „realise‟, „urge‟, „feeling‟) relating to particular activities (i.e., 
„bid on ebay‟), reformulated by the therapist in terms of „mood‟, which enables 
something that is readily hearable as a description (and an explanation of) a bipolar 
disorder symptom.
1 
Let us now examine how this plays out further in the interaction. 
 
Extract 5.1B 
1    Mike:   Mm (0.3) I agree (.) It’s um: .hh (0.4) >it’s something  
2     I’ve been more aware of the last couple of weeks<  
3     especially this last week >like the other day I was in  
4     a< .h (0.5) a magazine shop and I (0.3) I’m a nutter  
                                                 
1 Note that I will undertake a more sustained examination of issues relating to „moods‟ in Chapter 6, and 
psychological terms in Chapter 7.       
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5     when it comes to buying fishing magazines: .h (.) I’ve  
6     got piles of em >and I don’t really need em- I mean  
7     every now and then’s nice but [like] I buy them all= 
8    Phil:                                 [Mm  ] 
9    Mike:   =the ti:me [during] the week I’ll buy three .hh= 
10   Phil:              [Mm    ] 
11   Mike:   =or four<= 
12   Phil:   =Mm= 
13   Mike:   =some American one:s ↑yeah fifty sixty bucks a week  
14           just on ↑magazines .hh And I went to a booksto- er::z:  
15           the newsagency and I looked up this (.) fly fishing one  
16           and I thought (.) .hhh (0.2) Then I thought- then a  
17           little voice in my head said okay steady down  
18           (0.5) 
19   Phil:   Mm= 
20   Mike:   =Do you really need it (.) do you want it ↑rea:lly?  
21     (0.4) >↑And I thought no shit I don’t really want it<  
22     (0.3) 
23   Phil:   M↑m (.) 
24   Mike:   And I walked out (0.2) and bought (0.2) .hh >what did I  
25     buy< (.) newspaper (.) >and [that was it<] 
26   Phil:                               [Yeah        ] .tch 
27     [And  so] 
28   Mike:   [I’m I’m] trying to keep aware of that side of things= 
29   Phil:   =Yeah (0.5) 
 
Here Mike provides a more specific and detailed account concerning such 
problematic spending behaviour, which involves the purchasing of fishing magazines. 
This could be approached as Mike providing for some explication of concrete 
symptoms (e.g., as a response to a „Type 3‟ question, Heritage & Robinson, 2006), even 
though Phil has not specifically asked for such in his initial question in the preceding 
extract (Extract 5.1A, lines 4-5). Note how Mike, as a preface to a more detailed 
account, sets-up the temporal relevance of the account by way of a kind of „time 
compression‟. The “something” (line 1) with which he has “been more aware” (line 2) 
is initially presented as relevant to “the last couple of weeks” (line 2), which is 
subsequently compressed to “last week” (line 3), and immediately preceding the      
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substantive detail of his account is compressed further to “the other day” (line 3). In 
addition to positioning his account as a recollection of a specific event, this serves to 
make the „mood‟ as „something I‟ve been more aware of‟ as a constant, but until 
recently a relatively unexamined, feature of Mike‟s day to day experience. 
Mike then „sets the scene‟ for his story, which takes place in “a magazine shop” 
(line 4), with the scene later reintroduced with the repair of “booksto-” to “the 
newsagency” (lines 14-15), which he makes relevant as a locale for his account with 
“I‟m a nutter when it comes to buying fishing magazines:” (lines 4-5). Note that Mike 
provides for the elaboration of „nutter‟ in terms that sound relatively unremarkable, as 
opposed to something perhaps a bit more unusual or abnormal. Mike is a „nutter‟ in that 
he has “piles of em” (line 6) although he doesn‟t “really need em-” (line 6). Nutter, 
then, is to be taken as someone who is perhaps obsessive about particular pursuits, not 
necessarily someone who has a pathological condition that could be glossed as „being a 
nutter‟. Nonetheless, it would seem Mike‟s account of his resistance to the initial „urge‟ 
to buy the magazines is something that implicates some form of pathology, rather than 
opening up a discussion on any particular moral issue pertaining to the spending of 
money.  
In this regard, consider the manner in which Mike constructs his account 
concerning walking into the newsagency and looking at the fly fishing magazine. Note 
that Mike begins to provide some commentary on what he thought, which after several 
attempts at repair on line 16 (the abandoned “and I thought”, which is followed by 
something that sounds like a kind of repair, a micropause, marked inhalation, and then 
another pause before launching into a cut-off “Then I thought-”). The version that is 
finally produced does not involve thought, rather it involves a kind of direct reported 
speech (Holt, 1996), albeit from a “little voice in my head” (lines 16-17). Now, what 
this might do is enable Mike to maintain a kind of separation, a kind of differential      
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„footing‟ (Goffman, 1979) between what he thought and the words of the „little voice‟ 
which provides advice to “okay steady down” (line 17), and poses the questions “do you 
really need it (.) do you want it ↑rea:lly?” (line 20). Such a separation is made relevant 
when Mike shifts back to furnishing a report concerning (or indexing) thought with “ 
>↑And I thought no shit I don‟t really want it<” (line 21), which positions Mike as an 
autonomous, morally responsible agent.  
Here, Mike‟s account concerning fishing magazines is something which is 
entirely congruent with the previous talk, and provides a neat example of Phil‟s linkage 
of „mood‟ and „logic‟ as a kind of predictor of future conduct. Mike and Phil, as a 
collaborative joint production, effectively „work up‟ descriptions and formulations by 
which the importance, relevance, and consequences of symptoms associated with 
bipolar disorder are packaged. 
Turning now to material in which a Mike provides an even more detailed 
psychological account concerning his experience of such „ups‟. That is to say, following 
some description of events in which such „ups‟ might become manifest as a topic of 
concern (including the material presented in Extracts 5.1A and 5.1B), Mike provides 
some descriptions that are of a more fine-grained, causal character.    
 
Extract 5.2 
1    Mike:   Oh: go::d .pt it’s an amazing thought process and  
2     looking at it from a distance an- so to speak (0.2) .hh  
3     It’s just (0.2) incredible how (.) powerful .h it is= 
4    Phil:   =ºYeahº= 
5    Mike:   =>It is< mega powerful it’s not just .h ºpowerful (.)  
6     it’s very powerfulº= 
7    Phil:   =ºI kno::wº= 
8    Mike:   =It it makes- not makes you but (0.6) it urges you  
9            (0.2) 
10   Phil:   ºI kno::wº= 
11   Mike:   =And says ↑go for your ↑life you’ll make you ↑happy 
12           mate.       
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13     (0.3) 
14   Phil:   ºI knowº= 
15   Mike:   =↑It’ll make yo- you’ll be sto:ked. >And you are.< 
16           (0.5)  
17   Mike:   You come home with this brand [new]= 
18   Phil:                                 [Yep] 
19   Mike:   =fishing reel (.) and you think awe:some and then you  
20     sit there and you go (1.7) ºOka:y what now?º 
21      (.) 
22   Phil:   Mm. 
23   Mike:   Y’know then little spend devil goes (.) .h well you’ve  
24     done tha:t (.) you’re not feeling the best now are ya  
25     ↑no::: well ↑well we’ll go and buy something else  
26           then [you’ll] feel even better (.) 
27   Phil:        [M     ] 
28   Phil:   Mm.  
29           (0.2) 
30   Mike:   ºAnd that’s what (starts/stuffs ya up.)º 
 
Here, we have Mike providing an account of an “amazing thought process” (line 
1) that is associated with his problematic spending behaviour, which has been the topic 
of previous interaction. Note the repair “it it makes- not makes you but (0.6) it urges 
you” (line 8) in which the thought process is downgraded from something that „makes‟ 
to something that „urges‟. Recall that in Extract 5.1A Mike first talks of an „urge‟ with 
“So if I say get the urge to-” (line 10). This repair, while downgrading the lack of 
personal autonomy that „makes‟ entails, maintains the powerful nature of the thought 
process by use of the term „urges‟. Similarly, consider the repair of “it‟ll make yo-” to 
“you‟ll be stoked” (line 15). In other words, the provision of a self-description of a 
psychological event, via the use of mental predicate categories, is a thoroughly moral 
affair (e.g., Jayyusi, 1984). 
This can be further elucidated by consideration of the extensive use of a kind of 
direct reported speech (e.g., Holt, 1996)
 2 in which Mike reports not only on his 
                                                 
2 Perhaps a better description in this instance might be „direct reported thought‟.      
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„thought process‟ (e.g., “And says ↑go for your ↑life you‟ll make you ↑happy mate” at 
lines 11-12, and “↑It‟ll make yo- you‟ll be sto:ked.” at line 15), but also his own speech 
in response to the „thought process‟ (e.g., “and you think awe:some” line 19 and 
“ºOka:y what now?º” line 20) and the „spend devil‟ (e.g., “y‟know then little spend 
devil goes”, line 23). Again, one might approach this as an extensive form of footing 
(Goffman, 1979), in which Mike can report the actions and talk of the „thought process‟ 
and the „spend devil‟ rather than himself as „Mike‟. This perhaps formulates the 
problematic behaviour as something that Mike is not necessarily in control of – it is 
something that he struggles against. It places Mike, as an autonomous agent, in some 
degree of conflict with his own psychological processes. This account can be seen as a 
method by which Mike can provide a description and explanation of problematic 
conduct, which minimises his accountability while maximising the problematic nature 
of the “mega powerful” (line 5) thought process. It involves the utilisation of various 
psychological terms and devices, such as „urges‟, „processes‟, indeed even a metaphoric 
„spend devil‟, that can serve to account for – indeed provide the substantive elements of 
– the symptoms of bipolar disorder. Which, in this case, can be glossed as 
„overspending‟ and „impulsive‟ conduct. 
Getting back to the manner in which Mike provides descriptions of his own 
psychological interiority, one might consider that while descriptions of extraordinary 
events may of course be produced using ordinary and mundane sounding formulations 
(e.g., Jefferson, 2004a), if such events are in some sense primarily psychological 
dispositions, characteristics, and phenomena, one may well end up constructing what 
appear to be quite extraordinary accounts of otherwise mundane psychological concerns 
as symptoms (cf. Wooffitt & Allistone, 2005).
3 
                                                 
3 One might consider the applicability of the quote (oft cited to Carl Sagan) that „extraordinary claims 
require extraordinary evidence‟ to ascriptions and avowals concerning psychological objects.      
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„Up‟ Symptoms: Client Account, Therapist Question 
Turning now to a different client, for some examination of categorisation 
practices and symptom explication that is again related to „ups‟. However, in these 
extracts, in contrast to the preceding extracts, the therapist essentially fits „ups‟ to a 
client‟s account.  
 
Extract 5.3A 
1    Phil:   OKAY (0.6) Good afternoon welcome .pt Do your bit ask  
2            your question [that you want to ask] ((smiley voice)) 
3    Jane:                 [Aw    I   was   just]  
4     wondering cause u:m: (0.7) Like I told a friend the  
5     other day I said I’ve been diagnosed with bipolar and  
6     they said um (0.4) ((clicking sound)) >They go “oh but<  
7     you don’t ↑li:e” heh .hh and apparently just these two  
8     people that (0.2) she’s known like they’re com- 
9     absolutely compulsive li:ars: (0.2) 
10   Phil:   ºOh rightº= 
11   Jane:   =Like big time  
12     (0.5) 
13   Phil:   [Yeah] 
12   Jane:   [And ] I’ve just said aw: I don’t know if that’s the  
13     thing I’ve said every case is different 
14         (0.6) 
15   Phil:   Well it i[::s:          ]= 
16   Jane:            [ºI don’t knowº] 
17   Phil:   =Let me::: ((croaky)) .h hh (0.4) i- (.) >Le- lets just  
18     explore this with you<(0.7) 
 
This extract is taken from the start of a session (previously examined in Chapter 
4, Extract 4.1, lines 1-9) which begins with Phil providing Jane an opportunity to “do 
your bit ask your question” (line 1-2), and presumably indexes some talk occurring 
prior to the commencement of the recording. Jane then begins by introducing what may 
be a delicate matter, by way of “Aw I was just wondering” (lines 3-4). If one were to 
consider Phil‟s opening question in terms of the elucidation of any possible presenting      
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complaint in a medical consultation, this would best be characterised as a „Type 1‟ or 
„general inquiry‟ (Heritage & Robinson, 2006). 
One way of approaching this interaction, is to consider the commonplace 
experience that persons tell friends and family members that they have been diagnosed 
with a particular illness, and this may occasion the provision of a range of „lay 
diagnoses‟ (ten Have, 2001b). Moreover, friends may well dispute or query the validity 
of any proffered diagnosis. This would not be in the form of a direct refutation, but 
rather, may be in the form of a kind of general questioning concerning a particular 
symptom that is characteristic of the illness in question. They may express surprise or 
confusion concerning such diagnostic news (e.g., “>They go „oh but< you don‟t ↑li:e‟”, 
lines 6-7). They may also warrantably provide such disconfirmatory statements in the 
absence of any expert knowledge (e.g., “these two people that (0.2) she‟s known”, lines 
7-8). Further, persons with the diagnosis may then be required by such disconfirmations 
to provide justifications of the validity or utility of such diagnostic categories (e.g., “I 
don‟t know if that‟s the thing” and “I‟ve said every case is different”, lines 12-13).  
The point I wish to make with the current extract, is that what is available for 
analytic examination is not an interaction in which a person provides news of a 
diagnostic category to another „lay person‟ which is subject to a confirmation or 
disconfirmation (see Beach, 2001b, for some examination of such talk). Rather, it is an 
account of such an interaction that is presented to a clinician for further examination. 
Moreover, it is not important to consider whether such an account is an accurate report 
provided by Jane to Phil (i.e., that it is some sense „what really happened‟), but one 
should consider that an account in this form can be provided.
4 That is, an account given 
by a client to a clinician concerning a possible challenge to a diagnosis, in which what is 
                                                 
4 That is, one might consider that “context involves utterances designed to tell recipients how to hear the 
reported speech” (Buttny, 1998, p. 49).      
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at stake is the salience of a highly charged moral categorisation (i.e., „liar‟ and 
„compulsive liars‟) linked to the diagnosis.  
For Jane, it would seem that to „lie‟, to „compulsively lie‟, to „compulsively lie 
big time‟, is in some sense a significant, consequential symptom of bipolar disorder (the 
significance of which is bolstered by the repair at line 9 with an extreme case 
formulation “absolutely compulsive”, and the next-turn extreme case formulation “big 
time” at line 11). Note that such a symptom is provided in decidedly vernacular terms, 
with a family resemblance to a kind of „lay diagnosis‟ (e.g., ten Have, 2001b), which 
may stand in some contrast to the symptoms of a non-psychiatric illness. One can 
consider several implications; with a diagnosis of „bipolar‟ will Jane be seen as a 
compulsive liar? If not, does this bring into question the diagnosis of bipolar? How are 
the categories „bipolar‟ and „liar‟ related? If „lying‟ can be taken as a category bound 
activity of the members‟ category „liar‟, is it also a category bound activity for members 
of the category „bipolar‟? Note also that Jane does not specify that „just these two 
people‟ have or can be categorised as being bipolar. In other words, in Jane‟s account 
her „friend‟ does not specifically identify the two people she knows as being diagnosed 
with bipolar. Yet, that is the hearable inference. 
This relationship concerning the category „liar‟ and „bipolar‟ is a significant 
matter, given that it occurs as the first „order of business‟ in the therapy session as 
introduced by the client, requires some investigation from the therapist as a trouble 
source (i.e., Jane‟s “ºI don‟t knowº” at line 16 invites further inquiry by Phil), and 
indeed receives considerable attention by the therapist (i.e., “>Le- lets just explore this 
with you<”, lines 17-18) as we will see in the following extracts. While this extract does 
not feature the use of any specific terms one might immediately associate with „ups‟, it 
serves as an important precursor to the next extract in which the occurrence and 
relevance of such a term becomes apparent.      
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Extract 5.3B 
1    Phil:   If you’ve ever had a tendency to te:ll (0.4) ↓f:ibs  
2     (0.4) .h When has that been? 
3            (0.6) 
4    Jane:   .pt When I was a kid. 
5            (.) 
6    Phil:   Yeah? .h And in terms of your cycle of ↓moo:ds being a  
7     little bit elevated or a little bit ↓low and a little  
8            bit elevated and a little bit ↓low .h ↑whe:n: are you  
9            more incli:ned as an adult (0.4) to fib  
10           (1.5) 
11   Jane:   ºI don’t (0.4) unless it’s to m(h)y mu(h)mº (.) 
12   Phil:   Heh heh [heh okay        ] 
13   Jane:           [Wh(h)en sh(h)e’s] h(h)assling me= 
14   Phil:   =.hh Yeah okay= 
15   Jane:   =Yeah I don’t (.) 
16   Phil:   You see= 
17   Jane:   =Um (.) 
18   Phil:   M- my my experience is that i- if people get a bit  
19     elevated (1.1) if they [get up] 
20   Jane:                          [(    )] get it (.) (   ) all  
21     excited and (0.2) yep. 
22           (0.3) 
23   Phil:   .pt [Then     ] 
24   Jane:       [ºAlrightº]  
25           (0.4) 
26   Phil:   They get a bit grandiose (0.3) .h And I think there is  
27           a stage of (0.6) that can be a bit grandiose and in  
28           that phase .h I think people ca:n (0.2) tell (1.0)  
29           fibs. >I mean it ↑feels true to them.<  
30           (0.6) 
31   Jane:   ºYeahº (0.3) ºThat’sº (0.3) ºYeahº (0.4) Alright (0.4) 
 
It is in this extract that we can see Phil introduce several terms related to mood 
elevations („elevated‟, „low‟, and „up‟). Such terms feature extensively in Phil‟s 
provision of a formulation that might serve to provide a candidate explanation for how 
„lies‟ might be linked to „bipolar‟. That is, one may have a “tendency” (line 1) to „fib‟ 
(e.g., lines 1, 9, 29) when experiencing an „elevation‟ or „up‟ in a “cycle of ↓moo:ds”      
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(line 6). One may get “grandiose” (line 26) and as a result „tell fibs‟ (lines 28-29), which 
notably are not really lies as it “↑feels true to them” (line 29). 
Phil‟s question “If you‟ve ever had a tendency to te:ll (0.4) ↓f:ibs (0.4) .h When 
has that been?” (lines 1-2) projects for an answer that will involve a „stage of life‟ 
category (Sacks, 1992a), some synonym for „childhood‟. Consider that a category 
bound activity of „adult‟ may be „lies‟, but for „child‟ it may more properly said to be 
„fibs‟ – and while children can indeed lie, it is not normative to attribute the telling of 
fibs to adults. This of course trades on the differential accountability of a whole host of 
psychological acts and dispositions, where telling a lie (a morally questionable act) 
entails that the teller has knowledge of the lie as an accountably intentional, volitional 
act that one may be culpable for (e.g., Atkinson & Drew, 1979; Edwards, 2006b; Lynch 
& Bogen, 1996). However, telling a fib may entail a less stringent application of moral 
accountability. This defuses potential problems that may be associated with Phil making 
inquiries which are predicated on assumptions concerning Jane‟s propensity to lie. Phil 
can recast or reformulate „lie/lying‟ as „fib/tell fibs‟, and can thus link the category 
„adult‟ with the category bound activity „fib‟.
5  
Note also that Phil provides for two „dispositional‟ terms, a “tendency” (line 1) 
and “incli:ned” (line 9), which also works towards providing a softening of moral 
accountability. Jane may have a tendency or inclination under specific circumstances to 
tell a fib, in contrast to having a more-or-less intentional disposition to lie. Such a „set-
up‟ is a somewhat delicate matter, and as we can see Phil‟s attempts are not entirely 
successful, with Jane providing a declination “I don‟t” (line 11, which is repeated at line 
15). Again, the issue of moral accountability is relevant, with Jane providing a 
disclaimer that she doesn‟t tell fibs “unless it‟s to m(h)y mu(h)m” (line 11). Jane‟s 
                                                 
5 Sacks has a number of relevant comments on such matters, for example on „Class 1‟ versus „Class 2‟ 
rules and childrens‟ distinctions between „lies‟ and „secrets‟ (Sacks, 1992a, p. 78-79). See also Everyone 
has to Lie (Sacks, 1975).      
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within-speech laughter invites laughter from Phil (Jefferson, 1979, 1985), and Jane 
further insulates herself from moral challenge by providing a justification that telling 
fibs to her mum occurs “Wh(h)en sh(h)e‟s h(h)assling me” (line 13). 
Phil then changes tack and moves away from consideration of Jane as a specific 
case, and provides a more general formulation in terms of his “experience” (line 18). 
This allows Phil to pursue the line of inquiry pertinent to „lying‟ and a possible link 
with mood elevations, and also provides for a demonstration of his professional 
competence as someone who may warrantably pursue such an inquiry. Here, a „cycle of 
moods‟ is decoupled from any particular symptoms, such that an underlying „mood‟ is 
likely to be related as a casual factor (i.e., “in that phase”, lines 27-28) for any 
symptoms (i.e., „lying‟, „telling fibs‟, and „being grandiose‟). Nonetheless, Phil is still 
attentive to the moral implications of such a formulation, with his further softening of 
„fibs‟ as evidenced with “>I mean it ↑feels true to them.<” (line 29). A „lie‟ is 
something that a person knows is untrue or deceptive, in constrast to a „fib‟ which is 
something that feels true. Jane‟s tentative acknowledgement of this formulation projects 
for a more detailed explication from Phil. In short, what might be expected to occur on 
Phil‟s next turn is something which bolsters the formulation, perhaps in the form of 
some kind of account which indexes Phil‟s professional knowledge.  
 
Extract 5.3C 
1    Phil:   And I did actually have the case of the guy who  
2     pretended he was Lor:d somebody or other Strathmore or  
3     someone (0.2) .hh and wandered into car dealerships in  
4     Glasgow and bought Rolls Royces .h and managed without  
5            a cent to his name to buy three rolls Royces in a day  
6     (0.2) .pt [Or two actually] 
7    Jane:             [Lucky    bugger] 
8            (0.2) 
9    Phil:   .hh Ah (0.2) >Well he didn’t have any money and they  
10     never actually c- turned up [but]= 
11   Jane:                               [Oh ]      
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12   Phil:   =he actually< .h one actually did get delivered to the  
13     hospital (0.7) Which is ºjustº bizza:re (1.0) >So so< I  
14     think that’s what [they   ] may be referring [to    ]= 
15   Jane:                     [ºRightº]                  [ºOkayº] 
16   Phil:   =so I- I think it’s (.) .hh If you talk about going (.)  
17     up and going down w- what are your ups like?  
18           (0.4) 
19   Phil:   When you get a little (4.0) 
 
Here, Phil provides a story that bolsters his initial formulation, and which can be 
seen to achieve a number of related tasks. Again, Phil provides for a demonstration and 
a performance of his professional competence (e.g., Radley & Billig, 1996) which 
makes warrantable his formulation, by providing an account concerning a previous 
“case” (line 1). Note that Phil‟s use of „case‟ may well be a recycling of Jane‟s use of 
„case‟ as detailed in a previous extract (“I‟ve said every case is different”, Extract 5.3A, 
line 13). Consider also that Phil does not introduce this „case‟ with something of the 
form „And I had a client who‟, but provides for a more authoritative account with the 
preface “did actually” (line 1). This serves to mark this particular case as notable, and 
the use of “the case” (line 1) and “of the guy” (line 1) further provides for a measure of 
its significance, as something that may well be of note among a community of 
professionals (consider the more general „a case‟ and „of a guy‟ might sound less 
remarkable). 
Jane‟s subsequent assessment, “Lucky bugger” (line 7), works in a kind of „the 
end justifies the means‟ sense. If one could walk into a car dealership and get expensive 
cars without paying a cent, one would most likely be considered a „lucky bugger‟. 
However, if one were to focus on the moral issue of deception, or lying, or indeed 
telling a fib, categorising such an individual as being a „lucky bugger‟ might be 
problematic, as this would entail a tacit approval of morally questionable actions. Phil 
attends to this with an extension to his account of „Lord Strathmore‟, that “he didn‟t      
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have any money” (line 9) and that the cars “never actually c- turned up” (line 10). This 
serves to bolster his formulation concerning „lies‟ and „bipolar‟, and provides a means 
by which he can tie the formulation back to the initial problem of Jane‟s account 
concerning her friend, with “I think that‟s what they may be referring to” (lines 13-14). 
Jane accepts this with the overlapping agreement tokens “ºRightº” and “ºOkayº” (line 
15).  
This then serves as a kind of topicalisation of the components of Phil‟s 
formulation, and he proceeds to directly ask Jane at line 17 “what are your ups like?” 
(cf. Extract 5.1A, lines 4-5). In short, a client‟s initial concern, or formulation, packaged 
in an account involving reported speech, can be transformed or reformulated (Davis, 
1986) into a psychological problem, rather than being attended to as a matter that is 
solely a moral concern.
6  
Note that the first extracts featuring Mike (Extracts 5.1A-5.2) are notable in that 
it is the client that provides detailed descriptions of symptoms in the absence of overt 
prompting by the therapist. In the later extracts featuring Jane (Extracts 5.3A-5.3C), we 
see the therapist attempting to „fit‟ relevant symptoms into a categorisation that may be 
problematic. 
„Down‟ Symptoms: Client Initiated Account 
Consider the following extract which provides for some discussion concerning 
what could be glossed as the cardinal symptom of a „down‟, talk that features some 
consideration of suicide. In other words, talk that indexes what might be glossed as a 
person demonstrating „suicidal ideation‟, expressing „suicidal feelings‟, or 
contemplation of a specific „suicide plan‟ (APA, 2000, 2002). 
                                                 
6 For some explication of how therapists and clients coproduce „delicate‟ objects as delicate objects in 
HIV counselling settings, see Silverman (1997, p. 63-88).      
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Extract 5.4A 
1    Mike:   =I’ll just call- I’ll just ring the bank up (.) later  
2            on. .hhhhhhh Now how am I travelling well that is a  
3            very good ques↑tion (.) and (.) >ºgood question to  
4            start off with I suppose but ahº< .hhhhhh (0.6) This is  
5            what happened.= When did I see you last?  
6    Phil:   .pt .hhh Ah:::::::::[:: <bout ten     ]= 
7    Mike:                       [Last week was it?] 
8    Phil:   =days ago.> 
9    Mike:   Right. .hhhhh Well I took the ↓plunge (0.5) 
10           and [flew  ] 
11   Phil:       [(You-)]  
12           (0.4) 
13   Phil:   ↑Oh. 
14           (0.2) 
15   Mike:   .hhhhh On:::: s:: I saw: you, then saw my psychiatrist  
16           on the Thursday= 
17   Phil:   =Yes. 
18           (0.3) 
19   Mike:   And he said ↑wull (0.3) go and test the waters a bit  
20           (.) see how- see what it’s like (0.3) .hhhhh I flew up  
21           North Saturday afternoon?   
22   Phil:   Yeah? 
23           (0.3) 
24   Mike:   .pt .hhhh Arrived h >I had to take a valium to get on  
25           the plane (0.3) I thought that’s not a good start. (.)  
26           But I’ll try anyway.<= 
27   Phil:   =>Yeah.<  
 
This extract is taken from the start of a session, and after some preliminaries 
concerning payment for services rendered, Mike initiates a topic change with an 
extended inbreath (“.hhhhhhh” line 2) and then attends to providing an answer to a 
previous inquiry by Phil (“How‟s Mike been travelling” – not presented in the extract) 
“Now how am I travelling well that is a very good ques↑tion” (lines 2-3). This, and the 
rest of Mike‟s turn, serves as a pre-announcement sequence (Terasaki, 1976) that 
foreshadows a troubles telling (Jefferson, 1980). This might also be approached as the 
provision of a response to a „Type 4‟ or „how are you?‟ question (Heritage & Robinson,      
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2006), which I draw attention to as Mike‟s recycling of the question serves as the 
preface for an extended account that essentially sets the „scene‟ for the session.  
Mike‟s “.hhhhh Well I took the ↓plunge” (line 9) indexes previous talk 
(presumably from the immediately prior session) and also can be seen to foreshadow 
that an account will be produced in which there may be detail concerning some outcome 
which flows from events subsequent to Mike‟s flight “up North” (lines 20-21). There 
are a number of such turns in this and the subsequent extract, with “go and test the 
waters a bit” (line 19)
7 and “I thought that‟s not a good start” (line 25) forwarding what 
is likely to be the delivery of some kind of relevant „object‟, or „news‟ of some kind 
(e.g., Maynard, 1997, 2003).  
Moreover, it would seem that such a delivery may well involve the delivery of 
„bad news‟, which is further foreshadowed with Mike‟s “had to take a valium to get on 
the plane” (lines 24-25), the significance of which is made clear with the immediately 
following evaluation “I thought that‟s not a good start” (line 25). This is followed by 
“But I‟ll try anyway” (line 26) which works to position Mike‟s undertaking to „fly up 
North‟ as entailing considerable challenge. Nonetheless, this also denotes that Mike 
approached the challenge with some degree of determination. 
Note also, that following Mike‟s initial announcement at lines 9 and 10, and 
Phil‟s overlapped and cut-off “You-” (line 11) and the surprise token “↑Oh.” (line 13), 
Mike undertakes some repair of the trouble source by providing some more 
„background‟ detail on what „the plunge‟ indexes. What is of interest here is that Mike 
provides an account concerning seeing his psychiatrist using direct reported speech 
(Holt, 1996) “And he said ↑wull (0.3) go and test the waters a bit (.) see how- see what 
it‟s like” (lines 19-20). The significance of such a report is that Mike‟s account 
implicates his psychiatrist as a major factor in any actions that he is reporting – it makes 
                                                 
7 Note also the metaphoric link between the idiomatic expressions „took the plunge‟ and „test the waters‟.      
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the psychiatrist accountable (at least in part) for Mike‟s flying „up North‟, and as such 
Mike can make accountable his actions as reasonable (i.e., following advice from his 
psychiatrist). This could be seen as a reversal of a delivery of diagnostic news from a 
clinician to a client (e.g., Maynard, 1991b, 1997), in that Mike‟s story may detail 
particular symptoms leading to a specific outcome, the significance of which can be 
evaluated post-hoc by Phil. 
 
Extract 5.4B 
1    Mike:   .hhhhh  
2            (0.5)    
3    Phil:   And what was that concern about?= Just being on the  
4            plane or= 
5    Mike:   =Just going to Carville by myself= 
6    Phil:   =>Oh right. Okay.<= 
7    Mike:   =try and see if I can (0.2) y’know start again.  
8           .hhhhhhhhhh Okay I got into the airport okay, (1.2) had  
9            dinner that night with some friends,= 
10   Phil:   =ºMhmº= 
11   Mike:   =↑feeling a bit edgy but- (0.5) reasonable. (.) 
12   Phil:   ººMhmºº= 
13   Mike:   =Just (.) I was ↓tired so I thought ↑maybe I’m just  
14           tired, .hhhhhhhhh a:n:d >did all the< (0.5) ( ) u::m  
15           housekeeping things, picked up my dog took him back th-  
16           that Saturday night, and we settled in for the evening  
17           (.) >didn’t really feel like doing much y’know<= 
18   Phil:   =ººMmºº= 
19   Mike:   =.hhhhhhhh and ah didn’t even feel like planning my  
20           fishing (        ) just tired (.) and ah (.) sure  
21           enough, I woke up Sunday morning, (0.8) miserable.  
22           (0.4) 
23   Phil:   ºMhm.º 
24   Mike:   But more than miserable, [suicidal.]= 
25   Phil:                            [Okay.    ] 
26   Mike:   =Again.  
 
Mike provides an account of events subsequent to his arrival in Carville, in 
which its most notable features are decidedly unremarkable and mundane (cf. Sacks,      
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1984b). Mike reports that he “had dinner that night with some friends” (lines 8-9), that 
he “>did all the<”” housekeeping things”, that he “picked up my dog”, and “settled in 
for the evening” (lines 14-16). In other words, Mike‟s account is one whereby he is 
„doing‟ being an „ordinary person‟ (Sacks, 1984b). This serves to make the revelation 
that Mike woke up Sunday morning „suicidal‟ all the more dramatic. Consider also that 
Mike produces an account in which he initially “thought ↑maybe I‟m just tired” (lines 
13-14), with his later realisation (of something that sounds inevitable) that “sure 
enough” he woke “miserable” at lines 20 to 21, which is extended with “But more than 
miserable, suicidal” at line 24 (cf. Jefferson, 2004a, on „At first I thought X, then I 
realised Y‟).  
Mike does not come right out and say he was „suicidal‟, instead he constructs his 
account in such a fashion as to deliver the „bad news‟ as a kind of „joint activity‟ 
(Maynard, 1991b). One might approach this as Mike delaying the bad news, in order to 
get some sense of what Phil‟s perspective on such news is likely to be, as a kind of 
client initiated „perspective-display series‟ (e.g., Maynard, 1991b, 1997). In addition, by 
delivering such news in this form, Mike can invite Phil to provide comment on the 
significance of the „preindications‟ to the actual delivery of the news item itself 
(Schegloff, 1988). In this regard, Mike provides a slot by which Phil can make such 
comment (line 2), and Phil asks a question to clarify the “concern” across lines 3 to 4, to 
which Mike provides the response “Just going to Carville by myself” (line 5) to “try and 
see if I can (0.2) y‟know start again.” (line 7). 
However, providing such an account (i.e., that one felt/feels „suicidal‟) is not 
without considerable risk, when one considers that bipolar disorder could be seen as 
having the highest risk of all psychiatric conditions for suicide attempts and 
completions (see Oquendo & Mann, 2006, for recent overview), and as such the 
provision of an account that one felt/feels „suicidal‟ may well require a clinician or      
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therapist to directly attend to evaluating the likelihood of any such risk with a client. I 
will now turn to an examination of such issues in the next two extracts. 
 
Extract 5.4C 
1    Phil:   Oh: right= 
2    Mike:   =Mm. .hhhh [And ] 
3    Phil:              [And-] and what did you need when you 
4            [felt that]= 
5    Mike:   [Yeah     ] 
6    Phil:   =what did you need.= 
7    Mike:   =.pt >I needed to have someone to hold my hand needed-  
8            I needed some company.< 
9            (0.2) 
10   Phil:   ºYeah, okay.º 
11           (0.2) 
12   Mike:   >Was just me and my dog< and we sat there on the couch  
13           >and I (slept/sat) on the couch< and I thought. (.)  
14           Okay.= Bugger this.= Maybe it’s just now. Maybe it’ll  
15           pass. [.hhh]= 
16   Phil:         [ºMmº] 
17   Mike:   =So I got the dog and went for a walk,= 
18   Phil:   =Mhm= 
19   Mike:   =around town.= And I just .hhhhh I was looking around  
20           town (1.2) going (0.5) what am I doing here? 
21           (0.4) 
22   Phil:   ºMm::º= 
23   Mike:   Who am I? (.) Where do I belong. 
24           (0.3) 
25   Phil:   ↑Mm::= 
26   Mike:   =Do I belong here? .hhhh I felt this in (.) tense  
27           intense .hhhhhhhh sadness (.) loneliness (0.6) that  
28           (lost/loss) feeling. 
29           (0.3) 
30   Phil:   ºAnd disconnection.º 
31           (0.2) 
32   Mike:   Absolutely. 
33   Phil:   ºMm::º= 
34   Mike:   =Completely disconnected with the whole world. (0.2)  
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Note that while Phil does produce a surprise token (line 1) in response to Mike‟s 
report of waking up „suicidal‟, it is not produced directly adjacent to „suicidal‟, rather, it 
is following „again‟. In other words, Phil does not provide for an overtly surprised or 
markedly perturbed response to Mike‟s revelation of what might be considered a 
troubling development, as possibly a kind of relapse. Rather, he proceeds to take a turn 
to ask Mike “what did you need when you felt that” (lines 3-4) with a repeat “what did 
you need.” (line 6). Mike‟s delivery of the „bad news‟ that he woke up „suicidal‟ 
(„again‟), and Phil‟s receipt, is produced in a smooth interactional trajectory with 
latched and overlapping utterances. However, Phil does take a turn at talk which serves 
to cut-off Mike‟s turn, and as such, his question can be seen to be a kind of directive 
question. Note that Phil does not in any sense do a disconfirmation of what Mike has 
said, but moves quickly to asking a question in which the practical significance of 
„suicidal‟ can be elucidated by Mike. This, then, could be seen as providing an 
opportunity for Mike to provide a reformulation concerning the „suicidal‟ feelings that 
might present more specific issues that Phil can pursue, with „suicidal‟ a kind of gloss.  
Of interest is Mike‟s latched response, that is delivered with more rapidity than 
the surrounding talk, that “>I needed to have someone hold my hand needed- I needed 
some company<” (lines 7-8). Mike provides a reported thought description of some 
practical self-advice in response to his troubling thoughts/feelings “and I thought. (.)  
Okay.= Bugger this.= Maybe it‟s just now. Maybe it‟ll pass.” (lines 14-15). Mike then 
reports doing something that is, again, quite mundane and unremarkable – “So I got the 
dog and went for a walk” (line 17). 
 
Extract 5.4D 
1    Phil:   [ºYes.º] 
2    Mike:   [.hhhhh] And I thought well this is not very good.= 
3         =And I felt panicky, and depressed. (0.4) And >yeah  
4            suicidal.< .hhh Not (.) ºI mean obviouslyº I always say       
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5            this to you.= Not that I’d do it. (0.2) But (.) 
6            [(               )]= 
7    Phil:   [>YEAH YEAH YEAH.<] 
8    Mike:   =are there. Y’know. .hhhhhhh And I (.) went home, I  
9            thought okay I’ll sit down see if I can watch some  
10           telly maybe that will keep my ↑mind off things. .hhhh  
11           And I just burst into tears, an: just talk- talked to  
12           the dog. 
13           (0.5) 
14   Phil:   ººMmºº= 
15   Mike:   =And I said dog (.) wh- we’re here on our own mate, (.)  
16           >this is jus- this is it,< this is as h- good as life  
17           gets.= And that made me cry even harder [.hhhhhhhh= 
18   Phil:                                           [ºMmº 
19   Mike:   =and then I thought (0.3) ºokay well what am I gonnaº  
20           do? (0.8) And I packed the car, and drove two days:  
21           (0.4) back to Town. (0.2) 
 
Mike attends to the possible practical and moral issues that declaring that he felt 
suicidal may entail, by minimising or softening the implication that he will, or would, 
actually commit suicide “Not (.) ºI mean obviouslyº I always say this to you.= Not that 
I‟d do it.” (lines 4-5). This also attends to the possibility that Phil may misconstrue the 
practical upshot of Mike‟s account detailing the extent of his unpleasant and 
troublesome feelings. Phil quickly provides for diffusion of such an uptake with his 
overlapping, fast paced, and more loudly delivered “YEAH YEAH YEAH” (line 7). In 
other words, the reporting and discussion of „suicidal‟ feelings is treated by participants 
as an ordinary kind of thing. Ordinary in the sense that, if talk about „suicidal feelings‟ 
was seen to be linked to actions that one might associate with such feelings (i.e., the act 
of suicide), then this would be a decidedly non-ordinary matter. 
However, in such talk there is the risk that the upshot will be one of a more 
literal quality (e.g., „suicidal‟ as a measure of suicidality) or that such a claim is 
rhetorically weak and may be challenged (e.g., „suicidal‟ as an exaggeration of how one 
might be feeling). In this sense, Mike‟s talk of feeling „suicidal‟ can be approached as      
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involving the use of extreme case formulations (Pomerantz, 1986), with „suicidal‟ as the 
extreme term. Moreover, given that Mike provides an unchallenged qualification of the 
term, it would appear that it is intended to work in a kind of nonliteral, „as-if‟ manner, 
that might index Mike‟s stance towards the substantive elements of his descriptions 
(Edwards, 2000). In this sense, talk of feeling „suicidal‟ here works towards establishing 
the legitimacy of Mike‟s account of his problems and attempts to overcome them, 
invites Phil to be an active participant in a troubles telling (in which the substantive 
concern is not suicidality), and sets the scene for further inquiry with the delivery of a 
kind of practical conclusion (“And I packed the car, and drove two days: (0.4) back to 
Town.”, lines 20-21). In short, Mike‟s account of feeling „suicidal‟ makes warrantable 
the subsequent two day car journey back to Town. 
With regard to the conclusion („driving back to Town‟), consider also that Mike 
provides some description of undertaking some mundane activities that might in some 
sense diffuse or ameliorate the panicky, depressed feelings with “I thought okay I‟ll sit 
down see if I can watch some telly maybe that will keep my ↑mind off things.” (lines 8-
10). However, while engaged in such a mundane activity as „watching some telly‟ Mike 
reports that he “just burst into tears” (line 11). This might be approached as a kind of 
variant of what Jefferson describes as a „I first thought X, then I realised Y‟ device 
which might serve to normalise extraordinary events (Jefferson, 2004a). Mike describes 
„doing X‟ („watching telly‟ – a normal, unremarkable, non-psychological activity) and 
then „doing Y‟ („burst into tears‟ – a notable, psychological activity that is made more 
remarkable by directly following X). Note also how Mike produces an account featuring 
direct reported speech (Holt, 1996) detailing interaction with his dog “And I said dog (.) 
wh- we‟re here on our own mate” (line 15), which serves to make more salient, or 
contextualises (Buttny, 1998), an account of loneliness and isolation. This is followed 
by a summary of the bad events with the cliché “this is as h- good as life gets.” (lines      
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16-17) which might serve to bolster his account against possible challenge (e.g., Antaki, 
2007; Drew & Holt, 1988). In other words, Mike‟s conclusion (going „back to Town‟), 
is produced as a more-or-less inevitable occurrence. 
Now, rather than Mike‟s account being considered as relating to a „down‟, as a 
kind of „depression account‟, one might consider that it might also be described as 
relating to experiences of a „mixed affective state‟. Regardless, it does detail his 
attempts to interpret the significance of his own responses to a variety of activities, and 
indeed his attempts to engage in mundane, normal pursuits to stave off or minimise 
distressing and troubling psychological states. In this regard, let us turn to some 
examination of materials in which there is some description of instability, which we 
might loosely characterise as indicative of „mixed‟ presentation. 
„Mixed‟ Symptoms: „Aggro‟, „Explode‟ 
Extract 5.5 
1    Phil:   .pt And Jane if you look at the last week (0.3) or two  
2            weeks since we last me:t (.) .hh has there been an  
3            occasion where that’s happened you’ve gone from feeling  
4            okay (0.5) quite good to (0.6) ↓trough. 
5            (0.6) 
6    Jane:   .pt (0.4) ↑U:m:: (4.6) Mhm:: (0.5) Nah not in the last  
7            couple of weeks not that I remember. 
8            (0.3) 
9    Phil:   ºOkayº (0.6) So what has the last couple of weeks been  
10           like? 
11           (0.6) 
12   Jane:   Um (1.5) been getting more aggro than usual (1.7) um  
13           (0.9) but I could feel it coming on kinda thing (0.3) 
14   Phil:   Mhm. 
15           (0.4) 
16   Jane:   And I’ve just gotten to the stage where I might just  
17           (1.1) Everyone get away from me or’s I’m gonna (0.3) 
18   Phil:   ºexplodeº (1.1) ºAh:a:º (0.7) And what’s your: radar  
19           telling you. 
20           (0.2) 
21   Jane:   t’s (.) [Tell] everyone get the fuck away from me 
22   Phil:           [(  )]      
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23           (0.2) 
 
Here Phil asks Jane if she has had a transition from “feeling okay”, “quite 
good”, to “↓trough.” (lines 3-4). Note the prosodic features of „trough‟ which emphasise 
a kind of „bottoming out‟, a „flatness‟, as something that stands in contrast to „okay‟ 
which is delivered in a more emphatic manner. While Jane provides her negative 
response across lines 6 and 7 in a dispreferred turn structure, she does provide a display 
that she is giving the question some consideration, with a sequence comprising a 
number of „reflective‟ type tokens, including the lip-smack “.pt”, higher pitched and 
elongated “↑U:m::”, significant pause (4.6 seconds), and then the elongated “Mhm::”. 
Note that Jane does not entirely discount the possibility of ever having such a transition, 
nor does she discount having the transition in the “last couple of weeks” (lines 6-7), but 
rather her response is “not that I remember” (line 7). In other words, the description that 
Phil has provided, while not appropriate in this instance, is something that is 
understandable to Jane. 
Phil provides an acknowledgement “ºOkayº” (line 9) and then asks a more 
general, open ended question, that provides Jane with a turn in which she can detail 
“what the last couple of weeks has been like” (lines 9-10) rather than elaborate and 
extend Phil‟s initial question. Jane‟s response “been getting more aggro than usual” 
(line 12), as it turns out, works towards providing a description of a kind of „feeling‟ 
that is the opposite of Phil‟s initial suggestion (i.e., „okay‟ to „trough‟). While this 
positions „aggro‟ as something that is normative for Jane (i.e., „more‟ than „usual‟), she 
packages an account of its significance across several turns. The sequential contrast 
„but‟ at the start of Jane‟s utterance “but I could feel it coming on” (line 13), and the 
additive marker „and‟ (see Schiffrin, 1987, on the use of discourse markers but and and) 
occurring at the start of her next turn “And I‟ve just gotten to the stage where I might 
just” (line 16), works towards providing a sort of accountability framework by which      
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she can make declarative utterances such as “Everyone get away from me or‟s I‟m 
gonna” (line 17) and “tell everyone get the fuck away from me” (line 21).  
Such a „build up‟ and its demonstrable orientation by both participants as such, 
can be seen in Phil‟s successful (i.e., unchallenged) turn completion “ºexplodeº” (line 
18). This, for Phil, is also a matter of some significance, something interesting, with his 
acknowledgment “ºAh:a:º” (line 18) appearing as a kind of „newsmarker‟ (Heritage, 
1984a; see also Hutchby, 2005, pp. 317-332), and as something that perhaps marks the 
significance of this as a psychological matter. With regard to its significance, consider 
that this directly follows interaction which has featured an extended discussion 
concerning „aggro‟ and what might be glossed as Jane‟s extreme defensiveness towards 
other people. 
In this extract, in contrast to the preceeding extracts, the therapist‟s initial 
formulation pertaining to possible „ups‟, „downs‟, and so forth is rejected by the client, 
who proposes an alternative formulation (i.e., „getting more aggro‟). It is worthwhile to 
note that this extract precedes a lengthy discussion in which Jane provides an extended 
account concerning a dispute with her sister, which becomes a topic for extended 
discussion in which Phil works at producing candidate formulations concerning the 
underlying cause of such disputes. 
 „Mixed‟ Symptoms: „Racing thoughts‟, „ Negativity‟ 
The following extract details interaction occurring subsequent to Phil‟s 
suggestion to Mike that if he were to take three months leave from his employment, he 
might have some work available for him as a carer for a disabled person. Mike raises 
the possibility of undertaking some gardening work. 
 
Extract 5.6 
1    Mike:   =>I mean that wouldn’t be a problem (and I like)< .hhhh  
2            Cause. I’ve found also I mean last week before that-  
3            that trip up north .hhh I’d been helping dad a lot in       
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4            the garden. 
5            (.) 
6    Phil:   ºOh rightº 
7            (.) 
8    Mike:   I’ve mowed the lawn for him I’ve done the weeding  
9            [I’ve] 
10   Phil:   [Well] Mike I can use you nevermind anybody else   
11           [               ((subdued laughter))               ] 
12   Mike:   [HEH HEH HA HA HA HA I’ve found it very therapeutic]  
13           cause even though .hhh I still have the racing thoughts 
14           and the negativity and stuff= 
15   Phil:   =Mm. 
16           (0.6) 
17   Mike:   I’ve been able to push em aside a little bit (.)  
18           further back (.) [to] do the job, [and] (.) 
19   Phil:                    [Mm]             [Mm ] 
20   Mike:   And it wouldn’t annoy me as much [if] I was mowing= 
21   Phil:                                    [Mm] 
22   Mike:   =the lawn or (.) [in the garden and so ↑forth]= 
23   Phil:                    [>Yeah yeah.  I understand.<]  
24   Mike:   =.hhh And that was really quite nice (0.2) And when I  
25           ↑finished with it (.) the negative thoughts would come  
26           back but they wouldn’t come back as ↑far (.) 
27   Phil:   Okay= 
28   Mike:   =towards say the frontal lobe.  
29     (0.7) 
30   Mike:   Whatever [that means] 
31   Phil:            [Okay.     ] Okay.= 
32   Mike:   =Heh heh= 
33   Phil:   =I- I understand what you mean.= 
34   Mike:   =.hhh U::m so that’s (.) that was something I was  
35           thinking about.= It’s it- >cause it would be< .hhhh it  
36           would be um not very taxing on my (0.2)  
37   Phil:   Yes. (.) 
38   Mike:   My brain, .hhhhh but it’d also (.) keep my occ[upied] 
39   Phil:                                                 [Okay ]  
40           yeah which is why the PhD is probably a step too far.=  
41           Okay I hear you. .hhhhh U::m: (0.5) 
 
Consider Mike‟s description and formulation concerning “racing thoughts” (line 
13) and “negativity and stuff” (line 14), which are ubiquitously presented as symptom      
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descriptions of bipolar disorder in vernacular and professional accounts, with „racing 
thoughts‟ associated with hypomanic, manic, and mixed episodes; „negativity‟ with 
depression and mixed episodes (APA, 2000, 2002; WHO, 1992). 
Mike‟s account concerning „mowing the lawn‟ and „doing the weeding‟ provide 
for a  formulation that relatively mundane chores can serve as “therapeutic” (line 12) 
activities that enable him to minimise the deleterious effects of the „racing thoughts‟ and 
„negativity and stuff‟. Mike reports that he has “been able to push em aside a little bit (.) 
further back” (lines 17-18). In a sense, this works as a form practical self-advice (note 
how this is presented by Mike as a kind of empirical fact, with the preface “I‟ve found 
also” at line 2) concerning what one might do with troublesome „thoughts‟, which plays 
on an idiomatic expression (of the form) „to put to the back of one‟s mind‟. Engaging in 
some ostensibly non-mental, physical activity, such as mowing a lawn or weeding, 
might allow one to essentially „push‟ such matters out of ones awareness, out of one‟s 
mind. This, notwithstanding Mike‟s report that “the negative thoughts would come back 
but they wouldn‟t come back as ↑far” (lines 25-26).  
So far so good. But, what are we to make of Mike‟s claim concerning the return 
of the „negative thoughts‟, albeit not as far “towards say the frontal lobe”? (line 28). We 
might describe Mike‟s claim as entailing the provision of a kind of „lay diagnosis‟ (e.g., 
Beach, 2001a; ten Have, 2001b) which might serve as a tentative explanation for his 
symptoms requiring further elaboration by Phil (e.g., Gill, 1998); or as the furnishing of 
a kind of sense making narrative (e.g., Kangas, 2001); or perhaps Mike is talking 
beyond his competence as a non-psychologist (e.g., Salzinger, 2003), using jargon (e.g., 
Pilnick, 1998), or exhibiting a kind of „protoprofessionalisation‟ (e.g., Hak & de Boer, 
1996). Another possibility is that we might describe Mike as being simply conceptually 
misguided or in error (cf. Chapter 3 and McHoul & Rapley, 2003, 2006; Sharrock & 
Coulter, 2006) when making such an utterance – considering that he does provide for at      
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least a partial discounting (and invitation for Phil to provide some comment) of it with 
“Whatever that means” (line 30). And if that is the case, should one approach Phil‟s 
assertion of “I- I understand what you mean” (line 33) as further compounding such 
conceptual confusion?
8  
As Mike has made clear, he can „push em aside‟ – „further back‟, and this 
logically entails that on their return they may move forward, say towards the front of 
ones mind. Mike‟s use of „frontal lobe‟, then, is not something that is in a sense 
technically incorrect, that is to say, an increase in troublesome thoughts is in some sense 
related to the operations or functioning of the „frontal lobe‟, but rather, is more or less 
equivalent with saying that such thoughts might not be appropriately described as being 
at the „forefront of one‟s mind‟. In other words, even if „frontal lobe‟ is a misguided 
metaphor, it is perfectly consistent with talk concerning such things as „thoughts‟ and 
„brains‟, and as it turns out, particular kinds of work.  
Mike then provides for some justification of undertaking similar kinds of 
activities, as they „would not be um very taxing on my brain‟ (lines 36-38). Consider 
Sharrock and Coulter‟s critique of Churchland (Sharrock & Coulter, 2006, p. 284-285) 
concerning the sense (or non-sense) of talking about whether Jack remembers, or Jack‟s 
brain remembers. In the current case, Mike does not say that certain activities would be 
taxing for him, rather, they would be taxing for his brain. But this does not entail that 
Phil should then, in making comment about Mike working on a PhD, suggest that it is a 
„step too far for your brain‟. Such talk is perfectly understandable as Mike making a 
claim to having a preference for particular kinds of work (i.e., gardening, weeding, and 
mowing the lawn) and not others (i.e., his current employment „up North‟ or his PhD 
studies). It is not Mike that has a problem, or indeed a particular preference, it is 
                                                 
8 Another candidate description: Mike recognises a potential mistake has been made, and then begins to 
provide a self-correction and invitation for other-correction, which is not forthcoming. Rather, Phil does 
an acknowledgement, and following Mike‟s laughter provides an acceptance (cf. Jefferson, 2007).      
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accountably his brain (one might consider this a kind of „footing‟, Goffman, 1979). In 
other words, Mike can provide a kind of therapeutic justification for undertaking or not 
undertaking particular activities, using symptom-talk, which in other contexts might be 
difficult to defend.  
Contrasts 
Now, while the preceding analysis has featured examples of symptom 
production focused on descriptions of „highs‟, „lows‟, and some „mixed‟ types of 
„symptoms‟, and has demonstrated that such distinctions may be inherently fuzzy and 
overlapping, of some interest is the manner in which accounts may be provided that 
demonstrably contrast particular states against others. Consider also that the canonical 
feature of bipolar disorder, as opposed to a unipolar affective disorder, is alternating 
and contrastive periods, episodes, or phases of „mood lability‟. It is the changes, the 
transitions, the „cycling‟ (Baethge et al., 2003; Kraepelin, 1921) that is of central 
concern. Notwithstanding that the production and recognition of any specific account 
concerning the symptoms of problematic mood functioning relies upon some normative 
assessment entailing current functioning, how might accounts be produced that feature 
explicit comparison between, for example, a previous „low‟ or „high‟ with a currently 
unremarkable level of functioning? That is, unremarkable in the sense that any account 
provided by a client concerning what things are like right now is more-or-less likely to 
involve detail of some previous occasion that is notable.  
While I have provided categorisations of extracts as being representative of 
particular phases, or of transitions from discrete episodes, this is not to say that such 
categorisations are the most appropriate, particularly if one were to approach such an 
exercise as a clinical matter. What I have sought to do is collect examples where the 
participants explicitly enunciate a current level of mood functioning in contrast to some 
previous functioning. And, as we shall see, such contrastive work often involves a      
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degree of contestation over the relative significance of descriptions of past, and current, 
functioning. 
Current Low, Recent High 
Extract 5.7A 
1    Phil:   =An- and in terms of (0.5) bottom of the sweep .h (0.6)  
2            how: where are you i- in- it- (0.4) ºe*:º are you  
3            saying you’ve (0.7) gone through the trough  
4            [(  )] 
5    Kate:   [(  )] I’m still really quite low I’m not 
6            [I’m certainly not                 ]= 
7    Phil:   [>Yeah yeah no I’m picking that up<]  
8    Kate:   =I’m not u:m: (.) yeah not- not high up there it-  
9            [(        )] 
10   Phil:   [You’re not] no you’re definitely not= 
11   Kate:   =mum loves me when I’m like thi*s tho*ugh ºbecause I*’m  
12           no* dra:*ma:*º 
13           (0.7) 
14   Phil:   Y:ea:h (0.3) .h No you are y- y- you’re quite qui:et  
15           (.) 
16   Kate:   Yea(h)h ha ha ha ha ↑ha= 
17   Phil:   =You are ((smiley voice)) 
18           (.)  
19   Kate:   .hh Hm= 
20   Phil:   =Yeah you’re quiet I mean in a in funny sort of way  
21           it’s quite easy being with you= 
22   Kate:   =↑M↓hm 
23           (.) 
24   Phil:   Right. Because you’re not thinking ººfar outºº  
25           [where’s] she going now an- and you don’t= 
26   Kate:   [↑Mhm   ] 
27   Phil:   =have to race to keep up with you (.)  
 
Phil‟s initial question constrains the type of response that Kate can provide, in 
that it relates specifically to the “bottom of the sweep” (line 1) and requires Kate to 
assess “where are you i- in- it-” (line 2). Note the repair of “how:” to “where” (line 2), 
with „how‟ possibly allowing or inviting Kate to provide an assessment of the relevance 
of the question itself, with „where‟ allowing for a more „closed‟ question format that      
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invites an assessment in relation to „the bottom of the sweep‟. Regardless, in the 
repaired version, Phil produces a question that invites Kate to provide an upshot 
formulation (“are you saying you‟ve”, lines 2-3) concerning whether she has “gone 
through the trough” (line 3). What this is predicated on is the notion that Kate „goes 
through‟ different mood states, and a common metaphor used for such descriptions is 
one of a „wave‟, with the bottom of the wave corresponding with depressive states, the 
top of the wave with hypomanic and manic states, with the midpoint more-or-less 
corresponding with periods of normal (or at least unremarkable) functioning. Indeed, 
pictorial depictions of such a „wave device‟ are ubiquitous in the clinical literature (e.g., 
Greil & Kleindienst, 2003, p. 42) and in popular accounts (descriptions of which occur 
routinely in the current data corpus).  
Now, if one has gone through the bottom of a trough, presumably one is now 
moving out, and up. In other words, one might consider that „the worst is over‟. 
However, this could be of concern, as there may be a danger that while Kate may not be 
at the low point with regards to a „down‟ or „depressive‟ phase, she may be on the way 
„up‟ – in other words, heading towards an equally problematic state with a „high‟. In 
this regard, Kate‟s delivers her assessment, packaged with extreme case formulations 
(Pomerantz, 1986), that she is “still really quite low”(line 5) and that she is “certainly 
not” (line 6) “high up there” (line 8). Indeed, Phil‟s acknowledgment, in the form of an 
agreement, is also packaged as an extreme case formulation “you‟re not no you‟re 
definitely not” (line 10). Now, while this points to an issue that might be of some 
concern, namely, that there might be some grounds for a dispute on the most 
appropriate description of just where Kate is in regards to the „sweep‟, note how it is not 
constructed as in some sense remarkable, as something that is problematic. 
Interestingly, Kate provides for an other-assessment across lines 11 to 12 that her mum 
“loves” her when she is “like thi*s tho*ugh” (i.e., when she is „low‟), and provides the      
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explanation that this is “ºbecause I*‟m no* dra:*ma:*º”. In other words, there is an 
upside to how Kate is currently feeling, that people think she is no drama. 
Phil then provides an assessment that Kate is “quite qui:et” (line 14) which he 
emphasises (“You are”, line 17), and then repeats “yeah you‟re quiet” (line 20) with an 
explanation “I mean in a funny sort of way it‟s quite easy being with you” (lines 20-21). 
Now, what that „funny sort of way‟ might be doing as a preface to an explanation, is 
that it might serve as a kind of softener (e.g., Edwards, 2000) for what might be taken as 
a negative evaluation. Further, such a forthcoming evaluation is concerned with 
something that might be problematic (i.e., being „low‟) in relation to some other thing 
that might be problematic (i.e., being „high‟). Phil provides a positive assessment, in a 
framework that is essentially a dichotomy („low‟/‟high‟) with his “Right because you‟re 
not thinking ººfar outºº [where‟s] she going now an- and you don‟t==have to race to 
keep up with you” delivered across lines 20 to 24. 
In other words, while Kate‟s current level of functioning is perhaps of concern, 
it is at least a bit better than her previous level. Of course, the delivery of such an 
assessment might be fraught with peril, with the moral implications of such assessments 
a delicate matter requiring some attention. Consider the next extract in which such 
matters are dealt with. 
 
Extract 5.7B 
1    Kate:   Mm= 
2    Phil:   =So that’s quite interesting so mum likes you like this  
3            so- so- you’re- .h so that’s quite interesting  
4            ((stutter 0.6 sec)) how does that feel that mum likes  
5            you when you’re a bit (.) sort of (0.2) .h l::o:w  
6            (.) 
7    Kate:   U:m (0.7) it- a- it- (.) that was a- that had a lot to  
8            do with the fact that I was (.) seeing things as ups  
9            and downs ↑before [the sort of]= 
10   Phil:                     [ºYeahº     ]  
11   Kate:   =the old information that was out th*ere a*bout       
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12           bi*pola*r i*s I* thi*nk tha*t .hh (0.3) you have a ( )  
13           high and a low and- I don’t think that’s necessarily a  
14           good way of putting thi*ngs (0.5) because .hh I think  
15           that then means that there’s a se- a sense of I don’t-  
16           unacceptability for half of yourself (.) or so*methi*ng  
17           [li*ke tha*t ] 
18   Phil:   [↑Well that’s] interesting= 
19   Kate:   =Y’know an- and I actually think what it is is it’s .hh  
20           it’s (0.2) possibly the rate that you a*:r:e .h  
21           relating to people* ºa*t the* ti*meº i*t’s i*t’s .hh  
22           whether you’re there* and sometimes (.) downness  
23           sometimes actually low energy can ↑ground (.) some*one*  
24           li*ke me* a*nd I* [thi*nk] tha*t .hh that means= 
25   Phil:                     [ºMº   ] 
26   Kate:   =that I’m actually having a better re*lationship wi*th  
27           pe*ople [at the ] mome*nt a*nywa*y. 
28   Phil:           [ºYe*ahº] 
29   Phil:   Yeah. 
30           (0.4) 
31   Kate:   .hhh So that y’know you- you’re always the:re it’s just  
32           how grounded you are ºI think [at the] ↑timeº 
33   Phil:                                 [Yeah  ] 
34           (0.4) 
 
Here, Phil‟s use of the conjunction so initially serves as a kind of newsmarker, 
which marks as “quite interesting” (line 2) his summary of Kate‟s report concerning her 
mother. Phil starts to provide what appears to be a formulation, possibly some kind of 
hearably therapeutic formulation (e.g., Antaki et al., 2005a), which is abandoned after 
several attempts at repair. Following this Phil produces a verbatim repeat of “so that‟s 
quite interesting” (line 3). 
What Phil does eventually produce, and as something that sounds like a 
therapeutic bit of business, is an invitation for Kate to provide a formulation, using a 
feeling term. Note the qualifier‟s “bit” and “sort of” that serve to soften the delivery of 
the possibly tendentious term “l::o:w” (line 5). Kate then provides for some further 
explication of her being “low” and “down” across lines 11 to 27 that suggests there      
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might be some advantages to such “downness” (line 22), but one that requires the 
production of an alternate conceptual framework by which the suitability (perhaps the 
intelligibility) of the terms (e.g., „high‟ and „low‟) related to bipolar disorder can be 
assessed.  
Kate provides for a kind of reformulation (one might suggest a respecification) 
of bipolar disorder, which at its core involves „the rate at which you are relating to 
people at the time‟ (lines 20-21). Here, „downness‟ becomes “low energy” (line 23), 
which can serve to “ground” (line 23) Kate and enable her to have better relationships 
with people, rather than being a pathological condition which entails an “unacceptability 
for half of yourself” (line 16). This again touches on the suggestion that there may be 
some contestation over the significance of the „down‟, with Kate‟s construction of the 
„down‟ as a being possibly a positive thing. Kate provides for a kind of rejection of how 
she previously saw things, and the “old information” (line 11) about bipolar, which is 
predicated on the rejection of a significant portion of ones‟ self. Kate‟s alternative 
specification, which essentially rejects a notion of a „down‟ as a negative thing, also 
provides for a different moral upshot.  
 
Extract 5.7C 
1    Phil:   So how (0.4) .h by grounded you mean sort of centred  
2            an: (0.9) accepting or is it a bit more .hh that you’ve  
3            run aground which would be: (0.7) which would be a  
4            better (0.4) use of the word. 
5            (0.7) 
6    Kate:   ↑U::m hhh (2.8) .pt (1.2) ºN:::o I think it- (.) I  
7            think it (1.1) it isº (1.3) that I’m not (.) taking (.)  
8            shit (0.6) If I was on antipsychotics right now (.) 
9            [I wouldn’t] be f:eeling anything (.) 
10   Phil:   [Mhm       ] 
 
Here, Phil provides an upshot formulation, that Kate is “sort of centred” (line 1) 
and “accepting” (line 2) of how she currently is. This is then immediately followed by      
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his provision of a reformulation, that Kate has “run aground” (line 3). In this 
reformulation Phil proposes a kind of editorial correction that aground would be a 
“better (0.4) use of the word” (lines 3-4). In other words, when Kate suggests that low 
energy can ground her (which provides for a positive self-assessment), she might (or 
should) more correctly say that she has run aground (which would provide for a 
negative self-assessment). 
This is rejected by Kate at line 6, with her rejection packaged in a clear 
dispreference structure (e.g., the numerous lengthy pauses). Here Kate suggests that it is 
because she is not “taking (.) shit” (lines 7-8), which is given some further elaboration; 
that if she was taking “antipsychotics right now” (line 8) she “wouldn‟t be f:eeling 
anything” (line 9). Note that „shit‟ is retrospectively identified as medication, rather than 
indexing something like complaints and criticism as might be the case with the 
idiomatic expression „not taking shit from anyone‟. In other words, there would appear 
to be a number of possible implications were Kate to accept the „better‟ use of the word 
aground – one of which might concern questions relating to her discontinuation of 
antipsychotics. In contrast to Phil‟s reformulations, which could be said to work toward 
establishing that Jane is perhaps „down‟ and requiring some form of remedy for an 
unpleasant and distressing psychological state (i.e., depression), Jane‟s account 
emphasises that, regardless, she is feeling right now, and for her that is better than the 
alternative (i.e., not feeling anything).  
Current Normal, Recent Low  
Extract 5.8A 
1    Phil:   =Right (.) .h And so (0.3) w:hat if anything have you  
2            noticed so far?  
3            (0.2) 
4    Mike:   .tch .hh Okay I’m sleeping (0.8) rather well. 
5            (.) 
6    Phil:   Mhm=  
7    Mike:   =All the way through to >whatever time I want.<       
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8            (.) 
9    Phil:   Right. 
10           (.)  
11   Mike:   Been nine o’clock these last few [mornings]= 
12   Phil:                                    [Right   ] 
13   Mike:   =been so cold. 
14           (0.2) 
15   Phil:   Yeah. 
16           (0.2) 
17   Mike:   Ah:m:: I’ve been getting up (0.7) feeling reasonably  
18           well.  
19           (.) 
20   Phil:   Mhm.  
21           (0.3) 
22   Mike:   Ah:m bit shabby but not (0.3) to the extent where I’m  
23           (0.2) panic attacked and stuff= 
24   Phil:   =>D- y- okay< so you’re not really in that (.) dark (.)  
25           deep (.) trough:= 
26   Mike:   =No:: [definitely] not. 
27   Phil:         [ºOkayº    ] 
28           (.) 
29   Phil:   ºOkayº (0.4) 
 
This extract is taken from the commencement of the session, and immediately 
follows talk (which is presented in Chapter 4, Extract 4.9) in which Mike has provided 
some summary of a recent consultation he has had with a general practitioner and a 
subsequent referral and consultation with a specialist. In this, he details the 
commencement of psychopharmocotherapy for bipolar disorder with Epilim (sodium 
valproate).  
Phil‟s question “w:hat if anything have you noticed so far?” (lines 1-2) suggests 
that if anything has been noticed, it is likely to be a matter of some interest. Mike then 
provides an assessment that he has been “sleeping (0.8) rather well” (line 4), “getting up 
(0.7) feeling reasonably well” (lines 17-18), and that while he might be a “bit shabby” 
(line 22) it is “not (0.3) to the extent where I‟m (0.2) panic attacked and stuff” (lines 22-     
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23). In other words, there is nothing that would warrant Mike as „noticing‟ something 
untoward, for example, something like being „panic attacked‟. 
Phil then offers the reformulation that Mike is not in “that (.) dark (.) deep (.) 
trough:” (lines 24-25), which is accepted wholeheartedly by Mike. Note that it is that 
„dark, deep, trough‟ to which Phil refers and not (for example) a „dark, deep, trough‟, 
which establishes the intersubjectively shared sense of Phil‟s formulation (and also may 
index some previous use of such a „wave‟ metaphor). That is, both Mike and Phil can 
agree on a kind of metaphor by which they can jointly understand each others actions, 
particularly those that involve the provision and assessment of candidate formulations 
concerning Mike‟s most recent experiences that might be relevant as potential bipolar 
symptoms (e.g., sleep habits).  
 
Extract 5.8B 
1    Mike:   I managed to have breakfast (0.2) 
2    Phil:   ºYeahº= 
3    Mike:   =cup of ↑tea and read the paper a bit and then (0.3) I  
4            put my sneakers on and go for a- my- my six kay walk= 
5    Phil:   =Yep. 
6            (0.6) 
7    Mike:   Power walk .hhh I come back and um: (0.4) generally  
8            read the paper in the sunshine if the sun like >this  
9            [morning  ] I read a book<= 
10   Phil:   [>Yep yep<] 
11   Phil:   =Lovely. 
12           (.) 
13   Mike:   Outsi:de= 
14   Phil:   =↑Okay: good= 
15   Mike:   =talk to my parents (0.2) midday (0.2).h had some  
16           lunch:: (0.7) Felt ready to come ↑here. 
17           (0.3) 
18   Phil:   Mm. 
19           (.) 
20   Mike:   So .h I’m getting out of this pattern of (0.6) y’know  
21           when- waking up early (.) feeling distressed and  
22           miserable [and] deeply deeply depressed=      
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23   Phil:             [Mm ]  
24   Phil:   =Mm. 
25           (0.3) 
26   Mike:   To the point where now I’ve got worries on my mind  
27           certainly, (.) 
28   Phil:   Mm. 
29           (0.3) 
30   Mike:   But they’re not making me (1.0) .tch for >I’m handling  
31           them a lot better [is what I’m trying to say<] 
32   Phil:                     [Okay               >so-so<] they’re  
33           not so dark that [they’re] inconsolable= 
34   Mike:                    [No     ] 
35   Mike:   =that’s correct (.) 
 
Mike then continues with his description of engaging in relatively mundane and 
ordinary activities across lines 1 to 16, involving such things as „breakfast‟, „cup of tea‟, 
„read the paper‟, „go for a walk‟, „read a book‟, „talk to parents‟, and „had some lunch‟. 
One might see these as „over-engineered‟ or „over-determined‟ (cf. Drew, 1998, p. 318-
319) in that, for example, “put my sneakers on” (line 4) is a kind of thing that one 
would not need to routinely report when providing an account of going for a walk. 
These are detailed with a shift into more concrete, specific descriptions of activities and 
events that has Mike has been recently undertaking, leading towards activities and 
events that more-or-less run up to the current therapy session (i.e., “Felt ready to come 
↑here”, line 16).  
Then, as with the previous extract, Mike shifts to providing some contrastive 
descriptions between what he is like now and what he was like at some previous point, 
albeit with more detail. His previous talk across lines 1 to 16, detailing a range of 
normal and unremarkable activities, can be seen as warranting his summary assessment 
across lines 20 to 22 that he is “getting out of this pattern” of “waking up early (.) 
feeling distressed and miserable” and “deeply deeply depressed”. While Mike does not 
entirely discount these as possibilities, he does provide an account that while he has      
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“got worries on my mind certainly” (lines 26-27) he is “handling them a lot better” 
(lines 30-31).  
As with the first extract in this sequence (Extract 5.8A), we can see a particular 
sequential organisation of the talk, in which Mike‟s produces a kind of „list‟ of 
unremarkable actions and events that is followed by a contrast with something that 
would (or might) be of concern, which is then followed by summary formulation 
produced by Phil that Mike ratifies. Here, Phil‟s formulation is that Mike‟s “worries” 
are “not so dark that they‟re inconsolable” (line 33). 
 
Extract 5.8C 
1    Phil:   That- that- they’re gre::y: rather than being pitch  
2            black= 
3    Mike:   =Oh absolutely yep and in some cases they even might be  
4            .hh a bit (.) a bit (.) of colour on top of the grey  
5            too because .hh I’m starting to now (.) substitute some  
6            of my negative stuff [for] some positive stuff like (.) 
7    Phil:                        [Mm ]    
8    Mike:   .hh a week ago if you’d asked me about work I’d be  
9            going like >ºChrist am I going to be ok I think I’ll  
10           get off that plane I’m stuckº< .hh into that pattern  
11           again then I’m (  ) now I’m thinking (.) .h well okay  
12           look at it logically you’re doing well: .h your feeling 
13           a lot better and you’ve only just s- started the  
14           treatment for bipola:r (.) and depression ah::m: you’re  
15           not deeply darkly depressed your anxiety seems to have  
16           almost va:nish:ed (.) so why would that change getting  
17           on the plane [going to ↑Carville .h and I think well= 
18   Phil:                [Mm 
19   Mike:   =it probably wont (.) and second (  ) think the other  
20           thing you think you’ve got to look forward to when you  
21     get up there so instead of saying (.) it’s gonna be  
22           miserable up there I’m starting to think now (.)  
23           this’ll probably actually be quite good= 
24   Phil:   =Mm= 
25   Mike:   =to get back into work into my boat to go fishing.  
26   Phil:   ↑Mm   
27   Mike:   All that kind of stuff.      
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28   Phil:   Mm. 
29   Mike:   So (.) I can sense a change there as well. 
30   Phil:   Okay. So- so you’re ah (.) it would’ve been true that  
31           your- de- your depressive catastrophising thinking has  
32           disappeared as well. 
33   Mike:   .tch Ye:s [yes generally yes yes] 
34   Phil:         [ºOkay okayº      good] 
35   Mike:   I mean while I still have inklings like that it doesn’t  
36           (.) faze me 
37   Phil:   >It’s- it’s< not overwhelming 
38   Mike:   No::: absolutely not [yeah     ]=   
39   Phil:                        [Yeah okay] 
40   Mike:   =which is quite good. 
 
In the final extract of this sequence, Mike provides an even more detailed and 
elaborate account of how he would have responded to Phil‟s questions if asked “a week 
ago” (line 8). Again, we can see how Mike provides for a contrast of past events to how 
he is now, but with some additional contrastive work concerning the type of account he 
would‟ve produced last week. In this case, he produces two distinct accounts concerning 
future events (i.e., “going to ↑Carville”, line 17), one that provides for his current take 
(i.e., “now I‟m thinking” at line 11, and “I‟m starting to think now” at line 23), and one 
that provides for what his take would‟ve been a week ago (cf. Edwards, 2006b). The 
recipient design features of Phil‟s subsequent formulation are worth noting, in that what 
“would‟ve been true” (line 30) is that Mike‟s “depressive catastrophising thinking has 
disappeared as well” (lines 31-32).  
Note also that the assessment Mike „would‟ve‟ provided a week ago would have 
been a more-or-less negative assessment. That is, Mike can now provide an objective 
(e.g., as produced with extensive use of third-person terms across lines 12 to 20, such as 
„your‟ and „you‟ve‟ instead of first-person pronouns such as „I‟ or „I‟m‟) and „logical‟ 
(“look at it logically”, line 12) assessment of the significance of a range of bipolar 
symptoms that he wouldn‟t have been able to furnish at the time.       
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To gloss considerably, what we have here is an account produced by Mike of 
being generally positive towards an upcoming return to work, in the context of his 
recent commencement of treatment for bipolar, depression, and anxiety. Mike‟s 
account, however, is not that he is completely positive concerning this return to work, 
there is some room in his descriptions for the possibility that things might not go 
according to plan. Nonetheless, in this sequence Phil offers a number of formulations 
that are accepted by Mike, which in sum are: that Mike is not in that dark, deep, trough; 
the worries on his mind are not so dark that they‟re inconsolable; and that his depressive 
catastrophising thinking has disappeared. In that sense, there is a general alignment 
between Phil and Mike with regard to the descriptions, formulations, and possible 
consequences pertaining to Mike‟s current function as compared to his previous 
functioning, which is in contrast to the material presented across Extracts 5.7A to 5.7C 
in which there is some misalignment between Phil and Kate concerning what counts as, 
and the implications of, any particular symptom (cf. Gill, 1998; Maynard, 2004). With 
this in mind, I will consider how such possible misalignments might be prospectively 
attended to by clients in the production of their own accounts in the next extract.  
Current Low, Recent Normal 
Extract 5.9 
1    Mike:   ↑Yea:h I’ve been feeling very empty and sad the last  
2            couple of days (ah) today [.hh ] 
3    Phil:                            [Yeah] 
4            (0.3) 
5    Mike:  Just been ve::ry empty very sad nothing (0.2) nothing  
6            can make me- .h I mean a few days ago I was on top of  
7            the ↑world I mean like- when I say on top of the world  
8            .hhh certainly not (.) manic or even hypomanic but just  
9            felt= 
10   Phil:  =Yes= 
11   Mike:  =↑normal and (.) went out for coffee with dad walked  
12           along the beach [simple] stuff that makes me= 
13   Phil:                  [    Mm] 
14   Mike:  =feel happy WHICH was ↑great.      
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15           (.) 
16   Phil:  Okay. 
17           (.) 
18   Mike:  .hh So I guess the opposite of that is what I’ve 
19           [(been going through)] 
20   Phil:  [Yeah okay    >so so<] you f:lipped over. 
21           (.) 
22   Mike:  Yeah= 
 
Following his delivery of a self-assessment that he has been “ve::ry empty very 
sad” over the last “couple of days” (lines 1-2), Mike begins to provide a contrastive 
account of how he was before (“a few days ago”, line 6) that might provide Phil with a 
measure of how Mike is currently feeling. What is of interest here, is the same-turn self-
repair (Schegloff et al., 1977) that occurs at line 7 – “I mean a few days ago I was on 
top of the ↑world I mean like-”. Mike‟s subsequent correction, that he was “certainly 
not (.) manic or even hypomanic just felt==↑normal” (lines 8-11), is significant in that it 
attends to a possible upshot of his initial assessment that he was suffering from 
(something like) an elevated mood episode.
 9    
This can be seen as a kind of practical problem that a person warrantably 
categorised as „bipolar‟ may need to deal with. That is, in giving evaluations, 
assessments, and descriptions of one‟s psychological „being‟ there is always the danger 
that such descriptions will be taken as indicative of some kind of pathology. For 
example, for someone warrantably categorisable as „bipolar disordered‟ the use of an 
idiomatic expression such as „on top of the world‟, „never felt better‟, or „feel a million 
dollars‟, might well invite comment that one is perhaps displaying a symptom of the 
disorder, or as inviting some kind of „off-topic‟ assessment or intervention (cf. Antaki, 
2007; Drew & Holt, 1988). Indeed, and to present an extreme case, one could imagine 
the use of such expressions might serve to generate subsequent interactions in which 
                                                 
9 Compare this with Mike‟s description of feeling „suicidal‟ in Extract 5.4D, in which he attends to the 
possibility that one possible (incorrect) upshot might be that he would actually „do it‟.      
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people can be held accountable for a denial that they are, in fact, experiencing a 
psychopathological „episode‟, and may well be detained against their wishes to receive 
treatment in the form of psychopharmacological agents or psychological therapies (e.g., 
Rosenhan, 1973).  
In this regard, it is useful to consider more closely Sacks‟s notion of „doing 
being ordinary‟: 
 
The point is that it is almost everybody‟s business to be occupationally ordinary; that 
people take on the job of keeping everything utterly mundane; that no matter what 
happens, pretty much everybody is engaged in finding only how it is that what is going 
on is usual, with every effort possible. (Sacks, 1984b, p. 419) 
 
As Rapley has remarked, for those already identified as „non-ordinary‟, for example 
those ascribed the category of „intellectually disabled‟, the consequence for individuals 
is that orientation to „doing being ordinary‟ becomes problematic when ascriptions by 
professional mental health workers might be deployed to work precisely against „being 
ordinary‟ (2004). Paraphrasing Sacks, in contexts in which persons may come to have 
their „ordinariness‟ come under close scrutiny by those working in mental health related 
fields, perhaps it is more appropriate to consider that people have as their overriding 
concern the task of „doing being normal‟. 
In the current extract, the contrast that is produced by Mike, from feeling normal 
(i.e., involving simple, happy stuff) to the “opposite of that” (line 18) feeling “ve::ry 
empty very sad” (line 5) such that “nothing can make me-” (lines 5-6), is reformulated 
by Phil as “you f:lipped over” (line 20). That is, flipped over from normal to sad. Of 
course, the danger here is that the expression „flipped over‟ might well entail a contrast 
between two extreme positions, in this case depression versus hypomania or mania. 
Moreover, the packaging of self-assessments in what appear to be extreme case 
formulations (Pomerantz, 1986) may well present particular problems when one seeks      
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to talk about feeling normal. Again, note how Mike produces a kind of over-engineered 
account of what counts as “↑normal” (line 11), the “simple stuff” (line 12), such as 
„going out for coffee‟ and „walking along the beach‟.  
Consider also, that in the provision of descriptions of „ups‟ and „downs‟, it might 
be the case that one cannot provide a description of „not being up‟, and „not being 
down‟; as being „in the middle‟, as being „normal‟, as being „stable‟, is something that 
is defined in relation to the „ups‟ and the „downs‟. In short, descriptions of how one 
currently is, are produced in the context of how one was, and project for how one will 
be. One might consider that such matters are attended to by Kate in considerations of 
Phil‟s „wave‟ metaphor and her reformulation of „the old information‟ on bipolar 
disorder in Extracts 5.7A and 5.7B, and by Mike in his delicate positioning of his 
„suicidal‟ feelings in Extract 5.4D. In this regard, consider the following extract. 
 
Extract 5.10 
1    Phil:   ºOkayº (0.2) how do you know when you’re up? 
2            (1.6) 
3    Jane:   I’m not crying hah ha nah I don’t know .hh um 
4            (1.6) Yeah I just (3.0) >I don’t know< my (0.2) my ups  
5            these days are just like normal days, (1.0) 
6            ºbecause the rest of the time it’s downº (0.4) 
 
Here we can see a kind of „normalisation‟ of what counts as an „up‟, in that 
Jane‟s „ups‟ are now “just like normal days” (line 5). Here, „up‟ is defined in relation to 
an absence of a symptom that is accountably a marker of a „down‟ (i.e., „crying‟). This 
effectively renders assessments and formulations that might be provided by Phil 
concerning any „ups‟ as being irrelevant – after all, any such „ups‟ are essentially 
„normal‟ (or at the least, something desirable).      
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Symptoms Affording Interactional Problems 
Now, notwithstanding the problems that may be faced by incumbents of the 
category „bipolar disorder‟ in providing descriptions, assessments, and evaluations of 
their own conduct that might be related to possible bipolar disorder symptoms, the other 
obvious issue is how persons deal with others‟ descriptions, assessments, and 
evaluations of their conduct as being clearly denotive of, or manifesting, bipolar 
disorder symptoms, when they may not consider these as accurate or relevant. This 
might not be an immediately obvious concern when such persons are engaged in 
psychotherapy with professionals in an environment in which invocation of the category 
„bipolar‟ is unlikely to be contested. 
In regard to future conduct, and the possible consequentiality of such 
interactions as involved with the preceding interaction, consider the following extract 
which details interaction occurring immediately after Extract 5.1B. To recap, Mike has 
just provided a detailed account concerning his „amazing thought processes‟ that are 
associated with what might be glossed as „impulse buying‟. 
 
Extract 5.11A 
1    Phil:   .pt ↑What’s your gambling like? 
2     (0.5) 
3    Mike:   .hh Aw: I’m not a gambler. 
4            (.) 
5    Phil:   Okay >jus- [just (.) something]= 
6    Mike:              [.hhh  I  (.)  Yeah]   
7    Phil:   =that i- it’s a question I should’ve asked you last  
8     time<= 
9    Mike:   =Yeah::: na: I take= 
10   Phil:   =Cause I’ve got a couple of: (0.5) 
11   Mike:   Yeah?= 
12   Phil:   =Bipolar people who gamble.  
13           (1.1) 
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Here, Phil begins by asking a direct question “↑What‟s your gambling like?” 
(line 1) which is met with Mike‟s rejection of the question‟s premise “Aw: I‟m not a 
gambler” (line 3). Now, Phil‟s utterance might serve not only as a question (a somewhat 
leading question as it presupposes that Mike does gamble) but as a kind of upshot 
formulation of Mike‟s previous account.
10 While Mike begins to provide some talk that 
might shed light on his claim to not be a gambler, Phil‟s multi-turn repair (beginning at 
line 5) which extends over Mike‟s possible other initiated repair attempts at line 6 and 
the latched turn at line 9, is strongly suggestive of a preference for self-repair (Schegloff 
et al., 1977). Phil then begins to provide an explanation that he has “a couple of:” (line 
10), followed by a pause, which is followed by Mike‟s “Yeah?” (line 11) that can be 
approached a kind of „open class repair initiator‟ (Drew, 1997) which leaves the trouble 
source unidentified. Phil then concludes his explanation, that he has „couple of‟ “bipolar 
people who gamble” (line 12). 
Now, while Phil does not say he has a couple of „clients‟, or „patients‟, that have 
bipolar and gamble, his use of „I‟ve got a couple‟ does the work of making relevant his 
previous mistaken line of inquiry.
11 As Sacks notes: 
 
The category is hintable-at by naming the activity, is one way of coming to see that‟s 
it‟s one of those. But even here, you have to be able to show that what took place was a 
„seen hint‟ or a seeable hint‟ – or a „wrongly seen hint‟ … (Sacks, 1992a, p. 583).  
   
Here, one might suggest that „gambling‟ is a category bound activity of the 
category „bipolar‟, such that if a member of a population can be categorised as „bipolar‟ 
then one might reasonably infer that they gamble. Thus, Phil can demonstrate that his 
                                                 
10 While I would not characterise such a question as „fishing‟ for a response, consider that it involves the 
assertion of what Pomerantz (1980) describes as a „type 2 knowable‟ (i.e., Phil‟s presumption that Mike 
gambles) which relates to a „type 1 knowable‟ for a recipient (Mike not being a gambler). See also Sacks 
(1975). 
 
11 And which might mark his initial question (and subsequent explanation) as constituting a kind of 
„professional expertise‟ (e.g., Horton-Salway, 2004)      
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initial question (while mistaken) and subsequent explanation is a „wrongly seen hint‟. 
While „gambling‟ might be offered as a candidate „symptom‟ of bipolar, consider that to 
ascribe to someone that they are a „gambler‟, or that they engage in „gambling‟, is to 
provide a categorisation that could well have a negative moral connotation. In this 
regard, compare this extract with Extract 5.3A, in which Jane provides an account in 
which „lies‟ are linked as possible predicates of the category „bipolar‟. The difference 
here is that it is the therapist who makes relevant a category bound activity which is 
more-or-less discounted as being not relevant by a client, while in the earlier extract it is 
the client who makes relevant a category bound activity which invites further 
examination by the therapist.  
But what is Mike to make of Phil‟s explanation? Let us examine what occurs 
next in the following extract. 
 
Extract 5.11B 
1    Phil:   [To see what I’ve see-] 
2    Mike:   [And I think-  I think] I’d be jus:t- I think if I was  
3            a gambler I’d be mu:ch worse (.) 
4    Phil:   (get done much) >Okay okay I just- I just-  
5            [I just said that cause I know I haven’t] asked<= 
6    Mike:   [No-        no       haven’t       asked]  
7    Mike:   =Yeah= 
8    Phil:   =.hhh (0.2) Okay (0.5) 
 
Following a 1.3 second gap (in Extract 5.11A, line 13) that could be taken as a 
delay device for further disagreement (Pomerantz, 1984a), Phil and Mike both begin to 
take a turn, with Phil dropping out. After several false-starts or „hitches‟ (possibly due 
to overlap e.g., Schegloff, 2000) Mike provides a self-assessment that “I think if I was a 
gambler I‟d be mu:ch worse” (lines 2-3). Note that Mike does not discount Phil‟s initial 
question or his subsequent explanation for why he might ask such a question, rather, he 
makes it relevant to his own situation. While Mike is not a gambler, and does not      
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gamble, he nevertheless provides an assessment that incorporates the incorrect 
categorisation. Phil provides a further explanation for his initial question (after several 
repair attempts) that he “just said that cause I know I haven‟t asked” (line 5) which 
comes with Mike‟s overlapping acknowledgement. In short, what we can observe here 
is that while the therapist may „get it wrong‟, it is essentially the client who modifies, 
downgrades, softens, or otherwise adapts their talk to ensure that it in some sense 
acknowledges the grounds upon which a therapist might make a mistake.
12  
To conclude, let us turn now to an examination of something that might be 
unexpected – an instance when it is a client who provides a candidate upshot 
formulation that a therapist may have a possible mood disorder. 
 
Extract 5.12A 
1    Phil:   >.pt I’ll tell you a little anecdote< (.) which is  
2            very (.) embarrassing. (1.3) 
       ((Lines omitted, where Phil provides a lengthy story   
       concerning attempting to get service in a office   
       supplies shop)) 
3    Phil:   .hhh Now. (0.6) ↑What I did was to put my (0.3) box on  
4            the floor, (0.5) ↑stand on it, (0.7) and yell my head   
5            off about getting fucking service in this fucking shop 
6            I’m a fucking customer how do I get fucking served  
7            (0.6) .h Now, (1.5) what was the outcome of doing that? 
8            (1.3) 
9    Jane:   ºThey just (0.3) all thought you were a (0.3) mad  
10           bastardº 
11           (0.3) 
12   Phil:   ººAbsolutely.ºº 
13           (.) 
14   Jane:   I know I reali- I know (.) I’m and I’m SLOWLY LEARNING  
15           THAT (.) IT UM .h (1.5) it actually (.) people pay more  
16           attention if I (1.3) if I (0.9) ºs y-º say something  
17           instead of fucking going off the handle. 
18           (0.3)   
                                                 
12 And while Phil does not provide an explicit „apology‟, see Robinson (2004) on the strong preference 
for rejecting the need for an apology.      
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Following an extended story telling by Phil, that involves considerable self-
disclosure (Antaki, Barnes, & Leudar, 2005b) about a „very embarrassing‟ incident that 
occurred when he went shopping for office supplies, he invites Jane to provide an  
upshot formulation that might explain how his actions (detailed across lines 3-7) were 
regarded after „standing on a box‟, „yelling his head off‟, and „swearing‟, when he could 
not get service. Jane provides a formulation that the people in a shop would think that 
he is a “mad bastard” (lines 9-10). One might understand, then, activities such as 
„standing on a box‟, „yelling your head off‟, and „swearing‟ while waiting to be served 
in a shop, are normatively tied as category bound activities of a category like „mad 
bastard‟. That is, they would not seem to be appropriate for invocation of a category 
such as „valued customer‟. This suggests that „mad bastard‟ might be better approached 
as the furnishing of a description or an attribute by Jane, rather than as operating as a 
kind of membership categorisation device (Schegloff, 2007), which could be 
paraphrased with something like „wanker‟, „idiot‟, or some other clearly pejorative 
term. This highlights the important point here, that „mad bastard‟ is not used as a 
clinical term, it is used as a decidedly vernacular term that one might use to describe a 
person who violates some local, social „norms‟, such as standing on a box and yelling 
for service.  
Following Phil‟s ratification (“ººAbsolutely.ºº”, line 12) of Jane‟s suggestion that 
they all just thought he was a mad bastard, Jane produces a formulation in which she 
makes relevant for her an upshot that “fucking going of the handle” (line 17) is less 
effective at getting people‟s attention than to “say something” (line 16). In other words, 
she identifies, acknowledges, and makes pertinent an upshot of Phil‟s story to her own 
actions – as a kind of moral, practical, indeed therapeutic advice. Phil‟s story makes 
sense, then, as it is related to the kinds of things Jane does.       
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But, consider that Phil has not provided a version of what the „outcome‟ of the 
events described was, that is, what happened in more practical, concrete terms (e.g., did 
he get served or ignored?) as opposed to what people „thought‟ about his conduct. 
Perhaps Jane has „jumped the gun‟ so to speak and proceeded to provide an upshot 
formulation before Phil has effectively „finished‟ his story. 
 
Extract 5.12B 
1    Phil:   Yes (0.2) .pt and what he said to me was >after I got  
2            down off my thing (0.4) and he finished his phone call  
3            he said< (0.2) .h he took my money (.) ºtook everything  
4            and he saidº (1.0) .h “↑You have a better day now sir”  
5            (0.2) ºas I leftº (0.6) .h ººI could’ve killed himºº  
6            (0.5) .hh ºbutº who’s fault was that? (0.6) º↓M:ine,º  
7            (0.6) ºabsolutelyº ººmi:neºº (0.5) Right (1.5) Totally.  
8            (0.9) 
9    Jane:   Mm 
10   Phil:   Because, (0.5) I overreacted now ↑why would I overreact  
11           (1.0) ↓to that? 
12           (0.2) 
13   Jane:   Because you’ve got bipolar? 
14           (0.2) 
15   Phil:   ↓N:o↑[:] ((smiley voice)) 
16   Jane:        [h]hh 
17           (.) 
18   Phil:   No .hh (0.4) >But that’s possible I s- [but< ] 
19   Jane:                                          [That ] f:uckin  
20           drives ya NUTS. SO MANY PEOPLE THEY DO IT and I’m just 
21           like (0.7) I’ve walked into shops (.) y’know with a (.)  
22           credit card full of money .pt .hhh and the lady’s  
23           standing there I’m like (.) “Excuse me do you work  
24           here?” (0.5) >And she’s like< .h “Oh: yes” <and I’m  
25           just like well> F:UCK! (0.2) WHAT ARE YOU DOING what  
26           aw:= 
27   Phil:   =He he he he he he he [heh heh  ]   
28   Jane:                         [↑But they] do they= 
29   Phil:   =.h ººI knowºº= 
30   Jane:   =So many people and it’s like (.) 
31   Phil:   ºI knowº .h but the thing is this brings 
32           [something ( )]      
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33   Jane:   [ººGo::dºº    ] (0.4) 
 
Here, Phil does not provide any commentary on Janes previous turn of talk 
beyond the acknowledgement token “Yes” (line 1), but provides a continuation of his 
story, which details the „outcome‟ in more practical terms (i.e., what happened in the 
shop after Phil‟s „tantrum‟). Phil then provides a summary formulation of the episode, 
which makes it clear that he was responsible for the embarrassing outcome. He then 
provides an upshot formulation that he “overreacted” (line 10) and invites Jane to 
provide a candidate explanation for such overreaction. Consider that „why would I 
overreact to that‟ (i.e., lines 10-11) might invite a more psychological upshot from Jane, 
as opposed to the previous „what was the outcome of doing that‟ (i.e., Extract 5.12A, 
line 7) which might invite more of a summary upshot concerning events. 
Jane then offers a somewhat striking candidate explanation, that perhaps Phil 
has bipolar (“Because you‟ve got bipolar?”, line 13), and while Phil offers an initial 
rejection (with some humour), he does provide for a display of some consideration that 
“that‟s possible I s-” (line 18) which acknowledges that Jane could warrantably offer 
such an explanation (i.e., a client suggesting that a therapist might have a psychiatric 
condition). Leaving a detailed examination of this material to one side for the moment, 
Jane then displays stance alignment with Phil, with an assessment that acknowledges 
both the scenario Phil has described and his response, with “That f:uckin drives ya 
NUTS” (lines 19-20). Note how „drives ya nuts‟ is again, like „mad bastard‟, something 
that is entirely normal – it is a vernacular, idiomatic expression used to describe an 
entirely normal response. This precedes Jane‟s telling of a „second story‟ (Sacks, 
1992a) that concerns walking into shops with a “credit card full of money” (line 22) and 
not getting service. Note that in providing the conclusion to her story, Jane‟s talk details 
more-or-less the same kind of frustration and indignation that Phil describes in his story, 
which she has previously formulated as „going off the handle‟, and is also prosodically a      
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display of such frustration (e.g., “F:UCK! (0.3) WHAT ARE YOU DOING what aw:”, 
lines 25-26). 
Phil‟s laughter could be taken as ratifying an intersubjective alignment in regard 
to what he and Kate have described in terms of events (i.e., tardy customer service) – 
and their reactions to such events (e.g., yelling, shouting, and swearing), in that they are 
completely normal and expectable, albeit possibly problematic displays which might 
work counterproductively to getting good customer service. In this regard note Jane‟s 
“↑But they do” (line 28) overlapping Phil‟s laughter, to which Phil displays agreement 
at line 30 “I know”, and her “So many people and it‟s like” (line 30) to which Phil again 
displays agreement “I know” at line 32. The point here is that, waiting for service, 
getting none, and acting in what could be regarded in an embarrassing manner, is 
something anyone can, and most likely has, experienced or witnessed. 
Now, getting back to Jane‟s “Because you‟ve got bipolar?” at line 13. What is of 
interest here is that as an explanation of Phil‟s „overreaction‟, Jane‟s invocation of the 
category „bipolar‟, albeit in what appears to be a highly ironic and humorous fashion,
13 
might point to its possible omni-relevance as a categorisation in these interactions 
(Sacks, 1992a, p. 313).
14 Here, such omni-relevance is taken to indicate that the 
category „bipolar‟ might serve as an available categorical resource that might potentially 
have priority over others with regard to participants‟ production/recognition of 
accounts, descriptions, and formulations regarding actions, events, and person identities 
(cf. Sacks, 1992a, p. 313). Consider that if one can provide for a description, a 
categorisation, as to the identity of persons involved with the production of an action, 
one can then provide for a characterisation of the action, in a kind of reflexive manner 
(Schegloff, 2007). Recall that in Extract 5.11A this works such that Phil can ask a 
                                                 
13 However, as Goodwin notes “once a speaker produces an action, he or she is responsible for all of the 
legitimate interpretations that others might make of that action” (1987, p. 128). 
 
14 See also Sacks on „cover identities‟ (1992a, p. 317) and McHoul and Rapley (2002).      
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somewhat presumptuous question of Mike (i.e., „What‟s your gambling like?‟) as such 
activities (i.e., gambling) are usually undertaken (at least in Phil‟s account) by those 
categorised as „bipolar‟. In the current extract, Jane can provide a description of Phil‟s 
actions as being seen by others as possibly those of a „mad bastard‟, and can offer the 
category „bipolar‟ to further describe and moreover explain such actions.  
 
And, ordinarily, if you have a singular recurring action, and you get a statement “we do 
that” or “they always do things like that”, what‟s involved now is not simply that one is 
proposing to have categorized it as the action of such people, but to have explained it as 
well. If you can turn a single action into „a thing that they do‟, it‟s thereby solved. 
(Sacks, 1992a, p. 577, emphasis in original) 
 
Now, while Phil „gets it wrong‟ with Mike in Extract 5.11A and 5.11B, and Jane 
„gets it wrong‟ with Phil in Extract 5.12B, nevertheless one can gain a sense that 
formulations that might have as their substantive components descriptions relating to 
possible symptoms of bipolar disorder, even those that are tendentious, can work 
reflexively such that symptoms can be explained as resulting from bipolar, and that 
bipolar can be explained as resulting from symptoms. Moreover, such formulations can 
be utilised in a range of therapeutic undertakings, such as establishing a „history‟ 
concerning relevant problematic experiences (e.g., Extracts 5.1A, 5.4A-D, 5.5, 5.7A-C, 
and 5.8A), gaining some measure of what (for a client) might be matters warranting 
more sustained discussion (e.g., Extracts 5.3A-C), and establishing a shared sense of 
what any particular problem might be (e.g., Extracts 5.7A-C and 5.9).
15 
Conclusion 
To gloss considerably, in this chapter I have examined the manner in which 
possible symptoms of bipolar disorder are produced in accounts and formulations 
involving what might be described as „ups‟ (Extracts 5.1A-5.3C), „downs‟ (Extracts 
                                                 
15 This matter will be given further examination in Chapter 7.      
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5.4A-5.4D), and „mixed‟ or „unstable‟ periods (Extracts 5.5 and 5.6). In addition, I have 
provided a detailed consideration of how accounts can be produced of a current „level of 
functioning‟ by contrasting previous symptoms against current (or absent) symptoms, 
which can also be used to foreshadow future functioning (Extracts 5.7A-5.10). Finally, I 
have presented some analysis of how, with regard to ascriptions concerning categories 
and category bound activities involving symptom inferences, both therapist and clients 
can „get it wrong‟ (Extracts 5.11A-5.12B). In broad terms, analysis of these extracts 
indicates that symptom-talk appears to come in and as accounts that justify putative 
symptoms, or at least make the symptoms intelligible as symptoms of some kind, both 
with regard to client and therapist accounts. Such accounts may embellish particular 
symptoms, and particular symptoms can serve to embellish accounts in a reflexive 
relationship (e.g., Garfinkel, 1967). 
In some contrast to findings on the sequential structure of medical consultations 
(e.g., Heritage & Maynard, 2006), in psychotherapy sessions such as those detailed here 
descriptions and accounts of symptoms, the provision of detailed symptom „histories‟, 
therapist produced formulations involving symptoms, and the provision of clinical 
advice and treatment recommendations, can occur at any point in a consultation session 
and are often overlapping. This, then, could be seen as one of the candidate features of 
psychotherapeutic interactions, in that work involving such things as symptom 
description, identification, and validation (i.e., symptom production-recognition) is 
ongoing throughout the sessions (e.g., Buttny, 1996). As others have noted, getting a 
history or „a sense of what the problem is‟ in psychotherapeutic contexts may occur at 
any time (Antaki et al., 2005a), and that participants might best be described as building 
the interaction in a bottom up rather than top down manner (Silverman, 1997). In other 
words, the production-recognition of a bipolar disorder symptom involves more than 
just the observation, reporting, and identification of a range of experiences that a client      
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may provide to a therapist in discrete phases, as what counts as a symptom is subject to 
considerable revision.  
Perhaps in undertaking psychotherapy, that is to say something that seems to 
have at the very least a family resemblance to something involving a „talking cure‟ (as 
opposed to something like a „clinical assessment‟ or  a „psychological test‟), symptom 
production requires that both a client and therapist recognise some description as being 
adequate for the purposes of symptom categorisation. That is to say, symptoms only 
count as symptoms when there is some agreement, they are collaborative productions – 
they are not unilaterally produced. This is not to say that, for example, a therapist or 
clinician might produce some description of a mentionable as a symptom in an „official‟ 
account (e.g., Hak, 1998), or that there is never any contestation over symptom 
ascriptions (e.g., McHoul & Rapley, 2005a). In such cases, for the purposes of 
psychotherapy, unilaterally produced symptoms might best be seen as problems that 
will require some solution (e.g., ascriptions or avowals that will be subject to some 
contestation), in contrast to collaboratively produced symptoms which serve to furnish 
the solutions to problems. In this regard, one can consider that the action and event 
descriptions that are glossed as symptoms, are formulated and reformulated, chained 
together during and between therapy sessions, locally produced conjointly as solutions 
for problems that are themselves locally produced (Silverman, 1997, p. 78). 
Here, I have provided some description of how the symptoms of a mood 
disorder may feature in talk-in-interaction as interactional products decoupled from 
moods themselves. This might then allow for an examination of moods in a radically 
different manner, not as the confluence of cognitive and affective factors that are 
instantiated within individuals that in some sense serve to produce various symptoms, 
but rather, as Sacksian „devices‟ that serve to enable the production of accounts of 
actions and events. How „moods‟ might be related to the „incarnate production of      
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ordinary social facts‟ (Lynch, Livingston, & Garfinkel, 1983) will be explored in the 
next chapter.       
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CHAPTER 6 
„Moods‟: Normatively Accountable Devices in Therapy Talk 
 
It would appear to be an obvious and unremarkable observation that as persons 
go about their everyday affairs they experience a range of emotions, feelings, thoughts, 
and so forth that could be routinely described as comprising various „moods‟. Indeed, 
one could avow such things as „being in a bad mood‟, ascribe to another person a 
particular „mood‟ such as „she is in a happy mood‟, and even talk of events, objects, and 
various social phenomenon as having, exhibiting, or even being particular types of 
„mood‟ without controversy. However, when such an open-ended, loose, and general 
term is deployed in specific, ostensibly technical contexts, one might fall victim to 
making what Ludwig Wittgenstein referred to as a conceptual confusion (Wittgenstein, 
1967a). 
For example, by undertaking empirical investigations to answer such questions 
as „how can one measure moods?‟, „what causes moods?‟, or indeed „what are moods?‟, 
one essentially begins with logical-grammatical confusion about how the term „mood‟ is 
used that cannot be resolved by empirical means. Further problems may arise when one 
considers, for example, that persons can be ascribed as having a „mood‟ disorder. In this 
regard, consider that bipolar disorder is characterised as a relatively common and 
disabling psychiatric disorder that is principally a disorder of „mood‟ (APA, 2000). 
Such a characterisation belies a rather curious state of affairs, namely, that what exactly 
a „mood‟ is remains relatively unexplicated in both the extensive clinical literature on 
the disorder and in vernacular accounts.  
However, this is perhaps unsurprising, as „mood‟ appears to be a highly ramified 
and conceptually fuzzy term. Indeed, the OED provides entries for mood that range 
across a number of psychological categories (e.g., “mind”, “thought”, “will”, “feeling”),      
  263 
in addition to providing specific examples of emotions (e.g., “anger”, “wrath”, 
“passionate grief”) (OED, 2002, n.p.). But perhaps the entries most congruent with both 
vernacular and technical usage are of mood as a “prevailing but temporary state of mind 
or feeling; a person's humour, temper, or disposition at a particular time (later also 
applied to a crowd of people or other collective body)” and an “unaccountable fit of 
gloom or bad temper; a temporarily angry, irritable, or depressed state of mind” (OED, 
2002, n.p.). The latter definition provides for an introduction to the clinical use of the 
term, when one consults the latest incarnation of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders, the DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000), to gain some purchase on how one 
might understand a „mood disorder‟. 
Recall from Chapter 1, that according to the DSM-IV-TR the „bipolar disorders‟ 
encompass four specific disorders (bipolar I, II, cyclothymia, and bipolar disorder NOS) 
delineated by the occurrence or absence of particular „mood episodes‟. With regard to 
these „mood episodes‟, the first diagnostic criteria for a manic episode in the DSM-IV-
TR requires that for diagnosis there must be a “distinct period of abnormally and 
persistently elevated, expansive, or irritable mood” (Table A1, emphasis added). For a 
major depressive episode, the initial requirement is that “at least one of the symptoms is 
either 1) depressed mood or 2) loss of interest or pleasure” (Table A2, emphasis added). 
For a hypomanic episode, what is required is “a distinct period of persistently elevated, 
expansive, or irritable mood, lasting throughout at least 4 days, that is clearly different 
from the usual nondepressed mood” (Table A3, emphasis added). And for a mixed 
episode the criteria for both a manic episode and a major depressive episode are met 
“nearly every day during at least a 1-week period” (Table A4). 
What is of some interest is that an operational definition of „mood‟ remains 
unexplicated in the DSM-IV-TR, albeit it is „moods‟ which are clinically describable as 
„elevated‟, „expansive‟, „irritable‟, and „depressed‟ that the DSM-IV-TR nomenclature      
  264 
identifies as pertinent to a bipolar disorder diagnosis. These broad categorisations would 
subsume other categorisations, based on clinical report and observation, which might 
include descriptions such as „racing thoughts‟, „distractible‟, „active‟, „outgoing‟, 
„talkative‟, „hyper‟, „risky‟, to mention several of a plethora (e.g., Hirschfeld et al., 
2000). 
Notwithstanding the lack of any clear definitions, it is important to note that in 
no clinical settings, be those associated with the various practices of psychiatry and 
psychology, does there exist any technique or device that can verify a particular person‟s 
„mood‟. Neurobiological, neurochemical, and neurophysiological theories and 
investigations concerning the physicality of such things as arousal, activation, and the 
like (and their putative psychological counterparts) have little, if any, practical overlap 
with, for example, declaring that a particular person has a „mood disorder‟. That is to 
say, verification of a „mood disorder‟ can only be undertaken by way of practices that 
involve such things as „clinical judgement‟, which in the most part rest upon client 
reports of „moods‟ and so forth (cf. Buttny, 1996; Coulter, 1973; Palmer, 2000).  
It is important to note that this should not be taken as critique of psychiatry, 
clinical psychology, or related fields, but rather as providing a space in which 
investigations can be undertaken of the various undocumented practices that clinicians 
and clients engage in when „moods‟ may feature as important matters of concern in 
therapeutic interactions. Moreover, while Palmer (2000) rightly points to the importance 
of „delusions‟ as a central concern of psychiatry, I would suggest that „moods‟ and their 
fluctuations are of equal, if not greater, import. Consider that the WHO ranks „unipolar 
depression‟ as the leading cause of „years of life lived with disability‟ (with bipolar 
disorder ninth) and fourth for „disability-adjusted life years‟ in its estimates of the 
global burden of disease in 2000 (WHO, 2001).      
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„Moods‟ Respecified 
Here, then, the investigative focus is on the situated, practical methods by which 
(for example) persons can be ascribed or avow disordered „moods‟, and how such 
ascriptions and avowals may be contested in undertakings relevant to the treatment of a 
„mood‟ disorder. Moreover, the focus is on the manner by which such practices are 
normatively accountable. That is, it is not to question the ontological status of any 
particular „mood‟, but to question the notion that we can specify a priori how such terms, 
particularly as they relate to affect and emotion, are used in the performance of a 
diverse range of social practices (e.g., Edwards, 1999; Harré, 1986). Examinations of 
what people actually say and do may enable a better grasp of how „moods‟ figure not as 
mere expressions or descriptions of particular dispositional emotional states (for 
example), but rather how they may be implicated in a wide range of social actions – as 
doing some kinds of work. 
Given that technical definitions of „moods‟ are not provided in the DSM-IV-TR, 
and that they are unrecoverable from the official guideline that specifies how disorders 
involving „moods‟ are to be classified, recorded, and diagnosed, „moods‟ presumably 
serves as a gloss for descriptions of conduct (and attendant practices) employed by 
clinicians and researchers as they go about their affairs. Further, „mood‟ shares with 
other psychological terms a ubiquitous usage in both lay/vernacular and 
professional/technical domains (e.g., Coulter, 1973, 1979), and as such is perhaps 
hopelessly confounded with any particular scientific, psychological uses (Sharrock & 
Coulter, 1999, 2004). This presents significant conceptual and analytical problems in 
undertaking any empirical analysis of „mood-talk‟, namely, by what procedures might 
one extract vernacular versus technical orientations to particular words, terms, or 
discourses associated with „mood‟?       
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By way of offering a tentative (dis)solution, rather than point to where a 
professional may be deploying a term technically (e.g., „depression‟ as referring to a 
particular cognitive and affective state) and to a client deploying a term vernacularly 
that may have some points of intersection (e.g., „depression‟ as referring to not enjoying 
a family gathering), the analytic undertaking might focus on a term‟s situated usage as 
vernacular. This position, while not entirely avoiding the possibility of ironising at least 
one participant‟s usage of any particular term, might at least acknowledge what may be 
an irremediable constraint – that one cannot establish analytically what is or is not 
technical or vernacular from the materials at hand (McHoul, 1982). In this regard, the 
use of „vernacular‟ as a gloss to describe any use here is presented as one, hopefully, 
without ironic connotation (e.g., McHoul, 1988a; McHoul & Rapley, 2003). 
As a final caveat, what is not on offer in the present chapter is a theoretical 
contribution to the literature on „moods‟, nor a „better‟ description of what „moods‟ 
actually are. Rather, the focus is on the manner in which „moods‟ feature in-and-as 
practices involved in psychotherapy. We might speak of „moods‟, then, as kinds of 
devices (Sacks, 1992a); as collections of various categories that are vernacularly 
rendered, reflexively organised, normatively accountable descriptions of conduct. Or, to 
put it another way, „moods‟ here are ethnomethodologically respecified as reflexive 
„account production devices‟.  
While this description of what on first glance appears to be just „mood-talk‟ may 
appear somewhat obtuse, it is provided in order to specify with some degree of 
precision an approach to „mood-talk‟ that is not predicated on notions that „moods‟ are 
in some sense independent from their descriptions. In other words, „moods‟ here are not 
approached as being things (e.g., neurochemical and neurophysiologic states) that talk 
merely references. „Moods‟ here are respecified as discursive devices that are indexical      
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and reflexive in the ethnomethodological sense (Garfinkel, 1967) that can serve to 
account for conduct. 
Importantly, both conduct and descriptions of conduct are normatively 
accountable. For example, if one were to report „feeling terribly angry‟ or „beside 
themselves with fury‟ while engaging in such things as smiling, laughing, and joking, 
this would appear to be normatively problematic in terms of conduct (e.g., smiling and 
laughing are not normative displays for someone who is angry) and descriptions of such 
conduct (e.g., it would not be normative to avow or ascribe to a smiling and laughing 
person a description such as „they are terribly angry‟, unless of course one was making a 
joke or irony, see Sacks, 1992b, pp. 478-494).  
Analysis Materials 
Now, an obvious starting point for the examination of where and how „moods‟ 
might figure in psychotherapeutic interactions, is to note instances when a therapist asks 
a client a question such as „how is your mood?‟ or „how has your mood been?‟, or 
perhaps a more general question such as „how are you feeling?‟ or „how have you been 
feeling?‟. Indeed, questions of this general form could be regarded as canonical 
„therapeutic‟ questions that essentially define, or at least make hearable, any subsequent 
interaction describable as a potential therapy session; particularly if one examines the 
sequential positioning of such questions (e.g., at the beginning of an interaction, 
multiple repeats of the question, and so forth).  
Consider also that it is one of the critical tasks of a clinician to gain an 
evaluation of a client‟s current, and recent, level of „mood functioning‟ or „mood state‟ 
(e.g., APA, 2002; RANZCP-CPGT, 2004), whether that be undertaken by talk with the 
client, obtaining written or verbal reports concerning the client from other sources, or 
perhaps by utilising a diagnostic screening instrument (e.g., Hirschfeld et al., 2000). 
Nonetheless, it can be assumed that for the most part, it is through talk that such an      
  268 
evaluation can be formulated, allowing for putative „moods‟ to be ascribed by a 
therapist to a client, or avowed and displayed by a client, in order to be treated as 
relevant topic for clinical examination and intervention.  
In this regard, the data corpus was examined for such instances, and initial 
investigation revealed no therapist initiated questions that had as their substantive topic 
„mood‟. With regard to therapist questions concerning „feelings‟, these generally did not 
consist of client responses involving straightforward reports, categorisations, or concise 
descriptions of „moods‟. Invariably, such questions marked the beginning of a sequence 
of utterances in which the conversational trajectory could encompass a wide range of 
topics, and as such, straightforward explications of ascriptions and avowals of „moods‟ 
provides little analytic purchase on the how „moods‟ might figure as matters of concern 
to participants.
1 The focus of the current chapter, then, is to provide for some 
consideration of instances (not necessarily perspicuous) in which „moods‟ may feature 
as something more than just straightforward ascriptions and avowals of particular 
physiological and psychological states. 
„Moods‟ and Account Production 
Here, then, is an example of what could be describable as the rejection by a 
client of a possible „mood‟ ascription by the therapist, where such a „mood‟ might serve 
to invalidate the client‟s account and its method of production.  
 
Extract 6.1A 
1    Phil:   How depressed do you feel at the moment? 
2         (8.2) 
3    Dave:   I just feel ↓sad that it’s just- (1.1) I’m cornered and  
4            no matter (0.9) ºwhat I ↑doº (0.5)  
5    Phil:   >ºYeah.º (0.3) Now. ºWhat am I-º I suppose my question  
6     is< (.) If you weren’t feeling s:ad, (0.7) and somewhat  
7     depress:ed, (0.4) would your perception on what’s  
8     happening be different or would it still be the same  
                                                 
1 Such questions (e.g., “How are you feeling?”) are examined in more detail in Chapter 7.      
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9            and that’s an impossible question >but you know where  
10           I’m trying to get at< .hh is are you looking at this  
11     through .hhh r:ather depressed eyes at the moment. 
12     (1.0) 
13   Dave:   No, [I’m looking-    I’m] looking at through the eyes= 
14   Phil:       [And would there if-] 
15   Dave:   =that have experienced [what  ] I’ve ↑experienced,= 
16   Phil:                          [↑Okay.]    
17   Phil:   =Okay.= 
18   Dave:   =Y’know?= 
 
This extract, taken from the first half of the session, follows an extended 
discussion concerning Dave‟s difficulties with access to his daughter, his dealings with 
the Family Court, and problems with his ex-wife in regard to both. This particular 
sequence marks the first occurrence in this session of Phil directly turning to what might 
be glossed as a „how are you feeling‟ topic, and begins with Phil „begging the question‟ 
so to speak, by asking “How depressed do you feel at the moment?” (line 1). Note that 
Phil does not ask if Dave is depressed, rather the question is of a more leading nature in 
that it assumes that Dave is depressed – what is of interest is essentially the magnitude 
of the depression. 
The question is followed by a significant pause, after which Dave provides an 
avowal, not in terms of a putative depression, but rather “I just feel ↓sad” (line 3). At 
this point one might describe such an avowal of feeling „sad‟ as providing a congruent 
response to Phil‟s question, in that Phil can gain some metric on a putative „depressed‟ 
state, however, there are some features that suggest otherwise. Note the use of the first 
“just” (line 3) as a limiting device, that may serve to prevent the conflation of the 
vernacular „sad‟ to something more clinical, or to be precise, to stand as a counter to 
„depressed‟. The use of „just‟ also points to the unremarkable nature of the report of 
feeling „sad‟, possibly in contrast to the more notable „depressed‟ (Edwards & Potter,      
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2005). In addition, “I‟m cornered and no matter (0.9) ºwhat I ↑doº” (lines 3-4) provides 
an account in terms of actions and events, not psychological dispositions.  
In this sense, Dave‟s account appears designed to pre-emptively head-off or 
undermine any possible reformulation provided by Phil that what is at stake here is in 
fact „depression‟. This is oriented to as such by Phil, as evidenced with his 
noncommittal receipt “ºYeah.º” (line 5), and use of the discourse marker “Now.” (line 5) 
that serves to highlight what appears to be a dispreferred answer to his initial question. 
Consider that if „well‟, rather than „now‟, was used to precede Phil‟s response, such a 
response would be hearable as a kind of hedge, as opposed to something that here 
sounds like a disagreement (Schiffrin, 1982). This can be seen in Phil‟s reformulation of 
Dave‟s “just feel sad” as “somewhat depress:ed” across lines 6 to 7, and the 
presentation of the reformulated version to Dave that occurs across lines 10 to 11 (“are 
you looking at this through .hhh r:ather depressed eyes at the moment.”). In sum, Phil 
suggests that Dave‟s recent „mood‟ (i.e., „depressed‟) is implicative in his “perception” 
(line 7) being in some manner distorted. 
This reformulation is given a clear and unambiguous rejection by Dave‟s “No,” 
(line 13), which occurs with an absence of notable dispreferrence markers (Pomerantz, 
1984a), which is then expanded across lines 13 to 18 to be hearable as both an 
affirmation of the previous rejection of „depression‟ and a repudiation of the suggestion 
that Dave‟s perception is somehow occluded as a result of  „depression‟ (“I‟m looking at 
through the eyes that have experienced what I‟ve ↑experienced,” lines 13 and 15). 
Further, such an experiential claim can serve to legitimise Dave‟s avowal of feeling 
„sad‟ as being consonant with having an essentially realist, more-or-less correct take on 
his problems (i.e., linking experience with objectivity) as opposed to being more-or-less 
mistaken (i.e., linking perception with subjectivity).
2  
                                                 
2 See Hutchby (2005, pp. 324-325) for an example of a formulation shift involving „think‟ to „know‟.      
  271 
That is to say, Dave is accountably „sad‟ as the result of having to deal with real 
problems he has experienced, as opposed to dealing with merely the perception of 
problems as engendered by „depression‟. Moreover, this preserves the status of Dave‟s 
account retrospectively and prospectively, and the method by which his account has 
been produced, which would otherwise be essentially invalidated. „Mood‟ as a device, 
here, can serve to allow or render as unwarrantable particular kinds of formulations, and 
specifically ones that might serve to produce alternate explanations of an account and its 
method of production. 
Another way of approaching this extract, as a clinical interaction, is that Phil‟s 
initial question might be seen in terms of what Maynard describes as the importance of 
„predicating a diagnosis as an attribute of a person‟ (Maynard, 1991b, 2004) in order to 
avoid what could be a possibly confronting or challenging interaction. In this sense, if 
we consider Phil‟s use of „depressed‟ as hearable as a putative diagnosis, it is one that is 
essentially rejected by Dave. What is of some note here, that marks such a rejection as 
possibly different to rejection of diagnosis that may occur with other clinical interaction, 
such as those that might occur in general medical practice (e.g., Heath, 1992),
3 one 
should consider that the „work‟ of a psycho-therapist (and indeed client) is to essentially 
produce interactions that are recognisable as therapy (e.g., Turner, 1972).  
With regard to therapeutic talk, the reformulation of something hearable as a 
kind of general „troubles telling‟ into something essentially psychological by a therapist, 
by a variety of reproducible procedures, may allow „troubles‟ to be heard specifically as 
„psychological troubles‟ and thus interactions can be hearable as „therapy talk‟ (e.g., 
Antaki et al., 2005a; Davis, 1986). Moreover, it may permit a therapist to control the 
floor so to speak, both with regard to topic and sequential positioning (e.g., Madill et al., 
2001). Consider that getting „off‟ talking about „troubles‟ can be problematic (e.g., 
                                                 
3 See also Buttny (1996) for more discussion on such differences.      
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Jefferson, 1984b; Jefferson & Lee, 1981), notwithstanding that therapeutic talk is more 
often than not all about „troubles‟. 
In this case, Phil‟s request for Dave to provide a report on what could be glossed 
as his current „mood‟ (line 1) can be seen to be doing more than just that, as evidenced 
by Phil‟s elaboration beginning in line 5 and Dave‟s rejection in line 13. Consider, 
following from Maynard, that in the present case there may be additional problems 
associated with rendering a diagnosis as an attribute of a person, given that what is at 
stake is a putative „mood‟ which is itself an attribute of the person.  
In short, given that first-person avowals of a host of psychological terms occurs 
in the absence of verification (e.g., one not does not doubt that one is in pain; 
Wittgenstein, 1967), and given second and third-person ascriptions essentially provide 
for the descriptions, diagnosis, and objects of treatment for psychiatric/psychological 
illnesses, any putative diagnosis (or vernacular expression that is oriented to as one) 
may likely become a problematic topic when „mood‟ is of prime concern. 
Now, one description of this interaction might be that Phil has simply 
acknowledged Dave‟s stance, and has then withdrawn his initial presumption that 
„depression‟ is what is principally affecting Dave‟s perceptions. In this regard, consider 
the following extract which immediately follows Dave‟s “Y‟know?” (line 18).  
 
Extract 6.1B 
1    Phil:   =>So so so your [view] is this- this is<= 
2    Dave:                   [Um  ] 
3    Phil:   =absolutely accurate that .hh e:ven despite all the  
4            efforts that are being made on your beha:lf .hh (0.4)  
5            the family court (0.9) i:s: still going to essentially:  
6            >act against you< (1.2) 
 
This suggests that what is at stake here is clearly a contestation of a putative 
„mood‟ state, which such contestation a matter of some consequence. Consider that if      
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Dave were to accept Phil‟s so-prefaced upshot formulation (i.e., that it is 
unquestionably the case that the family court will act against him), it would position 
him as being unreasonable, exceptionally pessimistic, or perhaps even delusional. 
However, if Dave were to reject the formulation (i.e., the inevitability of the family 
court acting against him is something that is questionable) it would allow for the 
possibility that he may in fact be exaggerating, catastrophising, or perhaps (in line with 
Phil‟s suggestion) that he is experiencing a „depressed mood‟. Clearly, then, the matter 
of „depression‟ versus feeling „sad‟ is consequential to the interaction.
4 
This extract is provided in order to illustrate that this particular therapy session 
is hearable as an extended dispute over the nature of Dave‟s account. That is to say, 
what is at stake is the foundation upon which Dave‟s accounts are predicated; that he is 
having to deal with consequential issues concerning access to his daughter, and that he 
is facing what appears to be almost insurmountable odds. In short, the relevance of the 
category „depressed‟ for Phil is one that is consequential for the doing of therapy, 
however for Dave it is a category that may serve to undermine the practical telling of his 
troubles as practical troubles. 
Here, a putative „mood‟ for Dave appears one by which he can produce an 
account that is congruent with his battle against the odds, but for Phil the „mood‟ as a 
device enables the production of something of a decidedly different nature; and perhaps 
provides an opportunity to at some point undertake some therapeutic business (e.g., 
Antaki et al., 2005a). In this regard, let us turn to an examination of what transpires later 
in the session, following more „practical troubles telling‟ by Dave.  
 
Extract 6.2 
1    Phil:   .hh (0.2) But I’m interested- let me take you back to  
2            the question ºthatº (0.8) why is helplessness (1.5) why  
                                                 
4 As it transpires, in the very next turn-of-talk (Dave‟s), a mobile telephone rings, and following this 
interruption Dave initiates a topic-change to continue his previous „troubles talk‟.      
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3            is it something you do what’s your take on why you do  
4            that. 
5            (0.4) 
6    Dave:   ººI’m depressedºº 
7            (0.9) 
8    Phil:   Y::e:ah but (0.3) lots of people get depressed not uh-  
9            not everyone who’s depressed gets helpless (0.9) so  
10           where does the helplessness come from. 
11           (3.0) 
12   Dave:   My experience that (0.5) my wife was right she has  
13           managed to take Jessica from me .h [ºandº] 
14   Phil:                                      [ºN::o] I think it’s  
15           an older [thingº] 
16   Dave:            [ ºandº] 
17           (0.4)  
18   Phil:   H- how how a- .pt (0.6) it’s an interesting  
19           psychologica::l position to take (0.7) that they’ve got  
20           all the power, (.) I’ve got none, (.) everything they  
21           do will be used against me everythings a catch twenty  
22           two I just can’t win. .h That’s a very interesting  
23           (1.4) position to be in. (1.0) So how much is that a  
24         childhood issue. 
25           (3.3) 
26   Phil:   How much is that something that’s (0.3) way back (1.4) 
 
Here, Phil delivers a repackaged version of a previously unsuccessful 
reformulation of Dave‟s concerns across lines 1 to 4, which can be glossed as „why is 
helplessness something you do‟.
5 This is met with Dave‟s whispered “I‟m depressed” 
(line 6) which appears somewhat surprising given Dave has previously worked against 
providing such an assessment (e.g., Extract 6.1A, lines 3 and 13). One might wonder 
whether Dave‟s response is his (belated) acceptance that he is, in fact, „depressed‟ or 
whether it is delivered as a possible sarcasm or irony. In other words, that his response 
is designed to defease Phil‟s attempts to fit some kind of psychologised reformulation to 
his accounts. 
                                                 
5 Consider „doing being helpless‟ versus „doing being depressed‟ (cf. Sacks, 1984b).      
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Regardless of what such a turn might be implicitly designed to do (or not do), 
Phil‟s next turn can be seen to adequately deal with any such contingencies, as he 
essentially rejects Dave‟s answer with  “not uh- not everyone who‟s depressed gets 
helpless” (lines 8-9). Again, this is surprising as until this point Phil has spent 
considerable time attempting to offer „depression‟ as a candidate explanation for why 
Dave might be producing invariably negative accounts and formulations. Why, then, 
does Phil appear to abandon „depression‟ just when Dave appears to accept it as a 
possible explanation? 
Consider that Dave furnishes another decidedly non-psychologised formulation 
(both in terms of its construction and its substantive content) that “my wife was right 
she has managed to take Jessica away from me” (lines 12-13). As this might appear to 
be developing as yet another unsuccessful attempt to get Dave to accept his 
reformulation, Phil changes tack and cuts-off Dave‟s turn with “ºN::o I think it‟s an 
older thingº” (lines 14-15) which he further develops across lines 18 to 26 as a 
reformulation that speaks to perhaps a „powerlessness‟ that might be associated with 
„childhood‟. Phil‟s assessment of Dave‟s formulation “it‟s an interesting psychologica::l 
position to take” (lines 18-19) constructs Dave‟s accounts and formulations as entailing 
that Dave is adopting a position as a position, rather than it being Phil‟s gloss of a range 
of particular, defeasable, claims and statements concerning Dave‟s problems. In other 
words, while Dave appears to resist any psychologised reformulations concerning his 
troubles that Phil offers, Phil can now construct Dave‟s accounts and formulations as 
being psychologised nevertheless.  
To conclude, Phil‟s reformulation of Dave‟s „position‟ as having something to 
do with „childhood‟ enables a move away from the misalignment between Dave and 
Phil concerning immediate events (and their telling) and more towards the production of 
some other, more „productive‟ talk. Consider that (for most people) there is always      
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something „in one‟s childhood‟ – it is a „stage of life‟ category (Sacks, 1992a) that is 
available to all, and as such, offers a means by which any problem can be reformulated 
as being possibly related to something that has occurred in one‟s „childhood‟. This, then, 
gets away from the problems associated with „depression‟, and indeed „helplessness‟, as 
a kind of „mood‟ that might allow or render problematic the production of particular 
kinds of accounts, and can allow for Phil to move the interaction away from being an 
extended and problematic contestation over the nature of Dave‟s problems (i.e., an 
argument) and towards a more productive therapeutic interaction.  
„Moods‟ and Moral Accounts of Action 
By way of contrast, consider the following extract in which a client formulates 
their „mood‟ as possibly pathological, which is rendered as accountably non-
pathological by the therapist. 
 
Extract 6.3 
1    Phil:   .hhhhh >Which is ↑why you were feeling like shit  
2    ↑yesterday because you’ve suddenly been exposed and-  
3    and- she’s gonna find out you’re a fuckwit.  
4    (1.0)  
5    (  ):   .hhhhhh 
6    Phil:   Because you’ve ↑exposed yourself.= 
7    Mike:   =(ºYeahº) 
8        (1.9) 
9    Phil:   Y:e:s:.  
10     (1.0) 
11   Mike:   See that’s: (0.4) .hhh (0.4) it’s: in a ↑w:a:y I’m  
12     gla:d, (.) I’m not glad that I’m feeling this way,  
13     (0.3) .hhh cause I certainly was feeling better last  
14     week. 
15   Phil:   Mm. 
16     (0.8) 
17   Mike:   And I’m wondering if it’s also medication going in- up  
18     and down >I don’t- I dunno if it’s that<  
19     [I don’t-  ºw-  w’s-  w’s-º  was me  going up and down] 
20   Phil:   [Well it’s probably you going up and down b-but- but I]      
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21     also think that what you’ve done you’ve taken a  
22     large ri:sk,= 
23   Mike:   =Yeah I did I have taken [a risk. ] 
24   Phil:                            [you see.] An- an- d and- and  
25     ↑I:: would (.) put (.) th- your low mood directly down 
26     [to the fact   ]= 
27   Mike:   [ºYeah I thinkº] 
28   Phil:   =that (.) .hhh you now have to trust her. 
29   Mike:   ºMm.º (0.2) 
 
This extract is taken from a section of talk that concerns the client discussing a 
recent encounter with a woman that is a matter of some moral concern (i.e., on a first 
date the client spent the night at her house). The extract begins with Phil providing an 
explanation for why Mike, in previous interaction, has experienced a problematic 
„mood‟; introduced initially as “feeling like shit” (line 1) and later specified as a “low 
mood” (line 27). The explanation Phil provides for the „mood‟ is that Mike had 
“suddenly been exposed” (line 2) and “she‟s gonna find out you‟re a fuckwit.” (line 3).
6 
Note that the cut-off “and-” (lines 2-3) serves as a conjunction, such that „been exposed‟ 
and „she‟s gonna find out‟ are not temporally ordered with respect to each other (and as 
such each can stand as explanation of the other).  
Note that Phil modifies this formulation slightly, with “because you‟ve suddenly 
been exposed” (line 2) being repackaged at line 6 in a slightly different form, “Because 
you‟ve ↑exposed yourself”. The change, from „been exposed‟ to „you‟ve exposed 
yourself‟ is important, as it renders the act of exposure as volitional; as an action (rather 
than consequence) that Mike is accountable for. Thus, because Mike has „exposed‟ 
himself, she will find out he is a „fuckwit‟, and that provides the explanation for why he 
felt „like shit‟. 
This accountability is topical in Mike‟s uncertainty with regard to his 
“wondering if it‟s also medication going in- up and down” (lines 17-18) and if it “was 
                                                 
6 Note that „fuckwit‟ here is a derogatory, vernacular term that can be paraphrased as „stupid‟, „fool‟, or 
„idiot‟ (as in „she‟s gonna find out you‟re an idiot‟).      
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me going up and down” (line 19), which stand as alternate candidate formulations. 
Mike‟s „wondering‟ might best be approached not as the direct reporting of some 
private, internal mental process (e.g., McHoul & Rapley, 2003), but can be seen to 
operate more as a rhetorical device that might allow for Mike to tentatively provide a 
formulation that minimises any personal responsibility for particular actions causally 
related to the „mood‟. That is to say, rather than the „mood‟ being the result of a 
potentially questionable moral action (i.e., spending the night with a woman on a first 
date) that may have consequences, the „mood‟ can be, at least in part, attributed to 
medication effects or a dispositional factor (i.e., bipolar disorder).  
Consider also that, as Gill (1998) suggests, patients may exhibit caution by 
providing speculative explanations that do not warrant a direct evaluation from a 
clinician. Note that Mike does not directly ask Phil to evaluate his formulation, rather, it 
is delivered in an uncertain and tentative manner with “And I‟m wondering” (line 17), 
“I don‟t- I dunno” (line 18), and “I don‟t-“ (line 19). As Gill notes, patients‟ 
explanations are subject to confirmation or disconfirmation by clinicians, and indeed 
Phil does a disconfirmation, albeit disagreeing in a way that shows this to be a 
dispreferred utterance as evidenced by the preface “Well” (line 20), the agreement “it‟s 
probably you going up and down” (line 20), and the contrast term “b- but- but” (line 20), 
which precede the disconfirmation that occurs over lines 21 to 28. 
In this regard, Phil partially acknowledges this explanation that it was indeed 
Mike (“you”, line 20) that was “going up and down” (line 20) in the form of a 
disclaimer. This pre-account attends to the possibility that, as an explanation, it could be 
taken as linking the accountability of the problematic mood with Mike‟s „medication‟ or 
perhaps „bipolar disorder‟ (note also that this pre-account terminates with the 
adversative, self-repaired “but”). Phil then provides an account that directly posits 
Mike‟s „mood‟ as the result of non-pathological processes across lines 21 to 28. That is,      
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it is Mike who has “taken a large ri:sk,” and as a result his “low mood” can be factually 
presented as being “directly down to the fact” that Mike has to now “trust her.”  
In other words, Phil provides a reformulation of his initial explanation 
concerning Mike‟s recent „mood‟ (i.e., that Mike‟s actions are accountably the cause) 
that is bolstered against possible challenge in the form of some subsequent interaction 
that could undermine such an explanation, notably, by either Mike‟s suggestion that it 
could well be „medication‟ or his very „mood‟ disorder itself that is responsible. We see 
the transformation of Mike‟s „mood‟ from being the result of a consequence of an action 
for which he may be minimally accountable (i.e., „you‟ve suddenly been exposed‟) to 
being the result of actions that Mike is maximally accountable for (i.e., „you‟ve taken a 
large risk‟ and „you‟ve exposed yourself‟). In this instance then, „Mood‟ can be seen as 
a device that can enable the production of moral (as opposed to pathological) accounts 
of actions. 
„Moods‟ and Pathological Accounts of Action 
Turning now to the next two extracts, in which a client provides an account of 
„mood‟ as pathological, which is accepted and further elaborated upon by the therapist.  
 
Extract 6.4A 
1    Mike:   =>I was like< it’s- it’s ↑amazing (.) the thought  
2     processes I liked. .hh (0.8) Okay I’ll go and spend  
3     this today. (.) No problem and I’ve >and look< a tiny  
4     little voice out of the darkness would say (0.2)  
5     Mike you realise this will probably kick you in the  
6     arse in about (.) a year’s time or six months time and  
7     like, but my over (.) arching elevated voice would be  
8     going (0.5) ↑fuck o:ff: 
9    Phil:   Mm:  
10   Mike:   Excuse my language. >Let me do [whatever I like.<] 
11   Phil:                                  [↑Hm              ] 
12     >I know. I agree.< [And  I ] accep- 
13   Mike:                      [Y’know,]  
14           (0.2)      
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15   Mike:   >And that’s what I do.< 
16           (0.2) 
17   Phil:   I’m a big boy:= 
18   Mike:   =Yeah.= 
19   Phil:   =I’ve got money [and I’m (earning)] 
20   Mike:                   [>Ye- ye- ye- I’m<]  
21           (.) 
22   Mike:   Well ↑yea::h [mate,] nothings gonna- nothings gonna= 
23   Phil:                [(   )]  
24   Mike:   =hurt me: 
25   Phil:   Mm= 
26   Mike:   =And (.) it’s kicking my butt right now. 
 
This extract is taken from a section of talk that concerns the client‟s discussion 
of the signs and symptoms that he may be experiencing an „up‟ (i.e., a manic or 
hypomanic episode), with specific attention directed towards problems associated with 
his spending excess amounts of money (see Extracts 5.1A-B and 5.3). The extract 
begins with Mike making what can be described as an extreme case formulation 
(Pomerantz, 1986) “it‟s ↑amazing (.) the thought processes I liked.” (lines 1-2), that also 
positions the actions and thoughts to be described as past events, something that Mike 
can provide a report on without implicating any current or future occurrences of the 
actions to be reported. Further, Mike‟s self-assessment of his previous „thought 
processes‟ serves inferentially to position his current „thought processes‟ as 
unremarkable.  
Mike then provides an account concerning these „thought processes‟ and the 
manner in which they are linked to actions, the specific action being „spending money‟ 
(“Okay I‟ll go and spend this today.”, lines 2-3). However, he does not report on any 
specific instances of action or „thought processes‟, rather, they are detailed in a kind of a 
„script formulation‟ (Edwards, 1994) that presents both the actions and „thoughts‟ as a 
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With regard to the „thought processes‟, Mike describes two „voices‟, a “tiny 
little voice” (lines 3-4) and an “over (.) arching elevated voice” (line 7), that are 
positioned as being in some opposition. One might gloss these as the voices of 
„rationality‟ and „emotion‟, „reason‟ and „impulse‟, or perhaps „sanity‟ and „mood 
disorder‟. Note that „elevated‟ stands as an interesting description of an „inner voice‟, in 
that it sounds like „elevated mood‟. In any event, the „tiny little voice‟ provides what 
seems to be practical, commonsense advice, namely that spending money may entail 
some unpleasant consequences such that there may well be a day of reckoning 
(“probably kick you in the arse in about (.) a year‟s time or six months time”, lines 5-6). 
However, its apparent nemesis, the “over (.) arching elevated voice” (line 7) with its 
admonishment to “↑fuck o:ff:” (line 8), appears to have been the more persuasive. 
Indeed, if we jump ahead to the last line of this extract we can observe that the 
day of reckoning appears to have come, with Mike declaring that “it‟s kicking my butt 
right now.” (line 26). Consider also that such an outcome appears to be produced as 
more or less inevitable in this account, with the voice of „rationality‟ constructed as a 
„tiny little voice‟ that comes from „the darkness‟, in contrast to the other which is 
presented as „over-arching‟. 
In addition, Mike‟s use of the modal “would” at lines 4 and 7 (Edwards, 2006b) 
here serves to construct a normative and generalised version of these „voices‟, which 
might otherwise be approached as a kind of direct reported speech (Holt, 1996), in 
relation to spending. The interesting feature of the particular uses of „would‟ here is that 
while they implicate descriptions of the „voices‟ as internal, they are positioned as being 
possibly counter-dispositional to Mike‟s own, non-pathological disposition(s).  
Further, Mike‟s “Excuse my language.” (line 10), while credibly serving to 
attend to a possible etiquette violation, might also be describable as performing some 
rhetorical function, possibly as a form of footing (Goffman, 1979) that distances Mike      
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from the „elevated‟ voice. In other words, it is not Mike himself as the author of „fuck 
off‟, he is just reporting what the „elevated‟ voice would have told him. In this sense, the 
previous talk could be regarded as constructed to provide a more or less direct 
observational report concerning specific mental states and processes rather than 
reporting instantiations of problematic actions (Edwards & Potter, 2005). 
Phil emphatically accepts this account “>I know. I agree.<” (line 12) and further 
extends this by providing a kind of direct reported „thought narrative‟ of what Mike 
would be thinking, or what Mike‟s „overarching elevated voice‟ might be saying, 
beginning at line 17 with “I‟m a big boy:” and extending to line 19 with “I‟ve got 
money and I‟m (earning)”. Note that this does not present any particular trouble for 
Mike (i.e., as might be evidenced with a pause or a query immediately following the 
sudden switch at line 17), with his latched “Yeah” at line 18, and his further overlapping 
agreement at line 20.  
In other words, Phil‟s talk is recipient designed to be hearable not as his 
„thoughts‟ or „voice‟ but Mike‟s, and enables a demonstration of a considerable degree 
of affiliation and alignment. Mike then picks up the first-person „thought narrative‟ at 
line 22, and then provides a kind of contrastive „punch-line‟ at line 26 that “it‟s kicking 
my butt right now”. 
 
Extract 6.4B 
1   Phil:   But, that’s that beautiful slightly:= 
2   Mike:   =Mm= 
3   Phil:   =elevated mood state where .h nothing can hurt ↑me::,  
4     I’m ten foot tall and bullet proof,= 
5   Mike:   =That’s right= 
6   Phil:   =and y’know I’m king of the world, [and there]= 
7   Mike:                                       [Yeah yeah] 
8   Phil:   =ought to be enough juice in my system to pay 
9     [for any ] big bill like this.= 
10   Mike:   [Correct.]  
11   Mike:   =That’s right.      
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12   Phil:   Okay. 
 
In this extract, Phil provides a reformulation of Mike‟s account across lines 1 
and 3, which repackages Mike‟s descriptions of his „elevated‟ voice as being related to 
„mood‟, and as something which clearly denotes pathology. Indeed, Phil‟s “beautiful 
slightly:” (line 1) “elevated mood state” (line 3) could be given the clinical gloss of 
„hypomania‟. This is given further elaboration by Phil, who again delivers a kind of 
„thought narrative‟ to provide present tense, first-person psychological descriptions of 
the „mood state‟ such as “nothing can hurt ↑me::,” (line 3), “I‟m ten foot tall and bullet 
proof,”(line 4), and “I‟m king of the world,” (line 6). During this, Mike‟s overlapping 
and latched responses and affirmations (e.g., “That‟s right.”, line 5; “Correct.”, line 10) 
serve to bolster this description as being both relevant, and an appropriate description of 
Mike‟s own experience.  
In contrast to the previous analysis of Extract 6.3, in which „mood‟ was 
described as serving as a device to produce a moral account of action, here „mood‟ 
serves as a device to produce a pathological account of action. Furthermore, of interest 
here is the degree to which a „mood‟ as a pathological account of action is produced by 
the client and therapist in a setting of agreement and mutuality; as something that could 
be characterised as utterly mundane, matter-of-fact, and unremarkable.  
„Moods‟ and Conduct Prediction 
The following extracts detail interaction in which there is an acceptance by a 
client of a „mood‟ ascription provided by the therapist, although the status of such an 
ascription appears somewhat ambiguous (i.e., pathological/non-pathological).  
 
Extract 6.5A 
1    Phil:   .pt So how do you feel in terms of control and .hh  
2            (0.6) getting dangerous where are you on the* (.) in  
3            control g- this is getting dangerous= 
4    Kate:   =.pt (0.2) U::m: .h ºwhere am I on the in control       
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5            that’s getting dangerous I think I’m quite mellow.º  
6            (0.3) 
7    Phil:   ºOkay.º 
8            (0.3) 
9    Phil:   Yeah- y- you seem- oh look .hh to be honest, (0.4) 
10   Kate:   ººMm?ºº 
11           (0.4) 
12   Phil:   Y’know your presentation is (0.5) is:: more centred  
13           than it has been, y- you’ve got the occasional flights  
14           of [being] a bit dissoc- of a little [bit]= 
15   Kate:      [Yeah ]                           [Yep] 
16   Phil:   =.hhhhh bit circumstantial is a >ch- ch- ch- ch- ch-<  
17     [but-]  
18   Kate:   [  Is] there? Yep.= 
19   Phil:   =The thinking’s a bit woolly ↑but ah= 
20   Kate:   =Yep. (0.2) 
 
This extract, taken from the final minutes of a session, begins with Phil asking 
Kate to provide a self-assessment on where she feels in terms of being in “control” 
(lines 1 and 3) versus “getting dangerous” (lines 2 and 3). As with Extract 6.1, while the 
term „mood‟ is not directly invoked in these materials, I would suggest it can be 
approached as a pertinent gloss given that in the session (and indeed the entire corpus) 
talk around „mood‟ is ubiquitous. In this regard, the current extract follows a section of 
talk concerning evaluations of Kate‟s „mood‟ (e.g., Phil asks Kate “so in terms of your 
s:anity: where are you on the nought to ten fruit loop scale.”).
7 
Kate provides a repeat of Phil‟s question, and provides a self-assessment that she 
thinks she is “quite mellow” (line 5). On receipt of this (“Okay”, line 7) Phil then 
provides a kind of summary assessment of Kate‟s interactions with him during the 
session, which is prefaced by both an oh-preface (Heritage, 2002) and an honesty phrase 
(Edwards & Fasulo, 2006) “Yeah- y- you seem- oh look .hh to be honest” (line 9). This 
serves to preface what may be a delicate, possibly negative assessment, and perhaps one 
                                                 
7 While additional material is not presented here in the interests of brevity, some fragments of this 
material are presented in the next chapter (e.g., Extract 7.27).      
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that is to be delivered by Phil as a professional (e.g., Horton-Salway, 2004). In other 
words, it denotes a forthcoming assessment that should not be regarded as merely a 
negative assessment concerning Kate as a person, but rather as a sincere assessment in 
which Phil „shares‟ some professional insight that might not normally be provided to a 
client.  
In this regard, consider that the substantive detail of the assessment begins at 
line 12 with “y‟know your presentation is (0.5) is:: more centred than it has been”. The 
use of the word „presentation‟ is hearable as a kind of technical, clinical term, and 
speaks to Phil‟s authority as someone who can provide (and is about to) a technical 
assessment, in contrast to one that might be hearable as a kind of „personal attack‟ 
(Sacks, 1992b, p. 203). Additionally, the assessment infers a previous, presumably more 
„out of control‟ presentation, with the „centred‟ pointing to Kate‟s relatively 
unremarkable, or more normal, presentation. 
The assessment is then provided of Kate‟s current „mood‟ across lines 12 to 19, 
in the form of a three-part list (Jefferson, 1990) essentially “dissociative”, 
“circumstantial”, and having “woolly thinking”; all of which could be reasonably 
postulated as identifying candidate symptoms of a „mood disorder‟. Note also the use of 
„softeners‟ (Edwards, 2000) for these candidate symptoms, namely “occasional” (line 
13) and a “bit” (lines 14, 16, and 19). In addition, consider the following features which 
further point to the delicate manner in which Phil constructs and delivers his assessment: 
the repairs/cut-offs at lines 9, 13, 14, 16, and 17; the use of softeners; the discourse 
marker “Y‟know” (line 12) taken here as working in an affiliative sense (Schiffrin, 
1987); and the shift from „you‟, „your‟, and „you‟ve‟ as predicates of the candidate 
„symptoms‟ to “the” (line 19).  
In this regard, note that the interaction could be approached as involving 
something akin to a „perspective-display series‟ (Maynard, 1989, 1991b), followed by a      
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„citing of evidence‟ (Maynard, 2004), that might allow for a minimisation of potential 
disagreement in the delivery of a clinical assessment.
8 In this sense, consider that Phil 
provides an initial invitiation for Kate to provide her view on how in control she is 
(lines 1-3), Kate then provides her assessment (lines 4-5), and Phil provides a series of 
second assessments (across lines 12-19). Note that while Phil‟s assessments are 
prefaced with the honesty phrase “to be honest” at line 9 (Edwards & Fasulo, 2006) 
which may project downgraded agreement, the “↑but ah” (line 19) does project for an 
upshot that returns to a more positive assessment of Kate.  
 
Extract 6.5B 
1    Phil:   Y’know= 
2    Kate:   =>But y’know what< there’s a lot of nutters out there  
3            .h there’s not- you can’t not- you can still get a job,  
4     >that’s what I’m saying< you can [run  ]= 
5    Phil:                                    [↑↑Yeh] 
6    Kate:   =and work [behind   ] a bar like this and people will= 
7    Phil:             [↑↑Oh yeah] 
8    Kate:   =think I’m a nutter and that’s ↑it [y’know and-] 
9    Phil:                                      [     I know] but  
10           you’d be a jolly- [look I mean]          
11   Kate:                     [     Yeah a] JOLLY GOOD NUTTER (.)  
12           [y’know aHAH HAH] 
13   Phil:   [I-  you’d be-  ] you’d be- look if I walked in to the  
14           local pub and you were behind the [bar ]= 
15   Kate:                                     [Yeah] 
16   Phil:   =it’d be fun at the moment. 
17   Kate:   Yeah. [Sure.  ] 
18   Phil:         [Alright] because people (they’d) have a banter  
19     with you, you’re not gonna take any offence .h you’re  
20     gonna be easy and you’re gonna be (.) y’know (.) .hh  
21     you’re gonna [be   ] 
22   Kate:                [Mm hm] 
23           (0.2) 
24   Phil:   Y’know (0.3) reparteeing back again so=  
                                                 
8 As a „clinical assessment‟ I mean to suggest that it might or could be hearable as such, notwithstanding 
the previously raised issues with such things as determining a „diagnosis‟ in a psychotherapy session (cf. 
Buttny, 1996). Nonetheless, it would appear to hold for Maynard‟s description of an „assessment‟.      
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25   Kate:   =(oh yeah)= 
26   Phil:   =>no no no< I’m sure you can do that job 
 
Note that Kate repackages both the “but” (line 17, Extract 6.7) and the 
“Y‟know” (current extract, line 1) in a single turn in line 2, and by adding to Phil‟s turn 
rather than developing her own turn, her talk is hearably continuous with his. At this 
point, Kate begins to provide a kind of disclaimer with “>But y‟know what< there‟s a 
lot of nutters out there” (line 2). This could be approached as Kate accepting the details 
of Phil‟s assessment, with Kate orienting to the explicated details of the assessment as 
„natural predicates‟ (Watson, 1978) of the invoked category „nutter‟ (to which it can be 
inferred she belongs; as seeably an incumbent of the category which she makes explicit 
in lines 6 and 11) as opposed to broadly rejecting it (the discourse marker but latched 
with y‟know here appropriately described as a turn transition device, e.g., Schiffrin, 
1982).  
However, Kate works towards discounting any possible inference that the 
presence of any of these particular predicates in some sense precludes doing something 
perfectly ordinary; such as to “get a job” (line 3) in “a bar” (line 6). Kate asserts that 
even if people were to categorise them as a „nutter‟, it would be of no practical 
significance in such a context. Not only are there “a lot of nutters out there” (line 2), 
you can “work behind a bar like this” (line 6), and it is of no great import that “people 
will think I‟m a nutter” (lines 6 and 8). In short, working behind a bar could be 
category-bound to „nutter‟, such that a „nutter‟ working behind a bar is unlikely to 
garner any particular attention as a „nutter‟ (cf. Sacks, 1984b).  
Alternatively, while the category „nutter‟ may not be conventionally linked to 
the category „bar worker‟, Kate‟s account could be seen as working towards 
establishing that membership of both would not (or should not) be seen to violate 
conventional expectations. This, then, could be understood as Kate making a moral      
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claim with regard to her capacity to work behind a bar, regardless of what anyone else 
might impute as being reasonable or expectable activities associated with being a 
„nutter‟.  
Phil responds to this with multiple overlapping agreement tokens at line 5 
(“↑↑Yeh”), line 7 (“↑↑Oh yeah”), and line 9 (“I know”), that reinforce the notion that 
this is a rather delicate interaction, and can attend to minimising the possibility that his 
assessment was in some sense providing a negative assessment of Kate. Phil‟s self-
repair at line 10 occurs with Kate‟s overlapping, ironic self-categorisation of being a 
“JOLLY GOOD NUTTER” (line 11), which further establishes Kate‟s moral claim to 
being quite able to work behind a bar, regardless of any possibly negatively construed 
characteristics (which could be glossed as involving some problematic „mood‟).  
Phil then provides a decidedly non-technical, vernacular assessment, that not 
only attends to how Kate is presently, in terms of „mood‟, but one that can also be 
approached as kind of meta-narrative comment on their current interaction. Phil‟s 
assessment begins with what Kate would be like as a bar worker, “it‟d be fun at the 
moment.” (line 16), which is then justified with four characteristics across lines 18 to 24 
that could be seen as involving natural predicates and activities both of Kate in the 
present interaction as a „client‟ and as a „bar worker‟ (i.e.,  “banter”, “not gonna take 
any offense”, “easy”, and “reparteeing”).  
Additionally, Phil‟s assessment that it would be „fun at the moment‟ is 
significant, in that appears to be slightly destabilising Kate‟s account by attending to the 
possibility of change, or perhaps mood „cycles‟. However, if one considers that Phil‟s 
initial assessment (Extract 6.5A) is framed in terms of where Kate is now given some 
previous level of functioning, it does serve to provide a warrant by which Phil can 
provide an assessment concerning Kate‟s future functioning (cf. Extracts 5.7A-5.10)      
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This works to reconfirm Phil‟s previous assessment in a manner that is attentive 
to both the local, interactional demands (involving the delicate nature of his assessment), 
and as a way of downplaying any possible negative implications of Kate‟s „mood‟ in 
relation to future activities. In this regard, Phil‟s closes off this somewhat complex 
interaction at line 26 with an assessment that he is “sure you can do that job”. In 
contrast to the previous extract, one might say that „mood‟ as a device can here serve to 
enable the prediction of conduct.  
Conclusion 
The present chapter has provided some brief descriptions of how „moods‟ might 
feature in talk-in-interaction between a clinical psychologist and clients for whom 
„bipolar disorder‟ has demonstrable relevance. It is suggested that accounts of „moods‟ 
are constructed, produced, and assembled through ascriptions and avowals, accounts 
and formulations, detailing particular thoughts, feelings, and actions. They are operative 
as causes and effects, as predictors and things to be predicted, and as explanations and 
things requiring explanation. Evaluations of „moods‟ does not take place in a manner 
such that a clinician can in some sense „inspect‟ a client, who can then furnish textbook 
definitions of particular „mood states‟ drawn from a well defined inventory. Rather, the 
status of any particular „mood‟ is worked up in-and-through interaction, and is 
potentially subject to a considerable degree of contestation and co-production, both to 
its epistemological status as a „mood‟, and moreover any practical clinical significance.  
In this chapter, we have seen „moods‟ operative as kinds of devices; as 
collections of various categories that are vernacularly rendered, reflexively organised, 
normatively accountable descriptions of conduct. Examples were presented of „moods‟ 
as ostensibly pathological (Extracts 6.4A-B), non-pathological (Extract 6.3), and as 
contestedly pathological or non-pathological (Extracts 6.1A-6.2, 6.5A-B). „Moods‟ can 
be seen to be operative as devices that can enable explanations of account production      
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„in-flight‟ (Extract 6.1A-C), produce decidedly moral accounts of actions (Extract 6.3), 
and enable predictions of conduct (Extracts 6.5A-B). 
One might consider that the meaning of any specific „mood‟ in any specific 
setting is always contingent upon the practices in which the specific „mood‟ is taken up 
(McHoul, 1996). For example, a „mood-checklist‟ (e.g., Beck et al., 1961; Hamilton, 
1967; Hirschfeld et al., 2000) used by a clinician to evaluate a client, an avowal of a 
problematic „feeling‟ in psychotherapy, or the provision of a „mood stabilising‟ 
medication; all involve various practical matters by which „moods‟ are made relevant, 
not as entities in their own right, but as relating to a range of other practical activities. 
In this sense, and following from the examination of „symptoms‟ in Chapter 5, I 
would suggest that inquiries, particularly those of a „critical‟ flavour, that focus on the 
seemingly obvious shortcomings of such things as psychiatric nosologies and diagnostic 
methodologies, invariably fail to appreciate that such things as the DSM diagnostic 
criteria for bipolar disorder can only ever be loose, informal, and provisional in actual 
clinical psychiatric and psychological practice. What is not needed are better definitions 
of what „moods‟ are, but rather, more thorough investigations of the practices that any 
definitions are claimed to be informing. 
Consider the importance attached to ensuring that persons can and do engage in 
accurate monitoring of their „mood states‟ (e.g., Dell'Osso et al., 2002; Yatham et al., 
2006). What might be the implications of such monitoring be, given that one may be 
required to provide avowals that ones „mood‟ is essentially „disordered‟? The clinical 
literature employs terms such as „mood-congruent‟ and „mood-incongruent‟ (e.g., APA, 
2000), which points to the importance of the public ratifiability of given „moods‟. 
Notwithstanding that one could make an error in ascribing to oneself a particular mood 
description, and another person could reasonably challenge an avowal of such a 
description by citing particular criteria (Buttny, 1986), does it make sense to speak of      
  291 
one‟s own „moods‟ as „congruent‟ or „incongruent‟? Or, in doing so, does one render 
one‟s own „moods‟ as highly problematic, ostensibly psychological states, that stand in 
need of both verification by „outer‟ criteria and also constant „inner‟ scrutiny? (cf. 
Wittgenstein, 1967a). Perhaps, taking a different tack, one could understand such 
practices as entailing a kind of self-surveillance in accord with the issues raised by 
Foucault (e.g., Faubion, 2000; Foucault, 1967; Rose, 1999), such that individuals as a 
practical matter are required to constantly maintain a kind of surveillance of the „self‟; 
a policing of „moods‟ that are, in some sense, produced as being instantiated within 
individuals.  
Consider that in settings such as the one examined here, „moods‟ serve not only 
as normatively accountable devices that persons can utilise in the performance of a 
range of diverse practical actions, but are also the very things which are subject to 
investigation, clarification, and remediation. In this sense, further detailed examinations 
of the practices by which „moods‟ feature in such clinical settings may be of some 
interest to both mental health professionals and the consumers of their services, 
notwithstanding that they themselves are, no doubt, the ones to determine the relative 
merits of any proffered descriptions of their own practices. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Some „Thoughts‟ on „Thoughts‟ as „Thoughts‟ 
 
In this final analytic chapter, I will be focusing on the manner in which mental 
predicates and psychological terms are used in psychotherapeutic interactions. 
Following from the consideration of psychological terms usage in Chapter 3, I take the 
position that when one considers the use of psychological terms in actual use, such use 
cannot merely be taken as referential. That is to say, utterances involving terms such as 
„think‟, „remember‟, „understand‟, „feel‟, „thought‟, „perceive‟, and so forth should not 
by default be taken as substantives that map referentially on to inner, hidden, cognitive 
processes or states. Given that a strong counter-cognitivist position would suggest that 
when such things as „thoughts‟ (for example) are invoked in talk-in-interaction they 
cannot operate referentially,
1 what can one analytically say about invocations of 
„thoughts‟ that appear to be at first glance unambiguously presented as „thoughts‟? In 
addition, how might one approach talk that pertains to „feelings‟? 
In addition, my focus on „thoughts‟ and „feelings‟ follows from the 
consideration and respecification of what counts as a „mood‟ presented in Chapter 6. 
Consider that when one consults the OED one finds entries for mood that notably make 
reference to „thought‟ and „feeling‟ (e.g., “Mind, thought, will, Also: heart, feeling”, 
OED, 2002, n.p.). In this regard, my general aim in the current chapter is to take a 
circuitous route to „lead up‟ to some analytic considerations of what might be regarded 
as some „unambiguous‟ usage of such terms in relation to their common association 
with matters pertaining to „moods‟, and hint that “„having a cognition‟ [or „feeling‟] is, 
in spite of traditional psychological conceptions, defined by the (various) projects 
                                                 
1 Operate as an ontological, rather than epistemological, position.      
  293 
people get up to – including, of course, the various projects of Psychology itself” 
(Antaki, 2006, p. 14).  
Moreover, how might one proceed with empirical investigations of such 
materials in sites where the status of any particular „thoughts‟ or „feelings‟ may be 
highly contested, and massively consequential? While the consequentiality of such 
„thoughts‟ and „feelings‟ may well elude direct appreciation, I would suggest that the 
psychotherapy sessions in the current examination represent interaction which occurs 
in-and-as a specific, massively consequential setting or site for the doing of a range of 
psychological business. And, in this regard, such a site is likely to be rich with 
psychological terms usage. Indeed, this might well be unsurprising given that “using 
talk to find the psychological in the mundane is the stuff of therapy” (Antaki et al., 
2005a, p. 3). 
„Cognition in the Wild‟ 
Now, I present this material not in order to embark on a wide ranging critique of 
forms of psychotherapy, or indeed, to evaluate the relative merit of individual clinicians. 
Regardless of any cognitive or behavioural models that are presumed to inform, or 
underlie, the types of therapy that professional psychotherapists may engage with (e.g., 
„cognitive behaviour therapy‟, „rational emotive therapy‟, „client centred therapy‟, 
„psychodynamic therapy‟, and so forth), ethnomethodologically informed investigations 
can elucidate the techniques employed by therapists as practical skills and the products 
of their work as demonstrable achievements (e.g., Antaki et al., 2005a; Hutchby, 2005; 
Madill et al., 2001; Peräkylä, 1995; Silverman, 1997).  
In regards to examinations that are focused on psychological language use, in a 
sense, one might consider such work as the study of „cognition in the wild‟. How are 
thoughts produced as thoughts in naturalistic settings? How are feelings produced as 
feelings in naturalistic settings? I would suggest that these terms often feature in the      
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social scientific literature as variables and factors with operational definitions, where 
such usage occludes the situated and highly specific deployment of such terms in situ. 
Following from Lynch (2006) I would like to make the point that, whatever else things 
such as „thoughts‟ may or may not be, they are words, and as such one can examine 
how such words feature in-and-as situated displays of conduct, pragmatic actions or 
performances, as practices.  
For example, we could begin with an examination of the practices involved 
when persons go about establishing what other persons „know‟ (Antaki, 2006), or 
indeed the practices by which persons can not „know‟ (Edwards & Potter, 2005). Other 
practices that could be examined might include the practices by which persons „forget‟ 
or „not remember‟ (Lynch & Bogen, 1996, 2005), or perhaps display „forgetfulness‟ or 
„uncertainty‟ (Goodwin, 1987), or the practices by which people attend to intentional, 
goal-directed activities (e.g., Kidwell & Zimmerman, 2007). In the current analysis, 
what is of primary interest is an examination of what could be seen as some basic 
building blocks of psychological discourse, and one might suggest the basic objects of 
interest in any psychotherapeutic interaction. That is, it begins with a focus on the 
psychological terms „think‟ and „feel‟, in their various grammatical guises (e.g., „thinks‟, 
„thinking‟, „thought‟, „thoughts‟, „feels‟, „feeling‟, feelings‟, „felt‟), and then broadens 
to encompass the way in which such terms feature as matters of concern in the 
therapeutic interactions. 
The following is not presented as a complete and exhaustive empirically derived 
taxonomy, or surview of the grammar, of how such terms feature in every, and any, 
interaction. It is undertaken to suggest that in psychotherapeutic interactions, perhaps 
counter intuitively, psychological expressions that involve ascriptions, avowals, or 
displays concerning „thoughts‟ and „feelings‟ generally do not refer to events that occur      
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in some hidden realm, such that they can only be taken as descriptions of mental or 
emotional events.
2 
As Hacker makes clear, while something of the form „I think that X‟ is 
commonly an avowal of a belief or an opinion, it might also be used as something akin 
to an admission or confession, or indeed as a statement (Hacker, 2006). Nonetheless, 
one should be cautious in providing generalisations as to how such statements might 
operate, and bear in mind the importance of adopting a Wittgensteinian orientation 
towards such investigations by way of undertaking detailed examinations of the 
particular case (Hacker, 1990b, 2006). After all, as Wittgenstein reminds us, thinking is 
indeed a “widely ramified concept” (Wittgenstein, 1967b, §110). 
In this regard, what is on offer is analysis of instances of what appear at first 
glance to be fairly straightforward uses of such terms in order to develop more detailed 
analysis of how such terms may feature as significant matters of concern for participants 
engaged in decidedly therapeutic interactions. This involves an initial examination of 
the practices where such terms might be used in the performance of a variety of 
mundane activities, such as in giving an opinion or evaluation, demonstrating 
affiliation, and constructing a story. I will then consider usage that might be relevant in 
the reporting of problematic cognitions and troublesome emotions, and in-and-as 
situated displays involving „thoughts‟ and „feelings‟.  
Occassioned Use of Psychological Terms 
Hutchby, in an examination of „feeling-talk‟ (amongst other things) in child 
counselling settings, provides an analysis of some talk in which four siblings are talking 
with a counsellor about visiting their father‟s home. Hutchby suggests that, subsequent 
to a question concerning the frequency of the children‟s visits, a counsellor question 
                                                 
2 And while my initial exposition will cover familiar territory with regard to the grammar of such terms, 
consider that “the work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose” 
(Wittgenstein, 1967a, §127).      
  296 
“What bits o‟ that do y‟ like an‟ what bit o‟ that don‟t y‟like.” (Hutchby, 2005, Extract 
1, lines 14-15, p. 311) works as a counsellor produced reformulation that “seeks to 
relate that news back to the children‟s feelings about events” (Hutchby, 2005, p. 312, 
emphasis in original). However, there is nothing in this extract that points categorically 
to feelings, or indeed thoughts, in terms of how participants orient to such terms as 
categories; rather, it speaks to relating some prior news talk to children‟s opinion or 
stance towards those events. 
 In other words, the use of „feelings‟ here is an analytic gloss (as is „opinion‟ or 
„stance‟), as Hutchby no doubt suggests when stating that “formulations have been 
shown to be a key resource by means of which children‟s concerns or feelings about 
events in their family life are rendered into publicly available topics of talk” (2005, p. 
326, emphasis added). My point here is not to suggest that the analysis is in some sense 
incorrect, or that one should be overly pedantic about particular analytic glossing 
practices, but rather to highlight my concern that one can make a firmer case in relation 
to such things as „feelings-talk‟ (and „thinking-talk‟) by providing an explication of 
feelings and thoughts when those terms are occasioned in the interaction. In other 
words, when the terms themselves feature demonstrably as participants‟ concerns. 
As previously discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, in much of the talk clients provide 
accounts of troublesome matters, of problems, and the therapist provides for candidate 
psychologised formulations, or reformulations (Davis, 1986), of these problems. My 
earlier focus was on the manner in which such reformulations could serve in the 
production of what might count as a symptom of bipolar disorder (Chapter 5), and how 
„mood‟ might operate as a kind of account production device (Chapter 6), and while 
there is considerable overlap with those themes here I would like to suggest that not 
only are reformulations of clients‟ accounts produced and constructed using 
psychological terms (e.g., „think‟, „thought‟, „feel‟, „feeling‟), but that such terms may      
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themselves feature as the objects which are the topic of such psychologised 
formulations. 
Basic Assessments and Evaluations 
Utterances of the form „I think X‟ occur routinely in the data corpus, operative in 
a range of fashions, generally involving assessments and evaluations, involving 
agreement and disagreement, and in providing extensions to the utterances of prior 
speakers. These may occur in a sequence that does not have the typical prosodic 
features of a question requiring a response; rather, each speaker provides what could be 
approached as a kind of rhetorical question. For example, consider the following extract.  
 
Extract 7.1 
1    Phil:  Ah so it’s stress related. 
2    (.) 
3    Luke:  I think it is stress related. 
4     (.) 
5    Phil:  Yeah. (.) 
 
Here, Phil provides an evaluation concerning some previous talk that something 
is “stress related” (line 1), to which Luke provides a kind of stand-alone response “I 
think it is stress related” (line 3). Or, to put things another way, Phil provides an upshot 
formulation concerning the indexical „it‟, to which Luke provides a congruent second 
assessment (Pomerantz, 1984a). Consider also that Luke provides for a confirmation 
with an almost identical utterance, in a sense „confirming an allusion‟ (Schegloff, 1996). 
This is followed by Phil providing an acknowledgement token “Yeah” (line 5), which 
can serve as both a receipt of Luke‟s statement, and as a kind of confirmation of his own, 
initial formulation.  
As Buttny has outlined, this type of structure has three turns: 1) therapist 
ascription or recommendation; 2) client response or evaluation; and 3) therapist 
evaluation of client response (Buttny, 1996). Additionally, it can serve as an assessment      
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by Phil, following Luke‟s second assessment, of what the expected or anticipated 
assessment from Luke was going to entail – if one considers that with such an adjacency 
pair there is a preference structure for agreement (Heritage & Watson, 1979).  
Nonetheless, here a formulation is provided by one party, acknowledged and 
repeated by the second party, and then ratified by the first party – and it is via „think‟ in 
this instance (other psychological terms could of course serve this function) that both 
parties can construct a kind of stance alignment concerning the matter at hand.
3 While 
this is not something that is solely to be found in the provenance of therapeutic 
interactions, with considerable attention directed towards third turn and third turn repair 
notably by Schegloff (1992b, 1997a), in such interactions such a third turn may provide 
a means by which a therapist can “not only assess or correct, but also explain, clarify, or 
elaborate given the clients‟ uptake of the therapeutic position” (Buttny, 1996, p. 143, 
emphasis in original). It is to this „therapeutic position‟ that I will be directing my 
attention towards for the remainder of this chapter. 
 
Extract 7.2 
1    Phil:   Where are we it’s May: the fifth: (.) I have no doubt  
2            that (0.9) at least by the end of the month and  
3            possibly before (0.8) º↑you’ll be back up thereº= 
7    Mike:  =ºYeah I think so tooº= 
8    Phil:  =Mm (0.2) 
 
Here, we have a similar sequence to the previous extract (Extract 7.1), with 
Phil‟s assessment “º↑you‟ll be back up thereº” (line 3) latched with Mike‟s second 
assessment “ºYeah I think so tooº” (line 7), followed by Phil‟s latched 
acknowledgement token “Mm” (line 8). Phil‟s “I have no doubt that” (lines 1 and 2),  
“at least” (line 2), and “possibly before” (line 3) provide for a positive assessment (also 
                                                 
3 I note also that Schegloff comments on the use of „I think‟ preceding a repeat, in a brief footnote 
(Schegloff, 1996, p. 179).      
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displaying affiliation and alignment) that relates to „when‟ rather than „if‟ Mike will be 
„back up there‟.  
The use of „I think‟ often occurs following extended sequences where some 
version of events may be in dispute, and can serve to introduce an upshot formulation 
that is likely to entail a range of psychological terms that can serve to soften the 
rejection of a claim or inference. Consider the following extract which is taken from a 
section of talk in which there has been a lengthy account provided by a client 
concerning the details (and implications for the client‟s current situation) of a third-
party story. 
 
Extract 7.3 
1    Phil:   Now (0.5) I think a story like that makes me very  
2            suspicious because I <wonder what he ↓did.> 
3            (0.5) 
 
In this extract, Phil provides for his take on a story delivered by his interlocutor, 
and in doing so uses a variety of psychological terms, such as “think”, “suspicious”, and 
“wonder” (lines 1-2). Note that Phil does not directly reject his interlocutor‟s story 
outright, rather, he provides for an assessment concerning the story in terms of his own 
psychological reactions, and he delivers this with some degree of conviction. He 
“think[s]” it is a “story like that” that “makes” him “very suspicious” (lines 1-2). And 
„stories like that‟, for Phil, are ones that make him “wonder” about what the person 
involved in the story actually “↓did” (line 2).  
The „wonder‟ here serves as a kind of invitation to consider the veracity of the 
story, more specifically, the intentionality of its original author and not the current teller. 
Nevertheless, the description provided by Phil does moral work with regard to a 
negative evaluation of the original „story‟ and what its author „did‟, and may well be a      
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„veiled‟ moral evaluation of the telling of the story by his current interlocutor 
(Bergmann, 1992).  
In this regard, consider that „wondering‟ might work towards establishing 
affiliation concerning such a description with a current interlocutor (Drew, 1998), and 
while Phil‟s take on the „story‟ certainly appears likely to be tendentious, consider that 
such an invitation provides for Phil‟s interlocutor an opportunity to provide for a more 
extended treatment of the „story‟, not just as a moral matter, but perhaps in a manner 
conducive to the doing of therapy (rather than an argument, for example). In this regard, 
consider that „think‟ can be seen to be working in these extracts as a means by which 
interlocutors can emphasis subjectivity (e.g., Schegloff, 1992b) and sometimes to soften 
a claim (e.g., Edwards, 2000). 
 
Extract 7.4 
1    Dave:   They used .h you’d think (0.8) And she said yes because  
2            you’re a regular we put these other people in ºand I’m  
3            like well you’d think because I was regular 
4            [you could sayº  .hh] 
5    Phil:   [Yeah you’d get more] (0.3) 
 
Here, „think‟ is used with the modal would  (Edwards, 2006b) in the form 
“you‟d think” (i.e., „you would think‟) in line 1. In this form, „think‟ attends to 
normative expectations, that given certain events, contexts, actions and so forth, one 
could reasonably assume some particular type of outcome. Here, to „think‟ is specified 
as a normative practice, that is to say, an evaluation concerning what one could 
normally be expected to „think‟.
4 Note also the overlap across lines 4 and 5 which might 
work as a joint turn completion (e.g., Jefferson, 1984a), featuring Phil‟s upshot 
formulation, that further bolsters the notion that „what you‟d think‟ is something that 
anyone would „think‟ – here, one could say Phil provides for just such a demonstration.  
                                                 
4 Consider also Sacks‟s comments on the use of „you‟ as a way of “talking about „everybody‟ – and 
indeed, incidentally, of „me‟” (Sacks, 1992a, pp. 348-353).      
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Interrogatives 
Apart from providing an evaluation or assessment, speakers can of course use 
„think‟ and „feel‟ in direct questions. That is, clearly interrogative questions with 
regards to semantic content, sequential position, and intonational features. One common 
way in which the term „think‟ is used in the corpus is in such questions, commonly at 
the beginning or at the end of utterances. At the beginning of an utterance, an utterance 
that constitutes a first turn-at-talk, „do you think‟ enables a current speaker to maintain 
turn-at-talk until the completion of a hearable question, whereas at the end of an 
utterance it acts to foreshadow the positioning of a transition relevance place. Examples 
of the former include:  
 
Extract 7.5 
1    Mike:   Do you think that might be a good thing to do? 
 
Extract 7.6 
1    Phil:   Do you feel that you overreacted?  
 
Examples of the later include:  
 
Extract 7.7 
1    Phil:  >So it was methamphetamine you think?< 
 
Extract 7.8 
1    Phil:  Look h the question at the end of the day is how do you  
2            feel about your drinking? 
 
Parties can provide more-or-less direct answers to such questions, with „think‟ 
or „feel‟ packaged in a response that can serve as a show of agreement and affiliation 
(e.g., „Yes – I think/feel X‟). Now, while these discrete turns are indeed hearable as 
questions, and could be analysed as such, given they occur in sequentially organised 
talk it is more profitable to examine them embedded in interaction. Notwithstanding      
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conversation analytic concerns with regard to analysis of question-answer sequences as 
adjacency pairs, as Coulter makes clear, what might at first glance appear to be a 
straightforward „question‟ can often be approached as a “pre-sequence constraint on 
inference-potential” (Coulter, 1991, p. 38).  
In short, this points to the manner in which question and answer sequences often 
serve to enable the production of joint actions (i.e., Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970) that can 
be undertaken following the initial question and answer sequence. The kinds of joint 
actions that are of interest here, are those we might wish to gloss as involving 
therapeutic concerns, and to which I will begin to direct my analytic comments towards. 
 
Extract 7.9 
1    Phil:   How does that sound? 
2            (0.5) 
3    Dave:   You think they’d send one to me, put in the post?= 
4    Phil:   =Or they’ll give it to Jessica and Jessica can give it  
5            to you (1.1) 
 
In this regard, here we have one of only two instances in the data corpus where it 
is a client asking the therapist a question using the term „think‟ (at line 3), the other 
instance being Extract 7.5 (cf. with the modal usage in Extract 7.4). Notably, there were 
no instances involving a client initiated question using the term „feel‟. Moreover, in the 
current corpus, there were very few instances involving therapist initiated questions of 
this form (e.g., „what do you think?‟). Rather, „think‟ and „thought‟ commonly occur as 
part of utterances that provide an evaluation in the absence of a direct question.  
This was not the case with the terms „feel‟, with questions featuring the term 
commonly asked, but notably, such questions were always asked by the therapist. This 
could be taken as pointing to the particular institutional features of the talk, with 
questions in general being asked mostly by the therapist (cf. Frankel, 1990; Heath, 
1992). After all, one might not expect to observe clients to routinely quiz their therapists      
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on their „feelings‟. In this regard, the therapist may ask questions and offer advice 
concerning particular troubles, while clients generally restrict their actions to talk about 
troubles (e.g., Jefferson & Lee, 1981; Peräkylä, 1995; Silverman, 1997). 
In regard to such troubles, which often feature accounts concerning third parties, 
consider the following extract in which an attribution is made of a knowledge claim by 
a speaker to a third-party (i.e., the reporting of a third-person assessment), with a 
request for an evaluation of the knowledge claim by a present speaker.  
 
Extract 7.10 
1    Jane:   M:y mum reckons that she used to play with me lots when  
2        I was a kid (0.2) ºCause I wasº (0.9) ºNever sit stillº 
3     (1.1) 
4    Phil:   >And what do you think?< 
5     (1.8) 
6    Jane:   .pt I can’t remember it but she reckons um 
7     (0.7) 
 
Here, Jane provides an account of what her “mum reckons” (line 1) concerning 
events that occurred when Jane “was a kid” (line 2). Phil‟s question, “And what do you 
think?” (line 4), is non-specific with regard to an object of „thought‟, rather, it entails 
that Jane provide a re-assessment of her account of her mum‟s tendentious claim, and as 
a tendentious claim concerning her mum. Consider that Jane‟s answer “I can‟t 
remember it” (line 6) serves to index both the claim, attributed to her mum, that “she 
used to play with me lots when I was a kid” (lines 1-2) and the attributed reason given 
to support the claim “Never sit still” (line 2). In other words, both come packaged 
together.  
This is followed on line 6 by a disclaimer “but” and a repeat of “reckons” as a 
sort of qualified psychological/knowledge term (i.e., to attribute to someone that „they 
reckon X‟ is to bring into question the veracity of X – in other words, it has the status of 
an opinion as opposed to a fact). As noted by Pomerantz in the reporting of third-person      
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assessments, affiliation or disaffiliation with such assessments may be made by the 
current speaker (Pomerantz, 1984a). Here, then, „think‟ can provide for the teasing out 
of the implications of a reported claim of action („play with me lots‟) and the reported 
evidence that supports the claim („never sit still‟), such that the status of both are subject 
to disputation as a matter of fact („I can‟t remember it‟) and as a disaffiliative stance 
towards the third-person („but she reckons‟). 
 
Extract 7.11 
1    Phil:   <↑What do you think it could’ve bee*n** (0.2) that the  
2            experience of being in her bed has triggered for you> 
3            (0.2) 
4    Mike:  .pt (0.2) ººOh okayºº (0.3) U:m: (0.3) .hh Sense of  
5            ↑guilt I suppose? 
6            (0.2) 
7    Phil:   Guilt because? 
 
In this case, „think‟ relates to the dispositional characteristics of the person asked 
to provide the assessment. Note that Phil‟s question appears designed to project for an 
answer that may feature some kind of psychological account, with Phil‟s use of 
“could‟ve” (line 1) working as a kind of „back-dated predictability‟ (Edwards, 2006b) 
on what the “experience of being” (line 2) has “triggered” for Mike. Sure enough, the 
question elicits an account of a psychological nature, with Mike offering a tentative 
“sense of ↑guilt” (lines 4-5) as the thing which has been “triggered” (line 2). Phil can 
then move to draw out the implications of such „guilt‟ on the third-turn. 
„How do you feel at the moment?‟ 
Extract 7.12A 
1    Phil:   >How vulnerable do you feel at the moment?< 
2            (0.9) 
3    Phil:   >To exposure by her?< 
4            (2.5) 
5    Mike:  ºPretty vulnerableº (0.2) 
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Switching now to an examination of „feel‟, in this extract Phil‟s question does 
not appear to warrant a response that relates to some form of overtly affective account, 
rather it seems designed to elicit an answer that relates to the likelihood of some kind of 
outcome. Here, the question of how “vulnerable” (line 1) Mike may “feel” (line 1) to 
“exposure” (line 3) projects for some kind of evaluation – in much the same way as if 
„feel‟ were replaced with „think you are‟, or just „how vulnerable are you at the 
moment‟.  
Consider how this plays out in the next extract (which follows directly from 
Extract 7.12A). 
 
Extract 7.12B 
1    Phil:   >So what do you think she might do?< 
2    (1.5) 
3    Mike:  hhhhhh >ºTell her friendsº< (1.1) ºY’know I got this-  
4            went out with this nutcaseº 
 
In this form, „think‟ can serve to provide a term by which a person can be asked 
to provide an account concerning a third-person disposition. What is established by Phil 
in the first instance is that Mike feels pretty vulnerable to the actions of a third person, 
and then that Mike thinks this third person will engage in particular actions. Across 
these two extracts we can observe a particular kind of sequential organisation, the 
occurrence of a first question-answer pair in which the question features the term „feel‟, 
followed by a second question-answer pair in which a follow-up question features the 
term „think‟. And, in the data corpus questions concerning „feel‟ often appear to be 
designed to produce evaluative accounts that do not have emotion as their substantive 
topic, and for which „think‟ appears as an entirely appropriate term for questions in the 
second question-answer pair.  
For example, consider the following extract.       
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Extract 7.13 
1    Phil:   But (0.2) at the end of the day (0.2) y:our: 
2  >le- let’s go back to your drinking.< Your drinking.  
3  (1.0) >How do you feel about your drinking at the  
4            moment?<  
5  (0.5)  
6    Luke:  I feel ºm:º (0.5) >much better about it.< 
7  (0.3) 
8    Phil:  ↑Oh (   )  
9    Luke:  I feel like (0.8) I feel (.) much more in control= 
10   Phil:  >Okay.< ((sniff 0.3 sec)) And wh:en: (.) would you know  
11           (0.4) that you’d >overstepped the mark.< 
12           (0.3) 
13   Phil:   What- what would you need to see. 
14   Luke:   Okay. (0.3) La- last Saturday when we were at this  
15           party and we had lots of beers and I had a beer 
 
This type of sequence, involving a „feel‟ question, is typical of such adjacency 
pairs in the data corpus. That is, the therapist may ask a „feel‟ question that relates 
specifically to a current topic of talk (e.g., “drinking”, line 3), followed by a client 
evaluation or assessment (e.g., „feel much better about it‟ and „feel much more in 
control‟ lines 6 and 9), which may develop toward the provision of some form of 
therapeutic advice on the part of the therapist. For example, following Phil‟s question 
on how Luke „feels‟, and Luke‟s „feel‟ assessment , Phil then moves to establishing 
when Luke would „know‟ (“And wh:en: (.) would you know”, line 10) that he might 
have a problem.  
With regard to how think and feel might feature in terms of the sequential 
position of questions such as „what do you think‟ and ‟how do you feel‟, and how these 
might function as therapeutic devices, Hutchby provides analysis of a child counselling 
session (Hutchby, 2005, Extract 5, pp. 317-318) in which “the ultimate formulation of a 
segment of feelings-talk is presented as the climax to a set of „discoveries‟ that the 
counsellor makes” (2005, p. 317). While I will not examine this material in detail, of      
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interest is a question asked by the counsellor “D‟you think she‟d prefer to smack dad.” 
(line 33, p. 318) which is later followed by the „ultimate‟ formulation “So::, so „f she 
smacks you::, (.) sometimes it might feel better cuz it means that mum and dad don‟t 
have a row.” (lines 45-46, p. 318). Here, an initial formulation is provided that features 
think (as in „Do you think …‟), and following some client talk a reformulation is 
provided that features feel. This might enable a shift, from the provision of something 
hearable as an opinion, to something that might allow for a more delicate account to be 
produced concerning a problematic event.
5  
Or, to put it another way, it might involve something along the lines of „that is 
what you think – now tell me what you really feel‟ or „how does that make you feel‟. 
And, as one might imagine, questions featuring „feel‟ can be, and are, designed to elicit 
accounts concerning emotions. However, this is not simply a matter of a therapist 
asking directly what a client „feels‟, with a client providing a clearly enunciated 
description of a particular „feeling‟. Rather, such questions can function to elicit a 
reformulation from the client rather than a therapist.  
That is to say, rather than the therapist working towards providing 
reformulations that may be accepted by a client as a prelude to providing some kind of 
advice, a client can produce reformulations of their own descriptions, and this may well 
be a canonical feature which marks such interactions as psychotherapeutic interactions.
6 
However, this does not always go to plan, as we shall see with the following two 
extracts. These are taken from the end of a session, over which there has been 
considerable misalignment between therapist and client concerning the psychological 
implications of the client‟s accounts. 
 
                                                 
5 Consider the substitution of „sometimes you might think it‟s better‟. 
 
6 Or, to be more accurate, those that are often regarded (by therapists) as „successful‟, with clients 
claiming credit for therapeutic insights rather than attributing them to therapists.      
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Extract 7.14A 
1    Phil:   Right we need to s:top but >ºth- ah oº< (0.6) now I  
2            ↑know you got frustrated in the mini- in the middle of  
3            this that we were all going around in circ[les] 
4    Dave:      [ºMº] 
5    Phil:   >So so so< how do you ºf::º (0.3) How are you feeling  
6            at the moment. 
7            (1.1) 
8    Dave:   That it was a waste of time that I was desperate to  
9            find something .hh For Christ’s sake it’s the start of  
10           the holidays, (1.0) I’m gonna feel (0.6) really alone  
11           and really dissatisfied that I can’t (0.8) give Jessica  
12           what she wants (0.5) 
 
Following Phil‟s move to foreshadow the closing of the session, and after he 
provides a summary formulation concerning the session (and Dave‟s take on the session 
itself), he moves to ask Dave “How are you feeling at the moment” (lines 5-6).
7 Note 
that Phil‟s repair of “how do you ºf::º” to “how are you feeling” across lines 5 and 6 
projects for a report of how Dave is „feeling‟ now. That is, it moves away from 
something like „how do you [feel]‟ or „how do you [feel about X]‟ which might project 
for a possible uptake that what is being requested is some kind of evaluation or 
assessment (i.e., the provision of an opinion likely related to the utility or merit of the 
session) rather than something like an affective report. Consider that an extension, 
addition, or expansion to the statement „how are you feeling at the moment‟ such as 
„[about X]‟ would likely project that what is not required is some form of affective or 
emotion report.  
It would appear that (if one were to accept this decidedly tendentious analytic 
claim) this is unsuccessful in this instance, as Dave provides an account for what he is 
“gonna feel” (line 6), rather than providing for a kind of affective report of how he 
might be „feeling‟ „at the moment‟. Regardless, if one considers the negative projection 
                                                 
7 Note also the use of a prefatory so in the initial position of Phil‟s turn-at-talk (Hutchby, 2005).      
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that Dave provides of how he is „gonna feel‟ (“really alone and really dissatisfied”, lines 
6-7), this might provide a warrant for Phil to take this as an opportunity to have another 
„go‟ and work towards getting a more positive upshot formulation.  
Consider how this plays out in the next extract (which follows directly from 
Extract 7.14A). 
 
Extract 7.14B 
1    Phil:   ºOkayº (0.7) This year. 
2            (2.4) 
3    Dave:   ºYep.º 
4            (1.0) 
5    Phil:   ºBut next year could be different.º 
6            (1.3) 
7    Dave:   ↑Whoo ↑Hoo 
8            (1.9) 
9    Dave:   ºThat’s how I feel.º 
10           (0.3) 
11   Phil:   ºHmº (.) 
 
Here one could well describe Dave‟s “↑Whoo ↑Hoo” (line 7) and “ºThat‟s how I feel.º” 
(line 9) as being petulant, or sarcastic responses to Phil‟s turn at line 5, which projects 
that Dave might (or should) „feel‟ better given some time. Regardless, Phil‟s attempt at 
providing an upshot formulation of a more positive nature (perhaps as a means to end 
the session on a „good note‟) that will be accepted by Dave is clearly unsuccessful. 
At this point, I would like to draw attention to a particular kind of use of the 
terms „feel‟ and „feeling‟ when packaged in a therapist produced question of the general 
form „how do you feel at the moment?‟ (e.g., Extracts 7.12, 7.13, 7.14A, also 6.1A and 
6.5A). That is, these might be approached as involved in the production of a therapist 
initiated perspective-display series (Maynard, 1989, 1991b), in which the therapist 
solicits an opinion from a client, and following the client‟s account (or „perspective‟ on      
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the initial topic) the therapist provides a subsequent report or opinion in a manner that 
takes the client‟s „perspective‟ into consideration.  
In this sense, a question such as „how do you feel at the moment?‟ can serve as 
an initial perspective-display invitation which might „open up‟ or enable a more general 
range of responses by a client that can then be incorporated into a subsequent therapist 
report or account, rather than (for example) questions featuring „think‟ which may 
project for more specific, and possibly problematic, responses. 
However, that is not to say that such „feel‟ questions are not without potential 
problems, as I will demonstrate in the next two extracts.  
 
Extract 7.15A 
1    Phil:   Okay so what’s the essential message of that? 
2            (1.7) 
3    Phil:   Well how does it feel 
4            (4.1) 
5    Jane:   Hurtful? 
6            (0.4) 
7    Jane:   I dunno [ºI just  wanted  to  fuckin  kill] herº 
8    Phil:           [>Yeah yeah yeah< hurtful because?] 
9            (0.7) 
10   Jane:   ↑Caus:e she’s a bitch.  
11           (.) 
12   Phil:   ↑You (0.2) >Yeah yeah yeah okay okay< (0.4) Let’s let’s  
13           stick to the cycle [( )] 
14   Jane:                      [And] because she was wrong (0.2) 
15           I [dunno] 
16   Phil:     [Yes  ] (.) So how was her: (1.0) comment to you, how  
17           f:air: did it feel 
18           (0.7) 
19   Jane:  ºNot fair at allº (.)     
 
Phil‟s first turn appears designed to invite Jane to provide an upshot 
reformulation of some previous talk (in which Jane provides a lengthy account 
concerning a problematic interaction with her sister, with whom she reports being “ºf      
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fuckin pissed offº”). However, no response is immediately forthcoming from Jane (i.e., 
she does not take a turn-at-talk, by way of some substantive talk concerning Phil‟s 
question of by way of a „turn holder‟ such as an „um‟ or „ah‟), and Phil reworks the 
question at line 3 as “Well how does it feel” (cf. Hutchby, 2005). Now, such a question 
might be approached as an initial perspective-display invitation, which might enable 
Phil to take a more circuitous and delicate approach to exploring the events, and in 
particular, to possibly generate some „raw material‟ that could be used in a subsequent 
reformulation. 
However, it would appear that Jane provides an evaluation that is clearly not 
packaged in a manner that is amenable for further exploration by Phil. It would seem 
that Jane has provided some description of what she wanted to do, where Phil seems 
more interested in her providing some account of how she felt prior to any kind of 
action, or what underlies such action (i.e., a psychological cause). Phil essentially 
discounts Jane‟s extended answer, “ºI just wanted to fuckin kill herº” (line 7) with its 
explanation “↑Caus:e she‟s a bitch” (line 10), as it does not fit into „the cycle‟ (lines 12-
13).  
In other words, there are constraints on the type of formulation that Jane can 
provide, which we might infer have something to do with previous talk concerning a 
„cycle‟. Here, what might count as a „feeling‟ is something that stands in need of some 
form of explanation with regards to a previously established framework; something that 
sounds like it might involve some kind of therapeutic technique or technology to „solve‟ 
a problem (i.e., Jane‟s somewhat extreme reaction to her sister). 
 
Extract 7.15B 
1    Jane:   >Like I’d< (1.2) Y’know I mean I wanna help her with it  
2            but I was like if s:he’s gonna be like that she can  
3            stick it up her arse [I   ] 
4    Phil:                        [Okay] >so so< it felt (0.4)       
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5            unfair? 
6            (0.2) 
7    Jane:   Yeah. 
8            (.) 
9    Phil:   What else did it feel 
10           (1.7) 
11   Jane:   ºI dunnoº 
12           (3.5) 
13   Phil:   There’s something else going on here isn’t there, there  
14           is something else, so it’s unf:ai:r  
15           (8.6) 
16   Phil:   >ºWhat is it what is it what is it come onº< .hh (0.6)  
17           I- she hh .hh You’re doing something for h:er (2.0) and  
18           you’re feeling she’s (0.4) ↑exploiting you. 
19           (2.0) 
20   Phil:   >That’s a question not a:< 
21           (1.0) 
22   Jane:   .pt ↑Ah:= 
23   Phil:   =No no it’s not right.  
24           (1.4) 
25   Phil:   You’re [feel] 
26   Jane:          [Well] I just (0.5) I’m doing it for her a:nd I  
27           think (.) [that     ] she could’ve (.) [got ]= 
28   Phil:             [She’s not]                  [Yeah] 
29   Jane:   =up off her [fat    arse] and got me ith 
30   Phil:               [>Yeah yeah<]          
31           (0.8) 
 
Here, Phil works toward establishing a reformulation concerning Jane‟s account, 
with so-prefaced formulations at lines 4 and 14 (Hutchby, 2005). Following the first, 
with Phil‟s question “it felt (0.4) unfair?” (lines 4-5) and Jane‟s receipt and acceptance 
(“Yeah.”, line 7), Phil moves towards obtaining more information and asks “what else 
did it feel” (line 9). To this, Jane provides “ºI dunnoº” (line 11), which can be seen to 
effectively „close off‟ such open-ended „feel‟ questions, and as such does not furnish 
Phil with materials by which he might construct a candidate formulation that 
incorporates Jane‟s „perspective‟. Phil might now have to persue a different line of 
enquiry, or he can provide the raw materials and invite Jane to reflect on these. In this      
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regard, Phil muses that there is “something else going on here isn‟t there, there is 
something else” (lines 13-14) which is suggestive of an attempt to construct a more 
psychologically oriented reformulation that might account for Jane‟s reactions, which 
further extends across lines 16 to 18.  
One possible description of this is that Phil embarks upon a kind of „fishing‟ 
(Pomerantz, 1980), in which he casts about for some kind of response that might 
provide some clue as to an underlying cause for Jane‟s feeling of unfairness (which can, 
in turn, explain Jane‟s behaviour concerning to the dispute). Interestingly, such a 
„fishing expedition‟ does not appear predicated upon any suggestion that Jane, in some 
sense, knows what the causal underpinnings are and is choosing not to disclose them. 
Rather, Phil (as therapist) and Jane (as client) are engaged in a kind of collaborative 
forensic exercise where they are attempting to uncover the relevant information. 
Phil offers a candidate formulation that Jane feels her sister “exploiting you” 
(line 18) as a candidate feeling. With Jane not taking a turn at talk, Phil provides a self-
initiated repair (“>That‟s a question not a:<”, line 20) which makes his previous turn 
clearly hearable as a question. However, as Jane begins her turn in the absence of a clear 
acceptance (e.g., Pomerantz, 1984a), Phil undertakes repair of the projected 
disaffiliative response with the latched “=No no it‟s not right.” (line 23). Phil then has 
another (unsuccessful) attempt at providing a formulation, with Jane interrupting to 
provide a recycled version of her account (across lines 26-29) which provides for a 
present tense description of her actions in relation to the problem incident and a back-
dated account of what her sister should have done given Jane‟s actions (Edwards, 
2006b).  
While Phil continues in his attempts to generate an acceptable reformulation 
with regard to Jane‟s „feelings‟ (in interaction not detailed here), I would like to present      
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one final extract in this sequence that occurs a few minutes after Extract 7.15B, in order 
to illuminate some previous analytic comments. 
 
Extract 7.16 
1    Phil:   >Ah no no no I’m not I’m not< (0.7) it’s not your  
2            sister per se I’m [interested in the event .h]= 
3    Jane:                     [ºº    ((inaudible))     ºº] 
4    Phil:   =as a psychological event= 
5    Jane:   =ºMmº (.) 
 
Here, after several more failed attempts to work up a reformulation that Jane 
might accept, Phil makes explicit the nature of his questioning. That is, it is clearly 
psychological; he is “interested in the event .h as a psychological event” (lines 2-4). 
Here, then, is some confirmatory evidence regarding my previous analytic descriptions 
of Phil working towards constructing a decidedly psychologised account (i.e., a 
reformulation) concerning Jane‟s dispute with her sister. Moreover, given his 
unsuccessful attempts to do so, he now makes clear what would (presumably) remain an 
otherwise unstated constraint (i.e., his interest in psychological events) to Jane in order 
to get such a practical undertaking underway.    
Just Having a Thought  
Extract 7.17 
1    Mike:   An(w)- she was holding me y’know it was three in the  
2  morning she was holding me we were all cuddled up and I  
3  just said- thought to myself this is w:onderful all  
4  my problems have gone away (0.4) 
 
Consider the insertion repair of “I just said-“ to “thought” (line 3), which moves 
from producing a kind of direct reported speech account (e.g., Buttny, 1998; Holt, 1996) 
concerning an interlocutor to a kind of direct self-reported thought, makes Mike‟s 
assessment “this is w:onderful all my problems have gone away” (lines 3-4) as one that 
is private; one that was not provided to Mike‟s interactant, but is rather an assessment      
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that is now being revealed to the current talk participant (Phil). In other words, the 
grammar of the term „thought‟ is sensitive to temporal deployment (e.g., Goodwin, 
2002), such that what one might „think‟ about a particular event during its occasion (e.g., 
that cuddling up with someone has made problems go away) is what one might „say‟ 
about such an occasion on a telling (cf. Sakita, 2002). In the provision of an account, 
self-reported speech is likely to involve a report of thinking as opposed to saying or 
indeed some other private, psychological process as opposed to some other publicly 
available resource (e.g., Goodwin, 1996). 
Now, in further consideration of the manner in which a speaker may come to 
„just have a thought‟, consider that Sacks (Sacks, 1970?) suggests that such phrases are 
„on topic‟ topic markers that are “routinely used where it may be that the utterance they 
are part of is both extended and more than a possible complete sentence, and where also 
it might from its beginning otherwise not seem on topic” (Sacks, 1970?, p. 45). This 
idea, that the work of utterances that feature psychological terms such as „I just had a 
thought‟ do is anything but referentially index some kinds of cognitive, psychological 
mental states or processes, is developed by Coulter (1983b) and more recently McHoul 
and Rapley (2003). They (McHoul & Rapley) argue that such phrases, rather than 
working retrospectively to reference some private, metal event, work prospectively to 
configure some future talk (2003, p. 512).  
Goodwin (1996) provides for some explication of the practices involved with 
„having a thought‟ that draws from Goffman‟s notion of „response cries‟ (Goffman, 
1981). Goffman suggested these as “signs meant to be taken to index directly the state 
of the transmitter” (1981, p. 116) that “externalize a presumed inner state” (1981, p. 89). 
In this sense, one can approach the use of such terms as enabling a storyteller to report 
on events and as providing a means by which the storyteller can demonstrate a      
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particular stance towards the reported events (Goodwin, 1996).
8 For example, consider 
the following extract which occurs at the end of a story (introduced as a “personal 
story”) provided by Phil to Mike. 
 
Extract 7.18 
1    Phil:   =.hhhhhh ºAnd I suddenly thoughtº (0.3) ºJesus.º (0.4)  
2            .hhh And the responsibility of it, (0.3) I mean twenty  
3            nine, A B C consultant >duh da duh da duh da duh.< .hh  
4            And they were paying me quite a lot of money 
5            [in those] days. .hhhh >And I suddenly had a sense=  
6    Mike:   [Mm.     ] 
7    Phil:   =that< (0.2) I really don’t ↑like this. (0.3) .hh And  
8            that six weeks (0.2) >and I had to do it.= The only way  
9            I could do it was to pretend I’d got- been sentenced to  
10           ↑jail< (.) 
 
Here, we have an instance of “And I suddenly thought” (line 1) and “I suddenly 
had a sense” (line 5) which appear to combine a „thought‟ and something of a more 
affective nature. As Goodwin notes, such an “affective loading” (1996, p. 395) can 
serve to establish that a particular event, and a storyteller‟s orientation to it, is in some 
sense so obvious and yet so remarkable that it has warranted some utterance, and may 
further warrant some subsequent explanation.  
What is interesting, almost all examples of „suddenly thought‟ occur in 
interaction where it is Phil, the therapist, who is providing a story to a client, and 
generally occurs after either a brief preface or more detailed „set up‟ or for the story, 
with the introduction of relevant actors, situations, and precipitating events; or more 
often, immediately after the substantive detail of the story has been covered (as with the 
current extract). That is to say, in the telling of a story, „and I suddenly thought‟ occurs 
at a point in which an upshot or gist formulation can be provided by the story‟s teller 
which serves to make the point of the story, and the telling of the story, relevant.  
                                                 
8 See also Sacks on storytelling (1992b, pp. 222-268).      
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Now, while these sequences are often quite lengthy and detailed, which 
precludes providing extensive examples of transcript in the current account, I will 
present a number of extracts that feature some of the more interesting components of 
such interactions.  
 
Extract 7.19 
1    Phil:   Now. (0.9) .pt .hhh There was a celebrated evening  
2            (0.5) where I was (.) ↑cooking one night and my partner  
3            was sitting (.) opposite ↑me:: and it was just her and  
4            my (   ) (.) .hhh >And as I was cooking she was  
5            ºnibbling.º< 
6            (0.5) 
7    Luke:  Yehp. 
8            (0.4) 
9    Phil:  The next night, (0.6) she’s cooking I come ↑in glass of  
10           ↑wine sit down on the other side of the ↑counter .h  
11           she’s (.) cooking Thai fish cakes. (.) .hh I go oh  
12           they’re delicious aren’t they so- and they really are  
13           good. 
14   Luke:   Hu huh= 
15   Phil:   =And I lent across and stuck my finger into the (.) the  
16           mix and [went] mm that’s delicious >and she said< (.)= 
17   Luke:          [Yeah]  
18   Phil:  =Don’t do that.  
19           (.) 
20   Luke:  <Heh heh> heh heh heh .hhh= 
21   Phil:   =ºSo I thought (.) You: ↑f:ucker [(        )º]= 
22   Luke:                                   [Heh heh heh]   
23   Phil:  =So she turned around to go to the stove (0.6) 
24   Luke:  ºHeh hehº= 
25   Phil:  =>I took a second< (.) Whereupon she threw the whole  
26           thing at me, and stormed off (0.5) 
 
In this story (previously prefaced by Phil‟s question to Luke “Did I tell you my 
fish cake story”) “So I thought” (line 21) acts to both situate and highlight the salience 
of some preceding event and to enable the development of a formulation of the event 
that can allow for a range of possible moral inferences concerning participants‟      
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orientations. Consider how the interaction would appear with line 21 deleted. Here 
Phil‟s „so I thought‟ provides for an insertion, in the narrative sequence of the story and 
its telling, of his attitude (e.g., Sakita, 2002) or his stance or stake (Edwards & Potter, 
1992) with regard to the matter-at-hand; namely, the act of sampling some food while a 
partner is preparing a meal.  
In other words, it provides a way of introducing the subjective experience of the 
teller into an account of events. It makes the description of events relevant and 
understandable given his actions, involving taking a second sample of food when his 
partner has explicitly told him not to, and makes the somewhat problematic and 
questionable consequences of such actions something that are his partner‟s 
responsibility (i.e., throwing the mix at him and storming off). In short, Phil‟s thought 
of “You: ↑f:ucker” (line 21) makes relevant a range of moral positions that would 
otherwise be problematic to extract. 
 
Extract 7.20 
1    Phil:   =Said oh I’ll have a (0.2) a*- a beef pie or a  
2            stockmans pie or whatever it was .hhhh And I sat out on  
3            the sun halfway up the hill where they’re doing all the  
4            .hhhhh renovations (0.2) And it was just beautiful the  
5            wind was just blowing lightly [but] I wasn’t in it= 
6    Mike:                                [↑Mm] 
7    Phil:  =.hhh And I just sat there (chewing it) I see I had a  
8            good morning’s teaching and y’know I’d earnt some good  
9            money .hhh And I thought we:ll the world’s not a bad  
10           pla[ce ] 
11   Mike:     [↑Ye]ah (0.2) Absolutely. 
12           (.) 
13   Phil:  Y’know but it was simple it [was ] sitting on a= 
14   Mike:                              [Yeah] 
15   Phil:  =mountain eating a meat pie (.) 
 
In this extract we can see a more reflective „having a thought‟ with Phil‟s “And I 
thought” (line 9) appearing as less a surprising revelation, and more as a smooth preface      
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(e.g., with an absence of notable intonation features) for his upshot formulation 
(involving an idiomatic expression) that “the world‟s not a bad place” (lines 9-10). Note 
that this is met with Mike‟s overlapping and unqualified agreement “↑Yeah” (line 11) 
which he further ratifies with “Absolutely” (line 11). Phil then accounts for the 
unremarkable, utterly mundane, way in which he came to have such a „thought‟, that “it 
was simple it was sitting on a mountain eating a meat pie” (lines 13-15).  
 
Extract 7.21 
1    Phil:   And I suddenly thought yeah I don’t fit in.  
2            (0.3) 
3    Mike:   [Yeah 
4    Phil:   [I’m not a bloke. 
6            (0.2) 
7    Mike:   Yeah. 
8            (0.5) 
9    Phil:   >Cause I- I just don’t get it.< 
 
This extract follows an extended storytelling by Phil (introduced as a “funny 
story”), concerning a fishing trip (not detailed here due to length), which can be glossed 
as involving his provision of an account of not „fitting in‟ with decidedly „blokey‟ 
activities that occurred (e.g., catching fish, talking about boats and engines, killing a 
bird, using knives). During the telling of the story, Phil prefaces a number of utterances 
with present tense mental state avowals including:  “and I‟m thinking”; “and I just 
thinking”; “and I just thought”; “had a thought”; and “I thought”. At the end of his story, 
presented in this extract, he provides an upshot formulation, prefaced with “And I 
suddenly thought” (line 1), that he does not “fit in” (line 1) as he is “not a bloke” (line 
4). This is then followed by a lengthy „second story‟ (Sacks, 1992a) produced by Mike 
(not detailed here), in which he details not „fitting in‟ with „blokey‟ activities involved 
with hunting.      
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Now, while these story tellings by Phil and Mike are too lengthy to present here, 
consider the following extract which features most of the substantive elements of the 
conclusion to a first story and the telling of a second. 
 
Extract 7.22 
1    Phil:   .hhhhhhhh >ºShe was exhausted and she wants to ↑kill  
2            him.º< (0.5) .tch >And she says I want to turn his  
3            ventilator o(h)ff::  
4            (0.4) 
5            ((possible restrained laughter 0.6 secs)) 
6    Phil:   And (.) I said to her- and she- she said but why does  
7         he want, (0.4) to [live? 
8    Mike:                     [Mm. ºMmº 
9            (0.6) 
10   Phil:   ºAnd I said. (0.8) Because it’s better than the  
11           alternative.º 
12   Mike:   Mm. 
13           (0.3) 
14   Phil:   ºAnd I said. A- because, (0.8) he’s actually ↓enjoying  
15           itº 
16   Mike:   ººIt’s amazing.ºº 
17           (0.6) 
18   Phil:   .hh ºAnd I suddenly thought.= That’s ↑it. (0.3) And  
19           (0.5) I ↓know (0.4) from being seriously ill some time  
20           ago, .hhhhh That what struck me once I knew ooh fuck  
21           you’re dying, .hhh wa:s, (0.3) not that I wanted to  
22           climb Mount Everest .hh >but I wanted to wake up to the  
23           dog for a walk around the reserve again.º< 
24   Mike:   It’s amazing isn’t it. 
25           (0.3) 
26   Phil:   .hhh And the mundane becomes enormously important. 
27   Mike:   .pt (0.5) So there’s a lesson in that.= Obviously >I  
28           mean< .hhh A*** even this morning taking the dog for a  
29           walk just down the beach= 
30   Phil:   =Yeah. 
31   Mike:   It was just lovely. 
 
This extract is taken from the end of a story told by Phil (again introduced as a 
“funny story”) concerning a client who struggles to cope with looking after her husband      
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(who is described as being paralysed except for his head). Here “And I suddenly 
thought” (line 18) prefaces “That‟s ↑it.” (line 18) which acts as a kind of „revelation‟ 
that projects for a possible story moral, a therapeutic punch-line, as foreshadowing an 
imparting of some kind of advice (cf. Silverman, 1997). Now, while these stories are 
often prefaced with prospective indexicals (e.g., Goodwin, 1986, 1996, 2002; Sacks, 
1974), for example „personal‟ (Extract 7.18), „fish cake‟ (Extract 7.19), and „funny‟ 
(Extracts 7.21 and 7.22), which provide an interpretative framework by which a hearer 
can coparticipate in the unfolding story, consider that the subject of the „thought‟ in 
these extracts might also be regarded as prospective indexicals (“That‟s ↑it.” in the 
current extract).  
Phil then elaborates on this across lines 19 to 23, in that he links this to his own 
experience and previous revelation or insight (“what struck me”, line 20) concerning his 
experience of “being seriously ill some time ago” (lines 19-20) that “the mundane 
becomes enormously important” (line 26). This could be taken as related to the 
indexical „it‟ that Mike‟s acknowledges first at line 16 (“ººIt‟s amazing.ºº”) and again at 
line 24 (“It‟s amazing isn‟t it”), which relate to Phil‟s usage at line 10 (“Because it‟s 
better than the alternative”), lines 14 to 15 (“he‟s actually ↓enjoying it”), and the 
„revelatory‟ “That‟s ↑it.” at line 18.  
In such extracts we can get a sense a structure by which such utterances might 
be organised, beginning with Goodwin‟s (1996) suggestion that storytellers can design 
their utterances so that instead of a story character (which may be the storyteller) 
speaking a response, they can be reported as thinking the response. Now, while the 
instances here include response cries (e.g., “ºJesus.º”), plosive utterances (e.g., “You: 
↑f:ucker” and “That‟s ↑it”), and idiomatic expressions (e.g., “we:ll the world‟s not a bad 
place” and “yeah I don‟t fit in”), in general they fit in a similar type of structural 
arrangement as outlined by Goodwin (p. 394):       
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[Triggering Event] + [Response Cry] + [Elaborating Sentence] 
Now, if one respecifies these structural components in light of the examples 
presented, with a response cry as a kind of „insight marker‟, and any elaborating 
sentences involved in the construction of a kind of „story moral‟, when packaged in a 
broader storytelling framework (Sacks, 1972c, 1974, 1992a) we have an arrangement of 
the form: 
[Story Preface (with Prospective Indexical)] + [Story (with Triggering  
Event)] + [Insight Marker + Response Cry)] + [Formulation/Moral]  
Now, not only does the provision of a story by one speaker invite a story telling 
by a second speaker, as a kind of „second story‟ (Sacks, 1992a), but a self-disclosure by 
a first speaker may invite self-disclosure by a second (Antaki et al., 2005b).
9 Consider 
that across lines 27 to 31 Mike provides a second story, which notably incorporates the 
moral (or “lesson”, line 27) of Phil‟s story. Now, this gets at something which might 
appear to be quite striking about the extracts presented – the stories produced by the 
therapist involve considerable self-disclosure. Such self-disclosure ranges from 
accounts that could be regarded as relatively innocuous (e.g., eating a meat pie in the 
sun), to things that are somewhat more disclosive such as talk about a personal 
relationship (e.g., a dispute with a partner while preparing a meal), to decidedly delicate 
and personal matters such as health status (e.g., suffering a serious, life threatening 
illness).
10  
In other words, as a practical way of doing therapy, a therapist might provide a 
disclosive story with an embedded „story moral‟ or „formulation‟ prefaced by „suddenly 
thought‟, which may in turn allow for a client produced self-disclosive story that in 
                                                 
9 Consider also Sacks‟s suggestion that “if the teller of the first figured as a character in her story, then the 
teller of the second will figure as a character in her story” (Sacks, 1970?, p. 34). 
 
10 In commenting on the „magnitude‟ of therapist initiated self-disclosure, I wish only to draw attention to 
the notion that one might find this to be at odds with claiming that asymmetries should be present in 
psychotherapeutic interactions as a form of institutional talk-in-interaction, such that one might assume as 
normative clients‟ self-disclosure and not therapists.      
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effect ratifies, extends, or otherwise incorporates the therapist‟s moral or upshot. Of 
course, this might work the other way around, with a client producing a first story and a 
therapist „fitting‟ a self-disclosive story and moral to the client‟s telling. In this regard, 
consider that in the extracts presented, it might not be entirely clear how one might 
make any categorical ascriptions concerning who is the therapist and who is the client in 
the absence of my analytic categorisations. That is to say, I am not claiming that the 
„suddenly thought‟ device is something that is inextricably tied to particular types of 
talk, or particular institutional identities. However, given that I do make categorical 
ascriptions concerning who is a „client‟ and „therapist‟, and as an empirical observation 
it is Phil that uses the „suddenly thought‟ device routinely, I would suggest that 
something like „I suddenly thought‟, working as an extended „on topic‟ topic marker 
embedded in a therapist produced, self disclosive story, can work prospectively to 
configure some future talk that involves the furnishing of some kind of therapeutic 
product.
11  
Moreover, in the current corpus, it is often the case that client stories routinely 
„drag on‟ and seemingly require a therapist upshot formulation to work in such a 
fashion. Additionally, there is a notable absence of sequences in which a client „teases 
out‟ the implications of a therapist produced second story,
12 which does speak to an 
obvious and perhaps fundamental asymmetry in such interactions; one involving the 
differential rights and obligations (i.e., who has rights to do a troubles telling, and who 
has rights to do the provision of advice) of therapist and client (e.g., Sacks, 1972a). 
                                                 
11 One last example (which refers to some earlier materials). Following the interaction previously detailed 
in Extracts 5.12A and 5.12B, in which Phil provides an „embarrassing‟ self-disclosive story relating to not 
getting service in a shop, following the telling of a second-story he introduces (with the use of „And I 
suddenly thought‟) a formulation that he had „tantrums in his childhood‟.  
  
12 Compare this with the client‟s use of „I thought‟ in Extracts 5.1B, 5.4A, 5.4B, 5.4C, and 5.4D which 
are not followed by self-disclosive story from the therapist.      
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Displays of „Thoughts‟ and „Feelings‟ 
While the notion that one can engage in „emotion‟ discourse, that is to make 
avowals and ascriptions that carry a kind of illocutionary force, for example by proving 
an „angry retort‟, a „teary confession‟, or a even a „stunned silence‟ (e.g., Buttny, 1993; 
Edwards, 1997; Harré, 1986) seems unproblematic as a kind of general observation, 
what might one say about displays of cognition? After all, what counts as cognitive (e.g., 
thoughts, beliefs, intentions, memories) would appear to be ubiquitously presented in a 
kind of contrast to what counts as emotive (Edwards, 1999).  
Consider that, as a commonplace experience, we can forget the name of a song, 
an author‟s name, the title of a popular movie, or more consequentially we might 
encounter difficulty when pressed to recall a child or partner‟s birthdate.
13 An action 
oriented report of something like „it‟s just on the tip of my tongue‟ would appear to 
speak directly to questions of some kind of „cognitive‟ processes, that whatever we 
might want to call such failures, they seem to involve something describable as 
thoughts. However, consider that when such failures occur, inevitably it seems they are 
given a considerable degree of attention, that is to say they are „mentionables‟ – they are 
accountable whatever their ontological status.  
That is to say, one does not routinely in conversations have a failure of recall, 
for example, and make no utterance (or display) until the matter is resolved. To do so, 
one risks being declared socially inept, or worse, one may have one‟s status as a rational, 
possibly sane, member questioned. We regularly comment on such failures, joke about 
them, and indeed display expressions of pain at our failures. In other words, our failures 
are accountable – for whatever else might be „going on‟ (or not) in our „heads‟, „hearts‟, 
or other conceptual „beetle boxes‟ (e.g., Coulter, 1979; McHoul & Rapley, 2003) it 
                                                 
13 Or, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, we may „lose‟ our „thoughts‟.      
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would appear there is a requirement that we provide demonstrations that something is 
„going on‟.  
Now while such demonstrations might be taken as revealing of  “cognitive 
capacities that underwrite (and sometimes confound) talk-in-interaction” (Kitzinger, 
2006, p. 80), or that one can elucidate cognition as emergent from such social 
interaction (e.g., Levinson, 2006), or that such social actions are produced through 
cognition (e.g., Graesser, 2006), I take the position that what counts as a cognition and 
what does not count is entirely bound up in members‟ displayed practices (e.g., 
Goodwin & Goodwin, 2000; Lynch, 2006). Now, with regard to members‟ discursive 
practices in talk-in-interaction, saying something like „I think X‟ or „I feel Y‟ (to gloss 
considerably) for-all-practical-purposes always comes packaged in-and-as a witnessable 
(i.e., social) display. 
 
Extract 7.23 
1    Phil:  ºOkayº 
2    (0.8) 
3    Phil:   And where was she born? 
4    (0.5) 
5    Mike:  A:h: ↑think was born- Marystown. 
6    (0.6) 
 
This extract demonstrates features of talk that could be termed as hearably 
cognitive, that is to say, in the provision of an answer to a question a speaker may 
provide the substantive detail embedded within a number of discursive actions that 
serve as demonstrations of various psychological processes. In line 5, where Mike 
provides an answer of “Marystown” to Phil‟s question “where was she born?”, it is 
provided in a manner which seems suggestive that he is having to think about the 
correct response. Notwithstanding the delay at line 4 which could, in the absence of any 
other features, provide a display to Phil that Mike is doing something involving      
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„thinking‟ (e.g., remembering, visualising, mentally sorting), consider the “a:h” 
(Heritage, 1984a; Hutchby, 2005), rising intonation on the psychological term “↑think” 
(line 5), and the cut-off which immediately precedes the answer “born-” (line 5). In 
other contexts, such features might be hearable as providing a response in a hesitant, 
uncertain, or perhaps hedging manner. Here, I would suggest, they serve as a display of 
the psychological term „think‟ – they embed the term in the socially recognisable 
activity of thinking. Or, to be more precise, the activity of thinking „on one‟s feet‟ while 
engaging in conversation. 
 
Extract 7.24 
1    Phil:   >Are you gonna catch up?< 
2    (0.8) 
3    Mike:  ↑I think so. 
4     (0.4) 
 
Now, one might want to analytically characterise the pause at line 2 as prefacing 
a dispreferred response, however, I would suggest that the delay – whatever else might 
be occurring in the interaction – is the kind of thing that is expectable, and clearly 
congruent, with providing a response to a question that may accountably require 
something in the way of „thinking‟ (e.g., Wootton, 2006). Now, that could be glossed as 
„weighing up the consequences‟, „considering the alternatives‟, or indeed something as 
intractable to analysis as „not wanting to give a response and selecting something that 
will count as one‟. Regardless of what might be happening in Mike‟s „head‟, of what 
Mike may „really think‟, or what Mike‟s „intentions‟ may or may not really be, Mike 
displays that he thinks so. His display (i.e., the pause and the utterance “↑I think so”) 
that follows a question that concerns his future conduct, is produced as something that 
has been given some (or something like) „thought‟.      
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Now, one might suggest that such (admittedly speculative) analytic comments 
should be reserved for interactive sequences in which participants themselves make 
overt and explicit the status of any putative mentation that may or may not be occurring 
with the use of particular terms. In this regard, consider the following extract in which 
such a display is demonstrably remarked upon by participants. 
 
Extract 7.25 
1    Phil:   So how acceptable are you. 
2            (1.5) 
3    Kate:   Well I think I’m just getting away with it just by the  
4            skin of my teeth (.) Probably saying too much a*lready  
5            ↑no:w* y’kno*w >I* feel li*ke< .hhh I’m completely open  
6            I- I’m not open with people li*ke thi*s this [is ]= 
7    Phil:                                                [Mhm] 
8    Kate:   =very: (0.2) unusual for me* to* be*= 
9    Phil:   =Mhm= 
10   Kate:   =thi*s ope*n= 
11   Phil:   =Mhm= 
12   Kate:   =.hh Y’know. 
13           (0.5) 
14   Phil:   The** (1.4) >And that< (0.4) acc:eptable I- I’m- I’m  
15           only (0.3) just getting away with it what’s that l:ike  
16           (0.3) just being good enough (0.6) >Is that what you’re  
17           saying< (.) 
18   Kate:   ↑Yeah (.) Yeah (0.2) ↑U::m 
19           (17.2) 
20   Phil:   Where have you gone? What’s gone through [your head?] 
21   Kate:                                            [It just-  ]  
22           (0.3) I just- (0.5) U:m (3.4) Feel that- (0.6) That-  
23           (0.7) That it’s um (0.5) It’s ↑oka:y: y’know I’ve gotta  
24           good family an- (.) and um (0.8) .pt (1.8) And I don’t 
25           know if I’m any better person myself (0.6) .pt Y’know I  
26           think- I think that’s what it really comes down to is-  
27           is- (1.0) I could be just like her (2.5) 
 
Now, one description of this interaction might be that the lengthy pause 
occurring at line 19 marks a „slot‟ following a possible turn completion unit in which      
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Phil has rights to speak, but does not immediately take up a turn. Another description is 
that Kate has delayed her turn completion with the “↑U::m” (line 18), and she is 
possibly „confused‟ (e.g., Drew, 2005) about the nature of Phil‟s reformulation 
delivered across lines 14 to 17.   
However, I would suggest that Phil clearly orients to the absence of some kind 
of expectable response, and deals with the contingency (e.g., Wootton, 2006) as 
something other than merely some kind of confusion or misunderstanding concerning 
the question. Phil‟s questions “Where have you gone? What‟s gone through your head?” 
(line 20) appear to be oriented to something involving hidden, private, psychological 
(pace cognitive) activities displayed by Kate as such. Further, Kate orients to this by 
providing a kind of hesitant, reflective response before concluding (and notably by 
packaging the conclusion in terms of „think‟) that she could be “just like her” (line 27). 
 
Extract 7.26 
1    Mike:  =Why would it be any different for me and anybody else?  
2       (0.2) 
3    Phil:  .hhhh I- ºI*********º I- I think you just want to make  
4    a statement to her you just sa:y: (1.6) I don’t find  
5            this perspective helpful (0.3) 
 
In this extract, Phil‟s turn at line 3 (“.hhhh I- ºI*********º I- I think”) could be 
described as demonstrative of the manner by which speakers attend to providing 
disprefered responses and so forth, particularly given it is the therapist who is required 
to attend to a client question (e.g., Frankel, 1990). However, I would suggest that the 
delivery of such responses with delays, false starts, extensions of vowels and so forth, 
that occur with the use of psychological terms involving „thoughts‟, does the work of 
displaying to an interlocutor that some work is being undertaken.  
That is to say, consideration is being given to what has been asked, and what is 
being providing in response, in a manner that such consideration may be accountably      
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recognised as such. To do this, I would suggest, requires some performance (e.g., 
Goodwin & Goodwin, 2000). And here, Phil clearly provides for such performance, and 
possibly one that denotes a degree of „professional‟ consideration. 
 
Extract 7.27 
1    Phil:   =The ↑law is the ↑law (0.4) .pt Okay (0.2) .hh So in  
2            terms of your s:anity: where are you on the nought to  
3            ten fruit loop scale with ten being totally fruit loop  
4            to nought being (0.2) totally sane. 
5     (.) 
6    Kate:   .hhhh Well hhhh I think that I: a:::m::::: (1.1) 
7     Six. 
8       (0.4) 
9    Phil:   ºOkayº 
10     (0.4) 
11   Kate:   [ººMºº ] 
12   Phil:   [ºOkayº] 
 
Here, Phil asks for Kate to provide an assessment of her “s:anity:” (line 2) on a 
ten point “fruit loop scale” (line 3), with Kate providing her assessment as “Six” (line 7). 
Of note here is the manner in which Kate produces her self-assessment, in that she does 
not immediately respond with a number between nought and ten. Consider that an 
immediate response might possibly appear to be produced in the absence of any serious 
consideration (i.e., „thought‟), and in this sense Kate designs her response to be clearly 
„thought out‟ on line 6: with a long inhalation and exhalation punctuated by “Well”; the 
use of “I think” followed by the elongated “I: a:::m:::::”; and then the significant pause 
which precedes the numerical assessment itself.  
Now, one might argue that these are features which indicate Kate may be having 
some difficulty with the question, nonetheless, I would suggest such features are tied up 
with the practice of producing a reasoned assessment in response to an interlocutor‟s 
question that accountably requires some consideration. After all, immediate responses      
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to questions may very well entail the sense that the answers have not been given enough 
thought. 
This suggests a general kind of advice on how to show an interlocutor or 
observer that you are clearly a „thoughtful‟ person, or that you „consider your feelings‟, 
or simply that you pay due consideration to matters put to you by others; namely, pause 
before an utterance. Of course, pausing extensively before answering questions such as 
„what is your name‟ and so forth may likely to lead to an ascription that one has 
deficiencies in such things as „thinking‟. On the other hand, consider that an immediate 
response to a psychologically oriented question in one setting may be considered a 
display of „certainty‟, while in another it may well be taken up as a display of something 
of an entirely different nature.
14 
Consider the idiomatic expressions „think before you speak‟ and „engage brain 
before putting mouth into gear‟. I would suggest that these point to practices that entail 
a demonstration of „thinking before speech‟, a demonstration of „engagement of brain 
before putting mouth into gear‟, and so forth. That is, what is important is not „thinking‟ 
per se, but rather, some demonstration or display that is normatively accountable as 
involving something akin to „thinking‟ or „feeling‟ (or some other psychological process, 
function, or capacity) where whatever is being done is tied to the practical features of 
the local setting.   
 
Extract 7.28 
1    Phil:   .pt .h Okay .hh (0.9) What would you say is the  
2            difference is n:ow than when we met (0.4) two weeks ago  
3            (.) cause y- y** you’re you’re ↑s: (0.7) ((swallow))  
4            You’re presenting slightly differently so wh- where- w-  
5            where are you feeling what’s it- what’s it like being  
6            you today.  
                                                 
14 On setting and „timing rules‟, consider that “the tactics advisable for an accused who can answer the 
charge as soon as it is made are in contrast with those recommended for one who had to wait out the 
denunciation before replying” (Garfinkel, 1956, p. 424). See also Lynch and Bogen (1996).      
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7      (0.2) 
8    Kate:   .hhhh (0.8) ↑U::m:: (2.1) º↑t’s alrightº 
9     (1.3) 
10   Phil:   .pt .h >Give me more o*n tha*t< .hh 
11     (0.3)   
12   Kate:   º↑U::m:º= 
13   Phil:   =How sad is it (usually living) underneath? 
14     (0.2) 
15   Kate:   ºHow sad am I feeling?º .hh ºU::mº (6.1) ↑Ther- there’s  
16           definitely (.) ºthere’s definitely pa*in i*n the*reº  
17           ººthe*re’s de*fini*tely pai*n i*n the*re de*finitelyºº 
18     (0.4) 
19   Phil:   And what’s that about? 
20     (0.5) 
21   Kate:   º↑Mm::º (1.4) Not wanting to accept everythi*ng 
22          (0.6) 
 
After a few false starts, Phil initially asks Kate at line 5 “where are you feeling” 
and across lines 5 and 6 “what‟s it like being you today” (cf. to „how are you feeling at 
the moment‟ Extracts 7.12, 7.13, and 7.14A). Importantly, Phil‟s request for Kate to 
provide a self-assessment is in relation to how she was “two weeks ago” (line 2), and 
the use of the term “presenting” (line 4) is suggestive of some kind of clinical take on 
the matter. Note that Phil does not ask if there is a difference, rather he asks what is the 
difference. This question is made warrantable as Kate is “presenting slightly differently” 
(line 4). In other words, Kate is to provide a self-assessment that provides for an 
explanation of Phil‟s evaluation that something is different, and Kate is to provide an 
explanation in terms of feelings. 
Kate‟s response is delayed, and stands as a minimal response to Phil‟s query 
“º↑t‟s alrightº” (line 8). This is hearably an answer to “what‟s it like being you today” 
(lines 5-6) rather than “where are you feeling” (line 5). Phil then requests Kate to 
elaborate on her response, and as Kate begins her turn “º↑U::m:º” (line 12) he then 
extends his turn to provide some specificity to his question by asking Kate to provide 
for an assessment of how “sad is it” (line 13). Kate‟s uptake is clearly that the question      
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involves providing a self-assessment of how she is feeling „at the moment‟, as 
evidenced by her “How sad am I feeling?” (line 15). Across lines 15 to 17 Kate 
provides both a display of some kind of „inner search‟, with a lengthy pause (line 15) 
prefacing her croaky and progressively quieter assessment that there is „pain in there‟.  
This kind of „inner search‟ display is also evident in the following extract. 
 
Extract 7.29 
1    Phil:   =Okay so- and that- that’s emptiness feeling ↑today  
2            because its brought up your not special stuff. 
3            (2.5) 
4    Phil:   >How you feeling?< 
5            (1.7) 
6    Phil:   .pt [Okay  ] 
7    Mike:      [Pretty] rotten today b- (.)  
8    Phil:   >Okay no no no how are you feeling just at this moment<  
9            (0.2) 
10   Mike:  .h ↑OH .hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh hhhhhhhhhh average. 
11           (0.5) 
12   Phil:  Did we hit a spot there? 
13           (.) 
14   Mike:  .hh ↑Oh yeah (.) Definitely. 
15           (0.4) 
16   Phil:  What was the spot that got hit= 
17   Mike:  =ºWas theº (0.9) ºworthlessness the specialnessº 
18           (0.2)  
19   Phil:  Yes= 
20   Mike:  =º(Kind of) thingsº 
21           (0.2) 
22   Phil:  ººYesºº (0.5) 
 
Following the provision of a reformulation (lines 1-2) Phil asks Mike “>How 
you feeling?<” (line 4) to which Mike begins to produce an answer relating to how he is 
feeling “today” (line 7; cf. Extract 7.28, lines 5-6). Phil then undertakes a third-turn 
repair at line 8 with “>Okay no no no how are you feeling just at this moment<” (cf. 
Extracts 7.12, 7.13, and 7.14A). In response, Mike‟s “.h ↑OH .hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh 
hhhhhhhhhh average” (line 10) serves as a display not only of some kind of „real time‟      
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scanning of his psychological interior, but also projects that this is a matter Phil can 
(and perhaps should) investigate further (as a „downgraded conventional response‟, 
Jefferson, 1980).  
The „oh‟ here might be approached as denoting something akin to a „change of 
state token‟ (Heritage, 1984a) rather than a „surprise token‟ (Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 
2006), as Phil‟s question does not appear to be designed to elicit surprise, rather, it 
clarifies his pervious question of „how you feeling‟. Regardless, it serves to make more 
salient Mike‟s lengthy inhalation and exhalation which precede his self-assessment of 
“average”. That is, it demonstrates that Mike is not just „average‟ – his assessment is 
produced in such a manner that such a measure of „average‟ is something that may 
invites further attention. This is evidenced by Phil‟s remark “did we hit a spot there” 
(line 12) and Mike‟s “↑oh yeah (.) definitely” (line 14), which is further explored across 
lines 16 to 22. Clearly, then, persons may have „spots‟ that can be „hit‟, and such 
matters may be of crucial concern in therapeutic interactions.  
What I would suggest is that interactions that might occur in the absence of any 
„displays‟ such as those presented are problematic – indeed they may be characterised 
as not being human. That is, if one takes a view that to be „human‟ is to be-in-the-world 
as a cultural being, with interactions revealing “the reflexive relation of producability 
and recognizability as a condition for cultural action” (McHoul & Rapley, 2001, p. 445, 
emphasis in original). While my contention is that there may be nothing underlying 
such displays in terms of cognitive processes, mechanisms, structures, resources and so 
forth (cf. Kitzinger, 2006), to act always on the basis that this is the case is entirely 
problematic.  
To suggest that persons do not, and cannot, „have thoughts‟ is as incoherent as 
adopting a stringent cognitivist position that persons must „have thoughts‟ that in some 
sense underlie every meaningful behaviour (McHoul & Rapley, 2003). As Wittgenstein      
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suggests “so we do sometimes think because it has been found to pay” (Wittgenstein, 
1967a, §470). Or, to paraphrase Heidegger, the practical understanding of a „thought‟ is 
the capacity to use the „thought‟ in a diverse range of settings and situations (Heidegger, 
1982; Okrent, 1988). In short, what counts as a „thought‟ must always be tied to the 
local, occasioned circumstances by which such „thoughts‟ can be produced and made 
recognisable as „thoughts‟.  
Misalignments 
Let us now turn to a consideration of how psychological terms may feature as 
matters of considerable concern to those engaged in therapeutic interactions, when the 
status of such terms appears to be subject to some degree of contestation. I will turn 
now to an examination of two extended sequences of interaction, in which there may be 
some disconfirmation on the part of clients concerning the putative status of „thoughts‟ 
and „feelings‟. In these sequences, the therapist provides for reformulations of clients‟ 
problems, however, for these reformulated versions to „work‟ they require input by 
clients which can become problematic if there is some misalignment concerning the 
basic psychological terms.  
The first of these sequences (Extracts 7.30A-7.30E) features an emotion display 
in which there is some misalignment concerning what the client might „need‟ as a result. 
The second (Extracts 7.31A-7.31F and Extracts 7.32A-7.32B) details misalignment 
relating to a client‟s repeated avowal of „thoughts‟ rather than „feelings‟. 
 “And what do you need?” 
Extract 7.30A 
1    Phil:   .hh ººYeahºº (0.6) .h ºAnd the answer is of course  
2            (1.0) She’s being emotionally invalidated because (0.6)  
3            >If you’ve got a three year old that’s crying itself to  
4            sleep< (0.2).h What that child needs is ↑mum (.) .h And  
5            it needs a ↑cuddle and it needs to be told it’s  
6            ↑special (.) And it needs to feel safe and secure and  
7            ↑loved (0.4) .h Whereas (0.3) If you’re allowed to just       
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8            cry yourself to sleep .h you end up feeling (0.2) noone 
9            gives a fuck (0.9).hh And you also know it’s not ↑fairº 
10     (7.9) 
11   Phil:   How are you feeling? 
12           (0.8) 
13   Jane:   .pt ººI’m alrightºº 
14           (1.6) 
15   Phil:   When you feel like this: (0.2) and I’m not really  
16           buying if you’re alright, (0.7) >how sad are you  
17           feeling<  
18           (1.2) 
19   Jane:   ºLike I’m about to cry:º 
20           (0.3) 
21   Phil:   ºYesº (0.3) .hh Isn’t it interesting I ask you how you  
22           we:re .h and you said (0.5) I’m alright (0.3) .hh  
23           Whereas in fact what you meant was I’m about to cry  
24           (0.5) And you can’t cause there aren’t any tissues. 
25           (.) 
26   Jane:   .hhh 
27           (0.5) 
28   Phil:   ºNowº= 
29   Jane:   =Nah she’s right (0.3) 
 
This sequence begins with a lengthy turn by Phil, in which a formulation is 
provided that implicates aspects of Jane‟s childhood experience within her current life. 
Specifically, Phil provides a formulation that Jane had been “emotionally invalidated” 
(line 2) by her mother as a young child, with her mother letting her cry herself to sleep. 
To bolster this formulation, Phil provides two sequential three-part lists (Jefferson, 
1990), the first comprising a list of things that “a three year old that‟s crying itself to 
sleep” (lines 3-4) needs, including “↑mum” (line 4),  “a ↑cuddle” (line 5), and to be 
“told it‟s ↑special” (lines 5-6). Note also the prosodic features of this list (e.g., Selting, 
2007). The second, shorter list builds upon the first and details three additional things 
that a child needs; to “feel safe and secure and ↑loved” (lines 6-7).  
In other words, the first list details what the child needs in terms of the 
pragmatic actions of another person, whereas the second details what the child herself      
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needs in terms of „feelings‟. In the absence of these, Phil suggests across lines 8 to 9 
that “you end up feeling” that “no one gives a fuck” and “you also know it‟s not↑fair”. 
Note the shift to the use of the pro-term „you‟, which serves to index the category of 
„child‟ as being Jane. 
This packs together considerable information, and as such, it is perhaps not 
amenable as a kind of straightforward formulation that can be accepted or rejected  Now, 
while the formulation about Jane is presented in the present-tense, third-person (“She‟s 
being”, line 2), following the formulation Phil does not ask „how did that make you 
feel‟, or „how would that make her feel‟, but at line 11 asks Jane “How are you feeling” 
(cf. Extracts 7.12, 7.13, and 7.14A) to which Jane provides an almost inaudible “ººI‟m 
alrightºº” (line 13). 
Then, Phil essentially rejects Jane‟s evaluation that she is „feeling‟ anything 
other than „sad‟. Clearly, for Phil, Jane is displaying that she is sad, and Phil‟s recycled 
question projects a turn in which Jane can give some measure of how sad she is feeling, 
and likely some overt display of such a feeling. Jane then provides a description of how 
sad she is feeling “ºLike I‟m about to cry:º” (line 19) in contradistinction to her previous 
answer of „I‟m alright‟.  
However, consider that such an assessment attends less towards what she has 
previously said („I‟m alright‟) and more to the manner in which Phil implies she has 
been saying it, with his “I‟m not really buying if you‟re alright” across lines 15 and 16 
(cf. Davis, 1986, p. 57). Phil then provides for an additional reformulation across lines 
21 to 24, that what Jane „meant‟ when she said she „felt alright‟ was that she was „about 
to cry‟. Such a reformulation might be argued to incorporate both discursive and non-     
  337 
discursive actions, in that Phil‟s comment concerning tissues seems to speak to elements 
of the interaction which are unrecoverable from the audio record.
15  
Bergmann notes that a clinician may seek information not by way of asking a 
client, but by indirectly telling a client something about themselves (Bergmann, 1992). 
This draws upon the notion of a „my side telling‟ (Pomerantz, 1980), in which a person 
can „fish‟ for, and make relevant, information to which they may have limited 
knowledge.
16 Now, while Bergmann‟s paper deals with psychiatric intake interviews, 
and notably features examination of instances in which recipients produce responses in 
the absence of direct questions (cf. Phil‟s direct question at line 11), consider that after 
Phil‟s initial extended turn is a potential transition relevance place (Sacks et al., 1974) at 
line 10 (at which Jane does not take a turn) which precedes his direct question.  
In other words, Phil has indeed indirectly told Jane something about herself 
(across lines 1-9) prior to directly telling Jane what she meant “Whereas in fact what 
you meant” (line 23) which speaks to Phil having direct knowledge of what Jane is 
feeling, in spite of her claim of being „alright‟. That is, Phil confirms his own position 
while disconfirming Janes. One might consider this an invitation for Jane to make a 
confession, particularly after Jane has offered something that could count as a kind of lie 
(cf. Bergmann, 1992, p. 145-146). 
 
Extract 7.30B 
1    Phil:   Now (0.2) when you feel like this (0.7) >and you stay  
2            with the sad feeling (0.2) ↓the know you want to cry  
3            feeling↑ (0.2) .hh what do you need?< 
4            (2.6) 
5    Jane:   ººA tissueºº 
6            (0.6) 
7    Phil:   ºYeahº (.) [What do you need emotionally] 
                                                 
15 Note that Jane‟s “Nah she‟s right” (line 29) functions here as an idiomatic expression (i.e., “It‟s ok”) 
rather than referring to a particular person. 
 
16 For another example, see Extract 7.15B.      
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8    Jane:              [.h       .h      .h       .h]hh 
9            (0.9) 
10   Jane:   hhh  
11           (2.7) 
12   Jane:   (ººDun knowºº) 
13           (7.5) 
14   Jane:   I suppose a hug would’ve done but I- (0.4) 
15   Phil:   Mm. 
16           (0.3) 
17   Jane:   No I just (3.7) I ( ) push (0.6) push it away (0.3)  
18           [(when)] 
19   Phil:   [ºYeahº] 
20           (0.7) 
21   Phil:   .pt ººYeahºº .hh ºAnd why would you push people away  
22           when they go toº  
23           (1.0) 
24   Jane:   ºBecause I’m not used to itº 
25           (0.3) 
 
Having specified that Jane is feeling „sad‟, and after encouraging Jane to 
maintain the sad “you want to cry feeling↑” across lines 1 to 3 (something that is 
perhaps only likely to be advocated in a therapeutic setting), Phil asks “what do you 
need?” (line 3). Here, „sad feeling‟ serves as a category that Phil can do some 
therapeutic work with, namely, it can serve to enable the production of some normative 
actions that are associated with the category. In other words, as Jane is categorised as 
„sad‟, and given explanation for why she is sad has been provided by way of Phil‟s 
formulations, Phil‟s question „what do you need‟ projects for an answer from Jane in 
which some normative action/s linked to such a category are described. What does one 
need when one is „sad‟, when „one wants to cry‟? 
Jane‟s answer “ººA tissueºº” (line 5), while perhaps understandable as a 
normative literal action is clearly not adequate for Phil, who while providing an 
agreement token (“ºYeahº”, line 7 ) does so in a dispreference structure (with a delay 
preceeding turn, the recycled question, e.g., Pomerantz, 1984a). Phil then has another go      
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at the question with “What do you need emotionally” (line 7). The specification of 
something that counts as „emotional‟ projects for a less literal uptake (e.g., „a 
handkerchief‟, „to blow my nose‟, „to wipe my face‟), and might allow for Phil to 
provide some kind of decidedly psychologised formulation (e.g., Antaki et al., 2005a; 
Davis, 1986). 
Here I would suggest that Phil‟s formulations and questions concerning what 
Jane „needs‟ project a particular answer, specifically „a hug‟. Now, while Phil is asking 
overt questions of Jane (cf. Bergmann, 1992, p. 151) consider that his questions do not 
explicitly contain the term „hug‟ (e.g., „do you need a hug?‟). In this regard, Phil can 
solicit a response that relates to „hug‟ in a round-about manner, that is, as a hintable 
inference (e.g., Sacks, 1972b; Sacks, 1992a, p. 583). Now, what such an answer may 
enable Phil to do remains unclear, however one can postulate that it in some sense ties 
in with some therapeutic undertakings.  
Note that Jane does, eventually, provide for “I suppose a hug would‟ve done” 
(line 14), however it is with considerable disclaimers: several gaps (across lines 8-14); 
the disclaimation of a knowledge state (“dun know”, line 12); and packaged as a 
supposition (“I suppose”, line 14) with a disclaimer (“but”, line 14). In other words, 
while Jane provides for an acknowledgement of the projected „correct‟ answer (i.e., as 
an expectable, hearable, normative answer) it is delivered as a non-preferred response. 
One might suggest it is produced in an activity sequence that could be characterised as 
indicating client resistance (treatment of such interactions in terms of „power 
asymmetries‟ can be found in Peräkylä, 1995; Rapley, 2004; Silverman, 1997).   
 
Extract 7.30C 
1    Phil:   ºMmº ººCause you can’t trust the fuckersºº (0.6) ºAnd  
2            you don’t (0.2) believe it (1.4) .hh Cause it didn’t  
3            happen in your childhoodº (3.1) Okay I want you to  
4            imagine the following, (1.1) .pt You’re walking through       
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5            a park (2.0) ºOkayº (0.5) th- the adult you so you as  
6            you are now you’re walking through a ↑pa:rk (0.4) .h  
7            (0.2) You’re on your own (0.8) and you realise that the  
8            park’s quite empty. (0.3) .h (0.2) As you walk around  
9            >there’s a bit of a< cu:rve in the: (0.4) pathway and  
10           you see a set of swi:ngs (0.5) .hh (.) And you notice  
11           that there’s a child on one of the swings but there’s  
12           no adult around (0.2) .h (0.2) And as you get closer .h  
13           (0.2) you see that (0.3) the child is about six years  
14           old .h (.) and is crying (0.5) .pt (0.2) >What would  
15           you do< 
16           (2.2) 
17   Jane:   ºGo up to it and ask it if it’s okayº  
18           (0.4) 
19   Phil:   ººOkayºº [( )] 
20   Jane:            [ºWh]at’s wrong.º 
21           (0.3) 
22   Phil:   ººOkayºº (.) ºAnd it says I’m sad I’ve lost my mummy  
23           no one cares about me (0.8) >What would you do<º 
24           (2.4) 
25   Jane:   ºTell em I’m sure that’s not rightº 
26           (0.9) 
27   Phil:   ººOkay, (0.2) and?ºº 
28           (0.6) 
29   Jane:   ººAnd we’ll go and (0.4) find (1.0) its mommaºº 
30           (0.4) 
31   Phil:   .h 
32           (0.2) 
33   Jane:   ººIts mumºº= 
34   Phil:   =And would you give that kid a hug? 
35     (1.1) 
36   Phil:   ººOkayºº  
37           (0.2) 
 
This extract begins with Phil providing some candidate formulations across lines 
1 to 3 – “ººcause you can‟t trust the fuckersºº”, “ºand you don‟t (0.2) believe it”, and 
“cause it didn‟t happen in your childhoodº” – as a kind of summary. This summary 
serves as a preface to a story, in which Jane is invited to “imagine” (line 4) that she is      
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walking through a park, and that she comes across an unaccompanied child on a swing, 
who on closer examination is “about six years old” (lines 13-14) and “crying” (line 14). 
Now, I would suggest that such a story is prospectively designed by Phil to 
enable the asking of a specific question “what would you do”, which projects for an 
answer that features „a hug‟. In other words, given Phil‟s previously unsuccessful 
attempts to elicit this as a response to his question „what do you need‟, he can continue 
the pursuit of a such a response (Pomerantz, 1984b) by utilising a different modality; in 
this case, by constructing an „imaginary‟ story that features the client as main 
protagonist, and as such, one that invites a client dénouement. Again, such a story or 
scenario is built using a range of categories (e.g., „child‟, „adult‟) and category bound 
activities (e.g., „crying‟). What might an “adult” (line 5) do (or be obligated to do) when 
coming across a solitary “crying” (line 14) “child” (line 11)?
17 
Jane‟s initial answers, “ºGo up to it and ask it if it‟s okayº” (line 17) and 
“ºWhat‟s wrong.º” (line 20), while acknowledged by Phil (“ººOkayºº” at lines 19 and 22) 
appear to be insufficient, with Phil providing an insertion of some additional materials 
in a recycled question at line 23 (“ºAnd it says I‟m sad I‟ve lost my mummy no one 
cares about me º”, lines 22-23). Jane‟s subsequent answer, “ºTell em I‟m sure that‟s not 
rightº” (line 25), again appears to be insufficient with Phil providing an 
acknowledgement and an invitation to elaborate (“ººOkay, (0.2) and?ºº”, line 27). Jane 
then provides for an addition with “ººAnd we‟ll go and (0.4) find (1.0) its mommaºº” 
After repeated failed attempts to elicit the answer that the story is designed to 
produce, Phil moves to asking the question directly with “And would you give that kid a 
hug?” (line 34). Given there is no answer forthcoming, it would appear that Phil‟s 
adoption of an alternative strategy in pursuit of the response has not guaranteed success. 
However, Jane may have provided some form of non-verbal acknowledgement to Phil‟s 
                                                 
17 While I do not explicitly provide an analysis of the (considerably) more technical features of such 
stories, see Sacks (1972a, 1972c).      
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question (e.g., a nod) to which he provides an acknowledgment token at line 36 
(“ººOkayºº”). On the other hand, this could be Phil acknowledging no response and/or 
acting as a topic-change initiator (e.g., Button & Casey, 1984; Maynard, 1980). Given 
the lack of any confirmatory materials (i.e., as might be obtained with a video record of 
the interaction) let us leave this to one side and see how the interaction plays out. 
 
Extract 7.30D 
1    Phil:   .hh (.) ºThat six year old is youº 
2            (3.6) 
3    Jane:   ººMmºº 
4            (0.9) 
5    Phil:   ºWhat would you do if it was youº 
6            (4.1) 
7    Jane:   ºWhat do you meanº 
8            (0.3) 
9    Phil:   .h (0.2) The six year old on the swing is you (.)  
10           There’s a adult you passing by the swing and there is  
11           six year old you on the swing (.) .h (0.2) What would  
12           you do for crying six year old you 
13           (3.1) 
14   Jane:   I myself would (0.4) h (0.8) pick me u (0.3) p:= 
15   Phil:   =Mhm.  
16           (.) 
17   Jane:   And tell (0.5) that (1.0) >I love em< 
18           (0.5)  
19   Phil:   ºMmº  
20           (1.7) 
21   Phil:   .h (0.2) ºAnd that’s what you need to do (0.3) >And I  
22           know that sounds a bit weird< .h (0.2) But that’s what  
23           you need (.) to doº 
24           (10.0) 
25   Phil:   And how does that sound 
26           (4.8) 
27   Jane:   ººProbably ↑rightºº 
28           (1.0) 
29   Phil:   ººSorry?ºº 
30           (0.9) 
31   Jane:   ºProbably ↑rightº 
32           (0.4)      
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Now, regardless of whether Jane did or did not acknowledge Phil‟s question 
„And would you give that kid a hug?‟, consider that such a question relates to whether 
Jane would give a child a hug (in an „imaginary‟ story) and not if Jane needs a hug (as 
was the case with Phil‟s previous questions). What is important is that, sans Jane‟s 
acknowledgment, Phil has at least established that „a hug‟ is in some manner a relevant 
concern (i.e., an expectable response), and one that he can continue to pursue. 
Phil then presents a scenario in which the previous story roles are reversed, or 
one in which the roles of „adult‟ and „child‟ are essentially collapsed. That is, Jane is 
invited to be both „child‟ and „adult‟. Now, such a hypothetical question (i.e., what 
would you do as an adult if you came across yourself as a crying six year old child) 
appears to present some difficulty for Jane (i.e, the gap at line 6 and Jane‟s “ºWhat do 
you meanº” at line 7), and might be considered somewhat conceptually confused if one 
adopts a „strong Wittgensteinian position‟ (see Chapter 3, and McHoul & Rapley, 2003, 
2006). Nonetheless, this enables Phil to establish a link between Kate (as an adult) 
giving „a hug‟ (to a child) and Kate (as a child) receiving „a hug‟ (from an adult). 
Now, while Jane does not use the term „hug‟, she certainly provides something 
much closer than her previous responses, and something which may stand as a 
candidate client generated reformulation with „pick me up – and tell I love em‟ (lines 
14-17). This is met with Phil‟s acceptance, and his repeated suggestion “that‟s what you 
need to do” (lines 21-23). Note that Phil also provides for an account that attends to the 
somewhat odd and confusing nature of the „imaginary‟ scenario, “And I know that 
sounds a bit weird” (lines 21-22). Phil then does a kind of „upshot checking‟ with “And 
how does that sound” (line 25) which is met by Jane‟s delayed, tentative, and barely 
audible “ººProbably ↑rightºº” (line 27). Phil‟s “ººSorry?ºº” (line 29) can be approached 
as an open class repair initiator (Drew, 1997) in which repair is done by Jane with a      
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louder repeat of “ºProbably ↑rightº” (line 31), which marks the trouble source as Phil‟s 
difficulty in hearing what Jane had said.  
Nevertheless, there remains a degree of ambiguity concerning Jane‟s uptake of 
Phil‟s suggestion, which Phil further explores in the final extract in this sequence. 
 
Extract 7.30E 
1    Phil:   ººYes.ºº 
2            (2.1) 
3    Phil:   .h ºAnd what are you feeling at the moment?º 
4            (3.3) 
5    Jane:   ººSadºº 
6            (0.5) 
7    Phil:   ººMmºº (0.6) .pt (.) >ºAnd what do you needº< 
8            (18.8) 
9    Jane:   ºA tissu:eº >h .shih< 
10           (.) 
11   Phil:   >What do you need emotionally<= 
12   Jane:   =.shih 
13           (0.6) 
14   Phil:   I’ll get you a tissue hang on. 
15           (.) 
16   Jane:   (ººO:ka:::yºº)  
17           ((clattering sounds 1.4 secs)) 
18           (5.1) 
19   Jane:   .shih (2.6) .shih (5.4) .shih (4.9) hh (0.2)  
20           .shih (0.7) .hh (2.1) hh (0.5) .shih (5.9) 
21           ((clattering sounds 1.4 secs)) 
22           (1.6)    
23   Jane:   .hh (0.9) .shih (2.4) 
24           ((louder clattering sounds 1.1 secs)) 
25   Phil:   We’ve got everything but a tissue here you go. 
 
We are now in a better position to evaluate my claim concerning Phil‟s pursuit 
of a specific response („a hug‟). Following Phil‟s “ºAnd what are you feeling at the 
moment?º” at line 3, Jane indicates that she is feeling “ººSadºº” at line 5 (cf. Extract 
7.30A, line 13). This is followed by essentially a repeat of an earlier interactional 
sequence (Extract 7.30B, lines 3, 5, and 7) with Phil‟s question “what do you need”      
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(line 7), Jane‟s literal response “a tissue” (line 9), and Phil‟s recycled and extended 
question “what do you need emotionally” (line 11). In other words, Jane again declines 
to provide an answer of „a hug‟, at which point Phil abandons his pursuit with “I‟ll get 
you a tissue hang on.” (line 14). 
How Jane is feeling, how Jane should feel, and the significance to which Jane 
might attach displays of feeling to such accounts, is clearly a matter of therapeutic 
importance. Collecting together some of the hints alluded to in some of the previous 
analytic musings, it would seem that it is warrantable (although not without risk) for the 
therapist to tell a client what they are in fact feeling, whether that is in the form of a 
direct assertion (e.g., Extract 7.30A, lines 15-17; Extract 7.30B, lines 1-3) or by way of 
a more „veiled‟ delivery (e.g., Extract 7.30A, lines 1-11), in order to make such feelings 
„fit‟ a therapist produced formulation. Moreover, overt displays may offer an additional 
source of materials by which such formulations can be, in a sense, made confirmatory 
for both therapist and client.  
More generally, a therapist can provide descriptions of the client, to the client, 
using psychological categories, to which the client may be encouraged to generate 
candidate category bound activities related to such psychological categories. What can 
occur however, either as a matter of some „misunderstanding‟ or as a matter of 
deliberate „resistance‟, is that the psychological categories can be fitted with more-or-
less literal actions by the clients. Another way of putting this, is that attempts to 
psychologise things by a therapist, in order to do therapy, can be waylaid by clients – 
deliberately or not, such formulations can „misfire‟ (Antaki et al., 2005a; Bergmann, 
1992). 
 “That‟s just my internal thought” 
The following extracts detail interaction that occurs in the context of a 
discussion where Luke is providing an account of returning home from work, wanting      
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to talk to his partner, and being frustrated that his partner was involved in a lengthy 
telephone conversation with her sister. In addition, he mentions his concern with the 
„level of disclosure‟ that the conversation between his partner and her sister entailed, 
and suggests this occurs routinely. 
 
Extract 7.31A 
1    Phil:   >Right so so< Stephanie (.) probably won’t even be  
2            conscious that her way of doing it is very different  
3            from yours (0.3) .hh unless you say (0.2) 
4    Luke:   I- wha- e- (0.2) hhh (0.2) What I am gonna say is that  
5            I think she’s overcompensating= 
6    Phil:   =Careful. 
7     (0.6) 
8    Phil:   That was a you statement. 
9    (0.4) 
10   Phil:   I think you are .hh is a you statement. 
11    (0.4) 
12   Phil:   .pt Give me your experience of it. 
13    (0.4) 
 
This extract begins with Phil providing a formulation that Luke‟s partner is 
likely unaware (“probably won‟t even be conscious”, lines 1-2) that the manner in 
which she has lengthy and disclosive telephone conversations with her sister is a 
problem for Luke, and that Luke needs to “say” (line 3) something. Luke then declares 
that what he is “gonna say” (line 4) is that he thinks his partner is “overcompensating” 
(line 5), to which Phil provides a caution that this is a “you statement” (lines 8 and 10). 
Now, that there may be problems with using a „you statement‟ is something that has 
been previously flagged by Phil, namely that “the trouble with you statements h is that 
most people will resist them” (in transcript not presented here). 
Phil then invites Luke to provide his “experience of it” (line 12). Note that Luke 
provides his evaluation in terms of „thought‟ (i.e., “I think she‟s”, line 5) and he does 
not provide his evaluation using the term „you‟. Phil‟s formulation that this is a „you      
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statement‟, then, suggests that Phil‟s uptake on Luke‟s statement is as a first-person, 
present-tense statement to his partner (i.e., „I think you are overcompensating‟). Note 
that in Mike‟s initial evaluation, and Phil‟s subsequent formulation, „I think‟ serves as a 
common expression with „she‟s‟ given a temporal transform by Phil as „you‟. I briefly 
draw attention to this now, in order to foreshadow later analytic commentary concerning 
this distinction. 
 
Extract 7.31B 
1    Luke:   Well (1.0) her parents, never (1.0) Well in my opinion  
2            her parents sort of abandoned her a little bit in South  
3            America (0.5) 
4    Phil:   Yes= 
5    Luke:   =And (moved down) to Southtown (0.7) she was  
6            hospitalised a [couple] of times with depression as= 
7    Phil:                  [ºYepº ] 
8    Luke:  =you [know ] 
9    Phil:       [ºYepº] 
10    (1.0) 
11   Luke:  They didn’t come up to see her. 
12    (.) 
13   Phil:   ºYeahº 
14    (0.5) 
15   Luke:  An:d (0.7) >and it was just a-< I mean they’re all  
16    (1.0) y’know at fault (0.7) and (0.2) she’s trying to  
17           overcompensate for that now. 
18    (1.9) 
19   Phil:   >That’s an explanation and an interpretation.< 
20    (0.7)  
21   Phil:   Whadda you f:eel  
22    (0.6) 
 
Consider that Luke‟s “Well in my opinion” (line 1), in addition to 
foreshadowing the telling of a possibly tendentious account, could be seen as designed 
to retrospectively account for Phil‟s correction and to prospectively head-off a possible 
correction. After providing an account detailing the manner in which his partner was      
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treated by her parents, Luke then provides essentially the same evaluation concerning 
his partner that he offered previously (cf. “I think she‟s overcompensating”, Extract 
7.31A, line 5) with “she‟s trying to overcompensate for that now” (lines 16-17). In other 
words, Luke‟s account provides for an explanation, and makes warrantable, his initial 
evaluation.  
However, Luke is again admonished by Phil, who provides a formulation that he 
has provided an “explanation and an interpretation” (line 19). Here, it would appear that 
the problematic phrase is “she‟s trying to overcompensate for that now” (lines 16-17). 
Phil then clarifies his previous request for Luke to give his „experience of it‟ by asking 
Luke “Whaddya you f:eel” (line 21). This, then, marks a shift way from a focus on any 
potential „you statement‟, to a focus directed towards how Luke „feels‟. 
 
Extract 7.31C 
1    Luke:   .pt (0.6) I feel that (1.0) that she tries too hard  
2            with her sister. 
3    (0.7) 
4    Phil:   Stick with what you feel. Not with what she’s doing,  
5    stick with what you feel. 
6    (0.3) 
7    Luke:   Well I feel that heh heh [heh heh .hh hh Yeah. 
8    Phil:                            [>No no no no.< That’s a  
9    thought. That’s a thought. You’re thinking she  
10    overcompensates. What do you feel?  
11    (2.9) 
 
Here Luke begins to provide what might be considered an appropriate „feel‟ 
response by prefacing his evaluation with “I feel” (line 1), in contrast to a „non-feel‟ 
preface such as „I think‟ (e.g., Extract 7.31A, line 5). However it is clear that this is not 
appropriate as evidenced by Phil‟s continuing admonishment to “Stick with what you 
feel” (lines 4-5). This is followed by Luke asserting that it is indeed what he feels 
(“Well I feel that”, line 7) with Luke‟s laughter projecting a disprefered response, and      
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possibly designed to counter Phil‟s pursuit of the topic (Jefferson, 1979; Pomerantz, 
1984a). However, Phil makes it plain that this is not valid as a feeling (“>No no no 
no.<”, line 8), but rather “That‟s a thought. That‟s a thought. You‟re thinking” (lines 8-
9). Phil invites Luke to try again with “What do you feel?” (line 10). 
Luke‟s „thought‟, if one examines the utterances that could stand as candidate 
markers or referents for any particular display of mentation, could be specified as “she 
tries too hard with her sister” (lines 1-2). In other words, we can consider that a 
„thought‟ in this context is an assessment or evaluation concerning a particular action or 
event (e.g., an opinion) rather than a direct statement concerning the assessor‟s 
psychological (and more specifically emotional/affective) disposition concerning the 
action or event that is of topical import. What is at stake in this interaction, then, is the 
status of particular evaluative utterances. One might say that there is an interactional 
problem to be resolved here, which at its core involves an elucidation of what counts as 
a „feeling‟ versus a „thought‟.  
To examine how this problem is resolved, let us consider how the interaction 
further plays out in the following extracts. 
 
Extract 7.31D 
1    Luke:   Aw it comes back down to the possession thing. 
2    (0.4) 
3    Phil:   >Go on. Tell me about it.< 
4    (0.6) 
5    Luke:   U::m (0.2) I just feel it’s intrusive 
6    (1.1) 
7    Phil:  Y[::] 
8    Luke:   [On] my  
9            (0.8) 
10   Phil:   Y::[es] 
11   Luke:     [ti]me= 
12   Phil:   =.hh That’s a thought so what do you feel?  
13    (2.1) 
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Here, rather than providing a direct evaluation in response to Phil‟s question, 
Luke provides for a more general response; one that appears to index some previous talk. 
This is not met with an immediate correction or challenge by Phil, but rather an 
invitation to provide some further elaboration (“>Go on. Tell me about it.<”, line 3).  
Again, Luke has another go at producing something that on first inspection 
appears to count as a „feeling‟, with the preface “I just feel” (line 5) attached to his 
evaluation “it‟s intrusive” (line 5). While this is not initially met with a correction by 
Phil, at the point at which Luke completes (over several turns) his evaluation „I just feel 
it‟s intrusive on my time‟ (at line 11) this is again met with Phil‟s formulation that 
“That‟s a thought” (line 12) and another request that Luke furnish something that counts 
as a „feeling‟ (“so what do you feel?”, line 12).   
 
Extract 7.31E 
1    Luke:   A*h* I guess you could feel jealous? 
2    (0.4) 
3    Phil:   Yes, jealous an::d  
4    (0.4) 
5    Luke:   U::m (1.2) ºPossessive as I said,º (0.2) 
6         U:[:m    ] 
7    Phil:     [>Yeah,] yeah, yeah,< that’s a behaviour, come on  
8    what do you f:eel. 
9    (0.6) 
 
Here, note that Luke now frames his response in terms not of what he might 
report directly, as in the previous extracts with his use of the first-person pronoun „I‟ 
packaged in a preface such as „I just feel‟, but provides a kind of hypothetical or 
rhetorical question “A*h* I guess you could feel jealous?” (line 1). In other words, 
Luke attempts to „fit‟ his response to Phil‟s repeated formulations. This attempt is 
undertaken with some degree of hesitancy (i.e., the extended „ah‟, equivocal „I guess‟, 
switch from the first-person „I‟ to the second person „you‟, and the questioning      
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intonation), and could perhaps also be understood as a perspective-display invitation 
(e.g., Maynard, 1989).  
Note that while Luke‟s use of the first-person pronoun „I‟ can operate to provide 
a kind of privileged position by which Luke can speak authoritatively about what he in 
fact „thinks‟ or „feels‟, such authority is of course defeasable (e.g., Hacker, 2006) and is 
indeed repeatedly challenged by Phil. In this sense, Luke does maintain a kind of 
epistemic authority („I guess‟), but by way of delivering his answer using a second-
person pronoun („you could feel jealous?‟). 
Such a delicate delivery appears to be warranted, and while Luke‟s initial 
offering of „jealous‟ is met with acceptance by Phil, following Luke‟s addition of 
“possessive” (line 5) Phil again rejects Luke‟s response, this time as being “a 
behaviour” (line 7). Now, at this point one might suggest a gloss that Phil is becoming 
somewhat impatient or exasperated (e.g., Phil‟s “>Yeah, yeah, yeah,<” and “come on 
what do you f:eel.”, lines 7-8) with Luke‟s continued failure to provide something that 
is warrantable as a „feeling‟.  
 
Extract 7.31F 
1    Phil:   ↑Jealous,  
2            (0.9) 
3    Luke:   Angry, 
4            (0.3) 
5    Phil:   Yeah ↑angry::, 
6            (0.3) 
7    Luke:   ºUm::º  
8    (1.4) 
9    Luke:   Resentful,  
10    (.) 
11   Phil:   ↑Resentfu::l, bit left out, 
12    (0.2) 
13   Luke:   M*m* 
14   Phil:   Bit ↑ignored, 
15   Luke:   Resentful probably be the= 
16   Phil:   =Resentful. Okay.       
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17    (0.3) 
18   Luke:   Yeah. That would be [(    )] 
19   Phil:                       [So the] statement is .hhh I’m  
20    feeling resentful= 
21   Luke:   =Yep. 
22   Phil:   Full stop.  
23    (2.3) 
24   Luke:   That’s it? 
25    (0.4) 
26   Phil:   Yip. I’m feeling resentful. 
27    (0.2) 
28   Luke:   So:: (0.6) you mean I just say that? 
29    (.) 
30   Phil:   ↑YIUP  
31    (1.3) 
32   Phil:   >What’s she gonna say what’s Stephanie gonna say back?<  
33    (1.2) 
 
In this extract, Luke and Phil work towards coproducing a suitable „feeling‟ term 
that can fulfil the requirements of Phil‟s request. Of interest, note that it is Phil who 
provides the first (previously ratified) term (“↑Jealous,”, line 1), and offers in response 
to Luke‟s suggestions several others (“bit left out”, line 11; “bit ↑ignored,”, line 14), 
before both agree on “Resentful” across lines 15 and 16 (note that this is initially 
offered by Luke at line 9 and repeated by Phil at line 11). As with previous analysis 
involving interaction between Phil and Jane (Extracts 7.30A-7.30E), it would appear 
that a therapist can present candidate psychological categorisations to a client (e.g., 
„sad‟, „jealous‟, „angry‟), and these in turn can become „fitted‟ with the particular 
formulation and subsequent recommendation for action that the therapist may present.  
The import of this is that once the problem of a suitable feeling term is resolved, 
Phil can then provide Luke with a clear recommendation as to what action should be 
undertaken with regard to the initial problem (i.e., Luke‟s concern with his partner‟s 
telephone conversations). That is, Luke should tell his partner how he „feels‟ (“I‟m 
feeling resentful”, lines 19-20, 26) and avoid delivering such „feelings‟ in likely      
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problematic ways (i.e., packaged in a „you statement‟). To sum up, Luke should not tell 
his partner what he thinks, or frame this account in terms of thoughts; rather, he should 
tell his partner what he feels. And importantly, he is required to frame his current 
account in such terms.  
In the following extracts, that occur a few minutes later, we see some further 
contestation over the status of „thought‟ that may bear on the matters at hand.  
 
Extract 7.32A 
1    Luke:   =Yeah. (0.2) And, (1.5) yeah but hhh (0.7) I think she  
2            thinks I’m being: (0.4) probably she thinks that y’know  
3            I’m being smart .hhh (0.2) Because y’know oh you (.)  
4    you’re not making him .hh (.) y’know- (0.2) not making  
5         me not drink anymore therefore y’know he thinks that  
6            y’know I don’t need any clothes we don’t go out any .h  
7            (now) >I’m basically making a statement that we don’t  
8            go out anymore<  
9    Phil:   (And there’s a) sort of passive aggressive [(  )] 
10   Luke:                                              [Yeah] it’s  
11    going back to that thing. [U::m ]= 
12   Phil:                            [Okay.]  
13   Luke:   =It’s ↑sort of a bit of both= 
14   Phil:   =Yeah.  
15           (1.1) 
16   Phil:   I just heard you say (.) I think she thinks .hh (0.3)  
17           ah:::: ººa- (.) i- i-ºº (0.3) 
18   Luke:   No. But I’m just- that’s just my internal thought=    
19   Phil:   =>I know it is h but I’d be careful of that< (.) 
20   Luke:   (Uh**)= 
21   Phil:   =>Y- see what I’m< hea:ring is you ºdon’t say how you  
22    feelº 
23          (2.9) 
 
Of note here is Luke‟s “No. But I‟m just- that‟s just my internal thought” (line 
18) which attends to both the status of his previous accounts and Phil‟s unfinished query 
“I just heard you say (.) I think she thinks” (line 16). Now, one could argue that Luke is 
making clear a distinction between the thought he has as an internal, private process,      
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and the thought as an inappropriate referent that needs to be replaced with an avowal of 
a feeling. After all, much of the interaction appears to be about what Luke should say, 
and involves Phil‟s attempts to correct Luke on his avowing thoughts rather than 
feelings.  
However, an alternative description is that whatever the status of Luke‟s 
thoughts, by making his most recent thoughts „just‟ and „internal‟, Luke can preserve 
the status of his account. In other words, Luke can make a particular point, by referring 
to „thoughts‟, regardless of the inappropriateness or correctness of talking about such 
„thoughts‟ (as opposed to „feelings‟) in this interaction. Here, one might suggest, that he 
provides for an authoritative, non-defeasable claim (in the sense that he is making a 
statement to an interlocutor that he will not consider any challenge) concerning his 
„internal thought‟. And note that while Phil does caution Luke on this matter “>I know 
it is h but I‟d be careful of that<” (line 19), he does not discount that it is, indeed, an 
„internal thought‟.  
This is important, as the gist of Luke‟s account is concerned with another 
person‟s disposition towards him – which could be glossed as „I think this person thinks 
that I think‟. However, while Phil does not dispute Luke‟s privileged access to his own 
„thoughts‟ he does provide a reformulation that Luke‟s problem is that “you ºdon‟t say 
how you feelº” across lines 21 to 22 (cf. to the therapist‟s reformulation of the client‟s 
„problem‟ as „not able to express her feelings‟ in Davis, 1986). In other words, a 
therapist‟s caution on „internal thoughts‟ could be seen as a marker that denotes this 
interaction as one of a particular type, that is it is clearly some form of therapeutic 
interaction. An interaction in which various forms of psychological business gets done, 
and in which people can and do orient to „thoughts‟ and so on as internal, private things. 
Here, the client explicitly makes the claim that the „thought‟ he is referring to is 
indeed „just internal‟. However, I would suggest this can and does work to defease an      
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implication that he has somehow failed to attend to the therapist‟s instruction regarding 
a problematic use of such statements concerning „thoughts‟. The „thought‟, then, is not 
to be only regarded as actually „internal‟. Rather, it functions to draw an intelligible, 
normative contrast with a proposed misguided use of the term, one which has been the 
subject of some discussion (indeed disputation) between the therapist and client.  
Another way of approaching this, and much of the interaction, is simply as an 
instance whereby one can discern a therapist‟s rejection of a client‟s evaluations and 
assessments (and formulations), with therapist attempts to guide the client towards 
adopting more „correct‟ (i.e., therapist produced) formulations. However, in the current 
case, the objects of the formulations are of a fundamental importance as they involve 
the specification and respecification of the very things that may well underpin the 
machinery or apparatus involved in the future production of formulations of any kind. 
Namely, that „thoughts‟ and „feelings‟ become constituted for all-practical-purposes as 
kinds of local reality production devices, and not just as potentially correct or incorrect 
ways-of-speaking.
18 
Regardless, it is important to examine how this might play out in order to 
establish what the pragmatic import of such a claim regarding a „thought‟ might have. 
In this regard, consider the final extract.  
 
Extract 7.32B 
1    Luke:   No I don’t. I’m not- my dad hasn’t either, that’s  
2    what I’ve been taught. 
3    (.) 
4    Phil:   .hhh >Yeah I know. I understand that.< .hhh And I 
5    suppose what I’m trying to do is l- ºu-º is- is to say  
6    to you, (0.4) ((sniff 0.3 sec)) (1.5) Your partner,  
7    (1.0) ºany partnerº (1.3) any (.) f:emale partner  
8            ↑prefers to know what’s going on and what’s 
                                                 
18 „Local‟ as referring to “the heterogeneous grammars of activity through which familiar social objects 
are constituted” (Lynch, 1993). Familiar social objects, such as a „thought‟ or a „feeling‟, for example.       
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9            [not going] on. 
10   Luke:   [(ºYeahº) ] 
11       (0.4) 
12   Phil:   .hhhh ↑A::n:d (0.8) y’know so I: would move to the  
13           position o:f: (2.1) >telling her how you feel.<  
14    (0.4) 
15   Luke:   ºMm.º 
16    (0.5) 
17   Phil:  And (0.5) ↓don’t be ↓worried about whether she gets  
18           upset with what you ↑say or not (0.2) because 
19           [if she gets upset that’s= 
20   Luke:   [Wh- 
21   Phil:  =h:er business ((possible finger snap or clap)) 
22    (0.5) 
 
Here Luke appears to accept Phil‟s formulation that he does not „say how he 
feels‟ (line 1), and Phil suggests that Luke should not tell his partner what he thinks (or 
at least, he should not exclusively tell her what he thinks) he should tell her what he 
feels. Moreover he should not be concerned with what she may feel about what he feels 
(“if she gets upset that‟s h:er business”, lines 19-21). The notion that Luke is only 
responsible for his emotions, and not his partners, is interesting as it could be suggested 
to fly in the face of a kind of everyday „lay‟ knowledge that one‟s feelings are very 
much influenced by the feelings of others.  
Note also how the recipient design features of Phil‟s formulation, involving a 
kind of practical, general advice that „women partners need to be told feelings‟, works 
from the specific case (“Your partner”, line 6) to a generalisation (“ºany partnerº”, line 
7) , to a kind of „specific generalisation‟ (“any (.) f:emale partner”, line 7) involving 
gender categorisation. This, then, could be glossed as Phil furnishing a reformulation 
(involving generalisation) that is constructed using decidedly vernacular terms, that 
provides for both a recommendation and a justification for action (“>telling her how 
you feel.<”, line 13).       
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What counts as a „thought‟ here, then, is something that is exquisitely dependent 
upon, and consequential to, features of the talk-in-interaction. Indeed, what counts as a 
„feeling‟ as opposed to a „thought‟ is something that is highly consequential for the 
participants. In this instance, „thoughts‟ are things that need to be treated with some 
degree of caution, as things which one should perhaps not invoke in interactions with a 
partner. On the other hand „feelings‟ are to be, in a sense, reported directly. 
Here, the reporting of a „feeling‟ is presented as being essentially protected 
against disputation, at least in terms of the accountability of such reporting, in that Luke 
can (and should) provide a report of „how he feels‟ to his partner without having to 
provide an account for any such „feelings‟, while the reporting of a „thought‟ is likely to 
require considerable accounting (in addition to engendering problematic interactions). 
Whether by omission or commission, Luke is positioned as someone vulnerable to a 
charge of being reserved with regard to avowals of „feelings‟, and Phil‟s suggestion is 
that he should make attempts to avow „feelings‟ rather than „thoughts‟. 
Conclusion 
The current chapter has provided an empirical account of mental predicate and 
psychological term usage in psychotherapeutic interactions, with a focus on the terms 
„think‟ and „feel‟. Following an examination of such terms‟ usage in the provision of 
assessments and evaluations (e.g., Extracts 7.1-7.4), a more detailed examination was 
provided of therapist initiated interrogatives, with considerable attention directed 
towards questions of the general form „how do you feel‟. Such questions were 
analytically presented as designed to facilitate therapeutic business (e.g., Extracts 7.13, 
7.14A-B), notwithstanding that the pursuit of such business might engender particular 
interactional difficulties (Extracts 7.15A-7.16).  
Following this, consideration of a how one might come to „just have a thought‟ 
was undertaken (Extracts 7.18-7.22), in which a detailed account was provided of how      
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this might figure as a therapeutic practice. After examination of how „thoughts‟ and 
„feelings‟ are displayed in interaction (Extracts 7.23-7.29), the chapter concluded with 
an analysis of potential misalignments between therapist and clients, with regard to 
eliciting accounts and displays of „feelings‟ (Extracts 7.30A-E) and in „correcting‟ a 
client‟s avowal of a „thought‟ rather than a „feeling‟ (Extracts 7.31A-7.32B). 
Analysis of these extracts serves to demonstrate the manner in which „thoughts‟ 
and „feelings‟ are worked-up in-and-as particular accountable practices, and that 
participants attend to such matters as what is warrantably a „feeling‟ versus a „thought‟ 
with a considerable degree of sophistication. Moreover, in therapeutic interactions 
between a professional clinical psychologist and clients for whom „bipolar disorder‟ has 
demonstrable relevance, issues pertaining to what counts as a „thought‟, of what counts 
as a „feeling‟, are likely to be massively consequential. While such consequentiality 
may be impervious to direct elucidation, when one considers that such a „mood 
disorder‟ is characterised as involving problematic „thoughts‟ and „feelings‟, I would 
suggest that interactions such as those detailed here can at the least provide some hint as 
to how such consequentiality might „play out‟ in a wider range of settings and practices.  
In other words, what I would like to suggest is that undertaking detailed 
examinations of the work that such terms do, even when such projects may at first 
glance appear to be entirely trivial and unrewarding if approached from the dominant 
cognitivist perspective, that one may gain some sense that “even with the best models, 
the most sophisticated technology, and systematic empirical examinations, immense 
amounts of behavior go unaccounted for” (Maynard, 2006, p. 106). In this regard, if one 
approaches the study of mental predicates, psychological terms, the stuff of cognition 
and affect, not as hidden, inner states and processes, but as phenomena that are readily 
accessible and publicly available for participants in-and-through interaction, one can get      
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a radically different appreciation of what might be worthy of investigation when one 
undertakes studies of „bipolar disorder‟. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The thing is to try to talk in such a way that a task of analysis is involved. The success 
of that analysis provides the lack of need of an account of why you came to say it. 
(Sacks, 1992a, p. 545) 
 
The current dissertation has, as its topical concern, been focused on multiform 
discursive practices by which persons who warrantably can be ascribed or avow 
membership of the category „bipolar disorder‟ demonstrate and display in their talk 
matters relevant to such a categorisation. These practices have been examined in a 
massively consequential setting involved with the doing of psychological business – the 
psychotherapy session. As its central thesis was the claim that the practices by which 
bipolar disorder gets done as bipolar disorder are invariably absent in most formal 
accounts of the disorder, and to address this the dissertation has provided an empirically 
grounded description of a range of discursive practices associated with the doing of 
bipolar disorder in psychotherapy. This has been undertaken from a discursive 
psychological orientation, drawing extensively from ethnomethodology, conversation 
analysis, and Wittgensteinian philosophy.  
With regard to these broader domains of inquiry, the dissertation makes a 
number of significant contributions. Firstly, the dissertation represents the first 
systematic conceptual and empirical discursive psychological examination of work 
undertaken in the delivery of health care services related to bipolar disorder. The 
dissertation represents an original and detailed examination that specifically attends to 
how professionals, and clients „with‟ bipolar disorder, might manage their interactions 
„at the coal face‟ of mental healthcare delivery, notably by a focus on how 
psychological terms feature in situated psychotherapeutic discourse. 
Secondly, the dissertation provides a sustained consideration of the difficulties 
in establishing when logical-grammatical investigations and empirical investigations of      
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various psychological practices may have critical purchase, and presents an argument 
that there is in fact room for a fruitful collaboration between those conducting 
conceptual investigations into the use (and misuse) of grammar, and for those 
undertaking empirical examinations of talk-in-interaction. 
Thirdly, it provides for an addition and extension to previous 
ethnomethodological and conversation analytic work that has explored the practices of 
psychotherapeutic interactions since the pioneering work done by Sacks on emergency 
telephone hotlines (e.g., Sacks, 1967) and group therapy sessions (Sacks, 1992a, 1992b); 
Turner‟s examination of how therapy, and in particular therapy talk, gets produced and 
recognised as therapeutic (Turner, 1972); and Davis‟s work on therapists‟ 
reformulations of clients‟ troubles-talk into matters more amenable to psychological 
remedy (Davis, 1986). For one example, in Chapter 7 it provides a detailed explication 
of how a therapist produced utterance such as „I suddenly thought‟, working as an 
extended „on topic‟ topic marker, when embedded in a therapist produced, self 
disclosive story, can work prospectively to furnish some kind of therapeutic product. 
Finally, it has provided an alternate examination, by way of respecification, of 
several of the key concepts that underpin the majority of contemporary 
conceptualisations of bipolar disorder, to produce a radically different view of what 
might be „at stake‟ in such interactions. For example, by an examination of the practices 
by which „symptoms‟ of bipolar disorder are produced and recognised as symptoms, 
how „moods‟ can be profitably examined as account production devices, and the 
methods by which psychological terms (such as „thought‟ and „feel‟) operate in-and-as 
situated practices involved in psychotherapeutic business.  
In Chapter 1 I provided a brief overview of how „bipolar disorder‟ has come to 
be regarded as a medical disease entity, and reviewed the development of the DSM in 
order to gain some appreciation of what an „official‟ description of the disorder might      
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comprise. I demonstrated the problematic nature of adopting such an „official‟ 
description as a basis by which one could undertake empirical investigations of bipolar 
disorder, and further demonstrated that such an „official‟ description is one subject to 
considerable contestation. For example, while bipolar disorder was at one time 
considered a kind of „gold standard‟ as a psychiatric disease, the concept of the disorder 
has broadened considerably to include a host of other conditions. However, rather than 
focus on what appear to be obvious shortcomings with such „official‟ descriptions of 
bipolar disorder, I suggested that consideration of such matters alone may provide little 
purchase on what it is that people actually do when they routinely engage in a variety of 
consequential practices (e.g., diagnosis, treatment, and research participation) in which 
„bipolar disorder‟ may be of principle concern.   
I then turned to an examination of two disparate positions with regard to 
psychological, psychiatric, and sociological conceptualisations of insanity; the critical 
Foucaultian inspired historical scholarship of Nikolas Rose, and the strongly 
ethnomethodological informed Wittgensteinian scholarship of Jeff Coulter. This was 
undertaken in order to suggest the utility of undertaking a respecification of questions 
such as „what is bipolar disorder‟, „how do we identify bipolar disorder‟, and „how do 
we diagnose bipolar disorder‟, into something like „what are the practices by which 
bipolar disorder gets done as „bipolar disorder‟? In short, rather than attempting to 
provide some kind of „objective‟ description of bipolar disorder derived from a diverse 
and contested literature, my focus here was to suggest that bipolar disorder could be 
profitably examined as being produced in-and-through numerous, multiform practices.  
In then moving to a consideration of such practices, in Chapter 2 I presented an 
overview of ethnomethologically informed approaches to doing social science, by 
which one might seek to uncover the practices by which (for example) „bipolar 
disorder‟ is produced, recognised, and otherwise assembled as an „objective‟ and „real‟      
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social fact. This was to suggest that traditional studies of bipolar disorder invariably fail 
to provide for descriptions of the work by which bipolar disorder is produced as bipolar 
disorder. I argued that an ethnomethodologically informed investigation of bipolar 
disorder might seek to examine and describe such work as members work, rather than 
leaving it as a kind of unacknowledged resource from which social scientific accounts 
are constructed. 
I further undertook a detailed review of conversation analysis and membership 
categorisation analysis, and examined distinctions between „institutional‟ versus „non-
institutional‟ settings to demonstrate the considerable difficulties in providing 
descriptions of social life that are non-ironic with regard to members‟ practices. In 
addition, throughout the chapter I touched upon Wittgensteinian themes in order to 
sketch out problems associated with providing descriptions of categorisation practices 
involving overtly psychological concerns. In outlining how one might profitably 
undertake providing descriptions of such work, I suggested that in undertaking 
ethnomethodological and conversation analytic investigations one can draw upon a 
range of disparate approaches to investigations of the „obvious‟, such that one might 
gain a clearer view of the ubiquitous discursive nature of various practices.  
In consideration of such discursive practices, in Chapter 3 I presented an 
overview of an approach to undertaking ethnomethodologically informed investigations 
of „the psychological‟ from within the discipline of psychology, that of discursive 
psychology. I presented a version of discursive psychology that features a strongly 
ethnomethodological and Wittgensteinian approach to providing descriptions of how 
psychological terms and categories feature in situated use.  
More specifically, I considered in detail the difficulties in establishing when 
logical-grammatical investigations and empirical investigations of various 
psychological practices can be profitably undertaken, and further examined issues      
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surrounding the provision of non-ironising descriptions of the discursive, psychological 
practices that members‟ engage with. This was undertaken in order to provide a 
principled stance towards examination of interactions in which there may well be a 
priori disputation concerning members‟ competence to engage in such practices. In this 
regard, I positioned discursive psychology as being both interested in, and useful for, 
conceptual and empirical investigations of „the psychological‟.  
In moving towards analysis of the empirical materials of the investigation 
proper, in Chapter 4 I further elaborated on the focus of my empirical investigation, the 
mundane, ordinary, practical discursive work that might get done in professional-client 
interactions when bipolar disorder is of topical concern. Further, my investigation was 
directed toward an examination of individuals‟ talk-in-interaction in a setting which, for 
those identified as having bipolar disorder, may be massively consequential – the 
„psychotherapy session‟.  
I then provided an initial examination of the empirical materials, comprising a 
corpus of audio recordings of seven, two-party psychotherapy sessions recorded by a 
clinical psychologist and involving five client participants. Rather than presenting a 
synoptic description of bipolar disorder that might be tested or otherwise examined for 
its validity, or a range of possible associated categories, this was left as a matter for 
participants. Nonetheless, I showed that for the purposes of the present investigation, 
„bipolar disorder‟ was a category that could be demonstrably shown to be a members‟ 
category.   
In addition, I provided a brief examination of issues relating to „openings‟, that 
is, the coordination of talk that occurs at the beginning of each of the recordings that 
comprise the data corpus, in order to demonstrate that participants oriented to the 
recording as a practical activity. Additionally, I presented analysis demonstrative of the 
relevance of the category „bipolar‟ to participants (and related matters such as talk      
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pertaining to symptoms and treatment), and considered the issue of a possible „hidden‟ 
participant in the interactions (i.e., the researcher). 
In undertaking a more detailed examination of the corpus, in Chapter 5 I 
examined how bipolar disorder „symptoms‟ get produced in talk-in-interaction, and I 
argued that „symptoms‟ might best be approached as serving as a kind of gloss for a 
range of subtle and highly sophisticated interactional phenomena that are firmly rooted 
in ordinary, mundane practices. In consideration of clinical and vernacular 
understandings of what might comprise a „symptom‟, I showed that it may be unclear 
the extent to which „symptoms‟ stand as discrete entities from problematic „moods‟. In 
that regard, I provided descriptions of how the symptoms of a mood disorder may 
feature in talk-in-interaction as interactional products decoupled from moods 
themselves, and provided analysis of the practices by which symptoms are made to be 
obvious by-and-for participants in talk-in-interaction.  
I examined the manner in which possible symptoms of bipolar disorder are 
produced in accounts and formulations involving what might be described as „ups‟ 
„downs‟, and „mixed‟ or „unstable‟ periods. In addition, I provided a detailed 
consideration of how accounts can be produced of a current „level of functioning‟ by 
contrasting previous symptoms against current (or absent) symptoms, which can also be 
used to foreshadow future functioning. With regard to ascriptions concerning categories 
and category bound activities involving symptom inferences, I demonstrated the manner 
in which both a therapist and a client can „get it wrong‟.  
In broad terms, I demonstrated that symptom-talk appears in-and-as accounts 
that justify putative symptoms, or at least make the symptoms intelligible as symptoms 
of some kind, with regard to client and therapist accounts. Such accounts may embellish 
particular symptoms, and particular symptoms can serve to embellish accounts in a 
reflexive relationship. That is to say, I argued that in psychotherapy, symptoms are      
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collaborative productions and not unilaterally produced, and that symptoms might only 
count as symptoms when there is some agreement. I further suggested that unilaterally 
produced symptoms might best be seen as problems that will require some solution 
(e.g., ascriptions or avowals that will be subject to some contestation), in contrast to 
collaboratively produced symptoms which serve to furnish the solutions to problems.  
In Chapter 6, I further explored the distinction between a „symptom‟ of a mood 
disorder and a „mood‟ itself. I argued that while „mood‟ remains relatively unexplicated 
in both the extensive clinical literature on the disorder and in vernacular accounts, that 
this is perhaps unsurprising, as „mood‟ appears to be a highly ramified and conceptually 
fuzzy term. In this regard, I outlined an approach to investigating „moods‟ by which one 
might consider how „moods‟ are used in the performance of a diverse range of social 
practices. I then provided a respecification of „moods‟ as kinds of devices; as collections 
of various categories that are vernacularly rendered, reflexively organised, normatively 
accountable descriptions of conduct. That is, I presented an account of „moods‟, not as 
intraindividual affective „states‟, but as reflexive „account production devices‟.  
I then presented examples of „moods‟ as ostensibly pathological, non-
pathological, and as contestedly pathological or non-pathological. In addition, I 
provided some description of „moods‟ as operative as devices that can validate or 
invalidate an account and its method of production, produce decidedly moral accounts 
of action, and that can enable predictions of conduct. I argued that in consequential 
psychological settings, „moods‟ serve not only as normatively accountable devices that 
persons can utilise in the performance of a range of diverse practical actions, but are 
also the very things which are subject to investigation, clarification, and remediation. 
In the final analytic chapter, I examined the manner in which mental predicates 
and psychological terms are used in psychotherapeutic interactions. My focus here was 
on the psychological terms „think‟ and „feel‟ and related grammatical terms (e.g.,      
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„thinks‟, „thinking‟, „thought‟, „thoughts‟, „feels‟, „feeling‟, feelings‟, „felt‟), given that 
bipolar disorder, ostensibly a disorder of „mood‟, presumably involves problematic 
„thoughts‟ and „feelings‟. Moreover, given the previously developed position that 
psychological terms in actual use cannot be merely taken as referential, my focus was 
on providing descriptions of such terms when the status of any particular „thoughts‟ or 
„feelings‟ might be highly contested and indeed, massively consequential. 
I provided an empirical account of mental predicate and psychological term 
usage in psychotherapy, beginning with an examination of such usage in the provision 
of assessments and evaluations, in particular therapist initiated interrogatives of the 
general form „how do you feel‟. I demonstrated that such questions facilitate a variety of 
therapeutic business, notwithstanding that such business might entail interactional 
difficulties. I provided analysis of how one might come to „just have a thought‟, in 
which a detailed account was provided of how this might figure as a therapeutic practice. 
Additionally, I provided a detailed account of how „thoughts‟ and „feelings‟ are 
displayed in interaction related to psychotherapeutic business. Returning to issues of 
contestation, I concluded my analytic treatment of psychological terms use with detailed 
analysis of the manner in which misalignments might occur with therapist and clients‟ 
use of such terms, with the production of an emotion display involving elicitation of 
„feelings‟ by therapist, and the contestation of what counts as a „feeling‟ versus what 
counts as a „thought‟. 
In my analyses I demonstrated the manner in which „thoughts‟ and „feelings‟ are 
worked-up in-and-as particular accountable practices, and that participants attend to 
such matters as what is warrantably a „feeling‟ versus a „thought‟ with a considerable 
degree of sophistication. Moreover, I suggested that exhaustive examinations of such 
interactions might provide some hint as to how the consequentiality of such interactions      
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might be observed in a wider range of settings and practices in which psychology has 
some stake.  
At this point it is appropriate to turn to an examination of the limitations and 
weaknesses of the dissertation. The first relates to the absence of an explication of the 
methods of analysis employed, with the most obvious and significant omission 
occurring with the use of a formal conversation analytic transcription notation and the 
rendering of participants utterances into particular kinds of product. That is to say, the 
dissertation imposes a particular orderliness on the work that participants are engaged in. 
And, to revisit Sacks‟s comments in the Exergue at the beginning of this dissertation, 
while I have undertaken the current investigation to see if there might be some order to 
a „bunch of stuff‟ that I have collected, in the actual undertaking of my investigation any 
perceived orderliness might be less the result of an examination of the practices by 
which participants get their work done and more a feature of a host of undocumented 
practices by which the analyst of the materials has imposed a particular kind of order 
(i.e., the application of particular transcription notation, formatting, selecting of extracts, 
and so forth) in order to produce something that is accountably a social scientific work 
product (e.g., Crabtree, 2000; Lynch & Bogen, 1994).  
In this regard, I could provide a retrospective account of my struggles, as a 
novice with regard to „transcribing audio data‟, to provide what might count as 
„authentic‟ transcripts. I could provide descriptions relating to such activities as 
listening to the audio, my initial attempts at transcribing the audio into text, correcting 
and recorrecting transcript in light of new discoveries concerning how other researchers 
use particular symbols, and so forth. In short, the practices by which I came to produce 
something that might appear to be authoritative, scholarly, and congruent with canonical 
social scientific accounts; as something that might appear to be „just like the stuff in the 
journal articles‟.       
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These tensions can be somewhat resolved by a consideration that to undertake 
such work would represent an entirely different sort of project, one which (could it even 
be undertaken) would occlude the kinds of detailed descriptions provided in the current 
account. While I have clearly not provided for a kind of „purist‟ ethnomethodological 
account of my own work practices, I have nevertheless sought to undertake the 
investigation with a kind of ethnomethodological attitude that, while not accounting for 
practices involved in the production of the dissertation as a formal account, some 
sensitivity towards such tensions might be seen to be „built in‟ to the final product.  
Turning to a second explicatory absence, which concerns the production of the 
dissertation as an account which seeks to not privilege particular discourses over others, 
but which nevertheless is clearly produced as a social scientific, psychological, work 
product. For example, while one could well argue that the setting examined (the 
psychotherapy session) and its attendant practices and concerns could be described as 
„engines of the psy complex‟ (e.g, Rose, 1996a), so too can the dissertation‟s account of 
the setting and its activities be so regarded. In other words, both can be seen to trade 
heavily on psychologised words, terms, and concepts which are associated with a vast 
range of unexplicated psychologised practices. In short, perhaps one cannot obtain a 
privileged position outside the „domain‟ of psychology, which would appear to be 
more-or-less now the domain of „everyday life‟, such that one could critically evaluate 
its claims and practices while remaining untouched by them.  
To partially address such concerns, having providing a detailed consideration of 
Foucaultian themes with reference to the work of Rose in Chapter 1 in which I 
suggested that such critical historical perspectives on psychological research and 
practice would serve to „trouble‟ the dissertation, here it might be more appropriate to 
suggest that while remaining relatively unexplicated, such a perspective nevertheless 
„haunts‟ the analyses. That is, while I am deeply troubled by various conceptual and      
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theoretical underpinnings of the psy disciplines which I take to be often conceptually 
flawed and inchoate, and to which my own endeavours are certainly not immune, I 
suggest that in undertaking empirical examinations of the practices that might be 
associated with such disciplines, such as counselling, psychotherapy, and so forth, one 
can at least be wary of offering social scientific correctives, as I would suggest this is a 
moral and political undertaking.
1  
For example, my descriptions of the participants in the current dissertation are 
not undertaken in order to point to how (for example) the role of „therapist‟ is 
representative of a form of institutional control, or that „clients‟ are in some sense 
unwitting participants in a vast psychologised network of repression and subjugation. 
Rather, my focus has been on providing non-ironising descriptions (at least in relation 
to how contemporary psychology might provide such) of a variety of psychological 
practices that appear to make perfect and obvious sense to participants engaged in 
psychotherapeutic discourse. In that sense, is the present account concerning bipolar 
disorder, the psychotherapy session, the use of psychological terms and so forth, in 
some sense qualitatively better or more correct than others available?  
I would suggest that my descriptions are at the very least novel, given that to my 
knowledge there are no commensurate examinations of bipolar disorder undertaken 
from an ethnomethodological, conversation analytic, or discursive psychological 
orientation. I would suggest that beyond that, such a question is best left for the reader 
to answer. On the other hand, what if my descriptions are in some sense just plain 
wrong? Such a question might also serve as an opportunity for some comment on the 
relative practical significance of my „findings‟ to a broader readership. For example, 
would my descriptions of the psychotherapeutic interactions make much sense to those 
                                                 
1 And as Kessen writes in regard to the central contribution provided by those undertaking projects which 
seek a reconstruction of psychology: “the sum of the assessment is scaldingly simple. For all its 
spectacular achievements of the past centuries, positive social science is only one other way of solving 
human problems” (Kessen, 1996, p. 270, emphasis in original).      
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working in the area of applied mental health? Could I confidently position my „findings‟ 
as being relevant to practitioners, to add to their considerable „stocks of professional 
knowledge‟ (e.g., Peräkylä & Vehviläinen, 2003)? In considering the potential value of 
the proposed project in broad terms, at the core of the delivery of health care services 
are the interactions between health professionals and clients (e.g., Heritage & Maynard, 
2006), with such interactions critical to such concerns as the formulation of appropriate 
diagnosis, the adherence of clients to medication and treatment advice, and in 
establishing both professional and client satisfaction with health care practices. In this 
sense, I could suggest that for health care professionals, the current dissertation 
represents a unique and novel approach to investigating how both professionals working 
in the area of mental health and clients with bipolar disorder manage the complex 
business of interactivity in a health related context.  
I could further draw upon „findings‟ and suggest ways in which both 
professionals and clients might participate more effectively in the context of mental 
health consultations. For example, by pointing to ways in which professionals might 
take into consideration otherwise unnoticed features of interactions with clients, which 
may have implications for such things as training, improving client adherence to 
treatment recommendations, reducing unnecessary treatment, and other improvements 
in health care outcomes; particularly those pertaining to client satisfaction with services. 
However, I take the position that “we might say that no professional 
conceptualization can have much effect as far as on-the-ground members‟ actional 
methods are concerned” (McHoul, 2004, p. 435, emphasis in original). Or, by way of 
offering a more detailed explication, and one that reprises the recurring theme of this 
dissertation, I further quote McHoul (necessarily) at length, when he suggests that: 
 
… quotidian occurrences (from boiling eggs to world wars) are not to be grasped via 
exogenous technical concepts. Rather, they are methodically produced and achieved by      
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the local (endogenous) productional cohorts responsible for them: but such that the 
actual („lay‟) methods in question are a necessarily missing topic for almost every 
technical (Garfinkel would say „classical‟ or „formal‟) analysis. (McHoul, 2004, p. 441) 
 
Moreover, in consideration of the issues raised in Chapter 3, where I review 
Wittgenstein‟s notion of  „conceptual confusions‟ and his promise of a „therapy‟ for 
such confusions, consider that this does not entail a program for the „healing‟ of 
ordinary language use. While his cautionary arguments concerned how those practices 
when taken on holiday yield confusions for philosophy and social science, his therapies 
were undoubtedly provincial to those pursuits. In that regard, my overriding concern has 
been on providing descriptions that may stand in some contrast to those provided by 
social science theorists, but not members as they go about their ordinary affairs. In 
providing a somewhat less trenchant response, and to reprise the conclusion presented 
in Chapter 6, I would suggest that while my detailed examinations of interactions 
occurring in such clinical settings might be of some interest to both mental health 
professionals and the consumers of their services, they themselves are the ones to 
determine the relative merits of my descriptions of their own practices. 
Some brief comment is perhaps also warranted concerning what could be taken 
as perhaps a more obvious limitation of the dissertation, that being the validity, 
replicability, and generalisability of its findings, given what at first glance might appear 
to be a rather meagre „sample‟ of empirical materials.
2 Firstly, rather than having 
presented any clear formal proofs by which particular claims can be in some sense 
tested and found to be valid or not, in this dissertation I have provided some „thinkings‟ 
and considered „re-thinkings‟ concerning a selection of practices that appear to be 
relevant for the doing of „bipolar disorder‟ in psychotherapy.  
                                                 
2 That is to say, obvious for a reader with a strong commitment to quantitative research methods, or a 
reader unfamiliar with discursive psychological, ethnomethodological, or conversation analytic 
investigations.      
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Secondly, while the dissertation does represent a tentative first-step towards 
providing descriptions of some practices associated with bipolar disorder in its 
consideration of psychotherapeutic interactions, one might also consider seriously 
Sacks‟s insight concerning „order at all points‟ previously discussed toward the 
conclusion of Chapter 2. That is, the likely discoverability of order, an accountable 
order, an order that is put there to be found, in any empirical fragment (McHoul, 2001, 
2004; Sacks, 1992a, pp. 483-488; Sharrock, 1995, p. 4). In this sense, while 
recommendations to pursue further generalisability in the form of building more 
extensive corpora might of course yield additional practices for observation and 
analysis, I would suggest that the materials examined in the current dissertation, limited 
as they might appear to be, do provide for a sense of how bipolar disorder is indeed 
made „real in the world‟ (McHoul & Rapley, 2005a). That is, while my descriptions 
might (and should) be subject to contestation, they nevertheless attend to providing 
some description of interaction occurring in a domain which has remained relatively 
unexamined, and might serve as an initial point for undertaking further inquiry.  
I would like to think that studies, such as the one presented here, might provide 
for a gentle corrective, or more appropriately a reminder, to social science practitioners 
interested in investigating such things as mental illness that we are, after all, involved in 
investigations of phenomena – and not merely investigations of (for example) words 
about phenomena. Further, we must attend to furnishing adequate descriptions of 
particular phenomena prior to providing detailed explanations. Moreover, my overriding 
issue with what can be broadly glossed as overtly „critical‟ approaches is simply that 
they appear to be concerned with possibilities rather than with actualities. My focus has 
been on examining things as they are now, that is to say, things in their “local, in situ 
processes of coming-to-be” (McHoul, 1998, p. 15, emphasis in original) rather than how 
they might „come-to-be‟. That, it would seem, is an entirely different proposition, and      
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while not without considerable merit (and challenge) to revisit a theme that has infused 
much of the dissertation, it seems far to premature to be concentrating on explanation, 
and setting about explaining things that much of the time the social sciences appear to 
have a priori explanations for. Instead, the social sciences should be focused on 
obtaining adequate descriptions, as these seem to be in short supply. The strategy 
advocated and applied in the current dissertation for accomplishing, or at least making a 
start on this project with regards to „bipolar disorder‟, is to undertake sustained and 
exhaustive examinations of practices as practices, and not as (for example) some folk-
psychological analogues to what might take place in a laboratory. 
In conclusion, analyses such as those provided here may provide some further 
demonstration that social scientific conceptualisations of various psychological terms – 
which posit a form of „lay‟ usage as mostly involving members‟ provisions of (often 
flawed and inaccurate) descriptions, and which understand the „technical‟ usage (i.e., by 
psychologists) of psychological terms as referentially indexing psychological states (of 
which the „owners‟ of such states do not fully grasp how they actually operate) – will 
invariably fail to provide for adequate descriptions of how such terms may actually 
feature in-and-as situated practices. For, as I have demonstrated, it is in a detailed 
examination of such practices as involved with „having‟, „displaying‟, and „recognising‟ 
thoughts and feelings that one may gain a sense of the indisputably social nature of such 
practices. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Table A1 
DSM-IV-TR Diagnostic Criteria for a Manic Episode
a 
____________________________________________________________________ 
A.  A distinct period of abnormally and persistently elevated, expansive, or irritable 
mood, lasting at least 1 week (or any duration if hospitalization is necessary).  
B.  During the period of mood disturbance, three (or more) of the following 
symptoms have persisted (four if the mood is only irritable) and have been 
present to a significant degree:  
1) Inflated self-esteem or grandiosity 
2) Decreased need for sleep (e.g., feels rested after only 3 hours of sleep) 
3) More talkative than usual or pressure to keep talking 
4) Flight of ideas or subjective experience that thoughts are racing 
5) Distractibility (i.e., attention too easily drawn to unimportant or irrelevant 
external stimuli) 
6) Increase in goal-directed activity (either socially, at work or school, or 
sexually) or psychomotor agitation  
7) Excessive involvement in pleasurable activities that have a high potential for 
painful consequences (e.g., engaging in unrestrained buying sprees, sexual 
indiscretions, or foolish business investments)  
C.   The symptoms do not meet criteria for a mixed episode.  
D.   The mood disturbance 
1) is sufficiently severe to cause marked impairment in occupational 
functioning, usual social activities, or relationships with others, 
2) necessitates hospitalization to prevent harm to self or others, or  
3) has psychotic features.  
E.   The symptoms are not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (e.g., 
a drug of abuse, a medication, or other treatment) or a general medical condition 
(e.g., hyperthyroidism). 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Note. 
aManic-like episodes that are clearly caused by somatic antidepressant  
treatment (e.g., medication, ECT, light therapy) should not count toward a diagnosis  
of bipolar I disorder. From Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders:  
DSM-IV-TR (4th ed.) (p. 362), by American Psychiatric Association, 2000,  
Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association. Copyright 2000 American  
Psychiatric Association.  
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Table A2 
DSM-TR-IV Diagnostic Criteria for a Major Depressive Episode
a 
____________________________________________________________________ 
A.  Five (or more) of the following symptoms have been present nearly  
every day during the same 2-week period and represent a change from previous 
functioning; at least one of the symptoms is either 1) depressed mood or 2) loss 
of interest or pleasure: 
1) Depressed mood
b most of the day as indicated by either subjective report 
(e.g., feels sad or empty) or observation made by others (e.g., appears tearful)  
2) Markedly diminished interest or pleasure in all, or almost all, activities most 
of the day (as indicated by either subjective account or observation made by 
others) 
3) Significant weight loss when not dieting
c, weight gain (e.g., a change of more 
than 5% of body weight in a month), or a decrease or increase in appetite 
4) Insomnia or hypersomnia 
5) Psychomotor agitation or retardation (observable by others, not merely 
subjective feelings of restlessness or being slowed down) 
6) Fatigue or loss of energy 
7) Feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt (which may be 
delusional)
d  
8) Diminished ability to think or concentrate or indecisiveness (either by 
subjective account or as observed by others)  
9) Recurrent thoughts of death (not just fear of dying), recurrent suicidal 
ideation without a specific plan, or previous suicide attempt or a specific plan 
for committing suicide  
B.   The symptoms do not meet criteria for a mixed episode.  
C.   The symptoms cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, 
occupational, or other important areas of functioning.  
D.   The symptoms are not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (e.g., 
a drug of abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition (e.g., 
hypothyroidism).  
E.   The symptoms are not better accounted for by bereavement (i.e., after the loss of 
a loved one) and have persisted for longer than 2 months or are characterized by 
marked functional impairment, morbid preoccupation with worthlessness, 
suicidal ideation, psychotic symptoms, or psychomotor retardation.  
____________________________________________________________________ 
Note. 
aMood-incongruent delusions, hallucinations, and symptoms that are clearly 
due to a general medical condition should not count toward a diagnosis of major 
depressive disorder. 
bIn children and adolescents, mood can also be irritable. 
cIn 
children, can also include failure to make expected weight gains. 
dSymptoms extend 
beyond mere self-reproach or guilt about being sick. From Diagnostic and statistical  
manual of mental disorders: DSM-IV-TR (4th ed.) (p. 356), by American Psychiatric  
Association, 2000, Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association. Copyright  
2000 American Psychiatric Association.  
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Table A3 
DSM-IV-TR Diagnostic Criteria for a Hypomanic Episode
a  
____________________________________________________________________ 
A.   A distinct period of persistently elevated, expansive, or irritable mood,  
lasting at least 4 days, that is clearly different from the usual nondepressed 
mood.  
B.   During the period of mood disturbance, three (or more) of the following 
symptoms have persisted (four if the mood is only irritable) and have been 
present to a significant degree:  
1) Inflated self-esteem or grandiosity 
2) Decreased need for sleep (e.g., feels rested after only 3 hours of sleep) 
3) More talkative than usual or pressure to keep talking  
4) Flight of ideas or subjective experience that thoughts are racing  
5) Distractibility (i.e., attention too easily drawn to unimportant or irrelevant 
external stimuli) 
6) Increase in goal-directed activity (either socially, at work or school, or 
sexually) or psychomotor agitation  
7) Excessive involvement in pleasurable activities that have a high potential for 
painful consequences (e.g., engaging in unrestrained buying sprees, sexual 
indiscretions, or foolish business investments)  
C.   The episode is associated with an unequivocal change in functioning that is 
uncharacteristic of the person when not symptomatic.  
D.   The disturbance in mood and the change in functioning are observable by others.  
E.   The episode 
1) is not severe enough to cause marked impairment in social or occupational  
functioning, 
2) does not necessitate hospitalization, and 
3) does not have psychotic features.  
F.   The symptoms are not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (e.g., 
a drug of abuse, a medication, or other treatment) or a general medical condition 
(e.g., hyperthyroidism).  
____________________________________________________________________ 
Note. 
aHypomanic-like episodes that are clearly caused by somatic antidepressant  
treatment (e.g., medication, ECT, light therapy) should not count toward a diagnosis  
of bipolar II disorder. From Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders:  
DSM-IV-TR (4th ed.) (p. 368), by American Psychiatric Association, 2000,  
Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association. Copyright  
2000 American Psychiatric Association.  
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Table A4 
DSM-IV-TR Diagnostic Criteria for a Mixed Episode
a 
____________________________________________________________________ 
A.   The criteria are met both for a manic episode and for a major depressive episode 
(except for duration) nearly every day during at least a 1-week period.  
B.   The mood disturbance  
1) is sufficiently severe to cause marked impairment in occupational 
functioning, usual social activities, or relationships with others, 
2) necessitates hospitalization to prevent harm to self or others, or 
3) has psychotic features.  
C.   The symptoms are not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (e.g., 
a drug of abuse, a medication, or other treatment) or a general medical condition 
(e.g., hyperthyroidism). 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Note. 
aMixed-like episodes that are clearly caused by somatic antidepressant  
treatment (e.g., medication, ECT, Bipolar I light therapy) should not count toward a  
diagnosis of bipolar I disorder. From Diagnostic and statistical manual of  
mental disorders:DSM-IV-TR (4th ed.) (p. 368), by American Psychiatric  
Association, 2000, Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association. Copyright  
2000 American Psychiatric Association.  
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APPENDIX B 
 
Glossary of Transcription Symbols 
 
(.)      Micropause (pause less than 0.2 seconds). 
(0.5)     Pause in tenths of seconds. 
CAPITALS    Capitals denote louder speech. 
ºquieterº    Degree signs bracket quieter speech. 
ººwhisperºº   Double degree signs bracket whispered speech. 
underlines    Underlines denote emphatic delivery. 
das- dash    Dash – marks cut-off speech. 
Full stop.    A period marks final, falling intonation. 
Comma,    A comma marks slight fall-rise intonation. 
Question?    Question mark denotes „questioning‟ intonation. 
The [bracket  Brackets mark speech overlaps between interlocutors. 
    [marks  
(guess)    Text in single brackets is transcriber „guess‟. 
(     )    Single bracket with no text for unhearable word. 
((comment))   Text in double brackets is transcriber comment. 
Exclamation!  Exclamation marks denote dramatic emphasis. 
↑up arrow    Upwards arrow marks rising pitch. 
↓down arrow   Downwards arrow marks falling pitch. 
Latched=    Latches link speech across lines of transcript, 
=speech    and within single lines. 
>faster<    Carets pointing „inwards‟ mark faster delivery. 
<slower>    Carets pointing „outwards‟ mark slower delivery.      
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.pt      Lip smack sound. 
.tch      „tch tch‟ type sound. 
.h      Inbreath (each h denotes duration in tenths of seconds). 
h      Outbreath (each h denotes duration in tenths of seconds). 
.shih     Various „crying‟ aspirations. 
colon::::         Colons denote run-on of preceding sound (in tenths of seconds). 
Aster****         Asterisks denote „croaky‟ delivery of preceding sound (also  
used in same manner as colons for extension). 
Tilde~     Tilde used to denote „wavering‟ delivery. 
??:      In left margin for speech/sound unattributed to specific speaker. 
HAH heh HOH   Various forms of laughter. 
he he aHAHA 
tha(h)t’s    Bracketed h‟s denote laughter particles in words. 
fu(h)nn(h)y 
“quotation”   Quotation denotes reported speech which is markedly different   
            from speakers usual prosodic speech.  
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